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HUNGARIAN JEWRY: AN HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

by Randolph L. Braham

THE German occupation of Hungary on March 19, 1944 brought, along with the destruction of Hungarian independence and sovereignty, a virtual end to what had once been one of the most prosperous and flourishing Jewish communities in Eastern Europe. Indeed, notwithstanding the anti-Jewish measures of the interbellum period, Hungarian Jewry had enjoyed a steady social, cultural and political development and an increasing economic well-being ever since its emancipation in 1867. Yet, while the situation of the Jews in Hungary was in many respects different from the conditions under which the Jews lived in other parts of Nazi-occupied Europe, especially in the sense that they were physically able to survive up to the German occupation of the country, it was Hungarian Jewry which suffered the most concentrated destruction in 1944 through an utterly ruthless deportation and massacre program. The barbarity and the speed with which the "final solution of the Jewish question" was being implemented in Hungary evoked great consternation not only among the leading figures of the Grand Alliance but also among many notables inside Hungary itself. "There is no doubt," said the then Prime Minister Churchill in his July 11, 1944, memorandum to the Foreign Minister, "that this [persecution of Jews in Hungary and their expulsion from enemy territory] is probably the greatest and most horrible crime ever committed in the whole history of the world, and it has been done by scientific machinery by nominally civilized men in the name of a great state and one of the leading races of Europe."[1] The implementation of the deportation program of 1944 signalized the beginning of the end of the Jews' position in Hungary.

Historically speaking, the position of the Jews in Hungary since their emancipation can be divided roughly into the following distinct epochs:[2]

1. 1867-1919, the "liberal era"; 2. 1919-March 19, 1944, the "Horthy

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[1] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War.* Vol. 6. *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston, 1953), 693.

[2] Jews are known to have lived in Hungary as far back as Roman times. At Dunapentele, a Jewish community flourished during the reign of Alexander Severus (222-235 C. E.). For a detailed history of the Jews in Hungary, see Sámuel Kohn, *A zsidók története Magyarországon* (Budapest, 1884); Lajos Venetianer, *A magyar zsidóság története* (Budapest, 1922). 488 pp.

era"; 3. March 19, 1944-April 4, 1945, the "era of the German occupation and of the Arrow Cross terror"; 4. April 4, 1945-1948,[3] the "transitional period"; and 5. 1948-to date, the era of the "people's democracy."

1. The "liberal era" of Hungarian Jewry began with its emancipation on December 22, 1867 (Law No. XVII of 1867)[4] and came to an end with the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918. During this period the Hungarian Jewish communities prospered and enjoyed a number of privileges which their counterparts in the neighboring countries did not. They were given the right to the compulsory taxation of members and to the establishment and maintenance of religious, educational, health and welfare organizations. On May 16, 1896 (Law No. XIII of 1896) the Jewish faith was legally recognized by the state as having a status equal to that of the Catholic Church and of the Protestant Churches.

From a political, social and economic point of view, however, the "liberal era" represented in reality a pre-capitalist and, to a great extent also, a pre-democratic stage in Hungary's historical development. Hungary was still primarily an agricultural country with only a beginning of industrialization. While the trend was unmistakably toward further liberalization and the masses manifested a greater awareness of the political and social conditions prevailing in the country, a tightly knit caste composed primarily of large landowners exercised direct political power, and maintained its position of strength by virtue of the open ballot and control over all appointments to the administration. This landowning Magyar aristocracy steadfastly refused to engage in commerce, industry or other "middle class" occupations, preferring the pursuits of a bygone feudal era. While illiberal in its attitude toward the co-inhabiting minorities and anti-democratic toward the Magyar peasant and laboring masses, the Hungarian aristocracy displayed a consistently liberal attitude toward the Jews and encouraged them to engage in business and industry. This attitude of benevolent tolerance was, of course, also motivated by the desire to increase the percentage of the Magyars in the polyglot Hungarian Kingdom through the addition of the "Magyars of the Israelite faith," as the Jews were referred to in official statistics.[5] This friendly cooperation between the aristocracy and Jewry grew and became solidified when many noblemen were made silent partners in business enterprises through their enlistment as stockholders and board members by Jewish bankers and industrialists.

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[3] While the formal beginning of the people's democratic era in Hungary was signalized by the adoption of the Constitution on August 20, 1949, the Communists achieved full control as early as 1948.

[4] The law included, *inter alia,* the following provision: "The Israelite inhabitants of the country are declared to possess equal rights with the Christian inhabitants in the exercise of all civic and political functions. All laws, usages, and ordinances contravening this principle are hereby rescinded."

[5] In the Hungarian Kingdom of the pre-1918 period, the Magyars constituted only 53.1 per cent of the population. Even this slight majority, however, could be attained only with the aid of the "Magyars of the Israelite faith" who in 1910 accounted for 5 per cent of the population. See János Kovács, "Neo-Antisemitism in Hungary," *Jewish Social Studies* (New York), Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1946, p. 149f.

As a consequence of this policy of tolerance, Hungarian Jewry considered itself an integral part of the Hungarian nation, and the Magyars, in turn, accepted the Hungarian-speaking Jews as their equals. As such, the Jews not only had a full share in the development of Hungary's economy and government but also contributed generously to the enrichment of Hungarian culture and science.[6] Anti-Semitic manifestations and disturbances did, of course, occur even during this period but they were local and sporadic in character rather than concerted or centrally organized.[7] They were completely devoid of the racial elements of the German brand of anti-Semitism and were primarily manifestations of a semi-feudalistic mentality culminating in the exclusion of Jews from "good society." They represented a feeling of "antipathy toward the ethnic group of alien origin and dissimilar religion engaged in pursuits unbecoming a gentleman."[8]

2. The Horthy era extended from the crushing of the short-lived Communist dictatorship of Béla Kun in 1919 to the German occupation of the country on March 19, 1944.[9] During this period the Jews lost many of the privileges they had enjoyed during the "liberal era." The type of anti-Semitism that existed in the Dual Monarchy gradually yielded to a calculated political drive against the Jews. Admiral Horthy, supported by reactionary and anti-Semitic elements, began his reign by unleashing a "white terror" that took its greatest toll from among the Jews. Though an overwhelming majority of Hungarian Jewry had opposed the Bolshevik adventure of Kun and of his clique, popular opinion—not unlike that during the post-World War II era—tended to attach the odium of the abortive Communist dictatorship to the Jews as a whole.[10] Many Jews fell victim to the pogroms that were rampant during the first two years of Horthy's régime. In addition, a series of administrative measures were enacted resulting in the elimination of a great number of Jewish civil servants from the Government, the judiciary and the school system. Preceding the anti-Jewish legislative program of the Nazi era, the Horthy régime, in violation of the

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[6] It was during this period that Hungarian Jewish writers like Ferenc Molnár, József Kiss, Jenö Heltai, Frigyes Karinthy, Ernö Szép and others became famous. In 1894 the Orientalist Ignác Goldziher was the first Jew to be appointed professor at the University of Budapest. Furthermore, this era saw Ferenc Heltai, a nephew of Theodor Herzl, become Mayor of Budapest (1913), and Márton Zöld distinguish himself as a general during World War I. In addition, many Jews played distinguished rôles in both houses of the Hungarian Parliament.

[7] It was also during this period, for example, that the notorious Tisza Eszlár ritual murder case (1882) was tried. Even though the defendants were acquitted, thanks, *inter alia,* to the courageous defense by the noted patriot attorney, Karoly Oetvös, the incident contributed greatly to anti-Semitic agitation. As if to counterbalance this ugly incident in the history of Hungarian Jews, this period also witnessed the expulsion of Victor von Istoczy from the Liberal Party (1875) for anti-Jewish utterances.

[8] János Kovács, *op. cit.,* p. 148, as quoted from Zoltán Szabó's *Cifra nyomoruság* (Budapest, 1938), p. 210.

[9] Though Horthy continued in his functions as regent until his unsuccessful attempt on October 15, 1944, to extricate Hungary from the war against the Allies, his power was greatly reduced if not totally nominal.

[10] The purely propagandistic nature and anti-Semitic character of this identification of Jews with the Communists can also be derived from the fact that big business and high finance in Hungary were almost exclusively in Jewish hands.

principles of equality embodied in the Treaty of Trianon of June 4, 1920, enacted in September 1920 a *numerus clausus* law (Law No. XXV of 1920) which provided that admissions to the universities be based proportionately on the national composition of the country. The anti-Jewish trend of the post-World War I period was further enhanced, on the one hand, by the disappearance of the need for the Jews to complement the numerical strength of the indigenous Magyar element, and, on the other, by the adoption of the bourgeois competitive brand of anti-Semitism by the impoverished and slowly disintegrating gentry. Furthermore, the Jews remained the only scapegoats after the other co-inhabiting minorities were reincorporated in their new homelands. Yet, while many of the Jews were barred from continuing their higher learning or fired from the civil service, the situation of the Jews as a whole was quite tolerable, especially during István Bethlen's premiership between 1921 and 1931.

With the advent of Nazism in Germany, and especially after the annexation of Austria (March 1938) the irredentist and revisionist elements came to the fore in Hungary. These were composed primarily of the rightist groups headed by Gyula Gömbös and of the Germanophile officer corps. As the Nazi influence became more pronounced through the ascendancy of the Arrow Cross Party (*Nyilas Keresztes Párt*), Horthy embarked on a policy of appeasement that involved, *inter alia,* the passing of a series of anti-Jewish laws.[11]

The first anti-Jewish Law, euphemistically called "Concerning the More Effective Safeguarding of a Balanced Social and Economic System" (Act No. XV of 1938), was promulgated on May 29, 1938. It affected about 15,000 Jews[12] by providing for the establishment of two "professional chambers"[13]—one for the press and one for the theater. The ratio of Jews in those chambers and "the other types of white collar employment" was limited to 20 per cent.

The second anti-Jewish Law, "Concerning the Restriction of the Participation of the Jews in Public and Economic Life" (Act No. IV of 1939), extended the definition of "Jew" far beyond the confessional status and introduced the religion of the grandparents as the criterion of Jewish "race."

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[11] The question of whether or not the anti-Jewish measures which were enacted in Hungary during 1938-1944 were implemented under German pressure (*Veranlassung*) has assumed not only an academic and historical importance but also an economic and legal one. Thousands of applications filed with German authorities by Hungarian Jewish survivors for restitution for damages and suffering incurred during the Nazi era are being held up pending the clarification of this question. See the following expert opinions (*Gutachten*) written on this question: *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte* (Munich, 1958), pp. 183-220; *Praktische Fragen des Entschädigungsrechts. Judenverfolgung im Ausland* (Hamburg, 1958) (Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und ausländisches öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg, No. 33); Max Münz, *Die Verantwortlichkeit für die Judenverfolgungen im Ausland während der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft* (Frankfurt am Main, 1958), 251 pp.

[12] Eugene Lévai, *Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry* (Zurich, 1948), p. 12 (cited hereafter as Lévai, *Black Book . . .*)

[13] The "professional chambers" for lawyers, engineers and physicians were already in existence at the time.

[14] The two rabbis who held their seats *ex officio* were expelled only a year later.

By virtue of its provision the Jews were, *inter alia*, excluded from the civil service, their membership in the "professional chambers" was reduced to six per cent, the expropriation of Jewish-owned farms was authorized and they were excluded from the upper house of Parliament.[14] The law "Concerning the Protection of the Race" or the third anti-Jewish Law (Act No. XV of 1941) closely approximated the Nuremberg Law of 1935. Its provision prohibited marriage and extramarital relations between Jews and non-Jews. This was followed by others, depriving the religious communities of their "accepted" legal status (Act No. VIII of 1942), excluding the Jews from the para-military *Levente* youth organization and from the armed services (Act No. XIV of 1942) and stipulating the expropriation of all Jewish-owned farms and forest land (Act No. XV of 1942).

An attempt to stem the tide of Nazism was made in March 1942 when Horthy dismissed the Germanophile László Bárdossy, who had unconstitutionally involved the country in the war against the Soviet Union, and appointed Miklós Kállay as the new Prime Minister. Kállay succeeded in resisting the insistent German demands for more extensive economic and military aid to the anti-Soviet war effort and, to Hitler's great dismay, extended the Hungarian asylum rights to thousands of Jewish and non-Jewish refugees and to French and Polish prisoners of war. But remarkable as these achievements were, perhaps the most extraordinary accomplishment of the Kállay régime was the protection afforded to close to one million Jews living in Hungary—the last intact, though economically suppressed, Jewish island in Nazi-dominated Europe. While grave atrocities had been committed by Hungarian Army units against the Serbian and Jewish population of the Bačka (Bácska),[15] and while some 18,000-20,000 Jewish refugees were forcibly "repatriated" to Galicia, where most of them were subsequently slaughtered by the German SS at Kamenets Podolsk (1941),[16] within the territory of Hungary proper Jews dwelt in comparative personal and physical security. There were no restrictions on their liberty of movement, travel or recreation and they were treated fairly in the distribution of food supplies. Notwithstanding the restrictions of the various anti-Jewish laws, the economic position of the Jews of Hungary was relatively quite tolerable. About half of the breadwinners were allowed to continue their original occupations and others found it possible to shift to other occupations which were not affected by the provisions of the laws in force. Furthermore, since, with the exception of land, no Jewish property rights were violated up to the German occupation, the Jewish communities were able to organize large-scale self-aid programs for the benefit of the unemployed and needy Jews.[17] The lenient attitude of the Hungarian Government toward the Jews did not lack popular support. Indeed, the main current of Hungarian public opinion was anti-Nazi and supported the Government's decision not to emulate Germany in her "solution" of the Jewish question. The 1943 program of the Smallholders' Party, for example, included a demand for the abolition of the anti-Jewish laws. A resolution to this effect was introduced in the Hungarian Parliament in December 1943 by Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, a deputy of the Smallholders' Party who was subsequently executed by the Arrow Cross for his anti-Nazi activities. A demand for the "abolition of all legislation discriminating against any Hungarian citizen" was made in September 1943 by Ferenc Nagy, the Chairman of the Peasant League and future Prime Minister.[18] These and other manifestations of sympathy and solidarity with the Jews were all the more remarkable as, by the end of 1943, the Nazi program regarding the "final solution" in German-occupied Europe was almost completed. In fact, one of the official pretexts for the German occupation of Hungary was "the unrestricted presence of some one million Jews as a concrete menace to the safety of German arms in the Balkan Peninsula."[19] Kállay's overcautiousness, his vacillating policy and inauspicious "secret" negotiations with the British coupled with the Russians' advance toward the Carpathians led, *inter alia,* to the German occupation in 1944. With it the last vestige of Hungary's independence was gone and the fate of Hungarian Jewry was sealed.[20]

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[15] In January 1942, a Hungarian detachment led by Lt. Gen. Feketehalmi-Czeydner, Commander of the Vth Army Corps, and by József Grassy and Márton Zöldi undertook a "raid against Serb partisans" who were allegedly infiltrating Hungarian territory. In this raid they killed in and around Újvidék (Novi Sad) 3,309 people of whom over 700 were Jews. While the chief perpetrators of these massacres were brought before a court-martial in 1943, they succeeded in escaping into Germany with the aid of Archduke Albert of Habsburg. They returned with the German occupation forces in March 1944 and participated actively in the program leading to the extermination of Hungarian Jewry. Following their capture soon after the end of the hostilities they were handed over to the Yugoslavs, who hanged them for their crimes in the Bačka. Lévai, *Black Book . . .*, p. 25f. For documents and greater details on the "Bačka affair" consult: *Demokratska Federativna Yugoslaviya. Saopshtenya. Br. 7-33. O zlochinima okupatora i nikhovikh pomagacha* (Belgrade, 1945), pp. 242-301; *Zločini fašističkih okupatora i njihovih pomagača protiv jevreja u Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade: Izdanje Saveza Jevrejskih Opština FNR Jugoslavije, 1952), 245 pp.

[16] In July 1941 the Hungarian authorities deported to Galicia about 18,000 to 20,000 Jews "who could not prove their Hungarian citizenship." Upon the refusal of the German military commander's demand that Hungary repatriate the Jews, agents of the Gestapo—mostly Ukrainian hirelings—killed off about 12,500 of them. *American Jewish Yearbook* (New York), Vol. 44, 1942, p. 264.

3. The darkest period in the history of the Jews in Hungary extends from March 19, 1944 to April 4, 1945,[21] when Hungary was cleared of German troops. During this period Hungarian Jewry was exposed to the most cruel extermination program of the war.

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[17] *Ibid.,* Vol. 46, 1944, p. 255.

[18] *Ibid.,* Vol. 46, 1944, p. 256.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 257.

[20] For former Prime Minister Kállay's own story see: Nicholas Kállay, *Hungarian Premier. A Personal Account of a Nation's Struggle in the Second World War* (New York, 1954), 518 pp. While somewhat biased in the use of the sources, by far the best and most carefully documented book in English on the background and consequences of the German occupation of Hungary is C. A. Macartney's *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945* (New York, 1957). This writer has prepared for publication in the Spring of 1960 a selected, annotated and indexed bibliography of references pertaining to this era in Hungarian Jewish history. A three-volume collection of original documents emanating from both German and Hungarian sources is being prepared for publication in the fall of 1960.

[21] While an armistice agreement was signed by the Provisional Government headed by General Béla Miklós on January 20, 1945, Hungary as a whole was not cleared of German and Arrow Cross troops until April 4, 1945.

The German occupation of Hungary occurred during Horthy's second visit to Schloss Klessheim, where he had been called by Hitler to discuss the terms on which Hungary would remain in the war.[22] While Horthy was under virtual arrest, German troops entered Hungary (March 19-20, 1944) and occupied all key positions. Along with the regular troops came a German Security Police force under Major General Otto Winkelmann, which was to "perform tasks of the SS and police concerning Hungary, and especially political duties in connection with the Jewish problem."[23] A *Sonderkommando,* composed of Adolf Eichmann (the bloodhound of Europe), Hermann Alois Krumey, Dieter Wisliceny and other high-ranking SS leaders,[24] also arrived and received able assistance both from the new German Minister Plenipotentiary, Edmund Veesenmayer, and the newly formed Hungarian cabinet headed by Döme Sztójay, the former Hungarian Ambassador to Berlin. The new cabinet included such notorious anti-Semites as Andor Jaross, László Endre and László Baky. Immediately after the occupation a score of Jewish notables were arrested and an avalanche of anti-Jewish decrees were issued.[25] Under German orders a new Jewish Council (*Zsidó Tanács*) was established under the leadership of Sámuel Stern, a highly esteemed member of Horthy's Privy Council.[26] By virtue of Cabinet Decree No. 1,240/1944 of March 31, 1944, the compulsory wearing of the

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[22] Horthy's first visit to Schloss Klessheim took place on April 17, 1943. At this meeting Ribbentrop declared that the Jews of Hungary had to be either "exterminated or placed in concentration camps." For the text of the Schloss Klessheim protocol see *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal,* XXXV (Nuremberg, 1949), 426-431.

[23] See text of Hitler's power of attorney for the Plenipotentiary of the Greater German Reich, Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer, in *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10,* XIII (Washington, D. C., 1952), 336-337.

[24] Of the members of the *Sonderkommando* and other German agencies in Hungary, only Wisliceny received a condign punishment. He was hanged in Bratislava primarily for his activities against the Jews of Slovakia. All the others—Veesenmayer, Krumey, Eichmann, Hunsche, Novak, Wrtok and others—are free, either having escaped capture or freed for "lack of evidence" or after having served a token period of time in jail.

[25] For the texts of the various anti-Jewish decrees issued during this period consult the following collections: János Bártoffy, Endre Kincsesy and Gábor Somogyi, edd., *A zsidókérdés jogszabályainak gyüjteményes gyakorlati kézikönyve* (Budapest, 1944), 324 pp.; *Két év hatályos jogszabályai. 1945-46. Függelék: 1943-44 évi hatályos törvények* (Budapest, 1947), 407 pp.

[26] The Jewish Council was the only organization permitted to exist after the occupation and was used primarily as a tool for the carrying-out of the anti-Jewish orders issued by the German and Hungarian authorities. In addition to Mr. Stern, the first Jewish Council included Dr. Ernö Boda, Dr. Ernö Petö and Dr. Károly Wilhelm representing the reform Jews of Pest, Dr. Sámuel Csobádi representing the reform Jews of Buda, Sámuel Káhán -Frankl and Fülöp Freudiger as the delegates of the Orthodox community and Dr. Nison Kahan representing the Zionists. It was reorganized on May 6, 1944, by virtue of Decree No. 176,744/1944, VII. b. B.M. issued by State Secretary Endre. The new Council included in addition to Mr. Stern, Drs. Petö and Wilhelm, Messrs. Káhán-Frankl and Freudiger such figures as Sándor Török, Dr. József Nagy, Chief Medical Officer of the Jewish Hospital, Dr. János Gábor, the legal representative of the Jewish Community of Budapest and Dr. Béla Berend, Chief Rabbi of Szigetvár. The latter's rôle in the Council was the subject of heated debates because of his close contacts with Zoltán Bosnyák, the noted Hungarian anti-Semite who headed the Hungarian Research Institute on the Jewish Question (*A Zsidókérdést Kutató Magyar Intézet*) that was founded shortly after the German occupation. Lévai, *Black Book . . . ,* pp. 82, 167.

Yellow Badge was introduced, and the Jews were shortly thereafter ordered into specially assigned ghettos. The evacuation of the Jews from their homes and their placement in the ghettos were carried out by the Hungarian gendarmerie under the command of Major László Ferenczy. The conditions that prevailed in the ghettos were deplorable. In many places the ghettos were situated in brick yards or even under the open sky. Immediately preceding the deportations, the Jews were concentrated in the larger centers such as Cluj (Kolozsvár, 22,000 Jews), Oradea Mare (Nagyvárad, 36,000), Mátészalka (17,000), Nyiregyháza (20,000), Mukachevo (Munkács, 26,000), etc.[27]

The deportations that began early in May 1944 had tremendous international repercussions. Protests against the deportations came in, among others, from the late Pope Pius XII, the Papal Nuncio, Mgr. Angelo Rotta, King Gustav V of Sweden, the then Secretary of State Cordell Hull, President Roosevelt, and the President of the International Red Cross, Professor Karl Burckhardt.[28] The Hungarian clergy and especially Cardinal Prince Serédi,[29] Bishop László Ravasz and Bishop Vilmos Apor played a determining rôle in convincing Horthy of the necessity for stopping the deportations.[30] When they were finally stopped, however, during the first half of July 1944, the deportation program was more than half completed. While the Budapest Jewish community escaped the deportations that took place in the provinces during May-July 1944, it had to move during June 15-21 into 2,681 specially assigned "star houses"—a fourteenth part of space for a fifth of the city's population.[31]

Attempts to rescue Hungarian Jewry by negotiations with the SS were made right after the occupation. On April 5, 1944, Dr. Rudolph (Rezsö) Kasztner, the then head of the Budapest Rescue Committee, and Joel Bránd[32] began formal negotiations with Dieter Wisliceny, one of the leading SS "recommended" by Rabbi Weismandl of Bratislava. Though these negotiations were on the whole useless, or perhaps even harmful, 1,709 Jews were saved by being transferred via Bergen Belsen to Switzerland.[33] Of these, 388 came from Kasztner's home town of Cluj.[34]

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[27] Lévai, *Black Book . . .*, p. 192f.

[28] For a detailed and well-documented account of the international interventions in behalf of the persecuted Jews of Hungary, consult Jenö Lévai, *Fehér könyv, Külföldi akciók zsidók megmentésére* (Budapest, 1946), 174 pp.

[29] Speaking at a religious gathering in Budapest in December 1942, Cardinal Serédi declared that "no master race exists in the world . . . Murder is murder."

[30] For the story of the attempts made to rescue Hungarian Jewry by Hungarian political, religious and intellectual figures see Jenö Lévai *Szürke könyv magyar zsidók megmentéséröl* (Budapest, 1946), 238 pp. For material on the wartime activities of the various churches in Hungary, with special emphasis on their attitudes toward the Germans and the persecution of the Jews consult: Albert Bereczky, *Hungarian Protestantism and the Persecution of the Jews* (Budapest, 1946), 47 pp.; Antal Meszlényi, ed., *A magyar katolikus egyház és az emberi jogok védelme* (Budapest, 1947), 178 pp.; D. V. Szantó, *A magyarországi unitárius egyház magatartása a II. világháboru alatt* (Budapest, 1946), 32 pp.

[31] Lévai, *Black Book . . .*, p. 182.

[32] Joel Brand was a member of the Zionist-led Budapest Rescue Committee. In July 1914 he was sent to Turkey with the approval of the SS and entrusted with the mission to negotiate with the Anglo-Americans the exchange of a number of Hungarian Jews for trucks, medicaments and other material needed by the German armed forces. Accompanied by an alleged Gestapo agent, B. Gross, Brand fell into British hands and the whole mission proved fruitless. For Brand's account see Alex Weissberg, *Die Geschichte von Joel Brand* (Köln-Berlin, 1956) 319 pp. Also available in French, Hebrew and English translation.

The situation of Hungarian Jewry improved considerably when, on August 29, 1944, Horthy appointed General Lakatos to replace Sztójay as Premier. Following the departure for Moscow (September 22) of an armistice mission headed by General Faragó, Horthy announced his decision to withdraw Hungary from the war against the Allies (October 15th). But his attempt was frustrated by a German *coup d'état* that installed the leader of the Arrow Cross Party, Ferenc Szálasi, as the new chief of state. Horthy himself was detained and forced to recognize the new "chief of state" when he was told that his son Nicholas was kidnapped and held as hostage by the Germans. While unrecognized abroad and despised by the Germans themselves, the *Nyilas,* as the Hungarian Nazis were called, engaged in a campaign of terror that claimed many victims from among the close to 150,000 Jews still living in the capital.[35]

Under the short-lived Lakatos Government the Swiss, Swedish, Spanish, Portuguese and other consulates were allowed to register and place under their protection Jews "intending to emigrate to Palestine." The Red Cross, furthermore, was granted extraterritoriality by Horthy and took over the buildings in which those Jews were concentrated. The number of people with real or forged consular certificates and enjoying the additional protection of the Red Cross rose to about 33,000.[36] One of the war's most heroic efforts toward the rescuing of Jews was conducted in Budapest by the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who, following the fall of the capital, was arrested by Soviet agents and taken to a camp in the Soviet Union where he "died."[37] The *Nyilas* terror gained impetus with the Russian advance toward the capital. The new Minister of the Interior, Gábor Vajna,

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[33] Lévai, *Black Book . . .*, p. 271.

[34] Kasztner's controversial wartime activities became the object of a heated political and legal debate in Israel where he had settled in 1946. Found guilty of collaboration with the Nazis by a lower court, he was cleared by the Israeli Supreme Court in 1958. He was assassinated in Tel Aviv in 1957. For Kasztner's report on his wartime activities, see *Der Bericht des jüdischen Rettungskomitees aus Budapest, 1942-1945.* [Basel]: Vaadat Ezra vö-Hazalah bö-Budapest, 1946, XIII, 191 pp. (Mimeographed).

[35] *Hungarian Jewry Before and After the Persecution,* (Budapest: Hungarian Section of the World Jewish Congress, 1949), pp. 2, 4.

[36] Gerald Reitlinger, *The Final Solution,* (New York, 1953), p. 442.

[37] Raoul Wallenberg was a native of Stockholm who came to Budapest in July 1944 in response to an urgent plea by various Jewish organizations. In Budapest the Swedish Minister made him an Envoy Extraordinary with the rank of Secretary to the Swedish Legation. In this capacity he saved thousands of Jews from persecution and deportation by issuing them so-called safety passes. Following the occupation of Budapest by the Russians, Wallenberg was abducted and deported to a Soviet camp where, according to a Soviet report of 1957, he died. For more details on his activities consult: Jenö Lévai, *Raoul Wallenberg regényes élete, hösi küzdelmei, rejtélyes eltünésének titka* (Budapest, 1948), 311 pp., also available in a Swedish translation. See also: Josef Wulf, *Raoul Wallenberg* (Berlin, 1958), 96 pp.; Valdemar Langlet, *Verk och dagar i Budapest,* (Stockholm, 1946), 221 pp. Mr. Langlet was also associated with the wartime rescue activities of the Swedish Red Cross in Budapest.

"had sworn to carry out the deportations without exemption or foreign protection." When, on November 2, 1944, the Soviet troops were in the suburbs of Budapest, the remaining Jewish Labor Battalions, comprising about 15,000, were withdrawn west of the Danube and, on November 8th, about 25,000 Budapest Jews, regardless of age or sex, were marched 120 miles to the ill-famed camp at Strasshof.[38] Thousands of these died along the way and only a small proportion of them returned to Hungary after the war. During the Russian siege (December 28, 1944-January 17, 1945) many Jews went "underground." During November-December about 63,000 Jews who possessed no "protection certificates" were forced to move into an enclosed ghetto consisting of about 162 apartment houses.[39] In addition to the many thousands of Jews that fell victim to the *Nyilas* terror, it was during this same period that Otto Komoly and János Gábor, members of the Jewish Council, Hannah Szenes, the noted Palestinian parachutist of Hungarian-Jewish origin, and Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, the liberal Hungarian patriot, were executed.

In statistical terms[40] the losses of Hungarian Jewry can be summarized as follows: In 1920 Hungary had a Jewish population of 473,340, representing about 5.9 per cent of the country's total. Both the Jewish and the non-Jewish population of Hungary greatly increased during 1938-41 as a result of the territorial acquisitions from the member countries of the Little Entente. In November 1938 Hungary obtained the Felvidék area and in March 1939 the Kárpátalja (Sub-Carpathia) region from Czechoslovakia, with a total population of 1,000,000 and 592,000 and a Jewish population of 78,000 and 72,000 respectively. By virtue of the Vienna Arbitration Award of August 1940, Hungary acquired from Rumania the territory of Northern Transylvania with a population of 2,394,141, of which 148,294 (6.2 per cent) were Jews. Finally, in 1941, Hungary acquired the Délvidék region with a Jewish population of about 20-25,000 from Yugoslavia. According to the census of 1941 the enlarged territory of Hungary had a Jewish population of 825,007, including about 100,000 Christians of Jewish origin who were considered Jews by the racial legislation of 1941. The figures computed by the Statistical Department of the Hungarian Section of the World Jewish Congress place the losses of Hungarian Jewry at 569,507.

Of these, 63,000 fell victim to the persecutions that took place prior to the German occupation of March 19, 1944. About 42,000 of these victims were members of the various Hungarian Labor Battalions set up in accordance with Paragraph 230 of Law No. II of 1939;[41] about 20,000 others, mostly from the formerly Czechoslovak territories and Galicia, were slaughtered by the SS at Kamenets Podolsk following their expulsion from Hungary in the summer of 1941, and about 700-1,000 were killed during the Újvidék (Novi Sad) massacres of January 1942. While approximately 5,000 Jews were able to flee the country in time, 618,007 were deported or killed during the German occupation; 116,500 of these were eventually liberated in various camps and returned to Hungary. Together with the 139,000 Jews left in the country (of which 124,000 were in Budapest) this gives a total of 255,500 survivors (of these, 65,500 were from the territories ceded by Hungary after the January 1945 armistice).

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[38] Lévai, *Black Book . . .*, p. 381.

[39] Lévai, *Black Book . . .*, p. 375.

[40] The statistical data in this and the next paragraph were taken from *Hungarian Jewry Before and After the Persecution* (Budapest: Hungarian Section of the World Jewish Congress, 1948), 24 pp. (mimeographed), and from *Zsidó Világkongresszus (Magyarországi Képviselete) Statisztikai Osztályának Közleményei* (Budapest), Nos. 1-14, 1947-1949.

[41] For more details on the organization and fate of the Hungarian Jewish Labor Battalions see Lévai, *Black Book . . .*, pp. 425-430; Vilmos Nagy, *Végzetes eszetendök* (Budapest, 1946), 272 pp.

The bulk of the deportations took place in May-July 1944, when 434,351 Jews were taken to Auschwitz (Oświęcim) in 147 sealed freight trains. Of these, 380,667 were from Gendarmerie Districts No. II, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX and X, and 17,667 from Gendarmerie District No. III; 11,889 were from Gendarmerie District No. IV and 24,128 from Gendarmerie District No. I.[42]

According to the "Appeal of the Jewish Union's Executive Committee to Regent Horthy" of June 23, 1944, submitted over the signature of Samu Stern, Chairman of the Jewish Council (*Zsidó Tanács*), 427,400 Jews had been deported by June 20, 1944. The appeal included the number of Jews deported by then from the following assembly centers:[43]

SUB-CARPATHIA	
Munkacévo (Munkács)	26,000
Ungvár	14,000
Beregszász	10,000
Máramarossziget	12,000
Nagyszöllös	8,000
Huszt	10,000
Felsövisó	8,000
Szenklence	5,000
Iza	3,000
Bárdfalva	3,000
Técsö	10,000
Balassagyarmat	4,000
Salgotarján	4,000
Léva	4,000
Komárom	8,000
Érsekújvár	7,000
Dunaszerdahely	8,000
TRANS DANUBIAN REGION	
Györ	5.200
Székesfehérvár	4,000
Baja	8,200
Nagykanizsa	9,000
Barcs	2,500
Szabadka	3,500
Szeged	4,000
TISZA REGION	
Nyiregyháza	20,000
Kisvárda	12,000
Mátészalka	17,000
Szatmárnémeti	24,000
NORTHERN DISTRICT	
Kassa	12,000
Sátoraljaujhely	15,000
Miskolc	21,000
Eger	9,000
Hatvan	12,000
TRANSYLVANIA	
Kolozsvár	22,000
Beszterce	8,000
Dés	10,000
Nagyvárad	36,000
Marosvársárhely	6,000
Szászrégen	8,000
Szilágysomlyó	7,000
CONCENTRATION CAMPS	
Bács-Tapolya	5,000
Sárvár	1,000
Kistarcsa	2,000
Total	427,400

While the bulk of the Hungarian Jews were deported to Auschwitz, many of the ones "selected for labor" were eventually transferred to other camps in Nazi Germany and elsewhere. According to the Hungarian Section of the World Jewish Congress, Hungarian Jewish deportees were in 386 different camps.[44]

The docility of the Hungarian Jews in face of the great catastrophe and the lack of resistance during the deportations have baffled many individuals. The reasons why they "allowed themselves to be slaughtered" have been debated by many students of the holocaust. The multiplicity of assumptions notwithstanding, it is generally agreed that while the Hungarian Jews lived in the immediate vicinity of such extermination camps as Auschwitz and Treblinka, the masses had no idea of the gas chambers and of the mass murders committed there; those among the leaders who probably did hear about them feared perhaps that alarming the Jews would only aggravate the situation and jeopardize the chances of the expected "imminent" liberation; others discounted the information as rumor or, at best, as anti-Nazi propaganda. It was also unfortunate that when the Germans occupied Hungary in 1944, Hungarian Jewry found itself guided by a conservative, "legitimistic" leadership, which, though effective under relatively normal conditions, could not offer the kind of guidance that the period of extraordinary emergency demanded.[45] Hungarian Jewry, furthermore, deluded itself by the hope that, owing to the military situation prevailing at the time, transportation difficulties alone would make the effectuation of the deportation program all but impossible. But even if the necessary freight cars were mustered, they argued, the rapid westward push of the victorious Red Army would frustrate such sinister plans. Then, a large segment of the Jewish population, and especially the assimilationist group, still hoped that even a lackey Hungarian Government, while agreeing to measures against "alien" Jews, would refrain from taking drastic measures against the Hungarian Jews proper. When the deportations did begin, however, during the middle of May 1944, the Hungarian Jews, and especially those in the provinces, were much too weak, physically emaciated and spiritually broken to offer any resistance. They had by then been living for weeks under the most deplorable circumstances in specially assigned, exposed ghettos. As had been the case with the Jews in most other countries where the "final solution" was implemented, the Hungarian Jews, too, were bluffed by the German "explanations and promises" that the deportations involved only the supplying of Germany with much-needed labor and that the families were included only out of "consideration for the close family life pattern of the Jews."

A great share of the responsibility for the extermination of the Jews

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[42] Lévai, *Black Book . . .*, pp. 147, 154, 244, 251; *Hungarian Jewry Before and After the Persecution*, p. 3.

[43] Lévai, *Black Book . . .*, p. 192f.

[44] For a list of these camps see Endre Sós, *Európai fasizmus és antiszemitizmus* (Budapest, 1948), p. 98ff.

[45] For an eloquent presentation of this thesis see: Ernö Munkácsi, *Hogyan törnént? Adatok és okmányok a magyar zsidóság tragediájához* (Budapest, 1947), 252 pp.

must be borne by the Hungarians themselves. Lévai, the noted Hungarian Jewish journalist and the foremost expert on this catastrophe period, had the following to say in this respect:

> Owing to their insignificant numbers, the Nazis were practically unable even to supervise the deportations, let alone to carry them out. The marking of the Jews with the Star of David, their "round-up" into ghettos and concentration camps, were made possible only by the fact that the gendarmerie—although well-acquainted with the situation and numbering some 20,000 men—could everywhere be sure of the aid of the local police. Even then the procedure could not have been carried through if the Christian population had shown resistance. Thus it must be assumed that—quite apart from the part played by the Regent and the Sztójay Government—the chief causes for the complete sell-out of the Jews were the anti-Semitic propaganda, with which the Hungarian population had been inundated for scores of years, the stirring up of their hatred and, last but not least, the rousing of the rabble's rapacious instincts.[46]

4. Following the liberation, the remnant of Hungarian Jewry embarked on a heroic task of reconstruction. During the early postwar period (1945-1948) there was a general belief that a new era of democracy and liberalism would begin and flourish.[47] Religious, cultural and educational institutions were reactivated, and new efforts were exerted towards economic rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the conditions prevailing in postwar Hungary. The herculean task of repatriating and saving what was left of the Hungarian Jews, composed to a great extent of aged and physically emaciated persons, invalids, and orphaned children, would not have been possible without the aid of the American Joint Distribution Committee. Until its expulsion from Hungary in January 1953, the JDC distributed millions of dollars among the needy Jews of Hungary and shipped into the country close to 35 million pounds of relief supplies. At the peak of its activities in Hungary (1946-47) the JDC assisted 120,000 destitute Jews.[48]

Soon after the liberation, about 266 of the former 472 Jewish congregations resumed their activities.[49] Of these, however, 159 went out of existence by 1949 because of loss of membership. The property of the depopulated religious communities was left at the disposal of, and taken over by, the Central Board of Hungarian Jews (*Magyarországi Izraeliták Orzágos*

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[46] Lévai, *Black Book . . .*, p. 139.

[47] In the first and last free election in postwar Hungary (December 1945), the Smallholders' Party (*Kisgazda Párt*) obtained 56.5% of the votes and the Social Democrats and Communists received 18% and 17% respectively. The first postwar government headed by Zoltán Tildy consisted of 7 Smallholders, 4 Social Democrats and 3 Communists.

[48] Until his resignation early in 1948, the postwar JDC program in Hungary was administered by the noted Hungarian Jewish leader, Dr. Frederic Görög. He was succeeded by Mr. Israel Jacobson, an American who was expelled from the country at the beginning of 1950. The administration of the program was then assumed by Dr. Lajos Stoekler who was arrested in January 1953. In addition to financial and material help, the JDC also assisted in the emigration of 4,086 Jews during the 1945-53 period alone. Moses A. Leavitt, *The JDC Story, 1914-1952* (New York, 1953), p. 16f.; *JDC Statistical Abstract 1953* (New York, 1953), pp. 9, 12f.

[49] *European Jewry Ten Years After the War* (New York, 1956), p. 63.

Iródája), and that of the Orthodoxy by the Autonomous Central Board of Orthodox Communities in Hungary (*Magyarországi Autonom Orthodox Központi Iróda*) in accordance with the provisions of Cabinet Decree No. 10,400/1946. M.E. The Jewish Theological Seminary of Budapest was reopened, and helped the congregations to replace many of their martyred rabbis. Also in Budapest, the National Jewish Museum was re-established and a Jewish Free University and a Music School were founded. 23 of the former 147 elementary schools, 3 civic schools and 5 high schools were reopened.[50] Economically the surviving remnant of Hungarian Jewry was in a desperate situation.[51] While the Hungarian Government enacted a number of decrees and laws relating to the restitution of confiscated Jewish property, these were far from satisfactory from the Jewish point of view. In spite of their shortcomings, however, they provided a measure of relief for the Jews. While the Hungarian Governments of the immediate postwar era were earnestly concerned with the eradication of the evil of anti-Semitism and provided a measure of satisfaction by meting out condign punishment to war criminals,[52] the danger of anti-Semitism continued to plague the Jewish community. In fact, serious anti-Jewish disturbances continued intermittently, even though anti-Semitic agitation was made a criminal offense (Act No. VIII of 1946).

The responsibility for the postwar pattern of anti-Semitism in Hungary must to a considerable extent be borne directly by some of the allegedly "progressive" agrarian leaders of the National Peasant Party, one of the four political groups represented in the early postwar Government. The irresponsible exploitation of the anti-Semitic sentiments of the masses for narrow political partisan purposes by men like József Darvas and Péter Veres, coupled with the camouflaged allegations of noted church leaders[53] led to a series of anti-Jewish disturbances that greatly affected the destinies of Hungarian Jewry. Thus as early as December 1945, for example, the owners of a factory in Kispest passed a resolution demanding the immediate dismissal of all Jewish employees.[54] In February 1946 the miners of Ozd and Sajószentpéter and the workers of Tótkomlós and Szegvár informed the Jews that if they wanted to live they had better leave the locality within twenty-four hours.[55] Encouraged by the Communist-controlled police to blame their woes on "Jewish blackmarketeers," the population of many a Hungarian community found an outlet in anti-Semitic excesses. But by far the most serious and full-scale pogroms were those that took place at Kunmadaras during the latter part of May 1946, and at Diósgyör, near Miskolc, on July 30, 1946. In both of these Communist-condoned pogroms Jews were killed and property was destroyed. Thanks to Communist support, the culprits were either freed or received only nominal sentences. The late Chief Rabbi Hevesi summarized the outrage of the Jews of Hungary in the following words:

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[50] *European Jewry Ten Years After the War,* p. 63f.

[51] The financial losses of Hungarian Jewry were estimated in a joint memorandum of various Jewish organizations and institutions at no less than one billion dollars. *Ibid.* Hungary's international obligations relating to the restitution of confiscated Jewish property were implied in the Armistice Agreement of January 20, 1945, and specifically stipulated in Article 27 of the Peace Treaty of Paris (1947). For the text of both documents and commentaries thereon see *A párisi magyar békeszerzödés és magyarázata* (Budapest, 1947), 82 pp.

[52] Within two years after the termination of the war, 136 criminals were executed and 15,178 penalties of varying degrees of severity were imposed on lesser offenders. *Ibid.,* p. 65.

[53] See János Kovács, *op. cit.,* p. 159f.

[54] *Ibid.,* as quoted from *Képes Figyelö,* Budapest, December 22, 1945.

[55] Eugene Duschinsky, "Hungary" in *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites* (Syracuse, N. Y., 1953), p. 419, as quoted from *Uj Élet,* Budapest, March 14, 1946.

> A wave of indignation and consternation is spreading over Hungarian Jewry. In several provincial localities organized masses, nay gangs, attack our Jewish brethren, beat and mistreat them, pillage their homes, rob their stores, wreck their furniture and equipment. . . . Was it not enough that over 600,000 innocent brothers of ours were delivered to the German hooligans? How do these gangsters dare, whence do they get the courage to attack with organized brutality those who have suffered beyond endurance, and who returned to their homes to start life anew and to help rebuild the country with their honest labor?
>
> We demand an answer to this question from the Hungarian Government. The Government must know what is in the background. . . . The Government will perhaps be in the position to explain why these riots could not be prevented, and if they could not be prevented in time, why they could not be punished without delay.[56]

The anti-Semitic excesses continued even after the Communists acquired absolute power following the elimination of all opposition. As late as 1950 the president of the Jewish community of Tokay and his wife were beaten to death in their home. In 1952 pamphlets were distributed in Csepel plants alleging that the Government was controlled by Jews and that the State Security Police was a "playground for workless Jewish boys."[57]

The causes for the postwar wave of anti-Jewish manifestations were many and complex. The effect of years of Nazi racial propaganda by all media of communication, coupled with the dissatisfaction of many individuals compelled to return confiscated Jewish property,[58] was amplified by the fact that some of the leaders of the Communist Party and of the Government were of Jewish origin (Rákosi, Gerö, Révay, Vas, Péter and others).[59] Hungarian Jewry, not unlike that of the neighboring countries, became anxious to emigrate and resettle in other countries. According to a joint memorandum of the Hungarian Jewish organizations of March 1946, about

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[56] Eugene Duschinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

[57] Alfred Werner, "Hungarian Tragedy," *Congress Weekly* (New York), Vol. 20, No. 22, July 20, 1953, p. 24.

[58] József Darvas, for instance, in his election speech of August 26, 1945, declared that "a certain group" should not demand preferential treatment (i.e., the restitution of their property) on the ground of "racial prerogatives." Darvas was proclaiming a new *numerus nullus* law, as the noted Catholic publicist, György Parragi, so well remarked when he mentioned that the Hungarian working masses had the right to reparations and that "a certain group" had not. See János Kovács, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

[59] While most of the leading Communists of Jewish origin were either purged or otherwise eliminated in accordance with the pattern pursued in Eastern Europe since 1948, Hungary is, for all practical purposes, the only country where Jews still occupy a considerable number of high positions.

108,500 Jews were desirous to emigrate. Of these, 63,000 intended to leave for Palestine and 45,000 for elsewhere. Zionism, under these circumstances, gained tremendous popularity.[60]

5. With the seizure of power by the Communists (1948) and the concomitant adoption of a program of sovietization the *Gleichschaltung* of the Jewish and non-Jewish population was accelerated.

The pattern pursued by the Hungarian Communists was not unlike that followed by their counterparts in the other East European countries. The "salami tactics"[61] resulting in the splitting up and the gradual elimination of all opposition and the establishment of a monolithic totalitarian régime soon made their effects felt upon Hungarian Jewry as well.[62] With the exception of *Új Élet* (New Life), a Hungarian-language Jewish monthly until January 1, 1958 when it was changed to a fortnightly, all Jewish papers and periodicals were discontinued. All parochial schools were nationalized by virtue of an act passed in June 1948 (the rabbinical schools and Talmud Torahs were exempted) and the ORT schools were closed by the Government in 1949. After decades of fruitful literary and cultural activities, the IMIT (The Jewish Literary Society) and the OMIKE (Jewish Cultural Association) were disbanded in 1950. Following the separation of the Church and State (Constitution of August 20, 1949), the Jewish congregations were deprived of their right to levy taxes on their members. The Nationalization Law (Act XXV/ 1948) of May 11, 1948 and several subsequent decrees gravely affected the economic status of Hungarian Jewry, which was composed primarily of middle-class elements. The extent to which they were affected can be seen from the fact that of the 1,721 owners of retail stores nationalized by December 12, 1949, 1,504 were Jewish.[63] The need for economic integration and/or restratification became urgent and the MIZRAT, an organization for vocational training and the establishment of cooperatives, was set up (1949). The situation further deteriorated during the campaign against Zionism and cosmopolitanism that took place in the Soviet bloc during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Zionist leaders (Dr. Béla Dénes, Heinrich Galos and others) were arrested and imprisoned in 1949, as was the leader of the orthodox Jews, Abraham Kornitzer. Lajos Stoekler, President of the Budapest Jewish Community and of the Central Board of Hungarian Jews, and László Benedek, Director of the nationalized Jewish Hospital, were arrested in January and February 1953, respectively. Moreover, thousands of Jews were evicted during the deportation of "class enemies and unreliable elements" that took place during 1951-52.[64] With Stalin's death (March 1953) and the subsequent introduction of the "New Course" (July 1953) the lot of the Jews changed somewhat for the better. The bulk of the deportees were allowed to return to their homes, the remaining communities were invigorated and their religious and cultural life reactivated.

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[60] *European Jewry Ten Years After the War,* p. 67.

[61] In his speech to the Party Academy of February 29, 1952, Rákosi referred to the fact that he succeeded in obtaining the Party's aims by the adoption of "salami tactics," i.e. by "demanding a little more each day, like cutting up a salami, thin slice after thin slice." For the text of the speech see *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), Vol. VII, No. 2-3, February-March 1952, pp. 115-150.

[62] For the detailed story of Hungary's "Communization" see Stephen D. Kértesz, *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary Between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1953), 273 pp.; Ferenc Nagy, *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York, 1948). 471 pp.; Arthur H. F. Schoenfeld, "Soviet Imperialism in Hungary," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. XXVI, April 1948, pp. 554-66.

[63] Eugene Duschinsky, *op. cit.,* p. 466.

From the administrative-organizational point of view the three types of congregations that had functioned independently since 1868, i.e., the orthodox, the reform (neolog), and the *status quo* (middle-of-the-road) congregations were amalgamated in February 1950. The newly centralized congregations absorbed all the denominational institutions and organizations operating in the respective communities as, for example, the burial societies (*Chevra Kadisha*), the women's and youth organizations and the prayer groups. Hierarchically, the new organizational set-up of Hungarian Jewry can be differentiated as follows:[65]

1. The *lower branch*, composed of the various individual communities.
2. The *middle branch*, represented by the six communal districts (*községkerületek*) into which the congregations are administratively grouped, namely the *Budapest*, *Északdunántul* (North Transdanubia), *Déldunántul* (South Transdanubia), *Alföld* (Lowland), *Tiszántul* (Land Across the Tisza) and *Északmagyarország* (North Hungary) communal districts.
3. The *upper branch*, represented by: a. The National Representation of Hungarian Jews (*Magyar Izraeliták Országos Képviselete*), a "parliamentary" body of 230 members elected every four years; b. The National Executive Committee of Hungarian Jews (*Magyar Izraeliták Országos Intézöbizottsága*), the supreme denominational authority of Hungarian Jews, composed of 55 members; c. The Executive Committee (*Végrehajtó Bizottság*) comprising 22 members; d. The National Bureau, sometimes referred to as the Central Board, (*Országos Iroda*), the main secretariat; e. The Rabbinical Council of Hungarian Jews (*Magyar Izraeliták Rabbitanácsa*) and the Orthodox Rabbinical Council of Hungarian Jews (*Magyar Izraeliták Ortodox Rabbitanácsa*); f. The Central Jewish Tribunal (*Izraelita Központi Biróság*), the organ for denominational litigations.

The size and structure of Hungarian Jewry underwent a further change in the wake of the uprising of October-November 1956.[66] The membership of the various Jewish communities greatly decreased as an estimated 20,000 Jews fled the country at the time.[67] The cause of, and the dramatic changes brought about by the revolution in the structure and attitude of Hungarian Jewry were the subject of an unusually frank editorial in the *Új Élet* of

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[64] *American Jewish Yearbook* (New York), Vol. 54, 1953, p. 350ff.; Eugene Duschinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 472-482.

[65] *Új Élet naptár 1959* (Budapest, 1959), p. 128f.

[66] It is interesting to note that two of the leading writers in the Petöfi Literary Circle that kindled the fire of the revolution—Gyula Háy and Tibor Déry—are of Jewish origin. Both of them are now serving prison terms for their share in the revolution. The two journalists executed together with former Prime Minister Nagy and General Maleter—Miklós Gimes and József Szilágyi—were also of Jewish origin. *American Jewish Yearbook* (New York), Vol. 60, 1959, p. 224.

April 1957, the first issue to appear after five months' suspension. It portrayed the then prevailing situation as follows:

> We are much fewer in number than we were before October 1956. We have no precise data but we feel that many thousands of Jews have departed either without passports or legally with documents. A number of small congregations, whose rabbis, cantors, etc., departed, simply ceased to exist. But the membership of the larger congregations has also considerably decreased. In Budapest, too, we feel keenly the effects of dissidence [flight] or legal emigration. Children parted from parents . . . brothers and friends were torn asunder in the storm and amidst the thunderbolts of history. . . .
>
> What brought forth these reactions on the part of the Hungarian Jews? The reasons are manifold: the harassing memories of past experiences together with the new phenomena of anti-Semitism; the mass hysteria that swept members of all religious denominations; then the difficulties encountered by many a Jew in earning a living; finally the yearning for the Holy Land is still potent with many Jews. . . .
>
> Let us not conceal the fact that Rákosi's rigid economic measures ruined thousands upon thousands of Jewish small merchants and craftsmen. This we have to state clearly right now when the Government is issuing new licenses for artisans and seeking to correct the old mistakes. Many brethren because of these mistakes left the country in which they were unable to earn their daily bread. The difficulties of observing the Sabbath hindered many of the religious Jews in their efforts to become integrated in the country's economy.
>
> Although 'dissidence' has come to a stop, the movement to emigrate is still on. Many passport applications are being submitted to the authorities, who will decide on who may emigrate and who not.
>
> Despite the probability of a further decrease in our numbers, our primary task will be to preserve a normal religious life for the members of our faith . . . to take care of our orphans and aged, and of our schools, as well as to minister to our sick and procure the financial basis for our activities.
>
> The still valid agreements between the State and the religious denominations help us in our striving to maintain the continuity of our religious life. In order to continue our social work, we need the helping hand of Jewry abroad, of the Jews of the world. The President of the Swiss welfare organization visited with us a few weeks ago . . . we sought contact with the World Jewish Congress as it is our desire that this organization should function not only *de jure* but also *de facto.* We are connected with the Claims Conference in the question of indemnifications for damages inflicted upon us by Nazism. . . .
>
> Even though our number is smaller than it has been before and is bound to decrease still further, we shall do our utmost in order to preserve our moral and spiritual level.

During the revolt itself, anti-Jewish acts occurred in a number of provincial places. These, however, were primarily unplanned, sporadic acts of vandalism committed without the knowledge of the leadership of the

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[67] *Új Élet naptár 1959, op. cit.,* p. 144.

revolution, which seems to have been entirely innocent of anti-Semitic excesses. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that the anti-Soviet feeling of the Hungarians pushed anti-Semitism into the background.[68]

There are reports of anti-Jewish excesses having allegedly been committed by Communists who ascribed the revolt to the work of the triangle composed of Fascists, students and Jews.[69]

While, in contradistinction to the other East European people's democracies, Communists of Jewish origin continue to occupy a considerable number of high positions in Hungary,[70] the post-revolutionary atmosphere is highlighted by the statement of Minister of State György Marosán, that the "new Communist Party will not permit that its concept of Socialism be dictated by Jewish petty bourgeois."[71]

After the revolution the number of Jewish communities as well as the size of their membership declined sharply. In 1959 there were only 43 independent communities with synagogues of their own. Some of these also had their own rabbis or assistant rabbis. By far the largest of these was the Jewish Community of Budapest, with a membership of 72,000.[72] In the provinces as a whole there were only 12,000 Jews left.[73] Only three provincial communities had a membership of over 1,000, namely Debrecen (1,800), Miskolc (1,400) and Szeged (1,000). In addition to the 43 independent communities, there were only 35 minor, so-called affiliated congregations whose membership ranged from 100 to 200.[74]

The reduction in membership notwithstanding, the relative vitalization of Jewish life in post-revolutionary Hungary has been one of the encouraging signs in the current development of the remaining East European Jewish communities. The Hungarian community still maintains the Jewish Theological Seminary (*Országos Rabbiképző Intézet*),[75] a coeducational high school,[76] a number of *Talmud Torahs* (Hebrew Schools),[77] a library, a Jewish Museum[78] and a few social and welfare institutions.[79] The present leadership of the Hungarian Jewish Community headed by Dr. Endre Sós, a prolific leftist journalist,[80] seems to have embarked on a relatively positive program aimed at preserving Jewish communal life in the country. Cultural and artistic programs are conducted in Budapest and in the larger provincial communities under the guidance and sponsorship of the National Council on Religious Education and Culture (*Országos Vallásoktatási és Vallásmüvelödési Tanács*). Religious services seem to be held regularly in a number of synagogues in Budapest and in the provinces; in a few others, services are held only during the Sabbath and the main holidays. The *Új Élet,* the only Hungarian-Jewish paper, now appears fortnightly.[81] After years of virtual isolation, Hungarian Jewry has been drawn somewhat closer to the international Jewish community through the reestablishment of contact on August 25, 1957 between the Hungarian Jewish Community and the World Jewish Congress.[82] With the help of a grant-in-aid from the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, the Central Board of Hungarian Jews has undertaken a vast program for the documentation of the catastrophe that befell Hungarian Jewry during World War II.[83]

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[68] *The Position of the Jewish Communities in Eastern Europe on the Eve of 1958* (New York, 1957), p. 15, (mimeographed).

[69] *Ibid.*

[70] Among these are Vice Premier Antal Apró, War Minister Révész and the economic theoretician of the Party, István Kiss. József Révai, a former leader of the "Stalinist opposition," died in August 1959.

[71] *The Position of the Jewish Communities in Eastern Europe on the Eve of 1958, op. cit.*, p. 16.

[72] This figure includes the Jews of the formerly independent communities of Pest, Buda, Obuda, Ujpest, Köbánya, Kispest, Pesterzsébet, Sashalom and Rákosszentmihály which were amalgamated into the Jewish Community of Budapest by virtue of the Unification Act of 1950. *Új Élet naptár 1959,* pp. 129, 140.

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] *Ibid.*

[75] Founded in 1877, the Jewish Theological Seminary is the only school of its type today in the entire Central East European area. Led by Alexander (Sándor) Scheiber, the noted Hungarian Jewish scholar, the Seminary is active not only in the preparation of the cantors, Jewish school teachers, and synagogue attendants required for the satisfaction of the spiritual needs of the Hungarian community but also of those of other East European communities. While attended by a relatively small number of students, the Seminary provides for their upkeep through the maintenance of dormitories and canteens. The last time that the Seminary ordained rabbis was in 1950. Since then it has concentrated on the preparation of assistant rabbis. However, this program, too, seems to have bogged down a bit, as such assistant rabbis have not been ordained since 1957. *Új Élet naptár 1959, op. cit.*, p. 130ff.

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[76] Because of the continually declining enrollment and the perennial deficits incurred, the separate high schools for boys and girls were amalgamated in May 1959 into one coeducational high school. The facilities of the Jewish Theological Seminary are used for the conducting of classes and for other educational activities. *Új Élet* (Budapest), June 1, 1959, p. 3.

[77] During the 1957-58 academic year, according to available reports, 750 pupils attended 23 *Talmud Torah* courses in Budapest alone. The three *Yeshivahs* (higher Hebrew schools) that were functioning in Nyiregyháza, Paks and Soltvadkert had been dissolved by the end of 1956. However, a new *Talmud Torah* for orthodox youth was opened in Budapest in November 1958, which is attended by about 15 pupils. *Új Élet naptár 1959,* pp. 145, 153; *Új Élet* (Budapest), December 1, 1958, p. 6.

[78] Opened in January 1916, the Hungarian Jewish Museum was damaged and its treasures looted during the Nazi occupation. After the liberation it was reorganized and placed under the administration of the Central Board of Hungarian Jews under the name of the National Jewish Religious and Historical Collection (*Országos Zsidó Vallási- és Történeti Gyüjtemény*). *Új Élet naptár 1959,* p. 137.

[79] Among these are the Central Social Committee (*Központi Szociális Bizottság*), a hospital (*Szeretetkorház*), homes for the aged, public kitchens and the vacation-recreation area at Balatonfüred. *Ibid.,* p. 130.

[80] In addition to Dr. Sós, the leadership of Hungarian Jewry in 1959 was composed of Dr. László Fleischmann, President Emeritus, Marcell Steiner, Pál Gráber, Imre Wittenberg, Mór Paskusz and Károly Haas, Vice-Presidents, and Dr. Jenö László, Secretary General. *Új Élet* (Budapest), May 15, 1959, p. 1.

[81] Compared to its content of the 1949-1953 period, the paper seems more informative about Jewish life in the country. It has a regular "Jewish-calendar" section and brings occasional notices about a fifteen-minute Jewish religious radio program. A slight regression was, however, noticeable in the paper's content during the later part of 1959. It devotes more and more space to "protests" against the Israeli arms deliveries to West Germany, and to "Appeals" for increased Jewish participation in the "struggle for peace."

[82] It is interesting to note, however, that while a delegation from Hungary attended the July 1959 Geneva meeting of the International Executive Committee of the World Jewish Congress, no representatives from Hungary were present at the General Assembly of the Congress which was held at Stockholm in August 1959.

[83] By the end of 1958 the following volumes appeared under the auspices of the Board: Arthur Geyer, *A magyarországi fasizmus zsidóüldözésének bibliográfiája, 1945-1958* (Buda-

The multitude of hardships notwithstanding, consequently, the remaining Jewish communities in Hungary continue, for the present at least, to exercise their limited religious and cultural rights within the framework of the restrictive provisions of the people's democratic régime.

In the long run, however, the prospects of continued Jewish life in Hungary are very bleak. With the exception of Budapest, the membership of the once flourishing Jewish communities is quite negligible. With each passing day their number is further reduced by the unfavorable demographic situation that developed at the end of the war and by the steady though limited rate of legal and illegal emigration. Barring an over-all change in the international situation or perhaps in the internal evolution of the people's democratic régimes, it is not too unrealistic to assume that, with the remaining Jews fully integrated into the new social *milieu,* organized Jewish life in Hungary as once known will gradually disappear.

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pest, 1958), 167 pp.; Ilona Benoshofsky, and Elek Karsai, edd., *Vádirat a nácizmus ellen. Dokumentumok a magyarországi zsidóüldözés történetéhez,* Vol. I. 1944, március 19, 1944 Május 15. A német megszállástól a deportálás megkezdéséig (Budapest. A Magyar Izráelitak Országos Képviseleti Kiadása, 1958) 379 pp.

GENESIS OF THE ANSCHLUSS PROBLEM: GERMANY AND THE GERMANS OF THE HAPSBURG MONARCHY IN THE AUTUMN OF 1918

by Arthur G. Kogan

THE origins of the Anschluss problem and of the closely related question of the German minority in Czechoslovakia in the inter-war period lay in the profound changes in the political structure of Central Europe brought about as a result of World War I. "With the disappearance of the Bismarckian and Hapsburg political systems the way seemed open for a resurrection of the lost cause of 1848-71, the unification of all Germans living contiguously in the mid-European area."[1] Yet such statements must not be interpreted as meaning that the program of Greater Germany represented a sudden and violent break with the political past which was conceivable only after the final disappearance of the dynastic monarchies of Central Europe. For it can be demonstrated that political and military leaders in Germany under the pressure of events in the last few weeks of World War I began to re-examine their attitude toward the Germans in the Hapsburg Empire and to accept the idea of a Greater Germany at a time when a Hapsburg and a Hohenzollern still occupied their ancestral thrones. It can also be shown, however, that Germany's leaders were unwilling to pursue the goal of Greater Germany at the expense of other interests considered to be more vital.

Re-examination by Germany of her relations with Austria-Hungary and the peoples living there had, of course, set in soon after the outbreak of the war. Closely involved with the military fortunes of the Austrian ally, Germany took an interest also in its domestic affairs and became particularly concerned with the strengthening of the German element in the Hapsburg state and the defense of its position against the Slav nations. Germany's active interest in the internal politics of Austria-Hungary, in conjunction with the *Mitteleuropa* idea and the plans for expanding the Dual Alliance of 1879, marked a profound change in the relationship of the two Central European empires and, as it were, signaled the dissolution of the Bismarckian concept of the Reich.[2] At the final stage of this evolution, in the shadow of approaching defeat, German statesmen began to formulate policies which, by no longer assuming the continued existence of the Hapsburg Monarchy, laid the foundations for the Anschluss policy of the postwar period.

The Bulgarian armistice of September 29, 1918, had opened the back door into Central Europe to the Allies and, in combination with the pressure on the Western front, had forced the Central Powers to request an armistice. The military disaster which brought the beginnings of a parliamentary system to Germany seemed to impose on Austria-Hungary the necessity for sweeping internal reforms as the only conceivable alternative to complete dissolution. Yet Minister-President Hussarek's cautious promise of national autonomy made in the *Reichsrat* on October 1 was defiantly rejected by the spokesmen of the Czechs and Yugoslavs, who were confident that they would soon be able to establish their own national states with the help of the Entente Powers.[3] Confronted with the aspirations and claims of the other nationalities, the German parties in the Austrian parliament early in October adopted a resolution proposed by the Social Democrats recognizing the right of the Slav nations to organize their own national states, rejecting, however, "the subjugation of German territories by these national states." By its further demand, "that all German areas of Austria should be united in a German-Austrian state which will arrange its relations to the other nations of Austria and to the German Reich according to its own needs," this resolution provided a signpost for the bewildered Germans in the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy.[4]

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[1] Henry Cord Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815-1945* (The Hague, 1955), p. 292.

[2] For recent studies on this subject, see Meyer, *Mitteleuropa;* also Paul R. Sweet, "Germany, Austria-Hungary and Mitteleuropa," in *Festschrift für Heinrich Benedikt*, edd. H. Hantsch and A. Novotny (Vienna, 1957), pp. 180-212.

The predicament of the Austrian Germans and the problems confronting them were closely watched and commented upon by Count Botho Wedel, the German Ambassador in Vienna, who occupied this post from November 1916 to July 1919, and thus, one might say, was a symbol of a certain continuity in Germany's policy toward Austria across the divide of the November revolution.[5]

On October 2 Ambassador Wedel pointed to the apprehensions which Czech aspirations were arousing among the Austrian Germans who, realizing that Anschluss with the Reich was their only salvation, might take appropriate action. "The ground is prepared for a large-scale irredentist movement which could possibly sweep the whole German population. The Reich Government might have to make up its mind regarding the attitude which it plans to adopt toward a movement of this kind. It is necessary, in my opinion, to calm them [the Austrian Germans] and to admonish them gently that they should hold out loyally; it is not advisable, however, to repulse the Germans in a harsh manner."[6]

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[3] See L. B. Namier, "The Downfall of the Hapsburg Monarchy," in *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, ed. H. W. V. Temperley, IV (London, 1921), pp. 90-94.

[4] Otto Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution* (Vienna, 1923), p. 74.

[5] Count Wedel's conduct as German Ambassador in Vienna has been severely criticized by members of Emperor Charles' entourage. He has been accused of having worked against the Emperor and his policies even to the point of supporting Pan-German propaganda activities against state and dynasty. See Prince Ludwig Windischgraetz, *My Memoirs* (Boston and New York, 1921), pp. 281-282, 291; Ludwig A. Windischgraetz, *Ein Kaiser kämpft für die Freiheit* (Vienna-Munich, 1957), p. 114; Arthur Polzer-Hoditz, *Kaiser Karl: Aus der Geheimmappe seines Kabinettschefs* (Zürich-Leipzig-Vienna, 1929), *passim*. For a defense of Wedel's policy, see Graf Botho Wedel, "Windischgraetz und seine Erinnerungen," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, CLXXXII (Dec. 1920), pp. 289-297; also, Paul Molisch, "Zur Politik Kaiser Karls von Oesterreich," *ibid.*, CCXXXI (Jan.-Mar. 1933), pp. 4-23.

[6] Telegram No. 682 of Oct. 2, 1918, Wedel to Foreign Office, file Oesterreich 95 on microfilms of German Foreign Office documents, filmed by St. Antony's College, Oxford, and deposited in the National Archives, Washington, D. C.

Microfilms produced by St. Antony's College will henceforth be identified by the

Although the notion of a German irredentist movement sweeping the Austrian Germans may perhaps have been an exaggeration, it nevertheless reflected the anxiety felt by the Austrian Germans over the approaching fall of the dualist system in the Austrian half of the empire. Federalization, it was feared, might spell the final triumph of Austroslavism and put an end to German hegemony internally and to the alliance with the German Reich in foreign policy.

On October 11 the German Ambassador informed his Government of alleged plans of the dynasty to preserve a unified Austrian state which would be a predominantly Slav state. The Germans in the provinces, however, wished to prevent this danger "by creating a *fait accompli* through Anschluss with the Reich as quickly as possible." The only element of uncertainty, the Ambassador felt, was the attitude of Germany, and he urged that a positive stand be taken. In concrete terms, he proposed that Germany should recognize the right of self-determination for the Germans in Austria and express willingness to receive them into the Reich provided the request for Anschluss (*Anschlussbegehren*) had come about without any interference on the part of Germany. Wedel emphasized that the initiative in this matter must be taken by the Austrian Germans, since otherwise the Entente would speak of German imperialism. The Ambassador requested early instructions as he expected to be approached by Austrian deputies in this matter. In particular, he anticipated inquiries by the German deputies from Bohemia as to "whether the Reich would be prepared, in view of the menace of an economic strangulation of German-Bohemia, to prevent the famine which would threaten in that case."[7]

Apparently deputies representing the Bohemian Germans had raised the question of Reich German assistance for Bohemia also with German military authorities through Major Fleck, liaison officer attached to the staff of General Cramon, the representative of the German High Command at Austrian headquarters.[8] This information was communicated to Wedel in a Foreign Office instruction sent in reply to the Ambassador's telegram of October 11. Wedel was instructed to tell Major Fleck that the matter of Bohemia was being handled by the German Embassy in Vienna and that he therefore should pass on to the Embassy any questions or suggestions which he might receive.[9] The Foreign Office as yet did not take a position on the larger issue raised in Wedel's telegram regarding the future of the Austrian Germans. The German Government, however, continued to receive reports about plans for active intervention in Bohemia supposedly envisaged by German military representatives in Austria. On October 16 Wilhelm Solf,

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title of the file used and cited as St. Antony's reels. Microfilms of German Foreign Office documents in the National Archives filmed as numbered serials will subsequently be cited by serial and frame numbers only.

[7] Telegram No. 730 of Oct. 11, Wedel to Foreign Office, Oesterreich 95, St. Antony's reel.

[8] On the activities of Major Fleck, *cf.* August von Cramon, *Unser oesterreichisch-ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1920), *passim.*

[9] Telegram No. 1119 of Oct. 14, 1918, Under State Secretary to Wedel (7479/H187449).

State Secretary of the German Foreign Office, informed former State Secretary Hintze who, together with Freiherr von Lersner, represented the Foreign Office at General Headquarters, that General Cramon and Major Fleck, according to reports by the Saxon Legation in Vienna, had proposed German military intervention in Bohemia in the event of an invasion of the German areas of Bohemia by Czech forces. The two German officers were also said to have proposed that the Bohemian Germans be surreptitiously supplied by Germany with arms, ammunition and food. Solf added to this information the following instructions for Hintze: "I request that Your Excellency be good enough to ascertain the facts of the case at the OHL (*Oberste Heeresleitung*) and to warn against precipitate actions. In no circumstances must the measures under discussion be taken without the Chancellor's approval."[10]

Meanwhile the Foreign Office received from Ambassador Wedel a first-hand account of the activities of Germany's representatives in Vienna with respect to the problems facing the Austrian Germans.[11] Wedel reported that he had called a meeting of the Ministers of the German federal states accredited in Vienna (i.e. the Bavarian and Saxon Ministers) and of Germany's military representatives, General Cramon and Major Fleck, at the Embassy in order that agreement might be reached on a common line of policy in reports and in conversations with German-Austrian politicians. After a detailed discussion of the whole situation in Bohemia there was general agreement among the assembled diplomats and officers that an attitude of "wait and see" ought to be adopted but that the Austrian Germans must not be deserted in any circumstances. In the event of intervention by Germany, however, the initiative must be taken by the Austrian Germans themselves and not by the German Reich, since steps in that direction "would at once become known in Washington and London and would be exploited as evidence of imperialist aspirations with respect to [Germany's] ally." It was therefore necessary for the German-Austrians to establish first a German state of their own and to make it the biggest and strongest unit within the Austrian federation which might come into existence.

Nevertheless, Wedel expressed in this dispatch the opinion that Germany might even have to take action in support of the Bohemian Germans before the destiny of the German-Austrians as a whole had been decided. Establishment of a Czech state would practically shut off the Bohemian Germans from the rest of the Austrian Germans and would compel them to look upon union with Germany as their only salvation. "Besides, the incorporatio of northern Bohemia with its rich coal resources would be a great gain for our fatherland; and Vienna could not even have any justification for resenting this, since the development would not be directed against Vienna but rather against the Czechs. I am, therefore, of the opinion that we must view northern Bohemia as a special problem and treat it as such and that we actually must promote secession directly, although, to be sure, with the greatest possible caution."

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[10] Telegram No. 2599 of Oct. 16, 1918, Solf to Hintze (5256/E315402). Enclosed with this telegram was a copy of a dispatch from the Saxon Legation in Vienna to the Saxon Foreign Minister Count Fitzthum von Eckstädt, which was most critical of German representatives in Austria who talked of *Einmarsch* in Bohemia.

[11] Dispatch No. 270 of Oct. 16, Wedel to Chancellor Max von Baden (7479/H187472-75).

This dispatch indicates that the German Ambassador, the Ministers of Bavaria and Saxony, and the German military representatives in Vienna took such an active interest in the developments in Bohemia that they even considered military intervention and the annexation of territory which was still under the sovereignty of an allied ruler. Such a policy of active political and military intervention in Austria, however, was not yet the policy of the German Government.

The question arises in this connection whether the interest which Germany's military representatives took in the Austrian and Bohemian Germans was the result of specific instructions from their superiors in the German High Command. A clear answer to this question is not possible. A statement by Ludendorff, which he made when he was informed about the discussions regarding Bohemia held at the Embassy in Vienna, sounds rather noncommittal:[12] "I have brought the situation in Bohemia to the attention of the War Minister and I shall keep in touch with this matter. It cannot be determined at this moment what military measures might be feasible." A much clearer picure of Ludendorff's strong interest and definite views in the matter of the Austrian Germans emerges from a letter which he had sent State Secretary Solf only a few days earlier and which, incidentally, might explain the State Secretary's concern over the reported activities of German military personnel with respect to Bohemia. At the beginning of this letter the first Quartermaster General clearly defined his concern with the Germans of Austria:[13]

> The events of the last few weeks draw [our] special attention to Austria. If the Supreme Army Command takes up this question, it is for the reason that it is of decisive importance also for our military future. In the not too distant future we will perhaps be faced with a situation in which we have to extend our military protection to the Germans in Austria.
>
> German circles in Austria watch with growing anxiety the Government yielding increasingly to the aspirations of the Slav nations for independence. It is feared that the Government, prepared to make extensive concessions, will comply with the demands of the Entente, which wants to abandon the Germans in Austria to annihilation through the dissolution of the Danubian Monarchy into separate states and the creation of a Czech and Southern Slav state.

Ludendorff then commented on the planned creation of a Czech and a Southern Slav state, which could no longer be prevented, expressing the view that in the new states "the Germans would no longer be able to form the nucleus around which the other parts of present Austria would be grouped." Moreover, eventually non-German nationalities might proclaim their full independence, thus presenting Germany with a *fait accompli.* "It requires no explanation that we can count on the friendship of a Czech and a Southern Slav state just as little as on Poland's friendship."

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[12] Telegram No. 2510 of Oct. 20, 1918, Hintze to Foreign Office, Oesterreich 101, St. Antony's reel.

[13] Ludendorff to Solf, Oct. 14, 1918 (7479/H187450-52).

Ludendorff professed pleasure that the Germans of Austria had at last recognized this fact, had buried their party feuds, and had begun to feel "as *one* people claiming for itself exactly the same rights that are to be conceded to the other nations." In German circles there was now often expressed a negative attitude toward the dynasty and Emperor Charles, "since he is not expected to represent German interests." And from all this Ludendorff drew certain definite conclusions as to the policy which Germany ought to adopt toward the Austrian Germans:

> The question is being discussed increasingly whether the time has not come to prepare the Anschluss with the German Reich. It has been emphasized that the German Reich must insist that a special representative of German-Austria be sent to the peace conference.
>
> For our further campaign of enlightenment (*Aufklärungsarbeit*) in Austria it is necessary to achieve clarity on the question whether the German Reich ought to watch these developments calmly or to support them.
>
> A Reich German in Vienna writes to me on this subject as follows:
>
> "A complete rejection is generally considered out of the question, since Germany would not want to pass up the increase in territory and power. On the other hand, it is scarcely possible for the German Reich to support this development openly at this time. Consequently, for the time being, it can merely be a question of privately informing the leading people in Austria and those active on behalf of Anschluss with us that Anschluss of the German areas is entirely in accordance with our wishes but that in no circumstances could it be encouraged by official Germany."
>
> I am in absolute agreement with this view. There can be hardly any doubt that an Anschluss of the areas of German nationality will come about sooner or later. This development would be, after all, a valuable compensation, which we must not neglect, for the disappointments which the war brings us in other fields. Therefore, I feel that the time has absolutely come for relying on the Germans in Austria just as we do on the Hungarians.
>
> I would be grateful if Your Excellency would take a position regarding this so that the directives for military propaganda in Austria and Hungary can be issued accordingly.

In the light of this very definite interest in the Germans of Austria expressed by the leading spirit behind the German military machine, it is not likely that the German military representatives in Austria, who were openly talking of intervention in support of the Austrian Germans—especially in Bohemia—acted entirely without instructions. At the least, it can be assumed that their talk was in accordance with prevailing thinking at General Headquarters. In any event, it would seem that German military men concerned with affairs in Austria were accepting more and more the anti-Slav tenets of the radical German nationalists of Austria; and there is evidence that these circles had attempted even earlier to get Ludendorff interested in the fate of the Germans in Bohemia.[14] It is not without significance that ideas very similar to those of Ludendorff were expressed by William II in a memorandum with the heading "Observations about Austria."[15] In this memorandum the Emperor severely criticized Austria's failure after 1866 to combine a policy of alignment with Germany with a domestic policy aiming to strengthen the "Germanic" element against the Slavs. On the contrary, the governments of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy, fearing a German irredenta, had permitted the Czechs and other Slavs to rise at the expense of the Germans, and this "disastrous policy" had produced the present conditions. "Now, at the eleventh hour, the ruler wants to divide his country into autonomous states and to establish himself as 'King of the German-Austrians,' as overlord with the title of Emperor of the free crown lands of the non-German races that are to be ruled by princes of the Imperial House." This, however, would result in struggles, for the "non-Germanic people" in their "independent federal states" would no longer submit to German-Austrian hegemony. The Emperor felt that the latest reports from Austria regarding the desire of the Austrian Germans for union with Germany confirmed his own view that the war was uniting all Germans in defense of their racial community. Therefore, the Austrian Germans must draw the following conclusions: "As the struggle against the autonomous Slav states for hegemony and for an Imperial Federation (*Bundeskaisertum*) is hopeless, it will be best for German-Austria to join the German Reich, in some form or other, in order to preserve the existence and future of her race." True, such a development would signify the end of old Austria and of *Kaisertum* as well. "It is highly unlikely that the present wearer of the crown will take this fateful step, especially in view of the Franco-Italian blight of the House of Parma. But if the German-Austrians are really determined, he will have to do it in the end or he will have to leave the scene." Verbose and confused as the utterances of William II may sound, they too are proof that Pan-German nationalism was beginning to prevail over dynastic solidarity even with the crowned head of the Hohenzollern dynasty.

Despite the fact that Ludendorff's letter had been somewhat restrained as far as open advocacy of Anschluss by "official Germany" was concerned, the civilian officials of the German Government were extremely wary of his interference in the delicate matter of the nationalities struggle in the Hapsburg state. Lersner, the representative of the Foreign Office at General Headquarters, warned against Ludendorff's proposed directives for propaganda in Austria in a telegram to the Austrian specialist of the Foreign Office.[16] Acknowledging Ludendorff's letter, State Secretary Solf assured him that the questions raised therein had been receiving the full attention of the

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[14] H. C. Meyer, *Mitteleuropa,* p. 289.

[15] The Emperor's memorandum is dated "October 14" and was sent to State Secretary Solf by Freiherr Werner von Grünau, the Foreign Office representative with the Emperor, on October 15. There are two copies of the Emperor's memorandum in the files, one in his own handwriting, the other in typewritten form (7479/H187453-61).

[16] Unnumbered telegram of Oct. 15, 1918, Lersner to Bergen (7479/H187462).

Foreign Office for some time. He then added the following comment: "In my opinion, it [the problem] is not yet ripe for the adoption of a definite position and the greatest possible caution is required in handling it. If only for this reason, I should like to ask you that military propaganda, for the time being, exercise the greatest possible restraint with respect to the events which are now taking place in Austria."[17]

Nevertheless, events were gradually moving in a direction where Germany might feel compelled to take a more definite position with respect to the problems resulting from the disintegration of the Hapsburg empire. Emperor Charles attempted to halt this process of national disintegration by the manifesto of October 16, which was to transform the Austrian half of the Monarchy into a federalized state. At this late stage, however, the manifesto, by authorizing the formation of national councils, merely legalized the race of the nationalities toward independence. It is somewhat surprising that this state of affairs was not immediately obvious to the German Ambassador who, on the contrary, expressed the belief that Austria-Hungary might have found a solution for her difficulties; moreover, he suspected that she might even have received a hint from the Entente that adoption of a policy of federalization would enable the Entente to treat Austria with leniency. If such promises of leniency should materialize while Germany was treated harshly, Wedel commented sarcastically, "the enthusiasm of Austrian Germans for Anschluss with the Reich would probably cool off; they have never displayed strength of character." The only exceptions, perhaps, were the Germans of Bohemia and Silesia. "I could imagine that they might be left us as compensation for the money which is owed to us."[18] A few days later, however, Wedel, in evaluating the manifesto of October 16, seemed no longer concerned about the success of Hapsburg policy and moreover realized that the manifesto was most valuable to the Austrian Germans. "Indeed, it gives them an opportunity to call into being the German state without breach of loyalty. Revolution is made legitimate by the manifesto."[19]

The manifesto had indeed come too late to halt the empire's disintegration. Czech and Yugoslav leaders in the *Reichsrat* refused even to enter into a discussion of the manifesto,[20] and any remaining illusions about the success of this scheme of federalization were definitely shattered by President Wilson's note of October 19, in which he expressed his support for the nationalistic aspirations of the Czechs and Yugoslavs and declared that he could no longer accept "the mere autonomy of these peoples as a basis for peace."[21] Ironically, national self-determination now became the only visible hope for the Austrian Germans, too, who felt the foundations of the common state slipping out from under them. Their program of self-determination had already been formulated in the resolution adopted by the German parties in the *Reichsrat* demanding the union of all German areas of Austria in a German-Austrian state.[22] An isolated German-Austrian state, however, which would certainly be faced with territorial claims by the other new national states, seemed unacceptable to the Austrian Germans and made union with Germany look increasingly attractive. German nationalist leaders in Bohemia demanded, on October 15, national self-determination for German-Bohemia and Anschluss with Germany.[23] Demands for Anschluss were also voiced in German nationalist meetings (*Volkstage*) in Moravia, Silesia, Tirol and Styria.[24] Support for such a program came not only from the German nationalist parties but now also from the Socialists. It was significant that Otto Bauer, the leading theoretician of the Socialist left wing, pointed out in a series of articles published in the *Arbeiterzeitung* between October 12 and 15 that, unless an empire or Austrian federation continued to exist, the three geographically separated German areas (the Alpine provinces, the German fringe of northern Bohemia and the so-called Sudetenlands, namely eastern Bohemia, northern Moravia and Austrian Silesia) could retain their territorial connection only through union with Germany.[25] The publication of these articles in the official Social Democratic party paper signaled the triumph within the party of the "Nationalities Program of the Left," which had demanded, as early as January 1918, self-determination for Slavs and Germans alike and had looked forward to the "union of all Germans in a democratic commonwealth."[26]

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[17] Solf to Ludendorff, Oct. 21, 1918 (7479/H187495).

[18] Dispatch No. 274 of Oct. 17, 1918, Wedel to Chancellor Max von Baden (7479/H187481-83).

[19] Dispatch No. 281 of Oct. 21, 1918, Wedel to Chancellor Max von Baden, Oesterreich 103, St. Antony's reel.

[20] L. B. Namier, *loc. cit.*, p. 102.

[21] For the text of Wilson's note see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918,* Supplement 1, Vol. I (Washington, 1933), p. 368.

It was against the background of these events that the men in charge of German foreign policy finally decided to take a definite position regarding the Austrian Germans and to respond to the suggestions and ideas which Ambassador Wedel had put forward during the past few weeks. The manner in which this important foreign policy decision was transmitted to Vienna indicates that the Foreign Office considered it a matter of extreme delicacy. State Secretary Solf sent this communication in the form of a private letter to Ambassador Wedel, which was dispatched to Vienna by special courier on October 19.[27] A cover note appended to the file copy specifies that, on instructions of the Under State Secretary, the letter must be opened only by the specialist concerned with the matter, and by high officials.[28] The text of this letter which, in view of its significance, is printed here in its entirety, is as follows:

> The questions raised in your telegram No. 730 of the eleventh of this

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[22] See p. 25 above.

[23] Friedrich Purlitz, ed., *Deutscher Geschichtskalender* (Leipzig), XXXIV/2 (Oct.-Dec. 1918).

[24] Dispatch No. 276 of Oct. 18, 1918, Wedel to Chancellor Max von Baden (7479/H187488-89).

[25] L. B. Namier, *loc. cit.*, p. 98f.; also *Schicksalsjahre Oesterreichs 1908-1919: Das Politiche Tagebuch Josef Redlichs,* ed. F. Fellner (Graz-Köln, 1953-54), II, 302.

[26] O. Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution,* pp. 67-70, 101.

[27] 7479/H187464-71.

[28] 7479/H187463.

month[29] are so delicate and affect our alliance relationship with Austria-Hungary so profoundly, that I prefer, for obvious reasons, to send you the requested reply through these channels which are closed to the scrutiny of third persons.

You will share my feelings that it is only with a heavy heart that I approach the treatment of a problem which, in the last analysis, means the vivisection of our ally. I would have very much preferred if it had been possible to continue along the path of Bismarck and to pursue in the future, also, a policy aiming to preserve and strengthen the Danubian Monarchy, with which we had allied ourselves for defense against the dangers threatening from the East. Prerequisite for carrying out this policy loyally was the maintenance of the hegemony of the Germans in Austria and of the Magyars in Hungary. Effective and sympathetic protection of the Germans in Austria was the guarantee for keeping contented these elements, loyal to the Emperor and moderate in their requests, and would have prevented the rise of an irredenta, which, if its activity increased, was bound to have a disastrous influence on German-Austrian relations. The Vienna Government did not know how to preserve this strongest support of the Hapsburg throne; according to the principle of *divide et impera* it has played the various nationalities one against the other. Abusing the loyalty and restraint of the Germans, it has yielded to the ever increasing ambitions of the less modest and less reliable Poles and Czechs in order to buy their momentary favor through political gifts at the expense of the Germans. Nor, because of concern that this might provoke the German irredenta, could it [the Vienna Government] make up its mind in favor of a policy which would have completely eliminated the dissatisfaction of the Czechs. Vienna took a completely negative attitude toward our wishes and admonitions. I shall point merely to the disdainful remark of Count Burian, regarding our proposals for a friendly settlement of the Polish question along Austro-Polish lines, to the effect that Austria was not a German *Ostmark*.[30]

The disastrous results of the ill-advised policy of Vienna show themselves now in a frightening manner. Galicia gravitates toward Poland, the Czechs insist upon an independent state, Hungary wants to dissolve its ties with Austria and to accept a purely personal union at the most; the Southern Slavs dream of a large state of their own; the Germans, closed in on all sides, unite and in self-defense seek Anschluss with Germany. All indications are that this process of disintegration can not be stopped. The events in Austria are driving us into an extremely unpleasant and undesirable dilemma. There are duties of honor, however, which we can not shirk. The grave struggles of the four years of the war have raised and strengthened German national consciousness. No German, no party—I am including here the Socialist party—would now tolerate that our fellow-nationals [*Stammesgenossen*] across the border, who have made the greatest sacrifices in blood for the defense and honor of the Danubian Monarchy, should be oppressed and Slavicized in appreciation of the loyalty which they have shown. Thus, we *must* take care of the Germans and, if necessary, receive them hospitably.

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[29] See p. 26, footnote 7, above.

[30] The statement that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was "not merely a Germanic *Ostmark*" is found in an Austro-Hungarian note of Nov. 24, 1915, sent in reply to a German pro memoria proposing ways to strengthen the German-Austrian alliance. See Sweet, *loc. cit.*, p. 199ff.

Consequently, I shall ask you to tell the representatives [*Vertrauensmänner*] confidentially and with the necessary caution, if they should approach you, that we must strive primarily for the preservation of the Danubian Monarchy as long as this is at all possible; if, however, contrary to what we wish and want, there should be a disastrous collapse in Austria, the Germans would, of course, find protection and support with us. This assurance also applies to the matter of providing supplies in case of emergency, which was brought up at the end of your telegram. Nevertheless, it was neither in their interest nor in ours to accelerate the present panic-like process of dissolution. A joint and united stand of the two empires at the peace congress would be more advantageous for Germany, too, and the advantages for us resulting from this would also redound to the benefit of the Germans of Austria after their Anschluss has taken place, provided this should be the case.

For your personal information I would like to remark, in parenthesis, that for tactical reasons it is advisable for us that all those territorial questions which will be discussed at the peace conference in accordance with the Wilson program and which affect us directly—Alsace-Lorraine, Poland—should be settled and decided in our favor as far as this is at all possible, before it becomes evident that the Anschluss of German-Austria has to be reckoned with as a real factor. Otherwise, I am afraid that the increase in territory and power which obviously would fall to Germany by union with German-Austria would provide the Entente with justification for demanding territorial compensations, for presenting claims to Alsace-Lorraine and to our areas with Polish population, and for extending those claims to include territories on the left bank of the Rhine, especially the Saar Basin. On the other hand, making German-Austria autonomous ought to be speeded up and carried through in such a way that this newly formed state could not be prevented at the peace conference from deciding its own future destiny according to the recognized right of self-determination.

In case the Czechs should actually be represented at the peace conference by delegates of their own, it would be expedient if the German-Austrians were advised to do the same thing and simultaneously instruct their delegates to maintain close contact with us confidentially.

Anschluss of the German-Austrians with us, if it should occur, would furthermore postulate a change in our present policy toward the Czechs and Hungarians; it should be our goal to draw toward us economically, and as far as it is possible also politically, the future independent kingdom of Bohemia and, above all, the kingdom of Hungary. I should be grateful to you if you would be good enough to express yourself regarding this question in a private letter and to make appropriate suggestions along the lines indicated. I would also be interested to have your opinion with respect to the manner and form in which, if the occasion should arise, the Anschluss of German-Austria with us could be brought about with the least difficulties and in the most expedient way.

Before Ambassador Wedel had an opportunity to reply to State Secretary Solf's letter a decisive step was taken toward the establishment of a separate political community of the Austrian Germans. On October 21 the deputies elected to the *Reichsrat* from German districts constituted themselves as the Provisional National Assembly of the state of German-Austria and simultaneously elected an executive committee. Thus the nucleus of a government of the new state was established. The new Provisional Assembly also passed a fundamental resolution declaring that the new state would settle its relations with the other nations of Austria by free agreements. At the same time the resolution declared unequivocally that German-Austria "claimed territorial sovereignty over the entire area settled by Germans, especially in the Sudetenlands."[31] In the discussion only the representatives of the radical Pan-German parties demanded immediate Anschluss. Victor Adler, the spokesman for the Social Democrats, wanted German-Austria to join the other nations of the empire in a free league of nations—provided they wanted it; otherwise, German-Austria would be compelled to join Germany as a separate federal state.[32] It is interesting to note that, according to the German Ambassador, the committee preparing the agenda for the meeting of the Assembly discussed up to the very last minute "whether or not the desire for Anschluss should be incorporated in the proclamation of the German-Austrian state." The idea was finally abandoned, since no agreement could be reached on the wording and also because "there had been a hint from Berlin that events should not be precipitated."[33]

Ambassador Wedel took these events fully into account when he set out to reply to the State Secretary's letter, which had finally provided him with specific instructions with respect to the recent developments in the Hapsburg Monarchy. Noting that their views were in full accord, Wedel proceeded to discuss in a detailed letter of October 22 the whole range of problems facing German policy in Austria.[34]

At the beginning of his letter Wedel referred to discussions during a recent dinner party with several prominent German-Austrian deputies, most of whom were members of the Christian Social and German National parties, such as Richard Weiskirchner, Christian Social Mayor of Vienna, and Rafael Pacher, one of the leaders of the German Radical party. Wedel stated that he had assured these deputies that Germany would not abandon them or "let the Slav sled ride over them." He had told them "that our door will remain open," warning them at the same time not to precipitate matters, since a premature decision in favor of Anschluss would not be in the German interest; if Germany were strengthened in this way, the Entente might "put on the screws."[35]

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[31] O. Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution,* p. 77f.

[32] Walter Goldinger, "Der Geschichtliche Ablauf der Ereignisse in Österreich 1918-1945," in H. Benedikt, ed., *Geschichte der Republik Österreich* (Munich, 1954), p. 28.

[33] Dispatch No. 282 of Oct. 22, 1918, Wedel to Chancellor Max von Baden, Oesterreich 95, St. Antony's reel.

[34] Letter of Oct. 22, 1918, Wedel to Solf, Oesterreich 103, St. Antony's reel.

[35] *Cf.* the statement by Franz Dinghofer, one of the chairmen of the Provisional National Assembly, that Ambassador Wedel had warned against expressing the idea of Anschluss "as this might do harm at the peace conference"; Ludwig Brügel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie,* V (Vienna, 1922-25), 377; also, *Die Anschluss-*

Wedel emphasized that in this context he had urged the deputies to resist the tendencies noticeable in the provinces bordering on Germany, such as Tirol, Salzburg, and Bohemia, to abandon the territorial and political unity of the German areas of the Hapsburg state. He had appealed to them with the argument "that they were, after all, Austrians, that they ought to preserve their Austria; and even though it could merely be a German Austria, they ought to preserve at least that much and establish a German state with Vienna as the capital." In so doing, they would even remain loyal to their ruler in terms of the manifesto of October 16. "If it should turn out that this Austrian federation is unable to exist, it would then be better to join the Reich as a compact federal state rather than to fall apart and desert to the various German federal states in a disorderly mass." It was important that the German-Austrians should be represented at the peace conference on the same footing as the Czechs and find out what they had to expect. "Until that time it was imperative not to go beyond the limits set by the Emperor's manifesto."

Wedel felt that Germany had reason to be satisfied with the results of the first meeting of the Provisional National Assembly of German-Austria and could await further developments calmly. Yet the relationship between the Germans and the other nationalities had given rise to difficult problems. The most troublesome of these was the clash of conflicting German and Czech claims to Bohemia. The Czechs, in order to force the Austrian Germans to accept the incorporation of German-Bohemia in their new Czechoslovak state, were cutting off deliveries of food and coal to the German areas. Ambassador Wedel was convinced that Germany had the greatest interest in preventing the Czechs from absorbing the German element in the Czech state and in rendering ineffective Czech pressure to that end. Wilson and the Entente, as Wedel saw it, were doing everything to satisfy Czech aspirations. Thus, Germany would be confronted with a powerful, economically independent neighbor "who hates us and will become a willing tool of the Entente." "If, however, German-Bohemia remains within German-Austria, the Czech state, surrounded by Germans, can scarcely become dangerous to us." Economically, that state would be dependent on Germany. Wedel, therefore, suggested that no closer contacts be established with the Czechs for the moment and that one should wait until they approached Germany. "For, one day they will have to approach us!" Germany ought to state, however, that she was not fundamentally hostile toward the Czech state, which had the right to develop in accordance with its own wishes "within its legitimate frontiers."

In contrast with his expectations of a German-Czech struggle, Wedel was much more optimistic regarding relations between the Austrian Germans and the Southern Slavs. He was convinced that the Germans ought to support the movement for Southern Slav unity and thus gain a friend to the south. German-Austria was the natural hinterland for the Yugoslav Adriatic

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frage in ihrer kulturellen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Bedeutung, edd. F. F. G. Kleinwaechter and H. von Paller (Vienna, 1930), p. 68, footnote 5.

coast. The Ambassador believed that the leaders of the Austrian Germans themselves were realizing more and more the necessity for such a policy. With regard to the Italian claims to German-South Tirol, Wedel referred to the growing republican sentiment among the Austrian Germans, which was to be explained by the hope of saving German-South Tirol if it would become part of a German-speaking Alpine republic, somewhat like Switzerland, without any taint of imperialism. "It is believed that Wilson in particular will fall for this and in those circumstances will protect German soil, since he would have more sympathy for such an area than for imperialist Italy." It was also characteristic of the German Ambassador's new outlook that he now attached relatively little importance to Hungary, once the keystone of the German-Austrian alliance. Germany should be calm and deliberate in dealing with Hungary, which was in the process of becoming a Balkan state. Hungary would need Germany as a market for her products and Germany, in turn, would need Hungary for the sake of the Danube route. In any event, Hungary was likely to lean toward Germany, politically as well as economically.[36] In summing up, Wedel emphasized that it would be Germany's biggest task after the war to live in friendship with the Balkan states, old and new, and to aim for the paramount goal of a reconciliation with the Slavs—"In other words, I am hoping for a *Mitteleuropa* in a new and altered form."

This exchange of views between the State Secretary of the German Foreign Office and the Ambassador in Vienna shows very clearly that German policy, in the latter half of October 1918, had become resigned to profound changes in the political shape of Central Europe and was trying to develop a new concept that would take these changes into account. The significant fact was that Austria-Hungary was not expected to survive, certainly not in the form in which it had existed since the establishment of the Dualist system in 1867. A loose federation under the Hapsburg sceptre, although still considered possible for the immediate future, was probably doomed in the long run. In any event, such a Hapsburg state was no longer of great interest to Germany. The new reality in Central Europe were the emerging national states, and, with respect to them, Germany's position was not unfavorable. Germany would still be a great power, closely allied with a German-Austrian state which ultimately, after the inevitable, complete disappearance of the Hapsburg state, would enter the German Reich. If this German-Austrian state succeeded in retaining sovereignty over all the compact German-speaking areas of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy, the new Czechoslovak state would be incapable of pursuing an independent and anti-German policy. If, moreover, the combined political and economic strength of the Germans were supplemented by a skillful policy exploiting the antagonisms of Italians, Southern Slavs, Magyars and Czechs, as well as the differences which were expected to develop among the Entente Powers at the peace conference, then the small states of this area would gravitate into the orbit of German power and a German-dominated *Mitteleuropa* might yet arise from the ruins of Germany's military hopes.

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[36] In a dispatch of the next day Wedel enlarged upon his ideas about the relations between Germany and the nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy, stating that it would be a mistake on Germany's part to continue a pro-Magyar policy, since, as far as the Magyars were concerned, the alliance with Germany was based purely on their own interests. Austria-Hungary's dissolution need not frighten Germany if she succeeded in establishing good relations with the new states. (Dispatch No. 283 of Oct. 23, 1918, Wedel to Max von Baden, Oesterreich 103, St. Antony's reel.)

But the prospects for the success of this new German policy for Central Europe were gravely jeopardized by the rapidity of Austria-Hungary's military collapse and her decision to withdraw from the war. On October 27 the newly appointed Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Julius Andrássy, replying to President Wilson's note of October 19, stated that Austria-Hungary adhered to the President's declarations regarding the rights of the nations of the empire and that she was prepared to enter into armistice negotiations with the Entente "without waiting for the outcome of other negotiations."[37] It is well known with what consternation and bitterness Germany's political and military leaders reacted to the prospect of a separate peace between Austria-Hungary and the Entente with all its strategic consequences and its effects on Germany's capacity to continue the war.[38] It can also be shown, however, that the Andrássy note brought about the final break between official Germany and the Hapsburg state and dynasty. All the traditionalist and dynastic inhibitions to openly supporting German nationalism in Austria were now dropped. Germany was now interested exclusively in strengthening the emerging German-Austrian state while treating the Hapsburg emperor and his government with indifference and hostility. It became Germany's main concern to encourage German-Austria to oppose any effort by the Imperial Government directed against Germany and to support the new German state in its struggle against Slav claims to ethnically German areas. This policy was reflected in an instruction sent immediately after publication of the Andrássy note of October 27.[39] Ambassador Wedel was directed "to bring influence to bear on all German parties so that they would publicly protest against the action of a government which appeared as the representative of Hungarian and Slav special interests and whose decisions had no validity for them.[40] It ought to be stated definitely that the German-Austrians denied Count Andrássy the right to negotiate with the enemy in their name, that they declined explicitely to conclude a separate peace with the Entente, and that they reserved for themselves freedom of action." The German Ambassador, simultaneously, should advise the German-Austrians to establish their own state with its institutions as quickly as possible and warn them against the possible dangers to German areas as a result of Entente demands for the passage of troops.

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[37] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918,* Supplement 1, Volume I, p. 404f.

[38] *Cf. Amtliche Urkunden zur Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstandes 1918* (2nd enlarged edition, Berlin, 1924), pp. 211-217; *The Memoirs of Prince Max von Baden,* II (New York, 1928), 218-222; Cramon, *Unser österreichisch-ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkrieg,* pp. 193-196.

[39] Telegram No. 1188 of Oct. 28, 1918, Solf to Wedel (4064/914305-06).

[40] Germany's anger over Andrássy's policy, viewed as an attempt to detach Hungary from Germany and align it with the Entente, is reflected in an instruction sent on Oct. 27 by Under State Secretary Stumm to Consul General Fürstenberg in Budapest. The instruction speaks of "Hungarian gross ingratitude" toward Germany, which had supported her, and accuses Hungary of forgetting that her past policy directed against "refractory nationalities" could only be carried through thanks to "strong support by Germany" (4064/914250-51).

Nevertheless, the German Government was still opposed to committing itself openly in favor of Anschluss. In the same instruction, Ambassador Wedel was told for his information that "an official declaration of the Anschluss of German-Austria with Germany, for the reasons known to you, must in no case be issued at this time either. Moreover, our promoting the Anschluss might induce the Government at your post to demand the removal of our Embassy from Vienna; this is to be avoided, especially in view of the developments in the situation of the Germans." Wedel was authorized, however, to intimate "with the necessary caution" that Germany was willing to have German-Austria join the Reich when peace had been concluded.

The political situation in German-Austria was decidedly favorable to a German policy on the lines of these instructions.[41] The Andrássy note had destroyed dynastic loyalties in large sections of the German middle classes, unable to forgive the Emperor for having deserted the German ally. German middle-class nationalism and working-class socialism could now agree on a program which was in its implications anti-dynastic, republican, and favorable to Anschluss. For the moment, this meant the establishment of an actual government for German-Austria regardless of the Emperor's prerogatives and the existence of an Imperial Cabinet.[42] This immediate program was practically achieved on October 30 when the Provisional National Assembly of German-Austria assumed legislative powers and assigned the powers of the executive to a *Staatsrat* elected by the Assembly. Also on October 30 the *Staatsrat* appointed Victor Adler, the leader of the Social Democrats, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Otto Bauer, his chief assistant in the party organization, became his assistant also in the new Foreign Office and, on October 31, was given the rank of Under State Secretary.[43] In the person of Bauer, the most outspoken exponent of the Anschluss idea had entered the Foreign Office of the new state. Subsequently placed at the head of that office after the death of Adler on November 11, Bauer was to conduct the foreign policy of German-Austria for eight months "with the primary goal of opening the road to the union of German-Austria with Germany."[44]

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[41] It seems that German policy in Austria at this moment was to be promoted also by the expenditure of considerable amounts of money. On Oct. 28 the State Secretary of the German Foreign Office sent to the Treasury the urgent request that an amount of ten million marks be made available "for secret political operations in Austria" as speedily as possible (7479/H187508). The Treasury indicated in a letter of Oct. 31 that the request would be complied with (7479/H187512). *Cf.* Windischgraetz, *My Memoirs*, pp. 281-282, 291, for the assertion that money from the German Embassy in Vienna was behind some of the street demonstrations against the Andrássy note and that certain Vienna newspapers were in the pay of the Embassy.

[42] O. Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution*, p. 82f.

[43] L. Brügel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie*, V, 383f.

[44] O. Bauer, *Acht Monate auswärtiger Politik* (Vienna, 1919), p. 13.

In this way the harmful effects of Austria-Hungary's impending withdrawal from the war were, to some extent, off-set by a development favorable to Germany in the long run, namely the emergence of a German-Austrian state committed to a policy of close alignment and ultimate union with Germany. A certain optimism is therefore noticeable in a dispatch by Wedel discussing a plan promoted by leading Austrian Germans providing for a federation of the German provinces of Austria, which would then form a customs and currency union with Germany. Simultaneously, preparations would be made "to make possible a complete union with Germany at the appropriate time." For the moment, such an "East German Confederacy" (*Ostdeutsche Eidgenossenschaft*) could hope for "benevolent support" from President Wilson. If such a republic were formed there would no longer be any place for the Hapsburgs. Wedel felt that Germany had no more interest in the preservation of the dynasty or the empire in which the Germans would only play a subordinate rôle. The Imperial Cabinet must not even participate in the peace conference, since it would merely attempt to save the dynasty "at the expense of the German element and of the [German] Reich."[45]

For the immediate present, however, developments in Austria-Hungary confronted Germany with difficult and even dangerous choices. It was to be expected that the impending armistice agreement between Austria-Hungary and the Entente would include clauses permitting Allied troops to pass through Austro-Hungarian territory and thus threaten Germany's southern flank. Furthermore, as the remnants of the multi-national army retreated from the front lines in disorder, there was apprehension that chaos and anarchy might engulf the lands of Germany's former ally. Finally, the problem of Bohemia was more acute than ever since the *Národni Výbor* had seized power in Prague on October 28. There was now danger of unrest and disorders along the borders of Saxony and Bavaria, especially if the Bohemian Germans should attempt to resist incorporation in the new Czechoslovak state. Any one of these developments could induce Germany to intervene with military force in Austria. Yet, on the other hand, Germany's leaders knew that military intervention in Austria or against the Czech revolution would expose Germany to new charges of imperialism and increase the unwillingness of the Entente Powers to offer Germany favorable armistice terms, which she was desperate to obtain.

It is therefore not surprising that the question as to whether and to what extent German armed forces should enter Austrian territory became the subject of an argument within Germany's governing circles, especially between the Foreign Office and the OHL. It seems that the Foreign Office was anxious for the OHL to take the responsibility for such a step on grounds of military necessity, while the OHL was reluctant to embark on such a dangerous and problematical course without specific directives by the

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[45] Dispatch No. 289 of Oct. 30, 1918, Wedel to Max von Baden, Oesterreich 103, St. Antony's reel.

Foreign Office based on foreign policy considerations.[46] It was finally decided to put the question up to the Government of German-Austria and to extract from it, if possible, a request for the entry of German troops.[47] The *Staatsrat* of German-Austria thereupon took up the matter and decided that one had to distinguish between a German military occupation of Tirol which might be necessary strategically and for the protection of the Reich and, on the other hand, an occupation to secure public order in Austria.[48] The *Staatsrat* had no objections to the former type of occupation if the German military considered it necessary and merely requested that it be informed of any decision taken. As for an occupation with the aim of securing public order, the *Staatsrat* wished to delay its decision since the consequences might be grave.[49]

Meanwhile, however, the Bohemian Germans, under the pressure of events, had taken the initiative in calling for armed assistance by Germany.[50] In the night of November 2-3 the Foreign Office received an urgent telephone request from Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, German deputy from Aussig in the Austrian parliament, for German military help in order to protect the German population of Aussig against looters, "since it is impossible to obtain support from the [German-Austrian] Government."[51] The Foreign Office thereupon inquired of the German Embassy in Vienna by telephone whether the *Staatsrat* had any objections to the dispatch of German troops to the Aussig area. The reply indicated that there were no objections to the dispatch of German military assistance against looting in northern Bohemia. State Secretary Adler had merely requested that he be informed of the particulars if the case should arise, "so that he may be covered in the event of inquiries."[52] A little later, however, the leaders of German-Austria seemed to have had second thoughts on the matter when they realized the dangers of a military conflict in Bohemia for a disarmed German-Austria. Wedel was now told by Adler that the reports of looting in Aussig were exaggerated and that the moving of German troops into Bohemia should be avoided, since otherwise "the Czechs would march into

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[46] The various exchanges between the Foreign Office, the Embassy in Vienna and the Foreign Office representatives at General Headquarters between Oct. 28 and Nov. 4 regarding the entry of German troops into Austria are summarized in an unsigned Foreign Office memorandum of Nov. 11 (4051/906079-83). The individual documents are filmed on Serial 4051 and on St. Antony's reel Oesterreich 101. For a criticism of the "hesitation" of the Foreign Office in the official German military history of the World War, see Bundesarchiv, *Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918,* XIV (Mainz, 1956), 706ff.

[47] Telegram No. 1220 of Nov. 2, 1918, Solf to Wedel, Oesterreich 103, St. Antony's reel.

[48] For the discussion in the *Staatsrat* regarding the entry of troops see *Geschichte der Republik Österreich,* p. 37.

[49] Telegram No. 920 of Nov. 2, 1918, Wedel to Foreign Office, Oesterreich 103, St. Antony's reel.

[50] The idea of calling on the *Národni Výbor* in Prague for military assistance to restore order had apparently also been considered in some circles of Bohemian Germans. Their leaders eventually rejected the idea, fearing it might be interpreted as a recognition of Czech claims to the German areas of Bohemia. See Paul Molisch, *Die sudetendeutsche Freiheitsbewegung in den Jahren 1918-1919* (Vienna-Leipzig, 1932), p. 86ff.

[51] Foreign Office memorandum of a telephone conversation, Nov. 2, 1918, Oesterreich 101, St. Antony's reel.

[52] Foreign Office memorandum, Nov. 3, 1918, *ibid.*

German-Bohemia and war would start between Germany and Czechoslovakia."[53] That settled the issue. On November 4 State Secretary Solf informed the OHL of this report from Ambassador Wedel and requested that the movement of German troops into Bohemia be stopped at once. The OHL promised that appropriate instructions would be issued immediately.[54]

The German Government's decision had been made. In spite of all the planning and talking by German diplomats and military men about military intervention in weeks past, neither Vienna nor Bohemia were to experience, in the fall of 1918, the *Einmarsch* of the armed forces of the German Reich. It is quite apparent that at the decisive moment neither the German Government nor the military leadership wished to take the responsibility for an action which was apt to compromise severely Germany's chances of obtaining favorable armistice terms.[55] Nor could the responsibility for requesting military assistance from Germany be placed upon the shoulders of the Government of German-Austria, which was even less in a position to face the grave risks arising from a military intervention by Germany. The *Staatsrat,* however, had left the door open for a very limited kind of German intervention by its explicit statement that moving German troops into Austria to provide military protection for the Reich was different from an intervention "to secure public order" and that a decision to that effect was up to the German military leadership. Consequently, after Austria-Hungary had signed the armistice with Italy on November 3, the German Government informed the OHL on November 4 that it approved the occupation of the passes over the Alps on Austrian territory.[56] German troops thereupon entered Tirol on November 5.

Yet Bohemia and the German-Czech dispute over its German-speaking areas continued to confront German foreign policy with awkward choices even after the idea of Germany's military intervention there had been abandoned. After the proclamation of the Czechoslovak republic on October 28, the deputies who had represented the German-speaking areas of Bohemia in the old parliament constituted themselves the Provincial Assembly for German-Bohemia and elected from their midst a provincial government; similarly, the German deputies from the territorially connected German districts of Silesia and northern Moravia decided to form a new province, "Sudetenland," and to elect a government of their own.[57] The National Assembly of German-Austria in its session of October 30 approved the establishment of the two provinces and thus again asserted its jurisdiction over territories which were simultaneously claimed by the new Czechoslovak state.[58] Since German policy, as had been shown, had begun to realize the significance of German-Austria for Germany's influence in Central Europe even prior to Anschluss, it seemed to be a justified assumption that the Reich would support the claims advanced by the parliamentary assemblies of German-Austria and her two new provinces. On the other hand, however, Germany could not afford to disregard completely the existence of the new Slav states of Central and Eastern Europe, which could easily offer Germany great economic and political opportunities in the coming period of peace. Consequently, German policy was faced with somewhat of a dilemma on this point.

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[53] Telegram No. 928 of Nov. 3, 1918, Wedel to Foreign Office, *ibid.*

[54] Telegram No. 2719 of Nov. 4, 1918, Schubert (General Headquarters) to Foreign Office, *ibid.*

[55] For a different view, *cf.* Jan Opočenský, *Umsturz in Mitteleuropa* (Dresden, 1931), p. 385f. Opočenský's statements that plans for German military intervention in Bohemia were abandoned only after Germany had signed the armistice are not borne out by the evidence presented here. It would also seem that Opočenský has overstated the official character of the various promises of German military assistance which the Bohemian Germans received from German military and civilian officials.

[56] Foreign Office memorandum of Nov. 11, 1918 (4051/906079-83).

[57] O. Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution,* p. 105f.

This dilemma is clearly expressed in certain vacillations of German policy toward the new Czechoslovak republic as a result of a major divergence of opinion between the Foreign Office and the German Consul General in Prague, Freiherr von Gebsattel. Even deeper and more fundamental was the disagreement between the Consul General in Prague and Ambassador Wedel in Vienna, who vigorously supported the position of German-Austria in the question of Bohemia. The very day when the new state was proclaimed in Prague, Wedel expressed the opinion that Germany must support the Bohemian Germans, at least diplomatically and morally, if they requested German help in resisting incorporation in Czechoslovakia. "For we are and we shall be the leading people among the German tribes and less than ever can we now shirk our duty toward our national community." Wedel conceded that Germany would incur Czech hostility if she were to assist in severing German-Bohemia from the body of the Czech state. "However, I prefer the enmity of a Czech state, economically crippled without the German industrial areas, to the hope for the benevolence of a compact industrial competitor state on our border." Nor was Wedel prepared to accept the argument that good relations with the Czechs were important to Germany's relationship with the other Slav nations. "Poles and Southern Slavs will be guided by their own interests, not by sympathy for Czechoslovakia."[59]

But to Germany's official representative in Prague, matters looked quite different. The day after the *Národní Výbor* had taken over in Prague, Consul General Gebsattel called on the new rulers. Subsequently, he explained his action to his government as follows: "In order to establish relations with the new government and to be able to look after the interests of the citizens of the German Reich, I went today to the Czech National Committee. I felt that I did not have to wait for instructions in this matter, since the need to intervene on behalf of my fellow-citizens may arise at any moment." Gebsattel reported that he was very courteously received when he made this call to express thanks for the protection extended to the German Consulate and to request protection also for the German citizens living in the new state. Gebsattel felt "that friendly behaviour will produce a particularly grateful reaction by the Czech Government and that we may also be able to attract the Czechs to our side through concessions which they desire or by some other friendly action."[60] Apparently his first contact with the new government of Czechoslovakia inspired Consul General Gebsattel with considerable optimism about the future of German-Czechoslovak relations. In a subsequent report he particularly predicted vigorous economic relations between the two countries, pointing out that the Czechs would depend on overseas imports being shipped through the port of Hamburg and that Germany, moreover, could export machinery to Czechoslovakia, as well as the skills of German workers and engineers. Gebsattel took exactly the opposite position from Ambassador Wedel, who had doubted the significance of German-Czech relations for Germany's relationship with other Slav nations. "The Czechs will be the leaders of the Slav nations. . . . Their friendship will smooth our path to the Poles and Southern Slavs, while their enmity, on the other hand, will be communicated to the other Slavs." Austria had now definitely collapsed and what was past was finished. But any support by Germany of the separation of German-Bohemia from Czechoslovakia would hit the latter at her most vulnerable spot.[61]

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[58] Emil Strauss, *Die Entstehung der tschechoslovakischen Republik* (Prague, 1934), p. 293.

Believing that the Czechs would soon insist on a gesture indicating official recognition by Germany and concerned about rumors of an impending occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Entente, which might mean internment or expulsion for German citizens residing in the country, the German Consul General decided to call again at the seat of the *Národní Výbor* to announce that the German Government was prepared to agree to the establishment of a Czechoslovak diplomatic mission in Berlin. "To this communication I added, on my personal responsibility, that the Czechoslovak state was herewith recognized by my Government. I am fully aware that in doing so, I acted very much on my own responsibility [*höchst eigenmächtig*] even though I am certain of my basic assumption, that I was merely anticipating the course of events." Gebsattel emphasized that he had taken the step to prevent a large-scale expulsion of German citizens, which would have precluded from the outset the development of friendly relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the Czechs had now promised, as a *quid pro quo,* that German citizens would be left undisturbed even in the event of an occupation by Entente troops.

On this occasion the German Consul General also warned his Government against undertaking any military intervention in Bohemia to restore order even if the Government of German-Austria should request it. Such a request must not be complied with: "Otherwise the good relations which have begun to develop would immediately give way to bitter enmity." Gebsattel had even told the Czechs "very definitely" that military assistance by Germany to the Bohemian Germans was out of the question.[62]

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[59] Dispatch No. 288 of Oct. 28, 1918, Wedel to Foreign Office, Oesterreich 101, St. Antony's reel.

[60] Dispatch No. 236 of Oct. 29, 1918, Gebsattel to Foreign Office, *ibid.*

[61] Dispatch of Oct. 30, 1918, Gebsattel to Foreign Office, *ibid.*

[62] Dispatch No. 246 of Nov. 1918, Gebsattel to Foreign Office, *ibid.*

The German Ambassador in Vienna, who was apparently somewhat perplexed at the overtures which the Consul General in Prague had made to the Czechs, was thereupon informed by the Under State Secretary of the German Foreign Office that Gebsattel had issued his statement in Prague "without instructions and in order to protect German interests."[63]

Meanwhile, however, the German Consul General in Prague was prepared to draw the ultimate conclusions from the policy of German-Czechoslovak friendship which he was urging his Government to adopt. He was actually cautioning his Government against granting the request for formal recognition which the Government of German-Austria was about to make. For such recognition "would extend also to German-Bohemia and would be interpreted here, as I gather from my conversation with the National Council here, as a hostile act."[64] Gebsattel again warned against complying with any request for the dispatch of German troops to restore order in Bohemia and repeated this warning in a subsequent dispatch, emphasizing that the Czechs were dead serious about annexing German-Bohemia and would feel extremely provoked if Germany should send troops or even police units into Bohemia. "In our own interest it seems to me imperative not to heed such calls for help and to refer those who issue them to the *Národni Výbor,* even if the calls should come from places on the border of Germany and Bohemia, such as Bodenbach, Tetschen or Reichenberg."[65]

The fact emerges that in order to establish friendly relations between the new Slav state of Czechoslovakia and the German Reich the German Consul General in Prague actually suggested that the German-Austrian state be denied support and even diplomatic recognition because it had publicly and formally laid claim to the German-speaking areas of Bohemia. One is tempted to characterize Consul General Gebsattel's attitude with the epithet of "Little German," in contrast to the "Greater German" position taken by Ambassador Wedel and by many Reich German diplomats and military men. Strictly speaking, of course, such a characterization is not correct, since Bismarck's "Little German" conception, with its concomitant lack of interest in the fate of the Austrian Germans, still presupposed the existence of an allied dynastic state under German leadership—a far cry from the revolutionary creation of a democratic Slav state in which Germans had become a minority. Nevertheless, the Bismarckian concept of a self-contained German national state disinterested in the Germans outside the borders of the Reich might lead logically to the acceptance of a Czech national state, provided it did not involve sacrificing any of the territories of Bismarck's Germany.[66]

The confusion caused in Berlin by this growing discrepancy between the policies proposed by the German representatives in Vienna and Prague is clearly reflected in a Foreign Office memorandum submitted to Chancellor Max von Baden on November 5.[67] The memorandum pointed out that Ambassador Wedel was urging compliance with the request of the Government of German-Austria for recognition by Germany, while the Consul General in Prague remained convinced that such recognition would extend also to the incorporation of German-Bohemia in German-Austria and, accordingly, would be interpreted in Prague as a hostile act. In these circumstances, the memorandum recommended the following course of action: 1. Wedel should be instructed to make the statement that Germany was prepared to recognize the German-Austrian state but that this recognition did no mean taking a position on territorial questions which might result from the formation of new states on the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. These questions could be settled only by friendly negotiations among the governments concerned. 2. Consul General Gebsattel, on the other hand, should receive instruction to speak with the Czech political leaders and emphasize Germany's willingness to recognize the Czechoslovak state.

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[63] Telegram No. 1233 of Nov. 3, 1918, Stumm to Wedel, *ibid.*

[64] Telegram No. 11 of Nov. 2, 1918, Gebsattel to Foreign Office, *ibid.*

[65] Dispatch No. 250 of Nov. 4, 1918, Gebsattel to Foreign Office, *ibid.*

[66] *Cf.* the opposite interpretations of the implications of Gebsattel's call on the Czech leaders in Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau, *Die Katastrophe* (Vienna, 1929), p. 434, and Molisch, *Die sudetendeutsche Freiheitsbewegung,* p. 30f. Glaise-Horstenau asserts that Gebsattel indicated Germany's disinterestedness in German-Bohemia, while Molisch denies that this was the case. There seems to be little doubt, however, that the German Consul General was inclined to accept the Czech position regarding Bohemia.

In Berlin, apparently, a position of this kind was felt to be not positive enough in its support for German-Austria and too much in accordance with Gebsattel's pro-Czech recommendations. An instruction to Vienna drafted along the lines of this memorandum was cancelled.[68] Moreover, State Secretary Solf thought it advisable to enlighten his Consul General in Prague and to leave him in no doubt that Germany's policy toward Czechoslovakia, whatever it might be eventually, must not sacrifice the interests of German-Austria.

"It is impossible for us," Solf wired Gebsattel, "to recognize the Czech state while denying recognition to German-Austria if it should be demanded of us. Desirable as good relations with the Bohemian state may be, our interest in German-Austria nevertheless occupies the foreground. This, however, would not prejudice the territorial question." At the same time Solf assured Gebsattel that no German troops would be sent to Vienna to restore order and that the moving of a few German units to Tirol was merely a temporary measure for the protection of Tirol and the German border against undisciplined remnants of the Austro-Hungarian army. With respect to the ticklish question of German recognition of Czechoslovakia, particularly in the light of the statements which Gebsattel had already issued in Prague, the State Secretary expressed the following opinion: "Regarding recognition of the Czechoslovak state, the step taken by you on November 2 is being interpreted here to mean this: You made the statement that the German Government was prepared to recognize the Czechoslovak state in the event that the latter should send an accredited diplomatic representative to Berlin thereby establishing *de facto* diplomatic relations with us." Moreover, Solf pointed out that Karel Kramář and other Czech leaders were about to return to Bohemia from Switzerland[69] and that, consequently, "cautious reserve" was advisable as long as the attitude of the Czechoslovak Government toward Germany remained uncertain.[70]

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[67] Oesterreich 103, St. Antony's reel.

[68] *Ibid.*

In this way, after the initial vacillations, something like a German policy toward Czechoslovakia began to take shape. This policy of "Wait and see" attempted to avoid friendly gestures as well as hostile actions. When Under State Secretary Bauer, on instructions of the German-Austrian Government, drew Wedel's attention to the fact that the Czechs were beginning to occupy several towns in German-Bohemia,[71] the Ambassador merely received instructions from the Foreign Office to suggest to the Government of German-Austria that it issue a protest against even a temporary occupation of German-Bohemia, since this would prejudice territorial questions.[72] Apparently, however, the German Foreign Office was not opposed to giving some military assistance surreptitiously to the German-Bohemians. Under State Secretary Stumm forwarded to General Headquarters with a favorable recommendation a request from the *Staatsrat* in Vienna that German command posts at the border supply provincial authorities in German-Bohemia with arms for defense against the Czechs.[73] It is noteworthy that Consul General Gebsattel again "felt unable to share the apprehensions about the developments in Bohemia" and professed the belief that the Czechs were occupying places in German-Bohemia at the request of local authorities.[74] Gebsattel's optimism was apparently strengthened by his first talk with Karel Kramář, the designate Czechoslovak Minister-President, from which he gained the impression that Kramář was not hostile toward Germany and that it would not be difficult "to win him over to our side."[75]

At the end of the first week of November, under the impact of domestic revolution and bad news from the front, German officials felt more than ever unable and unwilling to take the initiative in the matter of Anschluss. On November 7 Wedel told Adler that German-Austria must make her own decision about her future; if she wanted Anschluss she would be received with open arms. Wedel made it clear to the Foreign Secretary of German-Austria that he was authorized to make this statement but that "we, for our part, could not issue an invitation for the reasons known to him." Adler appreciated this communication "which was most valuable to him in charting a course for his policy."[76]

In spite of its rejection of any risky and precipitate moves for the present, the German Foreign Office had not given up the long-range objective of preserving a dominant position for Germany in Central Europe through a close alignment with German-Austria, which ultimately would develop into a full-fleged union. This objection would have been frustrated, however, if last minute attempts to preserve the Hapsburg empire and dynasty in some form or other through negotiations with the Entente in Switzerland had been successful.[77] The last of these attempts prior to Emperor Charles' abdication was the mission undertaken by Prince Windischgraetz and Count Mensdorff at the beginning of November, with the aim, according to Windischgraetz, of finding out whether the French and British Governments would be disposed to enter into negotiations with the Emperor regarding the possibility of establishing a harmonious relationship between the new states formed on the territory of the empire.[78] Although we know now that these last attempts were doomed to failure from the outset, the German Government at the time took these efforts very seriously and followed the activities of these Hapsburg emissaries in Switzerland with the greatest misgivings.

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[69] Kramář and other Czech leaders who had been permitted to go abroad had arrived in Geneva on Oct. 26 for conferences with leaders of the Czechoslovak emigration. See Edouard Beneš, *Souvenirs de guerre et de révolution* (1914-1918), II (Paris, 1928-1929), 383f.

[70] Telegram No. 4 of Nov. 7, 1918, Solf to Gebsattel, Oesterreich 101, St. Antony's reel.

[71] Telegram of Nov. 6, 1918, Wedel to Foreign Office, *ibid.*

[72] Telegram No. 1275 of Nov. 7, Solf to Wedel, *ibid.*

[73] Telegram No. 996 of Nov. 8, 1918, Wedel to Foreign Office, *ibid.*

[74] Telegram No. 21 of Nov. 9, 1918, Gebsattel to Foreign Office, *ibid.*

[75] Dispatch No. 268 of Nov. 9, 1918, Gebsattel to Foreign Office, *ibid.*

[76] Telegram No. 981, Wedel to Foreign Office, Oesterreich 103, St. Antony's reel.

On November 7 the Foreign Office instructed the Legation in Bern to find out the purpose of the journey to Switzerland of Count Mensdorff and other high officials of the Imperial and Royal Foreign Office which had been reported by the German Embassy in Vienna. Even before this instruction was received in Bern, the Legation there reported that Windischgraetz had been sent to Switzerland by Emperor Charles to ask the Entente Governments to dispatch troops to Vienna in order to overthrow the Government of German-Austria.[80] The attention which the German Foreign Office paid to these reports is reflected in an instruction by State Secretary Solf informing Wedel of these developments and expressing the opinion that forces were at work aiming "to save the dynasty and monarchy at our expense." Solf identified these forces as the Court, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry and certain sections of the Austrian Civil Service. Wedel was instructed to discuss this matter with the *Staatsrat* and to suggest that countermeasures be taken such as "dissolution of, or at least, supervision over the [Austro-Hungarian] Foreign Ministry, surveillance over its correspondence bureau, and finally stronger emphasis on the idea of Anschluss."[81] A subsequent telegram from Berlin drew Wedel's attention to a news dispatch from Bern, published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, regarding the activities of emissaries of Emperor Charles such as Windischgraetz, Berchtold and Czernin in Switzerland. Their efforts were said to be aimed at persuading the Entente to occupy German-Austria with British and French troops. Such a move would protect the Court against the revolution and simultaneously prevent the incorporation of German-Austria in Germany. Consequently, "it would be desirable if this story were seized upon and would result in protest demonstrations." In any event, the instruction concluded, State Secretary Adler should be informed of the matter and urged to proceed against these machinations "which are directed primarily against the Government of German-Austria."[82] At this particular moment Ambassador Wedel, himself, was quite concerned about the persistence of monarchist sentiment in German-Austria which could block a union with Germany. Wedel felt that the republican elements seemed to be in no hurry to abolish the monarchy and that they might even prefer to preserve it as a kind of lightning rod, leaving the final decision regarding the form of government to a constituent assembly. The Viennese, as Wedel commented somewhat contemptuously, were beginning to realize what it would mean if Vienna were no longer an Imperial residence ". . . and when the Entente will have supplied the country with food, interest in the republican and German idea will slacken in the face of *Milchkaffee und Semmeln,* owing to the superficiality of the Austrians."[83]

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[77] For the story of the earlier phase of these negotiations in October 1918 see Opočenský, *Umsturz in Mitteleuropa*, pp. 287-296, 317-326; Count Julius Andrássy, *Diplomacy and the War* (London, 1921), pp. 253-258; Karl Freiherr von Werkmann, *Deutschland als Verbünder* (Berlin, 1931), p. 286ff.

[78] Windischgraetz, *My Memoirs*, p. 325ff; Windischgraetz, *Ein Kaiser kämpft für die Freiheit*, p. 121ff.; Andrássy, *Diplomacy and the War*, p. 292.

[79] Telegram No. 1714 of Nov. 7, 1918, Stumm to Romberg (4064/915068).

[80] Telegram No. 1919 of Nov. 7, 1918, Romberg to Foreign Office (4064/915091).

[81] Telegram No. 1290 of Nov. 8, 1918, Solf to Wedel, Oesterreich 95, St. Antony's reel.

In spite of Wedel's jibes at the Austrians, it was actually official Germany which seemed to become less and less enthusiastic about Anschluss. True, shortly before his resignation Chancellor Max von Baden sent a telegram to Vienna announcing the forthcoming election of a German constituent assembly "which would have the task of determining the future form of government of the German people, including those of its parts which might desire to enter within the borders of the Reich."[84] But during the deliberations of the *Staatsrat* regarding a reply to the German Chancellor's telegram, the German Ambassador did no more than support that faction in the *Staatsrat* "which wanted to make use of the invitation to give more vigorous emphasis to Anschluss."[85] It seems, moreover, that the German Foreign Office was now becoming rather cold-blooded in the matter of Anschluss. When the German Minister in Bern reported about the impression which Count Mensdorff, Emperor Charles' emissary, had gained from a talk with the British Minister in Switzerland, namely that the Entente might exploit a union of Germany and German-Austria to impose harsher conditions of peace on Germany,[86] he received the following reply from the Foreign Office: "It remains doubtful whether German-Austria will make up her mind and decide in favor of union with us. However, we encourage the Anschluss movement *sub rosa,* since in this way we will, in any event, have means of pressure at our disposal at the peace conference."[87] One cannot help suspecting that the German Foreign Office was considering using the threat of Anschluss for bargaining purposes at the conference table in order to prevent sacrifices of Reich territory, in accordance with the basic policy laid down in Solf's letter of October 19 to Wedel.

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[82] Telegram No. 1292 of Nov. 8, 1918, Foreign Office to Wedel, Oesterreich 103, St. Antony's reel.

[83] Dispatch No. 293 of Nov. 7, Wedel to Max von Baden (4064/915183-87).

[84] Kleinwächter and Paller, edd., *Anschlussfrage,* p. 68f.

[85] Telegram No. 1005 of Nov. 9, 1918, Wedel to Foreign Office, Oesterreich 95, St. Antony's reel. The reply of the *Staatsrat* actually expressed the hope that the German people in Austria would participate in the election to the German constituent assembly. Kleinwächter and Paller, edd., *Anschlussfrage,* p. 69.

[86] Telegram No. 2007 of Nov. 9, 1918, Romberg to Foreign Office (4064/915157-58).

[87] Telegram No. 1743 of Nov. 10, 1918, Stumm to Romberg, *ibid.*

As the war drew to a close, the outlines of a new German policy with respect to Central Europe had been established. Anschluss was one of the principal objectives of this policy, to be pursued without haste and in such a way that it would not prejudice Germany's case at the peace conference. In contrast, the leaders of German-Austria, unable to face a dismal present, wanted to profess without delay their belief in a Greater German future. Prospects for a workable federation of the nations of the former empire were dim and an independent small state was not yet an acceptable alternative to most Austrian Germans. Moreover, the disappearance of the Hohenzollern and the establishment of a government by the socialist parties in Germany had made the idea of union with the highly industrialized Reich even more attractive to the Social Democrats.[88] On a rising tide of national, republican and socialist aspirations the Social Democrats were able to carry along even the less enthusiastic leaders of some of the other parties. The decision in favor of an immediate Anschluss declaration was made by the *Staatsrat* on November 11 and seems to have been influenced also by fear that the provinces bordering Germany might join the Reich regardless of what the rest of German-Austria did.[89] On November 12 the Provisional National Assembly adopted the draft law proposed by the *Staatsrat,* articles 1 and 2 of which proclaimed German-Austria to be a democratic republic and a part of the German Reich.[90] Ambassador Wedel, who had so often prodded the Austrian Germans "to give greater emphasis to the idea of Anschluss," was compelled to report that he had been unsuccessful in dissuading them from proclaiming Anschluss at this time. "In vain I had warned and suggested that a decision be reserved for a constituent assembly; but the Social Democrats could not be restrained, while the German nationals, even though they saw the objections, did not dare to cast a vote in opposition."[91]

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[88] O. Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution,* p. 102.

[89] L. Brügel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie,* V, p. 393f.

[90] *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen der provisorischen Nationalversammlung für Deutschösterreich 1918 und 1919,* I (Vienna, 1919), 68.

[91] Telegram No. 1028 of Nov. 17, 1918, Wedel to Foreign Office, Oesterreich 95, St. Antony's reel.

ASPECTS OF NATIONALIST-COMMUNIST COLLABORATION IN POSTWAR GERMANY

by Kurt P. Tauber

I

HITLER'S psychopathic anti-Communism, the fear of the Russians engendered by a bad conscience for the brutalities committed by the invading German armies on Russian soil, and the experience of the vengeful, fierce, at first totally undisciplined bands of Russian occupation troops—all have contributed to a wide-spread immunity to Communist blandishments, slogans and theories in West Germany. Moreover, there are twelve million refugees and expellees in the Federal Republic who have become personally acquainted with Communism as practiced in the satellite countries and in the East Zone. Finally, one must remember the many millions in West Germany who, by virtue of friends and relatives in the German Republic, are reasonably well-informed on conditions there. They are alive to the contrast between the standard of living achieved by the "socialist" economy in the East Zone and that created by the "social market" economy which has popularly been credited with the "economic wonder" of West Germany's recovery. Understandably enough, then, Soviet views openly so labelled are not likely to attract a large and receptive public. The reverses suffered by the Communist Party (*KPD*) as long as it was still allowed to compete in the open market-place for the ear and the vote of the West Germans are convincing evidence on this point.

Fully aware of these conditions, the Soviet Government through its own agents, the authorities of the East German Zone and the West German Communist Party, soon developed alternative methods of placing its views before the public, of attempting to influence the relationship of the Western Zones to the Western Allies and, later on, of modifying the foreign policy of the Federal Republic. These methods involved the use of front organizations whose political aims were camouflaged by alleged philanthropic or reformist purposes, but whose members, on the whole, were widely known for their Soviet-friendly attitudes or even for their membership in the *KPD*. Because of their easy identification in terms of political orientation, these front organizations, though they proliferated for a while, soon became impotent. Yet, the need—from the Soviet viewpoint—for guiding German political development into channels acceptable to the policies of Russia increased with the onset and deepening of the "cold war."

As the recognition dawned on West and East that the wartime alliance would not be able to stand the strain of radically divergent national interests in times of peace, both sides began to re-assess the stern policies they had agreed on imposing on the vanquished Germans. At the Paris meetings of the Council of Ministers in April and June 1946, "the new race for Germany's favors began."[1] On September 6, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes, in a policy speech at Stuttgart, reflected the new attitude of the American Government by announcing "the end of the occupation's punitive phase."[2] No doubt could exist that this was motivated only in the second place by humanitarian stirrings, for he added: "It is not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world peace that Germany should become a pawn or a partner in a military struggle for power between the East and the West."[3] Byrnes was obviously whistling in the dark.

With the collapse of the Moscow meeting of the four foreign ministers and the concomitant announcement of the Truman doctrine in March 1947 the skirmishes were over and the "cold war" had begun. Then followed, in almost inexorable succession, the well-known stages of the conflict. In July 1949 the authorities of the Soviet Zone undertook their first indirect political offensive with the aim of mobilizing the energies and anti-Western resentments of extreme nationalists and former (or even present) Nazis and of providing them with an organizational structure, the National Front, which would permit collaboration and control without, at the same time, requiring extensive, and probably fruitless, ideological proselytization.

This major change in policy, conditioned as it was by world developments, was based upon the sound conviction that the interests of extreme German nationalists, on either side of the (by now rigid) "iron curtain," and those of the Soviet Union were becoming identical in a number of important respects. Given the identity of interests—at least under the conditions of the foreseeable future—problems of ideology were of purely secondary importance. Once the decision was made to de-emphasize *Antifa* activities and to attempt to recruit nationalist forces for limited collaboration in specific fields, the application of this technique to the West became obvious.

The timing as far as West-German nationalists and Nazis was concerned could not have been better for it was only in 1949 that they emerged onto the political scene *en masse*. In fact, of the approximately 110 significant organizations, parties, associations and groups on the extreme, nationalist "right" which have appeared in Western Germany in the last twelve years, fully 70% were founded in the years 1949-1952. Also, in terms of electoral success, these are the years of growth, reaching a never again attained height in the elections of 1951-52. The political reactivation of extreme forms of authoritarian nationalism and Nazism in 1949-50 paradoxically made the task of the Soviet propagandist or agent in the West relatively easy. What sentiments could he mobilize, what tendencies capitalize on, what interests satisfy?

There was, first of all, the now all-absorbing desire for reunification. For a year or two after the collapse in May 1945, the permanence of the division of Germany was not clear and, in addition, had been further concealed by the necessarily overwhelming pre-occupation with the business of mere physical survival. By 1948 the lines of demarcation between the Soviet Zone of occupation and the Western Zones had hardened into boundary lines. Also, small economic gains had been made so that less intensely personal interests could come to the fore, and among them the re-establishment of a national "homeland" was predominant. The recognition that this could be achieved only through agreement with the Soviet Union required no great insight.

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[1] Alfred Grosser, *Western Germany from Defeat to Rearmament*, translated by R. Rees (London, 1955), p. 36.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[3] *Ibid.*

A second tendency which could be useful to the East was the not unrealistic, and time-hallowed, nationalist hope of achieving the goals of a German rebirth (*"Erneuerung"*) and a predominant European power position by exploiting the vital, strategic, central position of Germany. This was to be accomplished by playing one side off against the other (*"Schaukel"* theory) that is, less politely, by a policy of international blackmail.

Then there was the factor of the deep resentments of the so-called "national opposition" against the West. In a bi-polar world, hatred of one of the protagonists could be relied on to dispose many to work for and support the other. That this collaboration is known by both "partners" to be merely tactical does not reduce its initial effectiveness. That both secretly think they can eject the "bed fellow" when he becomes objectionable, or neutralize him after he has served his purpose, may be political blindness and may, in fact, prove fatal, but, again it does not prejudice collaboration for limited objectives. A shared disdain for bourgeois parliamentary institutions, for liberal, multi-party democracy, a certain mutual respect for activist ruthlessness—all these may lead to similarities of emotion, if not outlook, that may facilitate collaboration in the face of a common enemy. After all, there was ample historical precedence for this kind of mutual assistance. In the 1920s and early 30s on at least three distinct occasions a *rapprochement* had been effected between the "bolshevist" wing of the national conservatives and the "nationalist" wing of the Communists.[4]

Fourthly, the reactivation, especially among professional soldiers, of the Prussian myth—the Eastern "task" of Prussia-Germany—and of the Tauroggen complex, once again, as we shall show, proved effective in harnessing authoritarian nationalists to the Communist chariot, just as it did—on an admittedly limited scale—twenty years before.

Finally, connections between nationalist, bourgeois groups and the East were established through mercantile circles. That the tight closing of the zonal border between the Russian sector and the Western Zone had caused considerable economic hardships and dislocations to the entire German economy is well known.[5] Needless to say, there were many businessmen who were (and are) anxious to engage in legal and illegal inter-zonal trade to save their firms from bankruptcy or to increase their profits. In fact, whole commercial branches provided financial support to nationalist opposition groups which have been able to establish good relations with authorities on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The inter-zonal trade thus affected becomes an almost perfect vehicle for sluicing off Soviet money to the West, and for strengthening those groups who are willing to urge Soviet policy alternatives.[6]

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[4] See A. Mohler, *Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932* (Stuttgart, 1950), pp. 60-65. *Cf.*, "Die Geburt des Nationalbolschewismus," *Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung*, No. 3, March 1957, p. 5, and K. von Klemperer, *Germany's New Conservatism* (Princeton, N. J., 1957), pp. 139-150.

In Sections III and IV an attempt will be made to exemplify with two short case histories, which roughly cover the period 1949-1958, the complex interweaving of these motivations, interests and resentments into a web of joint nationalist-Communist activity in the Federal Republic. In the first case the initiative for collaboration came from the nationalists, in the second, from the Russian—and later East German—authorities.

II

In the later stages of the war, and during the occupation, all the Allies recognized major variations in the political orientation of the captured German officers and took account of them by providing differential treatment. The Russians were, however, the most prescient and consequential in exploiting this diversity of political attitudes.

Taking advantage first of the old tradition of the Prussian General Staff, which saw in Russia the historic ally, then attempting to harness the ideological anti-Nazis to their political chariot, eventually playing on the opportunism of the non-political officers, and, finally, exploiting the deep anti-Western resentments of Nazi and conservative revolutionary officers, Soviet authorities began early the slow, methodical business of making more or less willing allies out of actual or potential enemies. Significantly, this attempt started shortly after Stalingrad with the announcement on July 13, 1943 of the formation of a "National Committee for a Free Germany" in which Field Marshal Frederick Paulus, the vanquished commander at Stalingrad, played a major rôle. Two months later, on September 12, a "German officers' League" was founded.

With the defeat and occupation of Germany the *raison d'être* of these organizations had disappeared and they were forthwith dissolved. Just as in the Western Zones, the treatment of Nazi and nationalist Germans in the Soviet Zone soon became a function of the relations between the erstwhile Allies. On February 26, 1948, the Soviet Military Administration (Order No. 35) announced the end of denazification as of April 10th and, significantly, added that those former Nazis who had "atoned by honest labor" should now be allowed to help on a basis of full equality with "democratic

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[5] For a contrary view see J. Nettl, *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50* (London, 1951), especially Chapter IX, pp. 259-281.

[6] Limitations of space have made impossible the inclusion in this article of a case study of the *Deutsche Soziale Partei* exhibiting the commercial phase of nationalist-Communist collaboration.

and economic reconstruction." But this was only the opening of an intensive campaign of rehabilitation and political "synchronization" of the Nazi and militantly nationalist elements.

This was followed almost immediately by the appearance in East Berlin of the *National Zeitung.* This attempt by the Soviet authorities to win former Nazi party members to the support of Soviet policies for Germany and to chain them to the *SED* without having to compel them to join it, was in turn succeeded by the launching of a new party, called the National Democratic Party (*NDP*). Yet, while it was vehemently nationalistic and was allowed to campaign in the name of bourgeois interests for economic planning without socialism, political power rested securely in the hands of its first chairman and co-founder of the "National Committee for a Free Germany," the veteran Communist Dr. Lothar Bolz.[7] The executive committee and other important posts were filled by former officers, many of them former members of the "National Committee."

With the Berlin Blockade and the West's diplomatic response to it, the war for the minds and hearts of the Germans shifted onto another level. Faced with the establishment of NATO and the very probable integration of a "sovereign" West Germany into the Western alliance, the Soviet Union through the mouth of the Presidium of the East Zonal People's Council, on July 22, 1949 decreed the creation of an all-German "National Front."

The purpose was clear. A new nationalist campaign for reunification was to mobilize all the latent hostility to the West on the part of militant nationalists and Nazis and to stimulate their *"ohne mich"* neutralism. A public opinion so roused might well be expected to deny assent to the evidently NATO-oriented political developments in West Germany—an orientation behind which the guiding hand of the American High Commissioner could be only too clearly perceived.

The new "nationalist course," so reminiscent in some of its aspects of Karl Radek's "deviation" in 1923 and of the "Scheringer course" in 1930, clearly emerged on October 4, 1949 when the Executive Committee of the Socialist Unity Party (*SED*) called for a broad, national movement for the re-establishment of the political and economic unity of Germany. The resolution went on to condemn "certain doctrinaires" who still refused to "collaborate with such patriotic forces who do not belong to the working class and who do not as yet belong to the democratic camp."

This rehabilitation, even of the most unregenerate Nazi "militarists" and "fascists," was continued in the activity of both the "National Front" and the National Democratic Party, and was supplemented by the efforts of other organizations and newspapers which now began to make their appearance in the *Bundesrepublik.*

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[7] Bolz, who is at the present time Deputy Prime Minister of the *DDR* as well as Foreign Minister, has been a member of the *KPD* since his student days. After emigrating from Nazi Germany, Bolz worked at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow, became a Soviet citizen and member of the *CPSU*. *Cf. Deutscher Informationsdienst,* No. 814 May 26, p. 2.

III

Only rarely has the founding of an organization in postwar Germany attracted as much attention as the public appearance in 1950 of a mysterious "Brotherhood" (*Bruderschaft*), a sworn band of brothers, an order that was meant to recall the Teutonic Knights, but in fact aroused in Western minds memories of the dread *"Orgesch"* or "Organization Consul."

The beginnings of this organization go back to a British prisoner-of-war camp, where, in 1945-46, a former staff officer of the Division *"Gross Deutschland,"* Major Helmut Beck-Broichsitter, began discussions with like-minded fellow prisoners on the nature of the German catastrophe and ways of salvaging the future. The latter was to be done by searching for, and bringing together, the leadership élites on whom any future recovery of Germany would depend. On July 22, 1949 Beck organized in Hamburg a secret founding convention under the chairmanship of Karl Kaufmann, the former *Gauleiter* of Hamburg.[8]

The plan of action of the *Bruderschaft* had been worked out by the co-founder and theoretician of the order, the former adjutant of Otto Strasser and later SS official, Alfred Franke-Gricksch. The plan called for the recapture of power by the still living Nazi and nationalist revolutionary élite through a method of slow, methodical insinuation into governmental and party positions under cover of such secrecy or camouflage as might be necessary for the success of the venture.[9]

As to the foreign political demands of the "order," the re-birth of Germany as a predominant power was to be achieved by working for a neutralized, "third force" Europe, i.e. for unification of the European peoples into a *"Nation Europa"* without sacrificing to it, however, the national identity, the *"völkische Eigenleben,"* of the parts.

The alternative before Europe was not, as the Americans would make the Germans believe, war or bolshevism, but rather, a free Europe or World War III. The struggle for European freedom and independence included the fight for German freedom and equality. Bonn must be rejected as thoroughly as Pankow, HiCOG as decisively as SMA:

> We don't want the freedom of becoming a battleground. We don't want the arms of mercenaries. We want a free, independent Europe, and—hand in hand with the other peoples of Europe—we want the weapons to defend the freedom and independence of that Europe.[10]

But even at this early stage of development the *"Nation Europa"* tactic was paired with another plan for rebuilding Germany's position or, as the folkish jargon has it, "salvaging the biological substance of our race (*Volk*)"[11]: namely, to exploit the central position of Germany, in a period of ardent courting by East and West. "Remilitarization," writes Franke's Hanover representative, Voigt, in January 1950,

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[8] From a secret report allegedly written by the political advisor to the British *Land* Commissar of Northrhein-Westphalia, Read-Jahn. For a somewhat skeptical discussion of this document see *Der Spiegel,* VII. Jahrgang, No. 20, May 12, 1953, p. 5f.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] See Franke-Gricksch's article "Europe—Battlefield or Power Center?" in *Die Bruderschaft-Hannover,* Jan. 1950, pp 3-11.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

> is at this point out of the question. . . . German honor forbids us to let Germany become an article of commerce. . . . As long as German soldiers and the volunteers of Europe [Voigt means the foreign SS Legions. K.P.T.] who have fought along side of us against bolshevism and for a new Europe . . . still languish in Allied or German prisons, it would be unsoldierly or dishonorable for the German military to take sides.

The element of blackmail is made explicit in accounts of Franke-Gricksch's greatly increased activities in the summer of 1950, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War. On June 17, 1950, Lieutenant General Vincenz Müller, the commander of the East Zonal Garrisoned People's Police and vice-chairman of the Communist-organized National Democratic Party, had sent an open letter to all former Nazi party members and professional soldiers and officers in West Germany, calling for a joint effort on behalf of reunification. A month later, on July 18, 1950, Franke-Gricksch expressed his willingness to take up feelers to the East, as he put it, "to gain some leverage to force the Western Allies into making, at long last, basic concessions" to Germany.[12]

This was not a sudden decision. Ten days earlier Franke-Gricksch had reviewed the possibilities of a German-Soviet pact with the Munich correspondent of the East Zonal Berlin Broadcasting Corporation, Lörches. This talk was followed by further conversations with the Hamburg correspondent of the official East Zonal news agency (*ADN*), Burmeister, with the well-known *KPD* functionary, former *Reichswehr* Lieutenant and National Socialist, Scheringer, and with members of the *KPD* Executive Committee whom Franke-Gricksch allegedly requested to arrange a date for talks with Minister President Grotewohl.[13]

The co-leader of the *Bruderschaft,* Beck-Broichsitter, was at this juncture still travelling along similar paths. In the newsletter of August 1950 he hinted broadly at the experience of Tauroggen, when he argued against re-militarization, saying: "It should be carefully weighed in the light of the experiences of the Second World War, if political considerations should not *this* time be put ahead of military ones." A few days before, Beck had been asked to sign the Stockholm "Proclamation for the Outlawry of the Atom Bomb," and, after some reflection, did so.[14]

At the very same time that Beck "reinsured" himself in the East, he made preparations against the "red terror" at home. In a letter (of September 22, 1950) Beck-Broichsitter explained that he had worked out plans to organize vigilante groups whose very existence would prevent any "red terror." Should prevention become impossible, these para-military units, in any case, would be capable of coping with any "disturbance." A few days later (on October 6, 1950) Beck arranged a meeting with officials of the U. S. Consulate General in Hamburg to discuss means of winning the cold war in West Germany. A week later, Beck-Broichsitter sent to the U. S. Consul General his suggestions for mobilizing all young men in West Germany for the political battle against Communism and stipulated the price: all Beck was asking for was a *Volkswagen,* to provide the organizational leadership with the necessary mobility, and the relatively small sum of 2,000-3,000 DM per month for a headquarters.

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[12] From an unsigned report of a secret informer. Neither the accuracy of the report nor the reliability of the informant could be ascertained.

[13] "S-r," "Bruderschaft in West und Ost," *Frankfurter Rundschau,* March 3, 1951.

[14] The accession of Beck-Broichsitter to the Stockholm "Peace Petition" was announced by the SED Press Service. In an interview with *Deutsche Presse Agentur,* Beck denied having signed the document. *dpa* Inf. 929, August 8, 1950, p. 1.

> In 4-6 months [a network of fighters] could cover the entire West German Federal territory. At the same time it would mean an intensive supplement to your intelligence sources and information regarding the Communist National Front and the FDJ.[15]

At the time (fall and winter 1950-51) that Beck-Broichsitter attempted to sell his services to American officials and was busy establishing some contact between U. S. Headquarters in Heidelberg and sulking Nazi generals, like Guderian, he was also offering his services to Soviet authorities and attempting to establish clear channels of communication to the SMA in Karlshorst.

The Hamburg correspondent of the official East Zonal news service, *ADN,* Burmeister, had offered Beck's liaison man, Cavalry Captain Gerhard Boldt, his help in establishing contact with the Soviet Russian authorities in the East Zone and had even suggested the possibility of some material assistance.[16] This offer was avidly accepted by Beck in the name of the *Bruderschaft.* Beck-Broichsitter was asked to submit, even prior to the first meeting, a statement embracing his suggestions for collaboration as well as the conditions upon which such "partnership" could proceed most fruitfully. This resulted in a most interesting document,[17] which was signed by Boldt and given to Burmeister. Burmeister took a microfilm of the memorandum to East Berlin to discuss with a contact man from the SMA (a Russian major) the possibilities of further collaboration.

In the initial *"Stellungnahme,"* as the Beck-Boldt document was entitled, the importance of creating conditions conducive to "genuine partnership" was stressed. Beck and Boldt then proceeded to outline those areas in which Soviet and *Bruderschaft* interests coincided, i.e. those areas within which "genuine partnership" was possible and desirable:

> a) The aims of the *Bruderschaft* and your interest coincide in the fight against the re-militarization of West Germany. Beyond that is the common opposition to the Atlantic Pact and to the creation of a West German and West European "glacis" [battle ground] which is connected with it.
>
> b) Furthermore, our aims and interests coincide in the creation of a reunified Germany. In this connection the *Bruderschaft* stresses emphatic-

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[15] See also "S-r," "Bruderschaft in West und Ost," *loc. cit.*

[16] *Ibid. Cf. Hannoversche Presse,* Feb. 24, 1951 and F. J. Schmidt, "Bruderzwist in der Bruderschaft," *Süddeutsche Zeitung,* No. 48, Feb. 27, 1951.

[17] A photostat of a copy of the document is in my possession.

> ally that such a reunified Germany can be established only on the basis of absolute independence and of a genuine partnership with the other European peoples and states, including Russia and the Asiatic area.

Finally, the *"Stellungnahme"* suggested areas in which the assistance offered by Burmeister could be accepted. Burmeister had offered aid in the form of press propaganda and financial subvention. The press support, suggested Beck-Boldt, might most fruitfully be employed to camouflage the activities of the *Bruderschaft,* presumably by appropriate sham attacks on it from the East. Tactical details would be worked out "as required by circumstances" through conferences with Russian representatives.

The final part of the memorandum deals with the financial arrangements involved in the "genuine partnership." As the amalgam of cynical opportunism and romantic bathos emerges particularly clearly in this section it may be worth quoting *in extenso*:

> b) Financial assistance can and may only be rendered for the realization of the goals indicated above and must never become—to put it mildly—"financial influence." It would be quite as impossible to have the pay of the Grand Master and the expenses for the organizational bureau covered by means derived from sources outside the *Bruderschaft* as it would be unthinkable to attempt to influence the direction of march of the *Bruderschaft.* . . . The high conception of Honor must not be sullied in the least. . . . In particular, an effective activation of the work as outlined above would require the following: 1. A *Volkswagen* (or something like it) for the sake of mobility; 2. At least 1500 DM per month. This amount must be viewed as a very minimum as secretarial help, office expenditures and, above all, travel expenses can hardly be covered by it; 3. A one-time "starting sum" of 30,000 DM which includes the purchase price of the car.

While these concealed and devious negotiations, East and West, were going on, the internal cohesion of that small band of brethren, that self-styled élite of a reborn Germany, the *Bruderschaft,* was put to severe tests by the rivalry, jealousy and ideological divergence of its co-founders and co-leaders, Beck-Broichsitter and Franke-Gricksch. Franke became more and more unconditionally in favor of connection with the East. On January 19, 1951, in the course of a "workshop" at Bielefeld, Franke-Gricksch called for a radical turning away from Western defense systems in favor of developing foreign policy concepts along the line of Rapallo. Should, despite all opposition, West German rearmament materialize, a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union would become imperative.[18] The demand for a closer relationship with the East was based upon all the old national revolutionary, "socialist" arguments of the anti-plutocratic front, the front of youthful peoples, and the geo-political considerations of "Eastern space."

All this differed only in degree and, possibly, mode of rationalization from the activity of Beck-Broichsitter, at least until the end of 1950, when he despaired of a deal with the Soviets. Until that time, as we have seen, Beck had also looked to a *rapprochement* with the Russians, though on a basis of "playing both ends against the middle" rather than on a basis of unconditional partnership. On the whole, his practical suggestions for future action differed not very greatly from those offered by Franke-Gricksch and his SS friends.

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[18] *Aide-memoire* of one of the participants at that meeting.

[19] *Cf. Deutscher Informationsdienst,* No. 577, April 25, 1952, p. 3.

The rivalry was far more a matter of personal ambition and of the inherent momentum of two parallel, non-integrated and often conflicting intelligence apparatuses set up by Beck and Franke. These organizations tended not only to become bitter rivals but also to spend more time collecting incriminating materials about each other than establishing contacts with potential friends and enemies.

As the purpose of these sketches of organizational and ideological activity on the extreme "right" of German postwar politics is to demonstrate the nature of connections between that wing and the Soviet Zone or Soviet authorities, we need not pursue the further development of the feuding factions of the *Bruderschaft.* Beck-Broichsitter, borrowing ever more blatantly from the vocabulary and theatrical art of the Nazi movement, finally joined (together with his followers) the *Sozialistische Reichspartei* in June 1952. Franke-Gricksch, in turn, had literally disappeared from the political scene even earlier, in the fall of 1951. On September 29, 1951 he had voluntarily gone to East Berlin, had been arrested, charged with espionage and sentenced to death.[19] Repeated inquiries as to Franke's fate had remained unanswered. Finally, according to one published account, persons returning from Soviet prisons and labor camps brought back the news that Franke-Gricksch had not been executed, but had died in a prison camp.[20]

IV

In the spring of 1951 there took place in East Berlin a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party (*SED*) with members of the Executive Committee of the West German Communist Party (*KPD*), at which it was decided to found an organization in West Germany whose initial purpose was to serve as a propagandistic counterpoise to existing veterans' and officers' groups and, in the name of the revered memory of the almost legendary convention of Tauroggen, to organize the opposition of former soldiers and officers to the concept of a European Defense Community. In the second instance, this organization was to persuade veterans and officers to cooperate with the "National Front."[21]

Preparatory work was undertaken with the assistance of the former SS Lieutenant Colonel and battalion commander of the SS Division "Hitler Youth," Gerhard Hein. By May 1951, a sufficient number of former officers and professional soldiers had been mobilized by Hein to make possible a public convention at which a firmer organization could be decided upon.

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[20] *Deutscher Informationsdienst,* No. 658, June 5, 1957, p. 3. *Cf.* also *Parlamentarischer-Politischer Pressedienst* Inf. 21/52, Feb. 22, 1952, p. 4. See also *Deutscher Informationsdienst,* No. 255, March 11, 1953, p. 3f.; *cf.* also *Feinde der Demokratie* (Nordmark), No. 5, June 26, 1953.

[21] *Cf.* Demokratische Gesellschaft 1952, "Links und Rechts im 'Führungsring,'" p. 2 (n.d.)

This convention was held on June 2 and 3, 1951 in the small Lower Saxon town of Uelzen with some 450 former officers and soldiers in attendance.[22] The speakers, the SS man Hein, the *"Führer"* of the radical, paramilitary *Reichsjugend*, Herbert Münchow, and the fanatic Nazi conspirator and anti-Semite, Hek Rau (really *He*inz *E*ric *Krau*se), served to give this meeting an unmistakable extremist, nationalist coloration. At the same time the convention was also attended by Communist functionaries and "National Front" officials, as well as by the leaders of the East-oriented "Hitler Youth-leader-circle," William Jurczek and Hans M. G. Schmitz.[23] The conference agreed on the formation of a permanent organization under the name of *Führungsring ehemaliger Soldaten* (*FeS*).[24] An executive committee of fifteen members was elected. Most prominent, in terms of their future "contribution" to the organization, were the Executive-Secretary, SS Lt. Col. Hein, the former Chief Inspector of the Hitler Youth Training Camps, Lt. General Max Schrank, Field Marshal Rommel's adjutant, Col. Hanns Baier, *"Reichsführer"* Münchow, and the Communist functionary and instructor of the West German Committee of the "National Front," Joachim Lerche.

Shortly after the Uelzen meeting, Col. Baier and Gen. Schrank began to put out a newsletter (*Rundbrief*) in which they argued that the dangers from the East, against which West-German rearmament was to guard, were little more than hobgoblins of the overheated imagination of Western "Morgenthau-boys." On the other hand, the *Rundbrief* stressed the willingness of the East to arrive at an understanding.[25] The Western treaty arrangements were shown to lack a proper legal base[26] and resistance to them was called a civic duty. At the same time, the Tauroggen myth, anti-Western resentments, and extremist nationalism were carefully nurtured.

In the meantime a wave of meetings was organized which featured in particular SS Lt. Col. Hein and Herbert Münchow, and highlighted sentiments such as these:

> The Soviet Government managed to rouse the youth to its banner. If there should be war, I'd rather go to the enthusiastic youth of the East, who surely will win if pitted against the lame West. The youth of the East Zone still believe that they have something worth defending.[27]

Despite initial successes, the *FeS* in December 1951 was almost rent asunder by an internal power struggle which ended in Hein's expulsion and his subsequent exposé of his dealings with the East Zone. These explosive revelations, however, did not lead, as might have been expected, to the immediate dissolution of the *FeS.* The *Führungsring* continued to work for the dissemination of its anti-West, pro-Soviet, shrilly nationalist and neutralist "Tauroggen" propaganda, though admittedly with diminished vigor.

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[22] Some of the participants represented relatively large nationalist organizations. See *Deutscher Informationsdienst*, No. 84, June 8, 1951 and No. 94, July 14, 1951.

[23] For details on the Hitler Jugend-Leaders-Circle see *PZ-Archiv*, Cologne, Feb. 5, 1952, p. 38ff.

[24] *Cf. dpa* Inf. 1550, October 20, 1951. According to a confidential report, Wolfgang Sarg, the Chairman of *Natinform*, an extreme, nationalistic, antisemitic information-gathering organization, insisted (on Jan. 16, 1953) that Hek Rau had no further connection with the *FeS*.

[25] See e.g. Christopher Feld, "Kann man mit den Sowjets verhandeln?", *Rundbrief*, No. 7, May 1952, p. 1ff.

[26] *Rundbrief* No. 10, Oct. 1952, p. 1ff.

[27] Münchow, according to an eyewitness account of a meeting in Flensburg, middle of October, 1951.

One of the permanent contributors to the *Rundbriefe,* Rudolf Steidl, an ardent Sudeten German Nazi who had settled in Bavaria after the war and had become active in refugee affairs, was approached in November 1951 by the *KPD* official directly in charge of the activization of front organizations. The official, Oskar Neumann, wanted to know if Steidl was willing to publish a military information bulletin which reflected his extreme nationalist, anti-Western "Tauroggen-oriented" neutralism. Steidl was.

The result was a military information service called *"Internationale Militärkorrespondenz"* (*IMK*) which made its first appearance in February 1952. It became the particular function of Steidl to propagate the famous Soviet Russian proposals (of March 10, 1952) for a peace treaty with Germany after consultation with an all-German government. The *IMK* argued that a German contribution to the Western "defensive position" was not only futile but highly dangerous and that the military interests of Germany demanded now, as they have constantly done since the time of Frederick the Great, an agreement with the East, this time on the basis of the Soviet proposals of March 1952.

The *IMK* was to serve as the basis for action groups. The circle of readers was to be organized into an *"Arbeitsgemeinschaft für nationale Wehrfragen,"* with local "workshops" and pressure and agitation groups.[28] For the purpose of their activation, Steidl arranged a number of widely publicized meetings which were conspicuous not only by their capacity to attract a relatively large number of general and staff officers but also by their opulence. This alone created a great deal of suspicion in the barely solvent Germany of 1952. In addition, these meetings frequently featured speeches or discussion by prominent members of the *Führungsring* of whom it was by now known that they maintained friendly relations to the leaders of the "National Front."[29]

Accordingly, it was decided to discontinue the *IMK* and withdraw Steidl from public view. What was needed was a man whose name and personality would "draw" in nationalist-military circles. Steidl found him in Ernst von Reichenau, the brother of the late Field Marshal.

Barely a month after the *IMK* had quietly suspended publication, there appeared, in October 1952, a journal called *Militärpolitisches Forum* (*MiFo*) with von Reichenau as its putative publisher and editor-in-chief.

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[28] See *Deutscher Informationsdienst,* No. 184, June 25, 1952, p. 3f.

[29] See "S-r," "Ein Mann namens Rudolf Steidl," *Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaftszeitung,* No. 34, April 28, 1954, p. 13, and *cf. Feinde der Demokratie* (Nordmark), No. 3, Dec. 8, 1952.

Though subtitled "Independent Journal for Problems of Germany's National Security," the content of the new Steidl-Reichenau venture left little doubt as to its orientation and its financial backing.

The extremist nationalist attack against Bonn and the Federal Republic in *MiFo* was constant and intractable.

> There must be no recognition of and declaration of loyalty to a mere provisional administrative apparatus. One's feelings toward the Bonn Republic must be similar to those one harbors for a revenue office. The only national task of the Federal Republic is its self-liquidation.[30]

Neutrality, the *Militärpolitisches Forum* argued, is a perfectly feasible German foreign policy as Russia's center of gravity lies in Asia and hence presents no danger to Germany whatsoever. Consequently, it would be dangerous in the extreme for Germany to enter into treaty relations with nations such as England, France, the Netherlands and the United States, whose interests in Asia are threatened by Russia. The German people and especially its former professional soldiers must reject any scheme such as the EDC. For the unregenerate Nazis, arguments such as the above were garnished with the assurance that documents from the year 1939-40 prove that Hitler at that time also shared this conception of the Asian "center of gravity" of Russia. Finally, almost every number of the *MiFo* was replete with hints that Russia had been the historical and traditional friend of Germany, whereas England, for instance, to the contrary, had always been the enemy of German unity.[31]

On December 4, 1952, von Reichenau extended invitations for a meeting on questions of defense policy to 346 persons, of whom approximately 160 actually appeared at Stuttgart-Feuerbach, almost one third of them being Generals.[32] Again, all travel expenses were paid, as were the hotel bills and the restaurant expenses of the participants. This meeting attracted, besides high staff officers, such notorious Hitlerites as Sepp Huber,[33] Waldemar Schütz, DRP politician and publisher exclusively of Nazi, Fascist, and nationalist authors,[34] and, above all, Col. Hans-Ulrich Rudel, the patron saint of all the most radical nationalist organizations and movements. Rudel, just returned from Argentina, was greeted with thunderous applause.

Shortly after this meeting, which created considerable furor in West Germany, reports circulated which tarnished the nationalist lustre of von

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[30] *Cf.* the selections presented in *Deutscher Informationsdienst,* No. 370, May 17, 1954, p. 2f.

[31] *Ibid.,* No. 228, Dec. 3, 1952, p. 3f.

[32] See "S-r," "Ein Mann namens Rudolf Steidl," *loc. cit.* and "Bürgerbräuromantik—Nationalbolschewismus unter dem Banner der Nationalen Pflichterfüllung," *Christ und Welt,* Dec. 18, 1952.

[33] The fellow-publisher, with Hek Rau, of the unrestrained, *Stürmer*-type *Deutschland Brief,* and "charter member" of the conspiratorial *"Bewegung Reich."*

[34] Such as Hans Grimm, Maurice Bardèche, Dieter Vollmer, Alfred Rosenberg, Col. H. U. Rudel, Gen. Guderian and SS Gen. Hausser.

[35] For details see confidential report of a leadership meeting of the radical Nazi intelligence organization *Natinform,* January 16-19, 1953.

Reichenau's name[35] and, in fact, made it imperative to withdraw him from public view. Steidl replaced von Reichenau with Col. (i. R.) H. O. von Berchem as "owner-publisher" of the *Militärpolitisches Forum*. But the veil had already been lifted too far from the publishing and organizational efforts to repair their severely damaged reputation. Like the *Führungsring* and Steidl's own *Internationale Militärkorrespondenz* before, the *MiFo* had become useless for clandestine nationalist-Communist collaboration. Though von Berchem could continue publication, a new start had to be made, more elaborate, better camouflaged than anything ever tried before.

The rapid developments on the international scene also called for increased Soviet activity in building a camouflaged opposition in West Germany to the Adenauer course of cooperation with NATO. The ratification of the EDC treaties had to be stopped and, if possible, Adenauer defeated at the forthcoming elections in 1953. Only a broadly conceived nationalist party enveloping all existing national oppositional elements from the old liberals and "1848'ers" to conservative revolutionaries and unreconstructed Nazis, and securely under Communist control, could stem the tide. Something like this conception had been the basis for the negotiations of SS Lt. Col. Hein of the *Führungsring* with the Hitler Youth leader Jurczek and the *KPD* emissary Claudia Kuhr a year before, in the autumn and winter of 1951. If such a party had been a matter of urgency for Soviet policy then, it had become still more important after the signing of the Bonn agreements and the Paris Treaty of May 1952.[36]

While organizational work was to start without delay and was to use the cadres won through the *Führungsring*, the *IMK* and the *MiFo*, a "catalyst and organizing factor" for the new party had to be devised. This was done in the form of a new, well-contrived and widely distributed weekly newspaper. On August 21, 1953, two weeks before the federal elections, the *Deutsche National Zeitung* (*DNZ*) made its first appearance in Munich.

The personnel make-up of this new venture in nationalist-Soviet collaboration is not uninteresting. As putative publisher appeared a refugee air force colonel, who was closely associated with such militant Nazis as Hek Rau, Sepp Huber, and Col. Rudel. The domestic politics desk was turned over to the former SS Major General Fritz Brehm, and Dr. Hans W. Hagen, formerly of the Goebbels Ministry, took charge of the cultural page. Both Brehm and Hagen belonged to a group of irrevocably committed national socialists who persisted in maintaining continuous contact with the *Bruderschaft,* the Naumann circle, and fascist groups abroad, especially in Switzerland, France, Italy and the Near East. For the position of Military Editor, Steidl engaged Werner Schäfer, who had been the first concentration camp commander in Germany and had earned his spurs in the particularly notorious peet bog camps of Emsland and later in Oranienburg. Totally incompetent as an editor, Schäfer was very soon relieved of this position and began to be used as the go-between responsible for the safe transport of the operating funds from *SED* headquarters in East Berlin to Munich. Later the editorial board was augmented by Paul Schall (alias Stadtler), an Alsatian irredentist who had become District Leader of the *NSDAP* in Strassburg after its occupation by German troops.[37]

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[36] *Cf.* Steidl's "confessions," *Deutsche National Zeitung*, Sondernummer, Aug. 1955.

Wildly nationalist, rabidly anti-Western, especially anti-American, the *DNZ* argued for a Swiss-type armed neutrality for Germany.[38] Its main purpose was clearly to mobilize opposition to the EDC treaty. Every issue of the paper rang new changes on the theme of opposition *à outrance.* In the course of this effort, the attacks against Bonn proved far more numerous and more vehement than against Pankow, and the West was far more bitterly criticized than the East—though, admittedly, neither Pankow nor Karlshorst were spared occasional, mild criticism.

Yet, despite an auspicious beginning, serious personal rivalries soon hampered the work of the editors. At the same time, increasing misunderstanding with, and pressure from, the East only stirred the mutual hostility and suspicion of the Steidl team. Finally, in June 1954, Steidl dismissed his editor-in-chief and closed down the *Deutsche National Zeitung.*

A few weeks after the last number of the *Deutsche National Zeitung* had come off the presses, a new weekly paper appeared, called *Die Nation.* As joint owners of the publishing firm appeared, for the public record, the names of four previous managers of the *Deutsche National Zeitung.* The editors listed were the old *DNZ* editors Herman Schaefer, Paul Schall, Dr. Hans W. Hagen and Col. i. R. Max Kemmerich, Military Editor of Steidl's second venture, the *Militärpolitisches Forum,* fanatic Ludendorff sectarian and formerly active supporter of the outlawed neo-Nazi *Sozialistische Reichspartei* (*SRP*). The Lower Saxon office was headed by Count Wolf Westarp, a founder of the *SRP.* Not appearing on the masthead, but playing an important rôle behind the scenes,[39] were Werner Schäfer and SS General Joachim Nehring.[40] The latter had been a leader of an underground organization, the *Bund,* which had maintained close relations with the *Bruderschaft* and had published, and clandestinely distributed in 1948-49, mimeographed newsletters entitled *Der Scheinwerfer* ("The Searchlight").

Editorially the *Nation,* more circumspect in tone than the *DNZ,* insisted that it represented the Third Force which was to mediate between the two power blocs, and that vis-à-vis Moscow there must be a policy of negotiation, not one of "massive retaliation," and "positions of strength." Though under intense attack by pro-Western newspapers and government-subsidized anti-Communist organizations, the paper existed until July 31, 1955, a week after the startling press conference of Rudolf Steidl in which he revealed the inner workings of "front organizations" and his own and his colleagues' rôle in them.

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[37] See *Deutscher Informationsdienst,* No. 751, July 11, 1959, p. 2ff.

[38] E.g. *DNZ,* Feb. 27, 1954.

[39] According to Steidl, at least. See Sondernummer of *Deutsche National Zeitung,* Aug. 1955, p. 3.

[40] There were also associated with this venture the radical Hitler Youth ideologist Gottfried Griessmayer, his friend, the veteran Kapp-putschist and nationalist revolutionary Wilhelm Kiefer, and Bruno Fricke, Otto Strasser's erstwhile representative in Germany.

If Steidl's "exposé" made the quick disappearance of the *Nation* inevitable this had not come without months of bitter feuding behind the scenes between those of the corporation who protected the interests of their Soviet-Zonal patrons[41] and those who wished to use Soviet money for their own, nationalist goals.[42] Much of the disagreement was caused by the activities of Nehring in connection with a new wave of nationalist-Soviet activity, the soldiers' conferences.

Half a year after his return from Russian captivity, Field Marshal Frederick Paulus, who throughout the previous ten years had worked closely with Soviet authorities, played host in East Berlin to 87 officers, 37 of whom had come from the Federal Republic. This conference of January 29-30, 1955 was to be the first of a series of all-German officers' meetings through which reunification was to be dramatically furthered, presumably by the massive revitalization of the Tauroggen myth. Besides offering a forum for anti-Western, neutralist propaganda, the Berlin conference also made possible the establishing of firmer connections between Soviet-Zonal authorities and West German nationalists and Nazis. The details of the meeting had been arranged primarily by Nehring with the help of former SS General (former *Bruderschaft* district leader and *Land* Chairman of the *Deutsche Reichspartei*) Georg Ebrecht.

Two months later, in April 1955, some of the former SS officers and Nazi functionaries who had attended the first officers' conference formed a permanent association under the title of "Workshop on Questions of National Defense" (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft Nationale Wehrfragen*) under the chairmanship of SS General Ebrecht. One of its tasks was to prepare for a much larger all-German soldiers' meeting in East Berlin on June 11-12, 1955.[43] For this meeting Ebrecht had invited 2,000 "Tauroggeners," of whom some 350 attended, together with about 200-220 former officers from the Soviet Zone. Violently anti-Western and virulently anti-American speeches alternated with fulsome repetitions of the clichés and stereotypes of militant German nationalism, to prepare the way for a resolution in which the participants declared their goal to be a "reunited, neutral Germany which is safeguarded and defended by its own national army."[44]

The gains registered by the Ebrecht-Nehring efforts to propagate the Tauroggen myth among anti-Western nationalist officers and soldiers were consolidated by the creation, in October 1955, of a "League for German

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[41] Werner Schäfer, Joachim Nehring and Paul Schall.

[42] Brehm, Greeven, Hans Ulrich Steuer (not to be confused with the conservative nationalist member of the Northrhein Westphalian *Landtag*, Lothar Steuer). For details see *Deutscher Informationsdienst,* No. 492, Aug. 10, 1955, p. 4f.

[43] See "*Rundschreiben* No. 1" of General Ebrecht, quoted in full in *Deutscher Informationsdienst,* No. 471, May 25, 1955, p. 4. *Cf. Die Brücke,* Folge 12, II. Jahrg., Dec., 1955, p. 6.

[44] Quoted in H. Bohn, "Die patriotische Karte in der sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik (III)" *Ost Probleme,* No. 42, Oct. 21, 1955, p. 1613 and in *Deutscher Informationsdienst,* No. 471, May 25, 1955, p. 4.

Unity and Questions of National Defense" (later just "League for German Unity"), which became the substitute for the *FeS*. This organization also took over the erstwhile organ of the *FeS*, the *Militärpolitisches Forum*, which from the middle of 1956 on has been published by Joachim Nehring, recently under the new title *Nationalpolitisches Forum*.[45]

The purpose of the new organization and its press is still the fusing into one powerful political phalanx of all nationalist oppositional groups whose main goal is speedy reunification. Appealing especially to former officers of the *Wehrmacht* and of the SS, the "League" rejects all military ties with the West as impediments to early unification and uses the *Nationalpolitisches Forum* for the "mobilization of public opinion against Bonn's policies of atomic rearmament and continued political division."[46]

The shift of emphasis in resistance from Western integration to atomic rearmament was largely due to the fact that, by 1957, reluctant but general acceptance of the facts of German integration into the Western military alliance system and of remilitarization had sharply reduced the effectiveness of Russian and East German efforts in influencing West German public opinion through nationalist military circles. About that time, however, the enormous excitement and passionate controversy occasioned by the prospect of equipping the West German army with atomic weapons (or even of stockpiling nuclear armaments on German soil) gave new impetus, scope, and direction to Communist management of nationalist-neutralist resentments. Under protective cover of the fact that the Social Democrats (*SPD*) had adopted the "Fight Against Atomic Death" as *the* campaign issue in the elections of September 1957 and that it has remained the battle cry of their left wing—despite the slogan's proven political impotency—Communist front organizations have worked feverishly to construct a broad coalition against Adenauer's foreign policy, which includes not only pacificist, democratic organizations but also nationalist-neutralists of the extreme right. Throughout 1958 scores of organizations were founded, hundreds of meetings organized in the Federal Republic which reflected this broader base of operations—and, incidentally, the influx of apparently unlimited funds. In organizations such as, for instance, the "Permanent Congress against Atomic Rearmament" the right-radical "League of the New Order," under the leadership of former *SRP* officials, is working side by side with disaffected neutralist leftists and Communist front organizations; while meetings, such as the "Congress for Disengagement and Neutrality" organized by Otto Strasser in October 1958, are staged to bring together representatives from neo-Nazi and international fascist organizations with delegates from the East-Zonal Communist-led Liberal Party and National Democratic Party.

V

It would lead to serious misunderstanding of the nature of joint nationalist-Communist action in West Germany and of its political potential not to take seriously the incessantly repeated asseveration by the men involved in this collaboration that they are not Communists. On the contrary, the effectiveness—actual or potential—of mutual political support depends on the fact that the nationalist participants are neither Communists nor, in most cases, friendly to Communism. They may well, and do, insist on maintaining that foreign political collaboration with the Soviet Union must not in the least lead to tolerance of Communism within Germany.

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[45] Paul Schall-Stadtler, former Editor of Steidl's *Deutsche National Zeitung* and later of the nationalist-neutralist *Nationale Rundschau* became, in September 1958, permanent contributor to the *Nationalpolitisches Forum*.

[46] See "Der Bund für deutsche Einheit e.v." *Gesellschaft zum Studium der Zeitfragen*, Vol. VIII/IX, April 3, 1958, p. 8.

Their aim is not a Soviet Germany but an anti-Marxist, unified, neutral, armed, German-socialist corporative state which would lead a "third force" movement between the hostile power blocks of plutocratic capitalism and totalitarian bolshevism. As these aims are partially irreconcilable with the desires of the *SED* under Walter Ulbricht, many of the "Eastern" connections of these groups circumvent both the West German CP (*KPD*) and the East German *SED* and go directly to the Russian Embassy in East Berlin or even to Moscow. Hence it is also unwise to scoff, in every case, at the assurances frequently given that the nationalist-neutralist circles are independent of the *SED*.[47]

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the purely opportunist, tactical element in nationalist-Communist relationships leads to even greater lability and combustibility. To this fact the evanescence of journals, *"Arbeitskreise,"* organizations and committees which follow each other in bewildering rapidity bears eloquent witness. With every failure, with every conflict, illusions are dashed, hopes are disappointed and the number of willing or unconscious "front men" is reduced. But, as long as there are millions in West Germany who have not yet made their peace with the Bonn Republic, the "Adenauer course" or the new democratic *Bundeswehr,* and who continue to stand aside in attitudes of varying degrees of contempt, distrust and resentment; and, above all, as long as a possibility of reunification through accommodation with the Soviet Union exists, the possibility of political blackmail will not fail to exercise a certain attractive power and collaboration with the emissaries of the East will persist.

It is—at this writing—too early to gauge the impact on nationalist-Communist collaboration of Russia's latest move in the cold war. The gambit of threatening to abrogate the four-power status of Berlin was not played without anticipting its effect on widespread nationalist and neutralist sentiment in West Germany. The organizational weapon forged by the extreme "left" and "right" may yet—after years of frustration and apparent failure—come into its own, and this may happen in the distressingly near future.

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[47] Journalistic disregard of this elementary fact has not infrequently brought victory to these groups in the courtroom in slander suits. In a typical case of this sort the radical, neo-Nazi but West-oriented *Deutsche Soldatenzeitung* was forced by court action to withdraw publicly the assertion that Joachim Nehring had political contacts with *SED* headquarters and received funds from the *SED*. See *Bulletin on German Questions,* No. 222/223, Oct. 20, 1958.

FERMENT IN THE POLISH CLASSROOM*

by Jacob Ornstein

THE subject of education in the East European satellites, while by no means neglected, has not yet received much detailed treatment by Western scholars. Today, however, almost fifteen years after the Communist seizure of power, it is time to take stock of the extent to which the educational model imposed by Moscow is actually being followed in the various lands. To students of Central European affairs, it can hardly come as a surprise that it is precisely Poland where deviation from the Soviet pattern has reached the greatest proportions. Although touching upon other germane issues as well, this paper will be mainly concerned with studying that country's daring experiment in resisting Soviet indoctrination in the classroom.

That the Communist régime assigns a high priority to education as an instrument of power is a truism. In a conversation with H. G. Wells, Joseph Stalin once said: "Education is a weapon the efficacy of which depends upon the one who holds it in his hands, and the one who is to be struck down by it." Stated in briefest terms, Communist education aims at producing the "New Man," equipped with practical skills for a technological society and inculcated with attitudes which make him a loyal and pliant subject of a rigidly controlled state.

Recent popular uprisings, spearheaded by disillusioned Polish and Hungarian youth, nurtured in the Soviet-type educational system, as well as anti-Soviet manifestations in East Germany, have demonstrated that the classroom in those lands is an important source of resistance to Communist efforts. Observers who predicted a generation of conformists, *à la* Milosz's Ketman, have been at a loss to explain away these defections from or antagonism to Soviet domination on the part of the youth, the very segment of the population which stood to benefit most from the régimes and which has been most assiduously cultivated by them.

It is scarcely surprising, in view of the peculiar circumstances which have conditioned the development of Poland, that the Soviet masters should have found its people so hostile and unreceptive to alien indoctrination. Centuries of foreign domination and oppression—now by Slav, now by Teuton—served as the crucible in which the Polish *hard duchu* was forged, giving that people long and effective experience in maintaining tenaciously the identity of their institutions and social patterns, while presenting a façade of conformity. If one adds to this the phenomenon of Russophobia, so characteristic of Polish attitudes since the Middle Ages, as well as a deep religiosity and traditional attachment to Western patterns, a picture emerges of a background extremely hostile to the implantation by a foreign power of Marxist educational structure and ideology.

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When the Communists seized power in Poland in 1945, they inherited the ruins of a school system which had been one of the best in Europe. Traditionally oriented toward Western culture, Poland prided itself on a humanistic tradition going back to the Middle Ages. During the many years of partitions, Polish education fared variously in different regions, but by the eve of World War II, although access to higher education was limited, the quality of instruction was generally at a high level.[1]

The tragic events of World War II took a heavy toll of the Polish schools. It has been estimated that about 40 per cent of the nation's teachers perished. However, the Polish people, no strangers to the struggle against oppression, even during the German occupation organized and maintained a surprisingly large network of underground schools and teacher-training institutions.[2] Considerably before Hitler's defeat, plans were being laid for the reconstruction of education in postwar Poland. Under the Nazis education had been reduced to almost nil, with the exception of a tiny amount of primary schooling and some technical training to feed the German labor force. "The Poles do not need universities or secondary schools," wrote Governor-General Hans Frank, "The Polish lands are to be changed into an intellectual desert."

Thus the Communists, assuming control even before V-J Day, were faced with the two-fold task of reconstructing the school system in the physical sense and of imposing a Soviet-type educational pattern.[3] Three distinct phases may be noted in this development. The first of these was the period of the Three-Year Plan of 1947-49. During this time the régime concentrated on the elementary and secondary school, making a vigorous effort to admit an ever-growing number of youngsters at these levels. Of great significance was the decree of October 28, 1947 on the organization of science and education, centralizing power in the Ministry of Education, and doing away with the academic freedom so jealously guarded by Polish educational institutions, particularly those of higher learning.[4]

The second phase, corresponding to the Six-Year Plan of 1950-55, paid much more attention to higher education and to the preparation of personnel for jobs in industry, which meant a tremendous increase in the emphasis on technical education. In addition, stress was placed on the intensification of ideological training in Marxism-Leninism. The decree of December 15, 1951 on higher education and scientific personnel called for in form as well as content. On paper at least, Polish educational structure was a replica of the Soviet model. For example, scientific research was placed under the administration and control of the recently established Polish Academy of Science.[5]

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[1] See Adam Vetulani, *Les écoles supérieures,* III (Neufchâtel, 1946-47), 184-96. R. Szepiętowski, "Elementary Schools in Poland, Pre-war and Post-war," *Polish Science and Learning,* No. 5 (1944), 43-47.

[2] See "J.Z.," "Prace podziemne w czasie okupacji:Nauka i szkolnictwo wyższe," *Nauka Polska,* XXV (1947), 196-213; Jerzy Alexandrowicz, "Szkolnictwo wyższe i nauka," *Oświata i wychowanie,* X (Jan., 1938), 57-66.

[3] See John S. Reshetar, "The Educational Weapon," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CLXXI (Sept., 1950), 144f.

[4] *Dziennik Ustaw,* Warsaw, X (1947), No. 66, Law No. 415.

The third phase, coinciding with the Five-Year Plan, was initiated in 1956 and is to end in 1960. To the Western observer, this is the period of greatest interest, since it coincides with the "decompression" period which followed Stalin's death. During this time a full-scale revolt has taken place, further radical changes, in the direction of a system which would be socialist supported by Communists and non-Communists alike, against the slavish imitation of the Soviet educational model and its forcible transplantation to Polish soil.

The Polish school system, like that of the Soviet Union, is intended to indoctrinate and educate "from the cradle to the grave." At the base of the nation's school structure are the crèches for children under three, designed to release mothers for work in industry. At the summit are the higher collegiate institutions and the network of special programs, including correspondence-extension courses for adults, intended to improve their effectiveness in their specialties or simply to indoctrinate them in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism.

Training properly begins with the nursery schools for children between three and seven years of age. While no formal instruction is offered, play and group activities are designed to imbue the tots with the spirit of Communism at this most impressionable age.

Formal teaching begins at the age of seven, when the youngsters commence a four-year or seven-year primary school. Those who complete the seven years of schooling may go on to a four-year general high school or lyceum. Often the elementary and secondary grades are combined into an eleven-year school.

Two types of secondary schools are in existence: the general high school or lyceum and the vocational or technical school. In the general high school curriculum about one third of the time is devoted to science and mathematics and one third to foreign languages, of which two must be studied. Of the remaining time, about half is devoted to history and geography, and the rest to art, physical education, games and military training.[6]

Those who do not attend the general high school may enter a trade school of two years duration to become skilled workers in industry or agriculture. Still others attend the technicum, a four- or five-year secondary semiprofessional school. It is similar to the general high school, but emphasizes science and also prepares students for university admission and more advanced specialization. The main rôle of the technicum, however, is to furnish administrative and supervisory personnel for industrial production.

To a large extent Poland appears to parallel, at present, the stage reached about 25 years ago by the Soviet Union, when, as Nicholas De Witt points out:

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[5] *Dziennik Ustaw,* Warsaw, X (1952), No. 6, Law No. 38. *Cf.* also Maurycy Jareszyński, Józef Litwin and Walery Taborski, *Prawo Szkół Wyższych* (Warsaw, 1955) . p. xxv ff.

[6] Brian Simon, *Education in the New Poland* (London, 1954) p. 25ff.

> . . . it was generally conceived that the primary and secondary schools should provide general education to such an abundantly large number of young people that there would be no difficulty in selecting available talent for specialized training on the higher steps of the educational ladder.[7]

Up until now a gross amount of the Polish educational effort has been devoted to broadening the base of the school system by vastly expanding primary and secondary facilities. According to official statistics, while, in 1937-38, 14,000 pupils completed the general high school, in 1955-56 a total of 29,900 were graduated. The vocational high schools (trade schools) graduated 33,000 students in 1937-38, while in 1955-56 the number had risen to 89,900.[8]

In 1955 there were eight universities, eleven medical academies, nine technical universities, eight engineering colleges, seven agricultural colleges, nine higher economic schools and twenty-three colleges for art and teacher training,[9] as well as a network of extension and correspondence higher schools.[10]

The régime has made capital through its mass media for both foreign and domestic consumption of the quantitative gains made by the Polish school system. One of its proudest claims refers to rural education. Pointing out that in 1937-1938 most country schools were of the four-year type, and a large number of peasants only semi-literate, it boasts that the number of seven-year schools has grown from 4,380 in that prewar year, attended by almost 45 per cent of the youngsters, to 14,753 in 1955-56, attended by almost 90 per cent of the country youth. By 1960 it is hoped to make the seven-year school compulsory throughout the entire land.[11]

Much is made of the accomplishments of higher education. According to official Communist statistics, the number of institutions of higher learning has grown from 32 in 1937-38 to 76 in 1956-57.[12] Enrollment has, according to the régime, more than tripled. In 1937-38 there were 49,500 students enrolled in higher institutions, while the number in 1956-57 had risen to 170,300. The network of correspondence-extension courses, poorly developed in the prewar years, now includes 32,911 students.[13]

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[7] Nicholas De Witt, *Soviet Professional Manpower* (Washington, 1955) p. 67.

[8] Central Statistical Office, *Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Poland, 1957*. Translated by U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, XVII (Washington, 1958), 316f.

[9] Janina Wójcicka, "Education," in *Poland*, ed. Oscar Halecki (New York, 1957), pp. 188-92.

[10] For excellent analyses of the Polish educational system up to 1952 consult Tadeusz Sulimirski, "Szkolnictwo powszechne i średnie oraz oświata pozaszkolna," *Kultura* (Paris), Numer specjalny I, (1952), 141-71. "Szkolnictwo wyższe i nauka," *ibid.*, pp. 172-212. 'Primary, Secondary and Adult Education," in *The Pattern of Life of Poland*, III (Paris, 1952), 11-42.

[11] Janina Borowska, "Czy rzeczywiście pustka?" *Trybuna Ludu*, Jan. 16, 1957.

[12] *Statistical Yearbook*, p. 316f.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 316f.

Another boast of the régime is the fact that higher education is free to a majority of deserving students through a system of state scholarships.

Perhaps the most touted achievement is the "democratization" of higher education. The policy of discrimination against children of "bourgeois" origin in favor of worker and peasant families was only recently relaxed to allow the criterion of pure ability freer play.[14] Nevertheless, from all indications, the process of "democratization" has gone very far indeed, as the following comparative table[15] will indicate:

Social Origin	*1935*	*1954-55*
Workers	9.9	34.8
Peasants	11.7	24.9
White-collar workers	38.2	35.4
Others	40.2	4.9

As elsewhere in the Communist world, both secondary and higher schooling tend to emphasize not the humanities, but rather vocational and scientific-technical training. The statement is frequently encountered in the general press and in educational literature that since 1945 almost a million students have graduated from vocational schools of various types. In the 1945-55 period about 150,000 degrees were awarded by higher institutions.[16]

Although statistically these much-vaunted achievements in the educational sector are impressive, the Polish teaching profession took advantage of the liberal atmosphere of the "thaw" to subject their school system to devastating criticism and attack, unparalleled anywhere else in Eastern Europe. So great and loud was the chorus of criticism, led by the now defunct journal *Po Prostu*, and coming from Communists and non-Communists alike, that the régime in 1955 undertook a vast program of educational reform.

The school reform already in motion was given tremendous impetus by the October 1956 revolution, when at last anti-Soviet sentiments, simmering for the past ten years, came violently to the fore. The Polish youth, on which the régime had lavished so much attention, turned against it with an intensity that had hardly been anticipated.

The reasons for the disenchantment of youth with the new Communist régime were various in nature. One of the most cogent of these was family pressure, and the determined efforts, particularly of the devout female members of the household, to counteract the "godless" education to which their children were being exposed. Another was the influence of the Church itself, which will be touched upon in somewhat more detail below. It must be borne in mind that religious education was never completely abolished in the primary and secondary schools, and that the clergy, particularly in the more remote rural areas, continued to exercise considerable influence.

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[14] See Neal Buhler and Stanley Żukowski, *Discrimination in Education in the People's Democracies* (New York, 1955), p. 12ff.

[15] From J. Wójcicka, "Education . . . ," p. 193. See also *Trybuna Ludu,* May 11, 1958.

[16] J. Wójcicka, "Education . . . ," p. 190. "Szkolnictwo wyższe u progu planu 5-letniego," (Rozmowa z Wice-Minister E. Krassowską), *Życie Szkoły Wyższej,* II, 1956, 5.

Moreover, the lack of vocational opportunity, contrasting so painfully with the promises made by the régime, induced a large segment of Polish youth to become thoroughly disillusioned with Communism.

The failure of the régime to capture the allegiance of young people was nowhere more dramatically expressed than in the eclipse of the youth organizations, so basic to the Communist pattern of indoctrination. The *Związek Polskiej Młodzieży*, corresponding to the Soviet Komsomol, had deteriorated to such an extent by the end of 1956 that the régime chose to dissolve it. It was replaced by the *Związek Młodzieży Socialistycznej* (ZMS) and the *Związek Młodzieży Wiejskiej* (*ZMW*). A year ago the *Tygodnik Powszechny* declared that there are no longer any youth organizations, and the number of members is insignificant.[17] According to it, philosophical discussions are carried out on "the fringes of organized life," in clubs and informal social groups.

Shaken by the attacks against the educational system, particularly the higher institutions, the régime took steps not only to seek improvement of teaching programs and techniques, but also to loosen the strangle-hold which the Party had gained over the entire school system. There was no single measure which could have met with more widespread approval on the part of both teachers and students. In 1957 Minister of Education Władysław Bieńkowski, himself a Communist of course, in a programmatic statement covering many phases of the reorganization painted a graphic picture of the plight of the teacher during the heyday of Polish Stalinism:

> The teacher was subjected to political censure, and ceased to be a teacher-educator. He became instead a bureaucrat, issuing formulas, programs and manuals as well as political circulars giving "instructions" on how to explain this or that social phenomenon. . . . The degradation of the teacher in the social hierarchy went so far that his prestige was much below that of any rural activist. . . .[18]

Coupled with this reduction of political influence in the schools was the de-emphasis of the grossly unpopular compulsory instruction in Marxism-Leninism in higher institutions, which by now has become pretty much an optional subject. This was without question the most popular measure undertaken by the reform. Aside from the general antipathy to the content of such courses, the manner in which they were taught apparently did little to make them palatable. Karol Kołtowski describes many instructors in Marxism as: "Poorly prepared, not knowing their subject well, lecturers on Marxism often compounded their ignorance by a teaching method marked by buffoonery, rote repetition and endless citing of quotations."[19]

Rivalling this subject in unpopularity was the compulsory study of

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[17] *Tygodnik Powszechny*, March 30, 1958. See also "Soviet Bloc Higher Education," Part II, *East Europe*, II (Dec., 1958), 22-23.

[18] Władysław Bieńkowski, "Drogi przebudowy oświaty w Polsce," *Nowa Szkoła*, I, 1957, 8-9.

[19] Karol Kołtowski, "O przyczynach upadku pedagogiki uniwersytetskiej w Polsce Ludowej," *Nowa Szkoła*, IX, 1957, 277.

Russian, the proportion of which has been drastically reduced and its study made optional at various educational levels.

Since October 1956 many features copied from the Soviets have been eliminated. Chairs of philosophy have been re-established and professors invited to return from retirement. Free election of university officials was resumed and, to an unprecedented degree in Eastern Europe, the educational administration was disengaged from the tight control of the Party-State bureaucracy. The content of social science courses was revamped. The Ph.D. and other "bourgeois" degrees were restored. Exchanges of students and professors with the West began to flow almost uninhibitedly. Not the least of the new gains is the almost complete abolition of the system of compulsory work assignments following graduation.[20]

Frederick Burkhardt, director of the American Council of Learned Societies, who visited Poland early in 1958 as the head of a group sent to interview applicants for the Ford Foundation Exchange Fellowships, interviewed over two hundred instructors and professors in Warsaw, Kraków, Wrócław and Poznań. He has furnished the following observation on higher education: "I found no professor who felt inhibited in his teaching although many of them were extremely critical of other conditions in Poland today. One exception to the free forum of the classroom was mentioned to me by one professor; a member of the faculty could not with impunity deliver a lecture that was critical of the Soviet Union."[21] As for student life itself, George Sherman has aptly remarked that: ". . . nonconformity has become the rule rather than the exception."[22]

At the secondary level, beginning in 1956 the reform provided that the seven-year school should become universal by 1960 and that the eleven-year secondary school term be extended to 12 years.[23] Instruction in religion was reinstated on a scale unmatched elsewhere in Communist East Europe. A great deal of criticism continues to be leveled at the poor results achieved by many of Poland's secondary schools. For example, Antoni Łubkowski has charged: ". . . holding their certificate in hand students leave school with gaps of the most elementary sort in their knowledge."[24]

A great deal has been written about the need for shifting the emphasis in Polish education from purely technical specialization to a broader concept. There is some evidence that a surplus of such personnel exists, except in the fields of agronomy and animal husbandry.[25] Eugenia Krassowska,

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[20] In March 1957 the Council of Ministers repealed the 1950 decree on compulsory assignments, basing employment on individual contract between graduate and enterprise. See *Monitor Polski*, April 5, 1957.

[21] "Universities in Poland," *American Council of Learned Societies Newsletter*, IX, (May, 1958), 2-3.

[22] George Sherman, "Poland's Angry and Un-Angry Young Men," *Problems of Communism*, VII (May-June, 1958), 35.

[23] See Mieczysław Pęcherski, "Perspektywy rozwoju szkoły ogólnokształcącej w Polsce Ludowej," *Nowa Szkoła*, IV, 1955, 465-86, and Bolesław Dunikowski, "O stanie przygotowania absolwentów ogólnokształcących szkół średnich," *Życie Szkoły Wyższej*, XI, 1956, 64.9.

[24] Antoni Łubkowski "Smutna szkoła," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, May 6, 1958.

[25] "Of the 9,100 [university] graduates in the autumn of 1957, 4,000 were not able to

Deputy Minister of Higher Education, in a statement made before the initiation of the new Five-Year plan in 1956, criticized it for neglecting the universities. She declared: "This neglect was the result of a one-sided, narrowly practical concern to produce a large number of specialists, especially for industry."[26]

Accordingly, more attention is now being paid to the rôle of the universities in training personnel in the basic sciences for advanced research. From all indications, no expansion of the number of graduates is intended but rather a decided emphasis on the improvement of the quality of their training.[27]

It is this quest for improved standards in the quality of teaching which has been the central issue of Polish educational literature during the last three years. Many educators feel that, in the haste to make up for the losses of the war, standards were let down too drastically, while still others have attributed the alleged poor quality of much of Polish teaching to the abject imitation of Soviet pedagogy. In particular, they take their colleagues to task for their worship of the Soviet psychologist Pavlov and the educational theorists Makarenko and Kayrov. Karol Kołtowski, in a 1957 article, charges that: ". . . a few formulas drawn from Kayrov and properly dressed up were allowed to become the authority for socialist pedagogy in Poland . . . although in his native USSR the latter's views are considered anything but definitive."[28] However, one of the most outspoken statements on the subject was made by Feliks Korniszewski in a 1957 article, in which he maintains: "Our present-day pedagogy, just as our psychology, which are at an unsatisfactory standstill, are not based on the principles of a true, scientific Marxism, but have grown out of the vulgarization of Marxism."[29] He also takes textbook authors to task for writing in an "agitation-propaganda" style bearing no resemblance to educational publications before World War II.[30] Like numerous other Polish educators during the past three years, Korniszewski serves notice that his colleagues ought to feel free to seek ideas both in Poland's rich pedagogic past and in the experience of the West: "The only way out of the impasse is to look for inspiration in the experience of the interwar period, as well as that of Western lands from which we were cut off for a number of years."[31] With encouragement of this type it is not

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find work in their profession. They now have freedom to find their own jobs, but no place to exercise it." Sherman, *loc. cit.*, 32. See also Dr. Tadeusz Rosner, "Czy rzeczywiście mamy za dużo inzenierów?" *Trybuna Ludu,* Feb. 14, 1957.

[26] *Życie Szkoły Wyższej,* II, 1956, 7.

[27] *Ibid.* It should be noted that, to a not inconsiderable extent, the measures of the reform have been paralleled in the case of the Hungarian educational system under the New Course. See "Education in Hungary under the New Course," *News From Behind the Iron Curtain,* III, 1954, 23-31. George Miles, "Where Communist Indoctrination Failed: On the Young People in Hungary," *The Listener* (London), Dec. 27, 1956.

[28] K. Kołtowski, *loc. cit.*

[29] Feliks Korniszewski, "Krytyka dotychczasowej działalności Instytutu Pedagogiki (Za Okres 1950-56)," *Nowa Szkoła,* I, 1957, 33. For a spirited defense of Soviet patterns in Polish education, see Józef Galant, "Dyskusja nad zagadnieniami pedagogiki," *Nowa Szkoła,* III, 1951, 266-74.

[30] Korniszewski, *loc. cit.*, p. 35.

surprising that Polish educational literature during the past few years has devoted many pages to studies of school systems abroad, with a great deal of attention being paid to practices in Western Europe.[32]

One of the most important pronouncements on teaching methods in Poland to appear in recent years was that of Bogdan Suchodolski, member of the Polish Academy of Sciences, which was printed in *Myśl Filozoficzna*. Above all, Suchodolski criticizes the failure of Polish educators to elaborate a system of pedagogy based on Marxist principles. He complains that the teaching profession cut itself off from its bourgeois roots without substituting anything in its place. He observes: "We are faced with the great and difficult task of finding a satisfactory answer to the question of what is dialectical materialism in pedagogy . . . although rejecting bourgeois solutions, we have not formulated our own concepts . . ."[33]

Going hand and hand with the dissatisfaction over teaching methods is the constant criticism of the poor preparation of teachers. It is quite generally conceded by educators that in the postwar reconstruction period expediency brought about a lowering of teacher training standards which still plagues Polish education today. Ludwik Bandura has pointed out that 51 per cent of the teachers in the elementary schools and 30 per cent in secondary schools are below 30 years of age. While this in itself is not undesirable, he deplores the fact that most of them are equipped with only a three- or four-year pedagogic course at the secondary level or a three-year college course.[34] He quotes a number of surveys made at pedagogic institutes reflecting a dismal lack of grounding of the teacher not only in the subjects which he intends to teach, but also in such fundamentals as Polish grammar and spelling. He cites the conclusions of fellow-educator Zbigniew Skórny, who finds in future teachers:

> . . . little resourcefulness or initiative, and the lack of a constructive attitude toward work, a superficial and mechanical manner of performing their tasks, lack of intellectual curiosity, of the desire to explore new methods, poor knowledge of their specialty, and the absence of a desire to perfect themselves in it.[35]

A veteran educator, Józef Kozielecki, writing in *Przegląd Kulturalny*, also paints a depressing picture of teacher qualifications, supporting his thesis by actual classroom incidents reflecting their woeful lack of general culture or intellectual orientation. He asks: "How can we speak of university training for every teacher when in our schools there are more than ten thousand teachers without secondary education?"[36]

One could cull at random an endless litany of criticisms of the per-

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[31] Korniszewski, *loc. cit.*, p. 35ff.

[32] See, for example, the favorable comments on British education by Jan Gawroński, in his article "Szkoła średnia i Kultura," *Kierunki*, Jan. 4, 1959.

[33] Bogdan Suchodolski, "Perspektywy pedagogiki," *Myśl Filozoficzna*, V, 1955, 26.

[34] Ludwik Bandura, "Model nauczyciela w społeczeństwie budującym socjalizm," *Nowa Szkoła*, II, 1957, 165.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

[36] Józef Kozielicki, *Przegląd Kulturalny*, Jan. 22, 1959.

formance of Polish schools at every level.[37] The current reorganization itself has been severely pilloried. For example, Teofil Wojeński wrote last year: "The reform carried out in the 1956-58 school years has led to a situation which can without qualification be described as catastrophic."[38] Janina Borowska has remarked, "The results achieved by our schools satisfy no one . . ."[39] Stefan Nieznanowski, in a scathing condemnation of the generally low cultural level of secondary school graduates, remarked last year:

> Every year commentaries and impressions of examinations fill the columns of newspapers and periodicals: every year they throw up their hands in despair regarding the knowledge of the graduates. All these complaints after a certain amount of time are whitewashed and no conclusions are drawn, which makes the situation truly alarming. Comparing the preparation of candidates of 5 years ago, one notes not an improvement as was expected after the initial change of program and methods, but a catastrophic regression. Hundreds of candidates are simply illiterate in the ABC's of the Polish language.[40]

It must not, however, be thought that the severe criticism of the school system tolerated during the past few years signifies that the ideal of a Communist-type education has been abandoned. For example, in his talk (already noted) Minister of Education Władysław Bieńkowski re-emphasized the intention to re-shape Polish education in the Communist mold:

> Let us know the world, so that we may change it. Only through inculcating youth with a positive creative attitude toward all social reality will we overcome the backwardness of the old conservative habits which still fetter us here and there. To this end we must change our programs and our textbooks.[41]

As Polish educators themselves realize, however, the crisis of Polish education cannot be resolved merely by changes in the system itself. In the final analysis, the greatest problem which faces the régime is the hostility or, at best, the apathy of youth itself. Indeed the deep concern with the attitudes and ways of today's young people is a *leit-motif* which pervades not only Polish educational literature but the general press as well. Janina Wójcicka, an American student of Polish education, as early as 1956 observed: "Caught in the crossfire of conflicting trends, a great many young people, far from having embraced Communist doctrine, are disillusioned, sceptical, resentful and often rather cynical in their attitude toward life and politics."[42]

More recently Józef Kwiatek has taken Polish young people to task for their lack of well-defined goals and purposes, their failure to appreciate the meaning of conscientious and well-organized study. Attributing much of this to the breakdown of the dogmatism of the Stalinist period, Kwiatek describes the shallow interests and poor morals of much of university youth as follows:

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[37] See, for example, Stanisław Dobosiewicz, "Mówmy o wynikach nauczania," *Nowe Drogi*, V, 1956, 3-17, and B. Milewicz, *Trybuna Ludu*, Oct. 23, 1957.

[38] Teofil Wojeński, "Zjazd oświatowy," *Życie Szkoły Wyższej*, II, 1957, 9.

[39] Janina Borowska, *loc. cit.*

[40] Stefan Nieznanowski, "Egzaminy," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Aug. 17, 1958.

[41] W. Bieńkowski, p. 10.

[42] J. Wójcicka, "Education . . . ," p. 197.

> Young people in the majority avoid the more difficult and higher cultural forms. . . . With some exceptions, youth is not interested in symphonic and chamber music, does not discuss social problems, plastic arts and architecture, avoids the more complicated dramatic performances. To satisfy their cultural needs the young people of today content themselves with jazz clubs, movies, television and card-playing. . . . On the moral side we see a lack of restraint in sexual life. Alcoholism, profanity, gambling and even robbery are on the increase.[43]

Statements regarding the waywardness of Polish youth—most commonly referred to as *chuligaństwo*—are legion in the Polish press. Władysława Hoszowska makes the charge that youth is afflicted by a disinclination for work, particularly physical effort, which it seeks to avoid by all possible means.[44]

In addition to the widespread mood of cynicism displayed by youth, the régime is confronted by yet another obstacle in the path of Communist indoctrination. This is the Roman Catholic Church, which traditionally has pervaded every aspect of Polish life, and which in 1956 regained an influence unmatched in any Communist land.

While it is impossible here to discuss extensively the influence of the Church at all educational levels in Poland, it cannot be over-emphasized that it is, in the fullest sense of the term, a persistent and ubiquitous counterweight to the Marxist-Leninist dogmas which the régime is attempting to spread in the schools.[45] Thus the régime cannot help but view with alarm the increased religious participation of Polish youth, including that of members of Communist organizations. According to one source: "In the center of Wrócław soldiers in uniform and cadets of the Officers' School of Engineers can be seen Sundays attending Holy Mass. . . ."[46] Complaints of the interest of youth in religion abound in the press. Several years ago Zbigniew Florczak, writing in *Nowa Kultura,* charged that "Our schools have practically become centers for the spread of religious worship. One can even say that in these people's schools, religious instruction is obligatory in practice."[47] The *Trybuna Ludu* last year, in an article severely criticizing the aimlessness and political indifference of students, particularly at medical schools, observed, among other things, that: "Most of the students are under clerical influence."[48]

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[43] Józef Kwiatek, "Aktualne zadania wychowawcze na wyższych uczelniach," *Życie Szkoły Wyższej,* I, 1958, 8ff. Today's youth has its defenders also; *cf.,* for instance, Leopold Tyrmand, "O młodości i młodzieży," *Tygodnik Powszechny,* June 8, 1958.

[44] Władysława Hoszowska, "Szkoła jaką czekamy," *Przegląd Kulturalny,* Jan. 15, 1959.

[45] The most detailed and useful discussion of this complex problem appears to be Father Joseph Bronars' unpublished dissertation, "Higher Education in Poland; Some Aspects of Its Sovietization," (Washington, D. C., Catholic University), 1957.

[46] Inter-Catholic Press Agency, 1 Sept. 1954, cited by Bronars, p. 181. See also: "Religion in the Captive Nations," *News From Behind the Iron Curtain,* IV, (Dec. 1955), 3-13; Stefan Rosada and Józef Gwóźdź "Church and State in Poland," in *Church and State Behind the Iron Curtain,* ed. Vladimir Gsovski (New York, 1955), pp. 165-245.

[47] *Nowa Kultura,* May 27, 1956, cited by Bronars, p. 483.

Employing a favorite tactic, applied in the Soviet Union as well as the satellites, the Communists have tried to weaken the resistance of the Church by developing a corps of "patriotic" clergymen, whose task it is to create an atmosphere favorable to the régime through "reconciling" religion and Marxism. The activities of this segment of the Polish clergy are directed by the PAX organization, which also controls Catholic publishing activities, and which issues such newspapers as the *Tygodnik Powszechny, Kierunki* and others. While the number of "progressive" clergy appears to be relatively small and their following limited,[49] it must be assumed that at least part of their sermons and writings influence a share of the students at various educational levels.

In considering the forces militating for and against the régime in its effort to achieve a Marxist educational system, it is necessary to make mention of the Catholic University of Lublin, the only institution of its type behind the Iron Curtain.[50] Although somewhat limited in its functioning, this university, supported by private donations, is an anomaly in East Europe, since it is subject to the dual authority of the Pope and of the Communist Party. Since 1956 contacts between it and Catholic institutions in the Free World have proceeded virtually without restraint. Nevertheless, the University, which is partly staffed by pro-régime professors, is under pressure to tolerate a certain amount of activity by the "progressive" clergy. For example, in 1955 it was forced to sponsor a series of lectures on "Elements of Building a World View," based partially on *Essential Problems,* a key work by Piasecki, leader of the Polish "progressive" clergy, and which has been placed on the Index by Rome.[51]

Despite the general disillusion and apathy of youth, there is some evidence that it is turning increasingly to the Church and its teachings. One source reports a 1957 survey intended to sound out the leading ideals of future engineers, doctors and other professionals. A Warsaw newspaper commented that the results took the poll-takers by surprise, since they found that ". . . the traditional Polish ideology of Sienkiewicz—'God and Country'—still has a mighty influence."[52]

No one can, of course, predict what the future has in store and whether the uneasy truce between Church and State can be indefinitely maintained. One thing is sure: even if pressure from Moscow might cause Gomułka or his successor severely to curtail the activities of the Church in the Polish classroom, the clergy, working closely in conjunction with the Polish family, would employ every possible means of influencing the younger generation against Marxism. How long the régime will allow the priest to undo what the teacher of dialectical materialism attempts to teach depends, to a large extent, upon the thoroughness with which the present struggle against revisionism will be carried out.[53]

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[48] *Trybuna Ludu,* June 7, 1958.

[49] J. Bronars, pp. 177-181.

[50] See Father Albert M. Krapiec, "Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski," *Tygodnik Powszechny, Sept. 21, 1958;* "Mówi Rektor KUL." *Ibid.;* Bronars, pp. 189-98.

[51] J. Bronars, pp. 191-94.

[52] *Tygodnik Demokratyczny,* Oct. 9-15, 1957. Cited in "Soviet Bloc Higher Education," Part II, *East Europe,* p. 25.

In addition to pursuing an anti-revisionist policy in the schools, it has been made quite clear that Poland is expected to participate in the general drive toward "polytechnization" now taking place in the entire Soviet European bloc. Gomułka first hinted at this in several speeches made in September 1958. In plainest terms the new trend means heightened emphasis on technological education at the expense of the humanities. Writing in *Kierunki*, Stanisław Matuszek recently commented: "Polytechnization in our country means the replacing of an antiquated school system by one which is suited to existing and proposed developmental changes. Moreover, it means the greatest possible all-around development of the humanistic content of contemporary science."[54] Despite this fine rhetoric, there is little in the Polish press which would indicate that the liberal arts are not doomed to decline.

At a conference on Professional and Agricultural Education held in January of last year, Vice Premier P. Jaroszewicz emphasized the necessity for a fundamental school reform to help supply manpower needs for an expanding economy, and advocated the addition of two years of practical training in industry and agriculture for graduates of the seven-year school. At the same conference, held in Warsaw, Deputy Minister of Education Michal Godlewski uttered words which bode ill for the present relative freedom of Polish educational institutions: "A monolithic school structure must be introduced if we wish to avoid the anachronism of a dualistic educational system. This demands that we free ourselves of some very deeply-rooted educational patterns and practices."[55]

These and other indications point strongly to yet another radical change in the Polish classroom and it is difficult to foresee anything but an anti-academic and anti-intellectual orientation in the offing. The new program will probably not only reduce access to the higher professions, but will also have the effect of reducing the concentration of young people in the universities, thus neutralizing them as a divisive force in the body politic. These developments can hardly bring much comfort to that portion of the intelligentsia which is oriented toward the West and which has had such a heady taste of freedom in the past few years. The writer of a survey of satellite education defines in the following terms the dilemma of Poland's intellectuals today: "Meanwhile the question of how to reconcile academic and scientific achievement with an ideological thought-control continues to fascinate the Polish liberals but has been carefully laid aside throughout the rest of the bloc in the interest of conformism."[56]

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[53] During the past year the Polish press has demanded with increased vigor that measures be taken against liberal trends in education. The following is fairly typical of such statements: "The results of this struggle will depend, in the first place, on the measures we take against revisionism and dogmatism. . . . In the second place, on the strengthening of the Marxist offensive against bourgeois influences, and deep-rooted attitudes of idealism."*Trybuna Ludu,* Feb. 5, 1958.

[54] Stanisław Matuszek, "Oświata, dziś i jutro," *Kierunki,* Nov. 16, 1958.

[55] *Sztandar młodych,* Jan. 22, 1959.

It is yet too early to assess the full impact of the law on higher institutions passed by the Sejm on November 5, 1958. Apparently aimed at putting an end to the chaos reigning in the universities, the law spells out in great detail the organization of the schools and faculties, as well as the obligations and rights of the student, making sure to specify punishments for infractions of academic discipline. At the same time it does recognize, at least on paper, concessions gained after October 1956, granting a great deal of autonomy to the academic senates and the presidents of the higher institutions. Nevertheless, the language of the law is such that it permits the Minister of Higher Education, under whose jurisdiction all higher schools fall, to intervene whensoever he sees fit. Moreover, for the first time in Polish legal history, the functioning and control of student organizations is specifically regulated by law. It is significant that Western-style rather than Soviet degrees are specified.[57]

The revolt in the Polish classroom, initiated in 1955 and which obtained concessions from the régime unparalleled elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, can therefore be said to have been uniquely successful. However, with the forward march of anti-revisionism and the threat of polytechnization, it would appear that the revolt has run its course, even if certain concessions are maintained. The question which now intrigues the student of education is the one regarding the long-term prospects of the Polish school.

Although opinions on the subject vary, it is difficult to escape the feeling that time is operating for the Communists in their efforts to impose their educational prototype. William Juhasz, an authority on Hungarian education, has commented: "Above all, time is on the side of the Communist education . . . given time it can create a new humanity in its own terrible image."[58] A similar conclusion is reached by sociologist Irwin T. Sanders with regard to Bulgaria: ". . . the régime tends to be successful because the drive for social mobility which it intensifies can be satisfied only by playing along with the school system and associated Communist organizations."[59]

From all indications, therefore, the educational insurgents who so gallantly rebelled against the transplantation of the Soviet pattern to the Polish classroom have already seen their finest hour. The action has been a gallant one, and a chronicler of recent East European history might well say that one of Mao's oft-cited hundred flowers has recently been allowed to bloom in the schools of Poland. Nevertheless, as the Gomułka régime well realizes, although the Polish people are, for historical reasons, exceptionally unreceptive to Soviet patterns, educational and otherwise, it is questionable whether the type of revolt witnessed in the past five years could be repeated in the predictable future. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the concessions gained since 1956 can be long maintained.[60]

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[56] "Soviet Bloc Higher Education, II," *East Europe,* II (Dec., 1958), 25; Part I of this study may be found in *East Europe,* VII (Oct., 1958), 14-30.

[57] See *Dziennik Ustaw,* "O szkołach wyższych," No. 68, Law No. 336, Nov. 5, 1958. I am indebted to Mr. Alfons Sergot of the Foreign Law Division, Library of Congress for the above interpretation. He also has informed me that his colleague, Mr. Joseph Dolina, is preparing an article on the law in question for publication in *Highlights,* issued by the Mid-European Law Project of the Library of Congress.

[58] William Juhasz, *Blueprint for a Red Generation* (New York, 1952), p. 92.

[59] Irwin T. Sanders, "Communist-Dominated Education in Bulgaria; A Study in Social Relationships," *American Slavic and East European Review,* XV, (Oct., 1958), 13-81; see also: George Z. F. Bereday, "Education and Youth," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CCCXIII (May, 1958), 69.

RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY and
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, GRADUATE SCHOOL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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[60] The writer has just learned that a study entitled "Educational Systems in Poland" by Miss Nellie Apanasewicz, in collaboration with William K. Medlin, is now in the press and will appear soon as part of the "Information on Education Around the World" series, published by the Division of International Education, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington 25, D. C. It will be available, free of charge, from that office. A similar study on East Germany has been completed by Mr. Paul Bodenman of the same Division.

ARVEDS ŠVABE (1888-1959)

by Edgar Anderson

GEORGE Macaulay Trevelyan in one of his most recent publications says: "In this stage of the world, when many nations are brought into close and vital contact for good and evil, it is essential, as never before, that their gross ignorance of one another should be diminished, that they should begin to understand a little of one another's historical experience and resulting mentality."[1] Another historian and philologist, Arnolds Spekke, has warned the historians that it is about time to start studying the historiographies of the small nations in order to clarify dark spots in the history of mankind and explode myths established as unquestionable truths by historians we may regard as apologists of the big powers. Historiographies of the Scandinavian, Finno-Ugric, Baltic, Irish, Caucasian and smaller Slavic nations will offer rich sources to future historians and the history of Europe will be more understandable and appear different to us when these sources have been elaborated into a general over-all study.[2] Therefore it is urgent to become acquainted with the most important works of the historians of the smaller nations. Here we are, however, confronted with a language problem, since only a few of these works are available in English, German, French or Russian. Yet, for the sake of historical truth, no less important works, which cannot be found in these languages, should not be ignored.

Too little has been written about the historiography of the Baltic nations, and what has appeared suffers from pronounced prejudices or inadequate knowledge. The historiography of this area is highly complicated due not only to the language difficulty, but also to the dispersion of the documents and other primary sources over numerous archives and libraries abroad. Moreover, the early period of Baltic historiography was entirely dominated by alien historians who represented the interests and power politics of their respective countries. In their presentation of Baltic history the periods of domination of their countries were strongly emphasized, periods of domination by other powers ignored or belittled, and the local Baltic nations as such scarcely mentioned These observers of historical events were neither psychologically nor nationally related to what they observed.

The period of national revival of the Baltic nations during the nineteenth century aroused the interest of the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians in their native history. This, in turn, strengthened their national aspirations. During this period the first academic historians of Baltic origin sought to diffuse knowledge both of the outside world and of the past glory of the Baltic countries in the hope of stimulating national revival. Baltic historiography, in the scholarly sense, could develop only after 1918 in the invigorating atmosphere of the free Baltic Republics. One of the most distinguished Baltic historians and the founder of the Latvian school of historiography was Arveds Švābe (who also used the spelling Schwabe).

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[1] George Macaulay Trevelyan, *History and the Reader* (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1945), p. 20.

[2] Arnolds Spekke, "Historiografiju kari" (Struggles in Historiography), *Cela Zimes* (1954), No. 21, 363f.

Born in Lielstraupe on May 25, 1888, of undistinguished parents, Švābe was already well-known in Latvian intellectual circles by the age of twenty-five. At fifty, he was widely-known as a distinguished scientist of broad interests. A historian and jurist by profession, he was a writer and student of folklore by avocation. His knowledge of languages was impressive, his capacity for work enormous and his personality extraordinary. At the time of his death on August 20, 1959, in Stockholm, he had published more than fifty books and approximately a thousand articles and essays.

As a student, Švābe sought solid ground in the natural sciences. Unsatisfied, he then explored the fields of history, law, sociology and aesthetics; but he never regretted his "mistake" of studying the natural sciences, whence he derived the habit of precise observation of minute changes in historical material and the morphological comparison of observed material. He doubted that he could have discovered the origins and morphological changes of Baltic rural communities without his previous training in the methodology of natural science.[3]

He received rigorous training in historical method at Shanavsky University in Moscow. He also devoured the publications of British, French and Russian writers of folklore and ethnography, considering it necessary to understand the mental characteristics of nations in order to trace their origins and development on the road to statehood before entering the field of written history. At the same time he gained success as an orator and as a powerful urbanist in poetry. After moving to Vladivostok in 1916, he continued his folklore studies, seeking methods of ridding his material of mystical and aesthetic elements before reconstructing the life and institutions of nations in the pre-historic period.

In 1918 Arveds Švābe became a member of the Latvian National Council in the Far East. After returning to Riga, he became an official of the Foreign Ministry and a member of the Constituent Assembly of the new Republic of Latvia, now embarked upon a rapid rehabilitation of her economic and spiritual life. The War had caused Švābe to revise traditional judgments and directed his attention away from antiquity to the recent past and current events.

As a member of the Constituent Assembly he was active in educational reform work and in the campaign to preserve historical monuments and documents. The Assembly provided for the creation of the State Library and the State Archives. In 1921 Švābe started to study law at the University of Riga. Tempted to continue his historical studies, he was faced by a department of history dominated by Baltic German professors who, being hostile to the new state and the Latvian national movement, were heavily emphasizing classical studies and the auxiliary sciences of archeology, egyptology, paleography, diplomatics, heraldry, etc., without offering a single course in the history of Latvia. There Švābe, choosing the long way around, entered the more liberal department of law. But in 1936 he became the head of the Department of History.

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[3] Arveds Švābe, "Mana dzīve" (My Life), *Trimdas rakstnieki.* Edd. Pēteris Ermanis and Arturs Plaudis (Kempten: Vilis Stāls, 1947), I, 183.

With the Latvian nation now thoroughly "history conscious," cities and communal centers had organized museums, established local archives and enlarged their libraries. The Republic demanded texts reflecting not only the history of the aristocracy and ruling minorities, but the nation as a whole. The Baltic German and Baltic Russian historians, writing from the angle of their respective nationality and class interests, had not touched the vital problems of the national majorities in the Baltic area. The alien aristocracy controlling Baltic history well knew how effective a weapon it could be in maintaining their position and justifying their actions to the world. The harm that such one-sided history had already done the Baltic nations was incalculable. Furthermore the War had been highly damaging to Latvian scientific institutions, many archives having been destroyed and others not returned after being removed by the invading armies.

Švābe, after receiving his M.A. in jurisprudence, had been appointed to the chair of the History of Latvian Law. He had already published *A History of Latvia* in three volumes (1921-1923) as a text for schools, two volumes of *The History of Latvian Culture* (1921-1922, the third volume remaining unpublished), as well as several articles. He urged the youth to study history from their earliest schooling in order to awaken their critical spirit, gain respect for truth and a sense of perspective, and form the habit of reaching conclusions through factual knowledge.

Realizing that the former overlords and now the enemies of the new republic, entrenched in their ideological positions, were still seeking to control the nation's history, Švābe determined to fight them with historical research. To him this was a continuation of the war of liberation, in a different field, with different weapons. The Latvian agrarian reform was causing friction between the big landowners (mostly the former nobility) and the Government, the case even going before the League of Nations. Švābe wrote his *Agrarian History of Latvia* (published in English, French and German, 1927-1929) to clarify the background for the agrarian reform in Latvia. This is still considered one of the finest contributions to the history of Latvia. In the fall of 1926 he finished his *pro venia legendi* work on the *History of the Rural Community*. While books followed one another in rapid succession, many results of his archival studies appeared in both Latvian and foreign professional journals.

After 1927 Švābe devoted much energy to editing the *Latvian Encyclopedia* of which 21 volumes had appeared by 1939. The Ph.D. degree, somewhat delayed by teaching and other duties, had been conferred on him in 1932, his thesis topic being *The Oldest Feudal Code in Latvia*. He was then made full professor of the history of law. He had received more formal training in jurisprudence than in his preferred field of history.

While the historians of the old school remained entrenched in the Department of History, a new breed of them was growing up in the Departments of Law and Economics at the University of Riga. In 1936, however, Arveds Švābe accepted the headship of the Department of History, and proceeded to improve seminars and reorganize the curriculum. Until 1941 he was engaged in imparting to others those attitudes and methods which had borne such rich fruit for him; a new and well-trained generation of historians was thus prepared to replace the old. He also helped to organize the State Institute of History, assisted in the publication of historical journals and source books, attended international congresses and continued his work in foreign archives. On his fiftieth birthday his friends and students honored him with a *festschrift* entitled *To the History of the Nation* (1938).[4]

Thanks to Arveds Švābe and his colleagues, young Latvian scholars could now publish monographs based on new and rich archeological and documentary discoveries. Their activities raised a storm of violent, even scandalous protest from the Baltic barons and their new friends—the German Nazis; while Russian Bolsheviks launched their attacks on Latvian historiography. Nonetheless, the rising generation of Latvian historians won acknowledgment among scholars in Scandinavia, Poland, Great Britain, France and the United States.

From 1939 to 1940 Dr. Švābe was Vice President of the Latvian State Institute of History. He promoted the publication of the monumental *History of Latvia* and the collection of sources, *Monumenta Historica Latviae.* His work was interrupted first by the Bolshevik, then by the Nazi invasion of the Baltic lands. The Russians allowed him to lecture at the University, but spied upon him, attacked his rejection of Marxism and accused him of serving the "rotten democracy." When the Nazis took over they closed the history department and kept most of the Latvian professors of history out of the lecture halls, including Švābe.

From 1941 to 1944 he was nominally President of the Institute of Historical Sources, but not permitted to use the archives. His only important production was two more volumes of historical sources. In 1944 he was deported to Germany, where he was rescued by the Allies. The second Russian occupation of Latvia uprooted Švābe's life, forcing him to remain in exile. Elected President of the Latvian Central Committee in Exile, he worked to relieve the plight of refugees, at his peril. Finally, this scholar-patriot settled in the Swedish capital where, associated with the University of Stockholm, he devoted himself to historical research. He published several books in English, French and Swedish, completed a three-volume special edition of the *Latvian Encyclopedia,* and finished the first volume of his monumental *History of Latvia, 1800-1950* (*Latvijas vēsture, 1800-1944*).

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In the course of his life Švābe worked in five different fields: folklore, the history of law, agrarian history, medieval history and, particularly, modern history. His work in all these areas was unified by the historical approach. It was his initial interest in folklore that led him into history. His *History of Latvian Culture* combines the study of customs and institutions along with that of documents as relics of historical significance. Using the methods of Fustel de Coulanges and Kluchevsky, he traced the evolution of Latvian culture from pre-historic times through the Middle Ages, influenced, to a degree, by Westermann, Morgan, Engels, M. Kovalevsky and P. Vinogradov. While certain methodological shortcomings can be found in his work, the organic concept of Latvian civilization together with the hierarchy of organization in this and following works of a similar nature indicate Švābe's mastery of the field. Fragments of the unpublished third volume of the *History of Latvian Culture* are scattered in various scholarly journals.

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[4] *Tautas vēsturei. Veltijums profesoram Dr. Arvēdam Švābem.* Edd. Benno Abers, Teodors Zeids, T. Zemzars (Riga: A. Gulbis, 1938).

Švābe spent much time in the medieval period of Latvian History, exploding many Baltic, Scandinavian and German legends, and striving for objectivity and candor in handling dangerous problems. Yet his treatment of some of these caused unfriendly critics to accuse him of a lack of realism. Reference should be made to his essays in *Currents and Sources* (two volumes, 1939-40). He brought to light much interesting material concerning Scandinavian-Baltic relations, the struggle between the Teutonic Order and the Papacy in the Baltic area, and the life and institutions of ancient, independent Latvian territorial units as well as the policies of their rulers. Švābe's *Agrarian History of Latvia* bears some resemblance to the works of such German historians as A. Agathe, H. Foelkersahm, A. von Tobien and A. von Transehe-Roseneck, but much of the text results from his own findings.

Among many essays dealing with more modern problems the most interesting may be his article on Sigismund Augustus' Livonian policy, proving that the so-called *Privilegium Sigismundi,* allegedly granting permission to the German landlords to hold their fiefs in the Baltic as allods, has never been legally promulgated.[5] Since he was mostly interested in rural development, few of Švābe's essays deal with the development of the Baltic cities; and science and technology are neglected.

His later works reveal a growing interest and expertise in diplomatic and political history. One may mention his *Histoire du peuple Letton* (1953), *The Story of Latvia and her Neighbors* (1947, 1949), *Baltic Autonomy Until 1918* (1954), *Genocide in the Baltic Countries* (1949), *History of Latvia 1800-1914* (in Latvian). He edited and published two volumes of *Fontes Historiae Latviae Medii Aevi* (1937, 1940), *Quellen zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte Livlands 1553-1618* (1941), *Quellen zur Rechtsgeschichte Livlands 1336-1551* (1941) and the less important *Chrestomathy of the Sources of the History of Latvia 1300-1500* (1940).

Some of his critics have argued, wrongly, that Švābe's historical outlook was restricted by provincialism and isolationism and that he evinced no interest in the factors of international cooperation. In fact, he projected Latvian problems on a carefully analyzed, well-balanced and skillfully presented international background. However, he was not expert in some of the questions he treated, and he did overestimate legal, social and economic factors while underestimating the political, diplomatic and military ones. In his early works he treated political and military history sketchily, and certain periods were dealt with in greater detail than others. He has been accused of *a priori* concepts and *idées maîtresses.* Yet his only *idée maîtresse* was to discover truth in a violently misused and misinterpreted field of history, hitherto appropriated by certain alien elements and their allies, a caste hostile or indifferent to the Baltic nationals. These accusers have been more violent nationalists than Švābe himself. Undeniably, however, a lack of moderation in his attacks on these elements sometimes seriously weakened the effectiveness of his arguments. He himself admitted he could never be either a diplomat or a politician.[6]

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[5] "Sigismunda Augusta Livonijas politika" (Livonian Policy of Sigismund Augustus). *Latvijas Vēstures Institūta Žurnāls* (1937), I, 67-109; IV, 483-522.

Švābe established a new school of Latvian historiography based on modern principles. Long an advocate of scientific methodology, he greatly raised Latvian standards through his own teaching and writing. He discovered and preserved significant new materials. He wove Latvian history into the pattern of World history. His books and articles have been profoundly influential; and even his Nazi and Communist enemies have been forced to admit, in their own ways, that Švābe has shed new light on the history of Latvia. In times of national crisis historians are likely to be under pressure to sentimentalize the story of their country's development and tragedy, if necessary with some disregard for truth. Švābe, even when dealing with recent events, relied exclusively on historical evidence, thus gaining respectful attention in the West.

Believing in continuity and gradual development, he maintained that any event is an integral part of a larger segment of history, and that our task of tracing causal connections involves separating those elements that persist through arbitrary cuts marking off an event under consideration. It is natural, he admitted, that historians should reflect the prevailing views of their time, their class or their nation; but he carefully followed Fustel de Coulanges' advice that we do not judge whether any institution is good or bad in itself, but seek only to understand. Documents speak for themselves if properly presented. As a combined jurist and historian, Švābe was always critical with his sources, sometimes caustically criticizing other scholars for the misreading of documents. To the *Quellenkritik* he applied the *Sachkritik,* judging the plausibility of actions and scenes described in the documents.

In his writings he followed the rules of simplicity, factual presentation and cautious interpretation. He considered the narrative art indispensable to the writer of history, but never at the expense of truth. His philosophy of history is not original, most of its elements being borrowed from certain French, German, Russian and British historians. He was particularly indebted to Fustel de Coulanges, Kluchevsky and Aulard.[7] However, Švābe's practical contributions to Latvian historiography are so great that he must be regarded as the most important Latvian historian up to the present.

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[6] *Trimdas rakstnieki, op. cit.,* I, 163f.

[7] Letter from Dr. Arveds Švābe, Stockholm, April 3, 1955.

San Jose State College

NOTES

The Pulaski Foundation (369 Lexington Avenue, New York 17) is asking for contributions of a dollar or more to build a fund for the rebuilding of the Pulaski Hospital at Warka, near Warsaw.

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The Society for Italian Historical Studies (Casa Italiana, Columbia University, New York 27) announces a prize of $200 for the best unpublished study in the history of Italy, of article or essay length. Essays or articles judged worthy of publication by a scholarly journal as well as doctoral dissertations presented at American universities will be accepted for consideration by the Committee. Manuscripts should be in the hands of Professor Howard R. Marraro, Secretary of the Society (at the above address) by July 1, 1960.

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The Soviet and East European Research and Translation Service (246 East 57th Street, New York 17), offers its services to the profession and others desirous of obtaining the latest reliable information on Soviet and East European questions. It offers a regular subscription service as well as special reports on a particular field.

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The International Institute of Education (1 East 67th Street, New York 21) announces a new scholarship program for American students desiring to study at Polish Universities during the academic year 1960-1961. The program is being administered for the Polish government by the IIE. Nineteen awards are being made, for study in a number of fields.

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The Russian and East European Institute of Indiana University has been holding a series of lectures, at fairly regular intervals, from Feb. 2 to May 5, 1960, on leading questions of interest to specialists in the field. February 2, Marshall Shulman of the Harvard Russian Research Center: "A Fresh Perspective on the Cold War;" Otakar Odložilík of the University of Pennsylvania, February 22: "Czechoslovak Democracy Revisited"; Boris Unbegaun of Oxford University, March 3: "Language and Civilization in the Slavic World"; Henry L. Roberts of the Russian Institute, Columbia University: "The Anatomy of Revolution: The Hungarian Case"; Charles Jelavich, May 4: "Tsarist Russia and Balkan Independence."

* * * *

The Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America held, on March 5, 1960 at Columbia University, a Second Academic Conference to commemmorate the Millenium of the Christianization of Poland and to discuss Poland's Place in Europe. Under the general presidency of Henry L. Roberts the following papers were read: Ludwik Krzyżanowski, "Poland's Contribution to Western Civilization"; George Y. Shevelov, "Poland's Cultural impact on the Eastern Slavs"; John A. Mikas, "Poland's Place in the European State System"; Arnolds Spekke, "Poland's Place in the Baltic Region"; George Waskovich, "Poland's Place in the Slavic World."

* * * *

The Far Western Slavic Conference is holding its second annual meeting April 23-24 at the University of California, Los Angeles, on the general theme of Russia and Eastern Europe—Old and New. There are four main sessions: 1. "Eastern European Images of Russia in the Nineteenth Century," with papers by Witold Sworakowski, Henry Cord Meyer and Peter Sugar; 2. "Centennial of Emancipation," with papers by Wilson Norman, Jack Posin, Basil Dmytryshyn, and Bernice Madison; 3. "Problems of Industrialization," with papers by Theodore von Laue, David Cattell, Kathryn Fever, and Bee Ward; 4. "Khrushchev's Administrative Reforms—A Decentralization?" with papers by Cyril Bryner, Bohdan Bociurkiv, John Létiche and Marin Pundeff. All the papers are being commented on and discussed from the floor.

* * * *

The University of Colorado has been chosen, under the National Defence Education Act of 1958, as a Center for Slavic and East European Language and Area Studies. The languages and areas to be offered are Russian, Czech, Polish and Magyar. S. H. Thomson is the Director of the Center.

MICHAEL KARPOVICH

1888-1959

The death, on November 7, 1959, of Michael M. Karpovich, Emeritus Professor of Russian History and of Slavic Languages and Literatures at Harvard University, was a tragic loss to Russian studies and a profound shock to his many students, associates and friends.

Born in Tiflis, Professor Karpovich attended the University of Moscow and continued his historical studies while assistant to the Learned Secretary of the Moscow Historical Museum. During the First World War, he served as secretary to the Special Council on Defense and, after the February Revolution, which he welcomed with enthusiasm, he was appointed private secretary to the Provisional Government's ambassador to the United States, Boris Bakhmetiev. He soon assumed the actual duties of Counsellor of Embassy and continued in that capacity until the embassy was closed in 1922. The next five years were spent in lecturing, editing and translating. Then, in 1927, he was called to Harvard, where he remained until his retirement in 1957. In addition to his duties there as professor of history, he assumed, in 1949, the chairmanship of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, which, under his leadership, became an outstanding center of slavic studies. With the establishment of the Curt Hugo Reisinger chair in Slavic Languages and Literatures in 1954, he became the first holder.

Because of his devotion to his students, which won him their deepest affection and respect, and his many efforts in behalf of Russian scholarship outside the Soviet Union, his writings were not extensive. But his published works are marked by unusual perception and extraordinary literary grace. His primary interest in intellectual history is reflected in his articles on the philosophy and political ideas of several Russian writers and statesmen, on the relatons of church and state in Russia, and on the geneses of Bolshevik totalitarianism. Yet, he also contributed the excellent chapters on Russian economic history to the Bowden, Karpovich and Usher volume on the *Economic History of Europe* (1937) and wrote the concise and useful survey, *Imperial Russia 1801-1917* (1932). His valuable editorial activities included selections from P. N. Miliukov's *Outlines of Russian Culture* (3 vols., 1943) as well as Miliukov's *Vospominania* (2 vols., 1955). Special note should certainly be made of his founding in 1942 and continuous editorship of *Novyi Zhurnal,* the outstanding Russian *émigré* journal in the United States, to which he was also a constant contributor of essays and reviews. At the time of his death, he was preparing for publication a volume on Russian intellectual history based upon his superb lectures at Harvard. The time and attention which he lavished upon his graduate students and their gratitude for his never-ending instruction and support was exemplified on his retirement in the presentation of a volume of twenty-six essays in his honor, *Russian Thought and Politics* (Harvard Slavic Studies, vol. IV).

A profound scholar, a great teacher, who trained a generation of Russian specialists in this country, a generous friend and gracious counselor, his passing has created a void in the hearts and minds of all who knew him.

University of Colorado **Robert Paul Browder**

CORRIGENDA

The following typographical slips occurring in the October 1959 issue of the JOURNAL should be corrected:

p. 301	line 21:	for "philosophically"	read "philologically"
	line 34:	for "Klemont"	read "Clement"
	line 41:	for "Wetzov"	read "Wetzor"
	line 43:	for "Korsua"	read "Korsun"
p. 302	line 3:	for "Renssen"	read "Reussen"
	line 7:	for "Horlich"	read "Halich"
	line 7:	for "Volkyrian"	read "Volhynian"

BOOK REVIEWS

Macek, Josef, ed., *Historica I.* Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1959. Pp. 349. Kčs 50.

The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences proposes to publish significant and representative studies by leading Czech and Slovak historians in the western languages. The present fascicle, I, contains 13 such studies by twelve different scholars, on subjects ranging from the archeology of the Great Moravian Empire to Czechoslovak historiography, the arts and folklore in 1957.

In the first substantial paper, Josef Poulík reviews (in English) the latest archeological discoveries around Staré Město and Mikuliče in Moravia, which make it certain that there were churches in Moravia long before the arrival of Constantine and Methodius in 863, and furthermore, that there was a high degree of Slav culture that existed contemporary with the Avars in the seventh and eighth centuries (pp. 7-70).

František Graus, in the second study, examines (in German) "Über die sogennante germanische Treue" as represented in nineteenth-century German historical literature and, more recently, by H. Mitteis. He comes to the conclusion, without great difficulty, that, in the early feudal period at least, there was no real consistency in the concept, nor was there any discernible relation between the German *Treue* and feudal *fides*. It might be captious to suggest that the burden of proof of the existence of such a connection rather rested on German scholarship, and that it hardly demanded fifty pages of disproof (pp. 71-121).

Josef Macek discusses the Peasant Revolt in the Tirol of June and July 1525 and the articles of Merano (in German) (pp. 135-195). Jan Patočka reviews (in French) the present status of Comenius studies (pp. 197-240), which, in view of the continuation of the project of publishing the *opera omnia* of the last bishop of the Union of Czech Brethren, is important and useful. The discoveries of MSS in recent decades are indeed considerably more than one would think, in view of the long established importance of Comenius in Czech scholarship.

Antonín Šnejdárek brings us into the recent period of Czechoslovak history in his study of "The Participation of the Sudeten-German Nazis in the Munich Tragedy." He surveys the literature and action of German nationalism from 1918 to 1938, both in Bohemia and the Reich, and shows how constant the irredentism really was. The story of Henlein and the heightened tempo of the Nazi movement after 1933 is only sketched. From that point the record of the Nuremberg trials may simply be referred to.

J. V. Polišenský discussing (pp. 267-277) "Archives in Czechoslovakia and the study of world history," recounts the centralization of all archives and libraries of monasteries and noble families in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior in 1945. In surveying these many collections of archival material, the archivists came upon many documents that showed how widely Bohemians had travelled, and how many foreigners had been in Bohemia or had been in correspondence with Czech scholars and leading personalities in the earlier centuries. Out of this survey will doubtless come separate studies tracing these relations and thus enhancing the historical importance of Bohemia in European culture.

The volume is concluded by a number of "chroniques," all helpful and informative as to scientific activities of the disciplines of history, art and archeology in Czechoslovakia in recent years. It is to be hoped that future volumes of *Historica* will be as informative as this first one.

University of Colorado S. Harrison Thomson

LÜCK, KURT and VIKTOR KAUDER, edd., *Deutsch-Polnische Nachbarschaft: Lebensbilder deutscher Helfer in Polen.* 3rd. ed. Würzburg, 1957. Pp. 531. DM 26.

This is the third edition of a book originally entitled *Deutsche Gestalter und Ordner im Osten* which was first published in occupied Poznań in 1940 as the third volume of the "Forschungen zur deutsch-polnischen Nachbarschaft" (the first two volumes being *Deutsche Aufbaukräfte in der Entwicklung Polens* and *Der Mythos vom Deutschen in der polnischen Volksüberlieferung und Literatur,* also edited by Kurt Lück), and as volume 12 of the "Ostdeutsche Forschungen." This is a popular book, consisting of 44 biographical sketches of "good Germans"—to use the editor's expression in the preface to the first edition—who achieved prominence in Poland, contributing greatly to progress made in various fields in that country. As evidenced by the appended short bibliography and as acknowledged by the editors, these sketches are based, in the main, on the results of Polish scholarship.

Beginning with St. Bruno of Querfurt, the lives are depicted of such people as Elisabeth von Habsburg—"the mother of the Jagellons," the famous sculptor, Veit Stoss (Wit Stwosz), the first Polish pubisher—Johann Haller, the diplomat Dantiscus, the rector of the university of Cracow—Andreas Schoneus, King Augustus the Strong, the founder of the first Polish journals—Lorenz Mitzler von Kolof, and "the father of Polish music," Joseph Elsner. Since it was in the development of Polish learning and of Polish economy that men of German origin and ancestry made the most important contributions, about two-thirds of the book is devoted to the biographical sketches of scholars, scientists, and businessmen. Of special interest are the chapters on G. S. Bandtke, the organizer of Polish learning, on the extraordinary linguist Samuel Linde, the Vilna physician Joseph Frank, the geologist G. Pusch, the pioneer of classical philology in Poland, G. E. Groddeck, and the botanist Willibald Besser. The men of trade, industry, and finance are represented by 18 names, among them John Boner, the organizer of the Polish treasury at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Peter Steinkeller, the founder of the first railroad in Congress Poland, and Wendisch, Kopisch, Geyer, and Scheibler, the builders of the great textile industry of Łódź.

In the preface to the first edition, Lück wrote: "Die Polen waren seit jeher beherrscht von dem Hang zur Unordnung, Planlosigkeit und Freude am Stillstand und Genuss. Im Gegensatz zu ihnen waren die Deutschen die Ordner, Gestalter und Träger des Fortschritts." Thus, originally, the purpose of the book was to show that Poland owed her progress to German immigrants; the Poles themselves would not have achieved much. In the new edition the title has been changed, the original preface has disappeared, and from the concluding paragraphs of 13 chapters such statements have been eliminated as: Elisabeth, "die Deutsche, deren Blut die Persönlichkeit der Jagellonen rassisch bestimmte und formte." (p. 34); "Auch vergassen die Polen unter ihrem bald darauf erwachenden Nationalismus, dass sie von den Deutschen zu einem europäischen Kulturvolk erhoben wurden." (p. 42); "Diese Zuneigung des Mannes zu seinem Werk, dass der Massstab seiner Schaffenskraft ist, aber ist so typisch deutsch, dass schon daraus, auch ohne dass die polnische Forschung es hätte zuzugeben brauchen, deutsches Wesen und deutsche Art des Rektors Schoneus zu erkennen sind. So arbeitete nur ein Deutscher." (p. 114). In the new preface Viktor Kauder states that the purpose of this collection of biographical sketches is to remind "all men of good will" that even though the German and Polish states now and then clashed, "die Völker selbst jahrhundertelang in kulturellem Austausch gelebt haben, der für beide Nationen förderlich war." And

no German has the right "aus dem Wirken dieser Männer und Frauen irgendwelche Überheblichkeit dem polnischen Volke gegenüber herzuleiten, das seinerseits grosse kulturelle Leistungen aufzuweisen hat, die Europa, vor allem seinen östlichen Ländern, zugute gekommen sind. Jenes darf um so weniger der Fall sein, also die geschilderten Männer und Frauen im deutschen Volke zum überwiegenden Teil vergessen worden waren."

Russian Research Center ZYGMUNT J. GASIOROWSKI
Harvard University

HALECKI, OSCAR, *From Florence to Brest (1439-1596).* Rome: Sacrum Poloniae Millenium. Fordham University Press, 1958. Pp. 444. $6.00.

Prof. Halecki's work treats the problem of relations between the Eastern and Western Churches separated in 1054. After this disastrous event a struggle developed between ancient Papal Rome and New Rome (Constantinople) for the spiritual domination of the Kievan Rus' State, the medieval political structure of the Ukrainian people. Although Kievan Rus' received Christianity and cultural progress from Constantinople, Rus' never followed blindly the anti-Western attitude of the Byzantine Church. On the contrary, Kiev sustained permanent, friendly relations with the West, creating by this an atmosphere favorable to formal union with the old, First Rome.

The anti-Western attitude of Byzance was inherited by the Great Duchy of Muscovy, a new political entity, which grew up on the northern colonial territories of the Kievan Rus' state following her desintegration after the twelfth century. The new expansive nation prepared herself to overtake the ambitious traditions of the Second Rome (Constantinople) after the decline of the Byzantine Empire.

But in the middle of the fourteenth century the essential part of Kievan Rus', including her capital Kiev, fell under the domination of Lithuania and Poland. These two nations created, in 1386, the Jagiellonian Federation, culturally dominated by Latin Catholicism, which started to expand over the territories of Kievan Rus', an area of deeply rooted Eastern Christian culture. Eastern Christianity in these territories was identified with Ukrainian nationality, and Latin Catholicism with Polish nationality. The expansion of Latin Catholicism initiated a cultural struggle which, for the first time in history, planted in Rus' (Ruthenian) lands disfavor toward Catholicism as such.

But, at the same time, the Byzantine Empire, hard-pressed by the Turks, declined. Only the imperial city of Constantinople was defended, with support from the West. The only salvation for the remnants of the former Empire was reconciliation with Papal Rome. This was done in 1439 at the Council of Florence, where the pattern of union between the Eastern and Western Churches was elaborated. According to this a pattern of Catholicism of the Eastern rite and culture was formulated.

The Florentine Union was transferred to the largest Church province of the Byzantine Patriarchy, the territory of the former Rus' state, by Cardinal Isidore, the Metropolitan of Kiev, who was a member of the pro-Western Byzantine ecclesiastical élite. His Kievan metropolitan province stretched over the territory of Muscovy as well as of the eastern part of the Jagiellonian Federation. What reaction met Isidore here and what was the fate of the Florentine Union until her renovation at Brest (1596) is the topic of Professor Halecki's study, *From Florence to Brest.*

Moscow categorically rejected the Florentine Union. Muscovy proclaimed herself the successor of Byzance, elaborating in political and Church affairs the theory that, after the fall of Constantinople, "Moscow became the Third and the Last Rome," the legitimate leader of Christianity and authentic interpreter of the Christian faith. The Moscow Church, transformed into an independent Metropolitan Province (1448) after the break with Eastern-Catholic Constantinople, was later advanced to the rank of Patriarchy (1589).

The Florentine Union on the territory of Eastern Europe was regarded by Muscovite ecclesiastical and state authorities as an illegal invasion by Papal Rome of foreign territory, which must be repulsed by every means. Indeed, during the following centuries Eastern-Catholicism was steadily exterminated, in the same manner and with the same brutality by the Czars as by Stalin and Khrushchev.

The Polish political attitude toward the Florentine Union was defined by the Polish historian of the Florentine Union, An. Lewicki. In his opinion Poland favored, in principle, the Church Union, but not such as was concluded in Florence with preservation of the Eastern rite; Poland, asserted Lewicki, wanted a Church Union with a uniform Latin rite. The Florentine Union was received most favorably by the indigenous Ruthenian (Ukrainian and Belorussian) population, the upper boyar class, and the autonomous princes, because the Florentine Union returned to the old traditions of the Kievan Church and was helpful in hampering the progress of Latinization in Rus' lands. The Florentine Union heralded the rebirth of the old rôle of Kiev as the capital of Christianity in Eastern Europe. In spite of difficulties, the Florentine Union was preserved in Ukraine and Belorussia up to the first decade of the sixteenth century. Only under the political pressure of Muscovy did the Kievan Metropolitan sever ties with Papal Rome. Favorable Florentine tradition survived in Ukraine up until the new Church Union in Brest (1596).

This crucial period of Ukrainian-Belorussian church history is treated by Halecki in four chapters. He most skillfully employs new, often unknown sources taken from Vatican, Venetian and other archives.

For the first time in the historiography of this period the author shows how the political affairs of Vatican diplomacy, especially the plan to found an anti-Turkish League, intermingled with the affairs of religious reconciliation between the Eastern and Western Churches.

The author also touches upon the important problem of Vatican diplomacy in Moscow, which was without permanent positive results. This is a problem which, even at present, could be very instructive for some Christian circles living in the illusion of the conversion of Muscovy (Russia) to Catholicism.

Halecki follows the idea of a new church union with Rome from its rebirth in the Ruthenian lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to its realization at Brest. This idea, initiated by Prince C. Ostrogski (Ostrozhsky), the natural leader of Ukrainians in Poland, was accepted without hindrances by the Hierarchy of the Ukrainian-Belorussian Church and finalized amid stormy opposition, led again by Prince Ostrogski. What was the reason of such an apparently unnatural turn of affairs? This is the only problem not clarified by the author of this worthy work. It concerned relations between Latin Catholicism, still progressing in Ukrainian lands, and Eastern Christianity, both Catholic and Orthodox.

Beyond this small inadequacy, Halecki's book is without question the most fundamental and the most valuable work on this subject.

Mahwah, N. J. NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY

KENTRSCHYNSKYJ, BOHDAN, *Karl X Gustav Inför Krisen I Östen 1654-1655*, Stockholm: Särtryck ur *Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok*, 1956.

The War of the Ukraine against Poland which began in 1648 loosed the developing crisis in Eastern Europe of the 1650s. Between 1648-1651 neither Sweden nor Russia were in a position to intervene in the Ukrainian conflict. After 1651, Russia became more active and, in October 1653, went to the aid of the Ukraine at the price of making that area a Russian protectorate. Sweden belatedly recognized the importance of the Ukraine for curbing Russian expansion to the West. In less than a year after the Ukraine came under the Russian wing, Sweden's king, Karl X Gustav, was negotiating with Hetman Bohdan Chmel'nyćkyj for an alliance. The next year (1655), when Sweden, on her own, went to war against Poland, Chmel'nyćkyj, at Karl X's request, pressed into the western Ukraine in order to hinder the Russian occupation of that territory. Also curious is the fact that the Ukraine, a country under the Tsar's protection, was Sweden's ally from 1656 to 1658, even though a Russo-Swedish war was in progress.

Dr. Bohdan Kentrschynskyj became interested in the reasons behind these events while he was tracing the background of Karl XII's treaty with Mazepa. He noticed that Swedish-Ukrainian relations went back at least to the days of Gustav II Adolph and that historians had either ignored or glossed over this diplomacy. Through a study of the Swedish archives and the correspondence of Karl X with Gustav Horn, Dr. Kentrschynskyj discovered that the main features of Swedish-Ukrainian policy were worked out in the seventeenth century, especially between the accession of Karl X to the Swedish throne and the start of the Swedish-Polish war in 1655. This policy became combined with all the complex problems which became decisive for Sweden's relations with Poland, Russia, and the Ottoman Porte and his vassals. In this connection Russia occupied the central position.

When Tsar Aleksej Michajlovič moved into the Ukraine in November 1654, Karl X feared that the Tsar, after recouping his strength, would mount a new offensive against the Baltic. Thus, it became imperative for Sweden to come to a clear understanding as to what could be expected from Poland should Russia make an overt move. The debates at the Swedish Riksdag meetings held in December 1654, definitely show that the chief concern was Russia. Karl X, therefore, tried to make a treaty with Poland, in which he hoped to present a Swedish-Polish front against Russia and at the same time keep the Ukraine neutral.

His entire policy was directed against Russia, but John Kasimir, the Polish king, let time run out on the Swedish overtures. Consequently, Sweden came to the conclusion that she must take action on her own by striking out from her Baltic possessions to keep Russia from the shores of that sea. In Swedish eyes, the balance of power in Eastern Europe had been upset by Russian intervention in the Polish-Ukrainian war. According to Dr. Kentrschynskyj, Sweden, as the leading power factor in northeastern Europe, was compelled to act in the face of a threat. Thus the curbing of Rusisan expansion was the basic political concept in the thoughts of Karl X, and all of his diplomatic and military proceedings were colored by his fears and suspicions of Russia.

During the Swedish-Polish negotiations of 1655, John Kasimir continually showed bad faith. Meanwhile Karl X had ordered Gustav Horn to take such military measures as would frustrate Russian advances without openly antagonizing the Tsar. Up to March, Karl X assumed that some sort of accord could be reached with Poland. After March it was apparent that John Kasimir would do all in his power to hinder a Polish-Swedish agreement. As his position worsened his demands became more unreasonable and intractable. This attitude made him "en av det polska folkets mest hatade konungar." (p. 115)

Horn, acting on Karl X's orders, moved against Polish Dünaburg and occupied that city. Sweden justified this action to Russia on the ground that Sweden had to remove John Kasimir from those Polish lands nearest to Sweden's Baltic possessions. The Polish king's refusal to give up his claim to the Swedish throne and his threatening attitude toward Sweden in face of the Russian danger were fraught with fateful consequences for his country. In mid-April, Poland became Sweden's chief enemy. Nevertheless, Sweden's move against Poland was only the first step in the greater action, "en första etapp inom ramen av en större militär aktion" (p. 135), and this was to keep Russia away from the Baltic coast.

Karl X's policy did not change after the attack on Poland. He still strove to end the Russian protectorate over the Cossacks and to prevent Russian from moving into Poland and Germany. To carry out his objectives he reached an agreement with Chmel'nyćkyj, a fascinating person and the greatest statesman in modern Ukrainian history. That union, of consequence at the time, was also significant later in light of Karl XII's Ukrainian policy.

Dr. Kentrschynskyj has made a real contribution to scholarship and his close use of the sources provides new insights into Swedish diplomacy prior to the Swedish-Russian war of 1656. As the book is an offprint, it lacks an index and a bibliography. Dr. Kentrschynskyj's full notes in part compensate for no bibliography, but an index would have been valuable. All in all, this is a book which will be used in the future by historians studying the problems of Eastern Europe in the seventeenth century. It is in accord with the high standards of scholarship set in the Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok.

Coe College JOHN J. MURRAY
Cedar Rapids, Iowa

ALANEN, AULIS J., *Der Aussenhandel und die Schiffahrt Finnlands im 18. Jahrhundert unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Umbruchsperiode der Handelsfreiheit im Bottnischen Meersbusen und der Grossen Seekriege.* (Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian Toimituksia, Sarja-Ser. B Nide, Tom 103.) Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Science and Letters. 1957. Pp. 495. 2,400mk.

Dr. Aulis J. Alanen has written a highly informative and valuable book on Finnish foreign trade and shipping in the eighteenth century with the last half of the century receiving special attention. Influenced in his training by Eli Heckscher, Dr. Alanen has brought forth a clear and concise narrative, and he accompanies it with tables compiled from widely scattered archives whose holdings in themselves were often incomplete.

This book is more than a mere narration and statistical study of Finnish shipping and foreign trade in the period covered. It provides deep and illuminating insights into the various factors—economic, political and psychological—that affected foreign trade and shipping. The treatment of Finland's export trade in wood products offers an excellent example of Dr. Alanen's thoroughness.

Contrary to what one might expect, Finland during the eighteenth century lagged behind her leading competitors in the lumbering industry. Norway, the leading exporter of timber, was closer to Dutch and British markets. Finns on the whole preferred to put their energies into shipbuilding and tar manufacturing. They had a real fear that lumbering operations would deplete the forests. The timber trade was further hampered by a shortage of saw mills and the difficulty of getting the lumber to the ports of embarkation. Finnish operators did not utilize the rivers for transport as they feared that water would damage the lumber. Instead in winter they hauled the logs across Finland's snowy hills. In the early part of the century most Finnish timber was bought by the Dutch with French purchases amounting to very little. After the 1730's, however, France became an important user of Finnish wood products.

Tar was Finland's main contribution to the world export market. During the eighteenth century, however, Finland's monopoly in the tar trade was broken by competition from Russia and from the British colonies in North America. A raising of prices accompanied by a deterioration in the quality of Finnish tar caused her best customer, Holland, to turn to other sources of supply. The international scene in Europe also affected prices and the flow of trade. The wars in the last half of the eighteenth century saw Hamburg replace Amsterdam as the main European *entrepôt* for Finnish tar.

After the first shipyard was constructed at Turku in 1732, shipbuilding became increasingly important to Finnish economy. Often the Finns would first use the ships they had constructed before they sold them to foreign buyers. The Finnish proximity to naval stores gave the shipyards of Finland real advantages over rival builders. The wars of Gustav III, however, were a real catastrophe for the shipping and the shipbuilding trade of the cities of East Bothnia.

Dr. Alanen in addition to describing the extent of shipbuilding and shipping in the East Bothnian cities deals with the mechanics of shipbuilding, the financing of the construction and trading voyages, the raising of crews, sea insurance, etc. He also includes detailed studies of the differences of Finnish ships as opposed to those turned out by rival shipyards in various foreign countries. Among other commodities exported from Finland were iron, textiles, and food. Finnish steel was able to compete with Swedish steel, and the principal exports in textiles were sailcloth and tents. Food could be exported only in years of plenty. Salt, various grain products, sugar and coffee were among the more important imports. Geographically the trade ranged from Swedish cities just across the Gulf of Bothnia to trading communities in the Mediterranean.

The innumerable wars of the eighteenth century both aided and hurt Finnish foreign trade. When Sweden was not involved and neutrality could be preserved, Finnish shippers, builders, and merchants profited. When Sweden was a belligerent, Finland's foreign trade and commerce decreased to practically nothing. In the final analysis, Finland's foreign and maritime activities were dependent upon political reactions and decisions in Great Britain.

The century in general was one in which the Finns absorbed profitable lessons in foreign commerce. Economically real strides were made under Swedish rule. When after 1815 the new masters from Russia appeared, it became quite apparent to all that the Swedish system was to be preferred and that Finland's real ties were westward rather than eastward.

This book is very useful for scholars interested in Baltic trade and commerce in the eighteenth century. It is marred by a few typographical errors and an index would have been helpful. These are only minor criticisms. There is a full bibliography and the text and the tables in the appendices are of real value. It is a real tribute to Finnish scholarship.

Coe College JOHN J. MURRAY

Sauvigny, G. de Bertier de, *France and the European Alliance 1816-1821: The Private Correspondence between Metternich and Richelieu.* Notre- Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958. Pp. xiii, 130. $2.75.

This book is not a history of Austro-French diplomatic relations between 1816 and 1821; nor is it a complete, well-rounded account of French foreign policy during those years. The author limits his short treatise largely to Metternich's and Richelieu's personal letters to each other and to reports which Vincent and Caraman sent them during the few years while Richelieu was premier of France. A considerable number of these letters, taken from the Austrian *Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv,* the Archives of the French Foreign Ministry, and the Victor Cousin Library in the Sorbonne, have been reproduced in full in the original French text. These letters and de Sauvigny's interpretation of them do not give as much insight into French domestic affairs and the foreign policies of Austria and France during the restoration period as they do into the personalities, political views, and modes of operation of Metternich and Richelieu.

As the correspondence shows, before 1818 Metternich was most sympathetic with Richelieu's efforts to increase the strength of the moderates in the Chamber of Deputies and to hold the ultra-royalists in check. In 1817 Metternich was so worried about the possibility that the Comte d'Artois might soon succeed Louis XVIII as king and then abolish the 1814 constitutional charter, that he discussed with Richelieu the need for Allied intervention, not to suppress the radicals, but to hold the ultra-royalists in check and force d'Artois to retain the constitutional charter. During the same year, when Pope Pius VII fell gravely ill, Metternich expressed his concern over the dangers that would confront Europe if an ultra pope were elected. As Caraman wrote Richelieu, Metternich was still convinced, as late as May 1818, that "representative governments have become a need, a necessity," (p. 61) and that in France representative institutions were "the only means to consolidate the royal government" (p. 62).

Soon, however, Metternich became more concerned about the resurgence of the liberal left in France than about obstreperous obstructionism of the ultras, and urged Richelieu to come to an agreement with d'Artois and the extremists that would enable him to hold the radicals in check. By 1820 and 1821 both Metternich and Richelieu had become greatly perturbed over the liberal revolutionary movement. Metternich warned Richelieu about the dangers of trafficking with the liberals, while the latter urged the Austrian chancellor, against his will, to call a conference of Big Powers to decide on measures to extirpate the revolutionary danger.

Although de Sauvigny deals only with isolated fragments of a much larger story of Austro-French relations, he has presented us with documents which support the thesis of "revisionists" that Metternich was not just a reactionary. The book should be read by everyone who wishes to obtain new insight into the "real" Metternich and the "real" Richelieu.

University of Texas R. John Rath

Aleksić, Ljiljana, *Stav Francuske prema Srbiji za vreme Druge Vlade Kneza Miloša i Mihaila* (1858-1868), (The Attitude of France toward Serbia during the Second Reigns of Princes Miloš and Mihail 1858-1868). Belgrade: Srpska Akademija Nauka, Posebna Izdanja, CCXCVIII, 1957. Pp. 173.

The second reign of Prince Mihail (1860-68) was one of the most hopeful periods in Serbian history in the nineteenth century. Serbia had gained her autonomy earlier, but she was still under the sovereignty of the Sultan. The goal of all Serbian patriots thus became the achievement of complete independence and the annexation of the territories inhabited by Serbian nationals which were still under Ottoman or Austrian control. It appeared for a time that Prince Mihail might attain at least a part of his objective and might even bring about a confederation of the Balkan peoples. Although he was not successful, South Slav historians have been greatly interested in his reign and the reasons for his failure.

The period of the 1860s has thus been studied in previous publications. In 1887 Jovan Ristić, the Serbian foreign minister, published his well-known work, *Spoljašnji odnošaji Srbije novijeg vremena* (The Foreign Relations of Serbia in Modern Times). Subsequently there appeared Jovan Jovanović, *Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila (1858-1868)* (The Second Reign of Miloš and Mihail, 1858-1868) (1923) and Vasil Popović, *Politika Francuske i Austrije na Balkanu za vreme Napoleona III* (The Policy of France and Austria in the Balkans during the time of Napoleon III) (1925). Although the present author covers the same period as the previous works, her interpretation of the events, in particular of the attitude of Napoleon III toward Serbian national aspirations, differs widely from that of the other writers. In addition to using the published primary and secondary sources available from all countries, Miss Aleksić has also examined much unpublished archival material. It is on her analysis of the hitherto neglected reports of the French agents from Belgrade for the years 1861, 1862, 1863, 1866, 1867 and 1868 that she bases her judgment of French policy.

Miss Aleksić's principal concern is the degree of validity to be assigned to the previously accepted assertion that Louis Napoleon's support of nationalism as a general principal determined French policy in respect to Serbia. Holding a negative view, the author denies that France ever gave the same support to Serbian aspirations that was offered to Italy and Rumania. Although France supported the Serbian policy of demanding the evacuation of Turkish troops from Serbian towns, Miss Aleksić asserts that this stand was taken only to deprive Serbia of any excuse for disturbing the Balkan balance. She also cites the fact that in 1860 France was willing to consider a possible Russian acquisition of territories containing Balkan, and possibly Serbian, populations should the Ottoman Empire disintegrate. France was also ready to make an agreement with Austria whereby the latter would take Bosnia-Hercegovina and in return surrender Venice to the Italians. However, despite this situation, the Serbian Government continued to base its hopes on French support, since there was no other possible alternative. Britain wished to maintain the integriy of the Ottoman Empire; Austria was naturally antagonistic to an enlarged Serbian national state; Prussia and Italy as yet played no major rôle in Balkan affairs. Russia also could not be called on for assistance, since her goals in the Balkans were based on her own national and strategic needs even if these might be to the detriment of the national aspirations of the Balkan peoples. Thus the Serbian Government was forced to follow a policy of reliance on France even after it became clear that Napoleon III was no longer in a position to act as a patron of Serbian nationalism because of the rising German threat. In the end Serbia was left without any reliable support for her national aspirations.

University of California, Berkeley CHARLES JELAVICH

TAMBORRA, ANGELO, *Cavour e i Balcani.* Torino: ILTE, Fondazione Camillo Cavour, 1958. Pp. 409.

Italian historiography has been extensive in dealing with the relations between Giuseppe Mazzini and the Slavs, or, to be more exact, the South Slavs and the non-

Slavic people in the Balkans, but it has been scanty in writing about Cavour and his realistic views of modern Italy's policy towards her neighbors on the other side of the Adriatic.

While Mazzini, and to a considerable extent Garibaldi, were emotionally attached to the awakening of the new Balkan nations concurrent with the general national romantic upheaval in modern Italy, Cavour faced this restless reality with cold statesmanship. Cautious and realistic, though essentially liberal and always clairvoyant, Cavour, in his instructions to the new Italian diplomacy, the consuls and representatives all over the Balkans and at the Sublime Porte, meant well and acted prudently; always keeping in mind that Italy should be present at and follow attentively every political change in the Balkans while remaining non-committal.

Italy, in Cavour's mind, was still young, her unification not achieved as yet on the Apennine peninsula; and, while Austria was her major enemy, she must be careful and not get into a diplomatic tangle with the declining Ottoman Empire. Paradoxically, in this subtle approach Cavour met with congenial understanding and similar political thinking in Serbia, in the person of Miloš Obrenović, probably the most realistic statesman of the period.

Angelo Tamborra, in nine solidly and accurately documented chapters of his *Cavour and the Balkans,* makes a definitive and excellent contribution toward a better knowledge and understanding of Italian policy and the Eastern and Slavic question from 1848 to 1861.

He has not only consulted facts and documents that have been published by South Slav, Romanian, Greek and Polish sources, but he has dug up diplomatic material from the Historical Archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry, the State Archives in Turin, the Risorgimento Museum and Archives in Turin and Rome, as well as the archives of the Sacred Congregation De Propaganda Fide, the British Foreign Office, the French Quai d'Orsay and the Staatsarchiv in Vienna.

Tamborra begins his diligent investigations with Italy's relations with the Slavs, then goes on to study the political efforts of Italian diplomats to arrive at an understanding between the Hungarians and the Serbs and Croats in the war with Austria of 1848-49. The author offers considerable new contributions to the clarification of Italian policy in his chapters on the policy of Serbia and the Sardinian kingdom, the problem of the unification of Romania, the crucial issue of the relations between Italians and Croatians concerning the future Adriatic borders of Italy following the solution of the problem of Venice. In the internal crisis of Greece brought about by Greek political dissatisfaction with the Bavarian dynasty, Tamborra has discovered an attempt to bring to the Greek throne one of Savoia's princes. But Tamborra's most valuable contribution is his chapter dealing with the conflict between the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Greek Phanar, when the Propaganda Fide seems to have been eager to attain a greater collaboration between the Bulgarian and the Roman Church. The liberal and anti-clerical Cavour again displayed his notable realism when he encouraged his diplomatic personnel to work closely with the Catholic clergy in this perilous endeavor.

The last chapter gives a clear *aperçu* of the ideas and projects for the formation of a Danubian and Balkan Confederation a hundred years ago. The work of one Czartoryski with Garashanin, of Strossmayer in bringing together the Eastern Orthodox Churches of the Bulgarians and the Serbs with the Roman Catholic Croats, as well as Kossuth's revised views in exile and the action of Kvaternik with Garibaldi and other Italian liberals of the same period, are here told again, but from the viewpoint of nineteenth-century Italians. This Italian side of the picture introduces so much new material that the book considerably enriches the literature on the problem of federation published so far. Aware of the internal nationalistic conflicts between Hungarians, on one side, and Croats and Serbs on the other, Tamborra rightly concludes that the *Ausgleich* (1867), with the establishment of "Dualism," had dealt a "mortal blow" to all efforts at a confederation, at least in that historical period.

This history, a paramount lesson in the relations between Italy and her Balkan and Danubian neighbors, is a painstaking contribution to the better understanding of these people who, even recently, have wasted their national energies in fighting each other, forgetting the great heritage left to them by the visionaries and statesmen of the last century.

Fairleigh Dickinson University
Rutherford, N. J.
Bogdan Raditsa

Malozemoff, Andrew, *Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904: With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. $5.00.

This is a book which should never have been published—not because the subject is not important or the materials accessible to the author were not significant, but because the scholarship is immature and the use and organization of the materials are faulty. In other words, this book represents a lot of hard work by a brilliant and promising student, but work which needed to be worked over before it became a Ph.D. thesis, and completely re-written before it became a book.

The most revealing and, to many readers, the most valuable part of the book is the first five chapters, which bring out basic but not always appreciated facts of Russian expansion in Asia. The late Mr. Malozemoff presents a careful picture of the inadequacy of Russia's administrative system, population, and financial resources to develop the vast empire she had acquired by 1600. Down to 1900 there were fewer Russian permanent residents in trans-Baikalia than Manchurian and Korean immigrants. Neither trade nor capital had been applied to the territory which had been Russian for three hundred years. And, in the face of this phenomenon, Russia was energetically and successfully extending her domains in Turkestan, the Ili Valley, Mongolia, Primorsk, and later in Manchuria and Korea.

In the crucial period covered by the author—the Boxer Uprising and the events leading to the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, the Russian documents used are handled with a curious kind of nostalgic nationalism and apology. Russian ambition, ineptitude, and lack of resources are twisted to make a case against Russian responsibility for the war and to place the blame on Japan. Here the Russian archives, not generally accessible to the student of this period, would have been a real contribution and still are useful as presented in the book. Perhaps the best part of this is a clearer and fuller view of some of the leading actors: Muraviev, Count Witte, Badmaev, Lobanov, and Bezobrazov.

Some minor lapses add to the limitations of the book. Obviously, no use was made of Chinese materials and Chinese names and terms are presented in inaccurate and unintelligible forms transliterated from Russian ("khunhuzes") without converting them to standard romanization. The 1896 proposal to divide Russian and Japanese spheres in Korea at the 38th Parallel is passed over without reference to the Russian demands at Yalta and Potsdam, etc.

Much valuable material and commendable scholarship are represented in this book and it is unfortunate that their possibilities are not more fully realized.

University of Colorado
Earl Swisher

Ziegler, Donald J., *Prelude to Democracy. A Study of Proportional Representation and the Heritage of Weimar Germany, 1871-1920.* (University of Nebraska Studies, New Series, Number 20). Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1958. Pp. ix, 134.

Ziegler's book represents an interesting effort "to relate the development of P. R. to prevailing social and political conditions and attitudes [in the Second Reich], and in this manner to shed light on the nature of the Weimar Republic." The thesis which underlies this commendable contribution holds that "P. R. was used almost extensively (sic) in Germany as an instrument of power against those who had as their ultimate political objective the democratization of the Reich."

The brief historical sketch of political and socio-economic conditions in the empire delineates quite clearly the problems and issues attendant upon election, representation, and power. It offers an adequate background for the comprehension of the many reform proposals which Ziegler examines in terms of techniques, intentions and implications. Of particular interest is perhaps the agitation for and justification of P.R. which issued from left-liberal and socialist writers and organizations.

The gradual introduction of the system by way of industrial, mercantile and mining courts, as well as *Krankenkassen* boards, reveals the degree to which P.R. was viewed and used as an instrument of power, especially by those who sought to repress and undermine the growing power of the socialists. This fact is particularly well demonstrated in Ziegler's analysis of electoral practices in Hamburg, Württemberg, Bavaria, and Baden, where P.R. was introduced. He also shows that the decision of the National Liberals and of the progressives to advocate P.R. for Reichstag elections was motivated by the belief that this electoral technique would halt a threatening decline in their political power in that body. Ziegler rightly questions the continued support of P.R. by the Social Democrats after 1912. Greater advantages would certainly have been realized from a redistribution and from the plurality system. Apparently, socialist theory prevented a realistic analysis of election statistics.

The adoption of P.R. by republican Germany worked highly interesting results and has permitted considerable speculation relative to the fate of the experiment in democratic rule. To be sure, the decline of socialist strength and the proliferation of small parties cannot be explained exclusively in the light of a particular election process. The many factors which fatally affected the Weimar Republic need not be mentioned here.

The concluding chapter offers a valuable comparison of the points of view advanced by proponents and opponents of P.R. in Germany. The former failed indeed to appreciate certain fundamental requirements for effective democratic government. Ziegler's conclusion that few Germans appeared capable of utilizing parliamentary government has some validity in the light of his study. If this be so, then logic would severely limit the application of his thesis to the post-1918 period. A few errors in the bibliography do not impair the value of Ziegler's contribution.

University of Colorado Willard Allen Fletcher

Nichols, J. Alden, *Germany After Bismarck: The Caprivi Era, 1890-1894.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. Pp. 404. $7.50.

The history of domestic politics under the German Empire (1871-1918) has until recently been neglected by critical historians. Scholarly interest has centered upon foreign policy in an effort to explain the origins of the "Great War" with the methods of traditional diplomatic history. To trace the sources of German *Welt-*

politik by examining the German political system—and the social system on which it rested—occurred to few historians, notably, Arthur Rosenberg, Eckart Kehr, and Johannes Ziekursch. Much energy was spent documenting Bismarck's fall, but little in analyzing how the "Bismarckian" system had functioned in internal politics with and without its creator.

Germany After Bismarck can now be added to the studies which will serve to correct this deficiency. It is more detailed than the excellent recent survey of Werner Frauendienst, *Das Deutsche Reich von 1890 bis 1914:* 1. Teil: Kanzlerschaften Caprivi und Hohenlohe (B. IV, Abschnitt 1 in *Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte,* ed. Leo Just), and broader in scope than the meticulous biographical sketch of Caprivi by Heinrich Otto Meisner in *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft,* CXI (1955), 669-752. Complementing these works, Nichols' book is essentially a narrative study of domestic politics in Prussia and the Empire during General Leo von Caprivi's chancellorship.

As a synthetic study based primarily on published sources available immediately after the war, Nichols' book is an extremely useful political history of 1890-1894 and will remain an essential reference work. It is well written and reveals a thoughtful approach to the problems of organization and interpretation. The author gives valuable background information on the constitutional structure and on prominent personalities—above all the irrepressible and disruptive "retired" Bismarck. The rôle of William II is somewhat neglected, but the parts played by Miquel, Botho Eulenburg, Philipp Eulenburg and Holstein are all illuminated through judicious use the memoir literature and the unpublished *Correspondence* of Holstein, which the author used in the German typescript. Caprivi's negotiations with the Reichstag and Landtag are analyzed in sufficient detail to convey the tone of party politics, which became increasingly strident and pressure-group dominated. The section on "court, cabinets, and cliques" is an excellent guide to the jungle of court politics in the early years of William II. One of Nichols' greatest achievements is his clear description of a key element in the German governing system: the complex imperial-Prussian relationship which proved unworkable after Caprivi had resigned the post of Prussian Minister-President in March 1892.

As a monographic contribution, this study has certain weaknesses which reflect the circumstances of its writing. The book began as a dissertation in 1951, but the author indicates that the original was given a "considerable reworking." However, some important German contributions since 1951 have been ignored, especially the dissertation by Horst Oehlmann, *Studien zur Innenpolitik des Reichskanzlers Leo von Caprivi* (Phil. Diss., Freiburg I./Br., 1953) and the biographical sketch, mentioned earlier, by Meisner (whose name Nichols misspells). Both omissions deserve attention, since Oehlmann's study was based on extensive use of the presently inaccessible sources at Potsdam and Merseburg, while Meisner's article reproduced the full text of several of the unpublished Caprivi papers, of which Nichols prints only selections. Further, Nichols did not exploit fully the Caprivi papers in the West Berlin *Hauptarchiv,* perhaps because study of the papers by means of microfilm copies made the author dependent on the archive in selecting the relevant documents. No use, for example, was made of the interesting letters written by Caprivi to his brother (folder No. 5 in the *Nachlass*).

The author does not refer to the many original sources made available since the late 1940s, such as the documents at the *Deutsches Zentralarchiv* in Potsdam and Merseburg, the *Bundesarchiv* in Koblenz, or the regional archives (containing *Gesandtschaftsberichte,* etc.). Even if Nichols had not chosen to use any of these new sources, there should have been some indication of their extent and importance.

The book's shortcomings as a monograph illustrate two difficulties confronting historians—one of a general nature and the other specifically applicable to American scholars. The first is the problem of constantly revising the bibliography of a dissertation before its publication. The second is the danger of writing on European history without direct access to the sources and the views of European scholars. These defects detract much less from the book as a narrative reference work, however. It can be highly recommended as an excellent starting point for anyone interested in the Caprivi era, and it will serve as a welcome aid to further research on politics under William II.

Harvard University THOMAS E. SKIDMORE

BIRNBAUM, KARL E., *Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare; a Study of Imperial Germany's Policy Towards the United States. April 18, 1916-January 9, 1917.* Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in History, No. 2, 1958. Pp. xxi, 388.

A detailed study of Imperial Germany's policy toward the United States in 1914-1917 has been possible only since 1945, when captured German foreign office and military archives became available. Mr. Birnbaum has written an important monograph, based on wide research in Europe and in America, delineating German policy in the crucial months preceding the fateful decision of January 9, 1917, for unrestricted submarine warfare.

The standard view has been that German policy in 1916, seeking a quick conclusion of the war, alternated between reliance on peace moves and ruthless underseas war. The author points out that Chancellor von Hollweg also pursued a third alternative: to so conduct relations with the neutral United States that a subsequent intensification of the U-boat campaign would not culminate in hostilities. Von Hollweg viewed war with the United States as disastrous for Germany, because of the probable effects on the European neutrals and the strengthening of the Entente cause. Yet he had to withstand pressure from the military and naval authorities, backed by the conservative press and politicians, for unhampered use of the submarine to break the stalemate and achieve decisive victory. By the fall of 1916, the Chancellor realized that he could not indefinitely restrain the military leaders, hence his desperate efforts to end the war through peace negotiations.

The Chancellor also believed that even if peace overtures failed and full use had to be made of the U-boats, a situation could be created by careful diplomacy in which a rupture with Washington would not ensue. This was the course long advocated by the German Ambassador in America, Count Bernstorff, who advised full concessions on the submarine issue and close cooperation with President Wilson's peace schemes. Two factors precluded success, however: the distrust with which virtually all of the German leaders and the public viewed Wilson's peace motives, arising from resentment at the benevolence of American neutrality for the Entente cause, and the determination of the dominant military leaders to use immediately unrestricted submarine warfare. The author's interpretations thus tend to substantiate the contention, long held by certain American historians, that a more impartial neutrality by the American Government might have precluded the final submarine crisis.

The one major criticism of this otherwise excellent study is that internal politics and pressures on the Chancellor are not adequately explored. A more detailed treatment of this aspect is found in E. R. May's *The World War and American Isolation* (1959). The text, translated by Mr. Albert Read, is strained and heavy, but this does not seriously detract from a well-researched contribution to the historiography of World War I.

University of Colorado **Daniel M. Smith**

Yakemtchouk, Romain, *La Ligne Curzon et la IIe Guerre Mondiale.* Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1957. Pp. 135.

The Curzon Line and World War II is the somewhat awkward title of a small French volume, which deals with a limited sector of the diplomatic history of Soviet relations with Nazi Germany, Poland, Great Britain and the United States during the years 1939-1945. Actually, it is not the so-called Curzon Line which is the main subject of Dr. Yakemtchouk's study, but rather the area situated to the East of this line. More precisely, it is that area of pre-1939 Poland which the Soviet Union received twice in five years: first, in August 1939 from Hitler, as a prize for the Soviet Union's participation in the Nazi-Bolshevik conspiracy known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and the second time in February 1945, at Yalta, from Great Britain and the United States, as a token of good will, when the Soviet Union, against its own volition, became a partner in the "Grand Alliance."

Both the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the Yalta Agreements have been treated quite exhaustively in English-language publications. To the French reader, the dealings leading to these "arrangements" are not yet fully clear, and it is indeed regrettable that Dr. Yakemtchouk has failed to fill the gap.

The author makes ample use of all official documentary publications of the American, the British, the French, the German, the Polish and the Soviet Governments dealing with the subject. He uses qualifying phrases which make it obvious that he does not approve of the Soviet Government's methods and tactics employed in its dealings concerning the area in question. However, Dr. Yakemtchouk reveals, by quite a biased selection of secondary sources, that he has his own axe to grind: the Ukrainian viewpoint on the subject. In his introductory chapter he "poses the problem" in the following words: "By the problem of the 'Curzon Line' one understands the question of the Western Frontier of the USSR with Poland, more particularly the settlement of the territorial and political status of Western Ukraine (called also Eastern Galicia), of Western Belorussia and of the Wilno region." (p. 7) One could accept this somewhat circumscriptive definition of the "problem of the Curzon Line" with one exception: There is documentary proof (and Dr. Yakemtchouk quotes several authors who reiterated this proof, hence he is cognizant of it) that it was only through a mistake of a negligent British Foreign Office official that Eastern Galicia, or as Dr. Yakemtchouk prefers to call it, "Western Ukraine," was mentioned in the Curzon note of July 11, 1920 to the Soviet Government as being placed East of the proposed "Curzon Line." But an admission that this was a mistake would not have fitted Dr. Yakemtchouk's pattern in approaching the entire problem from the Ukrainian point of view.

This is not the only fallacy in Dr. Yakemtchouk's "posing of the problem." He still calls Lord Curzon "the author" of this line, despite the fact that Harold Nicholson, who knew these matters from experience, clearly stated that "Curzon himself had little to do with it." (H. Nicolson, *Curzon: the Last Phase, 1919-1923*, London, 1934, p. 204.) Dr. Yakemtchouk, on p. 60, refers to the same page of Nicolson's work, hence he obviously was familiar with the statement, but again it would not have suited his purpose to admit it.

A note of the Polish Government-in-exile of March 4, 1943 to the Soviet Government, in which Soviet misconceptions about this line were corrected in a factual manner, is evaluated by Dr. Yakemtchouk as being "edited in quite a problematic style and making use of disputable arguments." (p. 74) He himself repeats the Soviet misconceptions by calling the Curzon Line a proposed "Polish-Soviet *frontier*," (p. 7—reviewer's italics) whereas a careful reading of the text of the note should have convinced him that it was proposed as an *armistice line* and not a frontier line. But again these factual findings would not have fitted his pattern.

Lack of space makes it impossible to give more examples of misinterpretation, intended omissions, and biased evaluations contained in the volume. The book, therefore, despite its scholarly appearance, may be classified as just another propaganda item.

Stanford University W. S. SWORAKOWSKI

THIMME, ANNELISE, *Gustav Stresemann: Eine politische Biographie zur Geschichte der Weimarer Republik.* Hannover: 1957. Pp. 132. DM 5.80.

Since the Stresemann papers were opened to research in 1953, the person, the policies and the methods of that controversial statesman of the Weimar republic have become the object of an intensive reappraisal. As a result, the curtain of myth and legend enveloping the author of Locarno has now been raised. Much credit for this is due to Dr. Thimme, who was one of the first to work her way through the Stresemann papers, and who has written several penetrating studies, the most remarkable of which appeared in the April 1956 issue of the *Historische Zeitschrift.* The short popular political biography under review is an excellent synthesis of the subject.

Thimme repudiates the view that Stresemann underwent a "great transformation" under the shock of German defeat in the First World War, breaking radically with the past—the past of an admirer of Tirpitz, of an ardent supporter of Ludendorff, in short, of an enthusiastic imperialist, candidly avowing that Germany's mission lay in taking over "the heritage of Napoleon." He was not all of a sudden transformed into a "good European" as his admirers would have us believe. He always remained a fervent German nationalist at heart. But first of all he was a realist. His "romanticism" was confined to the past and the future. Insofar as the present was concerned he was always a practical statesman, who knew that a new situation required a new policy and new methods. It was not for the sake of "Europe" but to further German national interests that he launched the Locarno policy. Since Germany could not overthrow the treaty of Versailles by force or by the threat of force, she could only strive to revise it gradually, step by step. This could only be accomplished through an understanding with France. Hence the necessity to assuage French fears. Only by coming to terms with the West could Germany hope to recover her complete sovereignty, to bring to an end the Allied occupation of the Rhineland, and in general to retrieve her strength. The policy which Stresemann pursued since 1925 aimed at "pushing France back from trench to trench," recovering the colonies, sustaining and inciting irredentism in the neighboring states, effecting the *Anschluss* of Austria to Germany, and, finally, attaining the equality of armaments with other European nations either through German rearmament or through the disarmament of the other countries. Even Hitler said later that, considering the situation, nothing more could have been achieved at that time. (p. 128)

Well organized and lucidly written, this is a valuable little book.

Russian Research Center ZYGMUNT J. GASIOROWSKI
Harvard University

Höltje, Christian, *Die Weimarer Republik und das Ostlocarno-Problem—1919-1934.* Marburger Ostforschungen, Bd. 8. Würzburg: Holzner, 1958. Pp. 306. DM 24.

Immediately after the defeat of 1945, German contemporary historians—and publicists as well—applied themselves hungrily and sometimes hastily to the exploration of the Hitler era. As the events became more remote, interest increased and the Weimar period, with all its controversies, has become a *cause célèbre* in learned and less learned circles. This change in emphasis causes little surprise. First of all, there is a tempting possibility that an analysis of the Weimar period can, to some extent, explain the rise of Hitler and thus distribute the onus for the subsequent events more justly. And then, the problems of defeated Germany in 1918 and 1945 are somewhat similar and thus a lesson can *possibly* be drawn for Germany and the world around. If, then, a topic such as the one dealt with by Dr. Höltje, namely the problem of Germany's Eastern border of the period after 1918, is examined, one cannot but think of the German Democratic Republic, Berlin, the Oder-Neisse Line and the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Höltje examines only summarily the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference pertaining to Germany's Eastern border and draws very strong conclusions. Needless to say, his pillars are the memoirs of Lloyd George and Lansing, whereas their opposite numbers from Paris are represented only to the extent that their arguments are accessible in German. This criticism applies, unfortunately, to some other sections of this book. For instance, in order to prove that even the British and the American public rejected the Paris settlement as far as Germany's Eastern border was concerned, a few quotes from a few articles written by some known but mostly unknown publicists, are hardly adequate. The same is true when it comes to the appraisal of the Polish and Czechoslovak counterparts of Germany during the twenties, when Dr. Höltje feels, for instance, that it is adequate to quote from an American thesis written in 1937 about Czechoslovakia's foreign policy.

On the other hand, Dr. Höltje's pains in securing his information from Stresemann's Papers (London), from the State Archives of Bavaria, and from German published materials, should be acknowledged. And exactly this imbalance in documentation divides Höltje's contribution in two different parts. The stand of the political parties of the Weimar Republic and of the responsible German statesmen towards Germany's Eastern border—to put up a guarantee similar to that given to France, or to leave the door open for a future revision—is skillfully analyzed. Dr. Höltje proves that Germany as a whole (with the exception of a W. Foerster, but including German pacifists, Social Democrats and Communists) strove towards a revision, any differences being only in methods. Stresemann, hitherto believed by many historians to be primarily a European who not only sacrificed Germany's aspirations in the West but was ready to do the same in the East, is presented as a German statesman who was quite concerned with the fate of the parts of the German nation living outside Germany's borders. In fact, Dr. Höltje stresses so heavily Stresemann's aversion to any guarantee of the status quo in the East, that he scarcely mentions the German arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, signed by Stresemann. To those students of the Weimar era who see in Stresmann one who paved the way for Hitler and the Second World War, Dr. Höltje presents strong evidence to the contrary, as did Erich Eyck before him.

Ottawa, Ontario Boris Čelovský

KERTESZ, STEPHEN D., *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool. Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.* Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953. Pp. 273. $4.75.

The pride of the Hungarian capital, the venerable Chain Bridge connecting Buda with Pest, lies in ruins. A photo of this dismal sight on the front cover of the book symbolizes its contents. It impressively summarizes what happens to a peaceful small country when ruthless big neighbors break in upon it; to a freedom-loving country when it becomes the prey of totalitarian dictatorships.

Hungary has been the focus of international interest since her uprising against the Soviet Union of October 23, 1956. This book was written three years before that date; yet the reviewer cannot recommend a better book to anybody investigating the causes of both the uprising and its suppression by the Soviet army .

The author, Stephen D. Kertesz, is excellently equipped to write on his country's victimization by two antithetical dictatorships in succession. A former student of Yale, Oxford, and Geneva universities and a Lecturer of International Law at the University of Budapest, he had a diplomatic career in his country before, during, and after World War II. As one who belonged to the group of anti-Nazi Hungarian diplomats and was, in the last years of the war, charged with the secret preparation of Hungary's peace negotiations in expectation of the collapse of the Third German Reich, he was arrested and court-martialled by the Nazis in October 1944. After the war he rejoined the Foreign Ministry of democratic Hungary as head of the Peace Preparatory Division. In 1946 he became General Secretary to the Hungarian peace delegation that negotiated in Paris, and the following year he was appointed Minister to Italy. In the summer of the same year when the Communists took over in Hungary he resigned from the diplomatic service, and came to the United States, where he was first Visiting Professor in the Law School of Yale University, then Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Committee on International Relations at the University of Notre Dame.

His well-documented book is a case history of totalitarian aggression. A brief but excellent survey of Hungarian history shows the struggles of this country of the Middle Danube, first as an independent state, then, from 1867 through 1918, as an integral half of the Habsburg Monarchy. He then points out that the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, unavoidable as it was under the principle of self-determination, meant the Balkanization of Central Europe and, in the words of Sir Winston Churchill, "a cardinal tragedy." We may add that this tragedy was the dismal outcome of the collision of political slogans favoring the constitution of small nations with economic necessity favoring large free-trade areas. The author vividly draws the picture of postwar chaos in Hungary, the clash of the pro-Habsburg legitimists with the Horthysts, the signing and the tragic consequences of the peace treaty of Trianon, which reduced to one-third both the area and the population of Hungary. This gave rise to the Hungarian irredentism, which, on one hand, called into being the anti-Hungarian Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and, on the other, determined Hungarian foreign policy to seek the friendship and protection of Fascist Italy.

After describing the political and economic difficulties of dismembered Hungary and the successful consolidating work of the cabinet of Count Stephen Bethlen (1921-31), the author sketches the reactions of Hungary's political life to Hitler's seizure of power in Germany. He especially dwells on the fact that Hungarian diplomacy, young and incipient as it was, with sober instinct endeavored to ward off the ever-growing influence of Nazi Germany by relying on Italy and Poland, the two traditional friends of Hungary and resuming the friendship of old standing with Austria. However, this policy of the golden mean was also practiced even after the Austrian *Anschluss* in March 1938. Hungary was reluctant to take action against Czechoslovakia in the two-phase crisis of 1938-39, maintained her traditional Polish sympathies even after the Russo-German partition of Poland, and troubled Nazi Germany with her anti-Rumanian feelings after the dismemberment of Rumania in 1940.

It was in April 1941 that Nazi Germany decisively gained the upper hand in Hungary, when Yugoslavia was overrun. This cost the life of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Paul Teleki, who committed suicide. His successor, Ladislas Bárdossy, brought Hungary into the war with the English-speaking powers and Russia. It is breath-taking even two decades later to read the author's account of the diplomatic acrobatics ensuing from the catastrophe of the Hungarian army at Voronezs in January 1943, which, however, ended in disaster, in the autumn of 1944, with the forced abdication of the Regent Horthy and the seizure of power by the Hungarian Nazis. There follows a vivid description, based on the author's personal experiences, of how the Hungarian Nazis were swept away by the Russian army, the seven-week-long siege of Budapest, and the democratic reorganization of the Hungarian foreign service.

The second part of the book bears the title *Hungary in the Shadow of the Red Star.* In detailing the lootings of the Red Army, the author dwells on the fact that the Allied Control Commission of Hungary was entirely in Soviet hands owing to the reserved attitude of the Western powers after the Yalta and Potsdam agreements of 1945. The numberless difficulties, both economic and political, with which Hungary was confronted after World War II, as well as the arduous road to the financial reconstruction of the country, are all described by the author, who finishes his work with the detailing of the peace preparatory work in 1945-46.

The last sentences of the book are especially noteworthy in the light of the Hungarian uprising which took place three years after the writing: "Despite this ruthless procedure, results of bolshevization and Russification have so far been limited and superficial. One cannot change the spirit of a people and wipe out traditions of centuries overnight. The passive resistance of the Hungarian people has remained general. The time factor, however, is all important because the spirit of resistance can not be maintained for an indefinite period."

Numerous literary references and notes as well as a collection of 23 documents are appended to the book. It is an indispensable reference-work for those interested either in the methods of the Nazis and the Communists or in the modern history of Hungary since the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Harvard University JOSEPH DE SOMOGYI

LEMBERG, EUGEN, *Osteuropa und die Sowjetunion. Geschichte und Probleme. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Ostkunde.* Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag, 1956. Pp. 301. DM 13.80.

Lemberg's book is the second, revised and considerably enlarged edition of a book which was first published in 1950 at Stuttgart (CES-,*i.e.* Curt E. Schwab-Bücherei, v.43) with the sub-title "History and Problems of the World behind the Iron Curtain." Although the preface frankly and modestly asserts that this book does not claim to offer any fruits of original research, nevertheless it is being reviewed here even after considerable time has passed since its publication, for it is pioneering in the pedagogic field by reconsideration and revision of long-held and cherished concepts of Germany's political and cultural relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Originating from lectures at the Kassel Pädagogische Akademie, the book comes close to being a compendium of materials basic for an understanding of Germany's Eastern problem in the post-World War II world. Lemberg's aim is primarily didactic: to counter and to remedy the West German lack of knowledge of the Eurpean East, of its nationalities, its civilizations, and its problems.

In the introductory chapter the author criticizes the hitherto pervailing German approach to Eastern problems as "etatistisch"; he thinks that too much stress has been laid on political developments to the detriment of demographic, social, economic, and cultural history, and he stresses a special need for a penetrating analysis, a "characterology," of the nationalities of Eastern Europe. However, his "östliches Menschenbild" is far from being a convincing key to the history of the region. The traits of his "Mensch des Ostens" are obviously derived from the "(gross)russische Mensch," but do not fit the Ukrainian, the second-largest nationality of Eastern Europe, not to speak of other peoples. Fortunately, the author soon leaves this slippery ground. (His stress here upon the "magic element" in Eastern religiosity has been cited in a somewhat distorted manner in a scathing attack against him in the East German *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft,* 1958, No. 6: "Die 'Ostforschung'—ein Stosstrupp des deutschen Imperialismus," p. 1205.) Gratifyingly, no attempt has been made to use a typology of the Eastern nationalities as the basis for his skillful and amazingly comprehensive presentation of main trends in the medieval and modern history of Eastern Europe and Russia, including the Soviet period.

While the book is conceived as an introduction for the teacher to the problems of the European East and generally avoids generalizations and oversimplifications, it is unusual and excels in two respects: It is without parallel in pointing out educational factors in the cultural development of the Eastern nationalities; its treatment of nationality problems greatly profits from the author's own experience as a Sudeten German, his familiarity with the nationality problem of Czechoslovakia as inherited from Austria-Hungary, and from his own research.

Lemberg has earned recognition as a serious scholar with his books—*Grundlagen des nationalen Erwachens in Böhmen* (1932), *Wege und Wandlungen des Nationalbewusstseins* (1934) and *Geschichte des Nationalismus in Europa* (1950). Unfortunately, manuscripts on the idea of the nation (*Volksbegriff*) and the national consciousness in Poland from the time of the partitions to Mickiewicz's lectures at the Collège de France, and another on the idea of the Czech nation were irretrievably lost when the author was forced to leave Czechoslovakia. He is in fact one of the first and few German historians dealing objectively with the Czech national awakening, and is referred to by Hans Kohn in *The Idea of Nationalism* (1944), where the writings of Reich-German authors tainted by National Socialism are conspicuously omitted. (Reviews of Lemberg's *Geschichte des Nationalismus* in the *American Historical Review,* Vol. 57, Oct. 1951, No. 1, p. 154ff. by Hans Kohn, and in the *Historische Zeitschrift,* Vol. 172, 1951, pp. 314-320 by Reinhard Wittram, and also Wittram's discussion of Hans Kohn's *magnum opus* on nationalism—*Historische Zeitschrift,* Vol. 174, 1952, pp. 1-16: "Der Nationalismus als Forschungsaufgabe"—are basic statements of divergent opinions in German and American research on nationalism.)

Another aspect of the book under review which deserves close attention is the author's strong indication that, since Ranke, the German *Geschichtsbild* has been too exclusively identified with the community of the Teutonic and Latin nations (*germanisch-romanische Völkergemeinschaft*), neglecting Germany's close link

(*Verflechtung*) with the East and the rôle played in German history by the East German element. German history has too often been seen as the history of Western Germany. The author, with his *gesamtdeutsche* conception of German history, not only wants to restore the balance of West and East German history, but goes much further: He postulates that East German history likewise belongs to the history of Eastern Central Europe and should be treated within its framework.

The progress in the rebuilding of East European studies in Western Germany has been so rapid in recent years that the author's remarks about the organization of Eastern research, although written only three years ago, are out of date, while the very selective bibliography (with several small errors) still stands, on the whole.

To sum up: Lemberg is one of the pioneers in the reform of history teaching in West German schools. His special contribution as an educator has been the stressing of the rôle of the German East in West German education. His merit lies in replacing the emotional approach in dealing with Germany's territorial losses in the East and the problem of the refugees and expellees, with its almost inevitable appeal to maintain the will to return to former homes or regain "*die Heimat*," by a more sober and rational approach. His approach revises and deepens the German *Volksbegriff* and demands a new orientation in German historical thought, which will simultaneously try to do justice both to the national development and to the aspirations of Germany's Eastern neighbors. Lemberg's "*Gesamtdeutsches Geschichtsbild*," of course, regards Eastern Germany, the German Democratic Republic, as an integral part of the fatherland. Lemberg has set into motion a discussion equally noteworthy from the scholarly and the pedagogic viewpoint of the rôle of the East in Germany's past and under present conditions; a discussion to which important contributions have been made, for instance, by Hans Rothfels, Theodor Schieder and Reinhard Wittram. Some of Lemberg's statements may be found in: "Geschichte und Probleme des Nationalismus in Ostmitteleuropa," (in *Unser Geschichtsbild. Der Sinn in der Geschichte.* Ed. Karl Rüdinger, München, 1955); "Der deutsche und der europäische Osten in Unterricht und Erziehung" and "Ostmitteleuropa als Ganzheit" (both in *Der Deutsche Osten im Unterricht*. Ed. by the "Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft für deutsche Ostkunde im Unterricht," Weilburg/Lahn, 1956); "Ostkunde und Ostbewusstsein in Deutschland" (in *Osteuropa*, Sept. 1959) and "Voraussetzungen und Zusammenhänge des deutschen Vertriebenenproblems. Zur Vorgeschichte: das Nationalitätenproblem," "Das Bildungswesen vor neuen Aufgaben," "Wandel des politischen Denkens," and "Völkerpsychologische und weltgeschichtliche Aspekte"—all in the Sammelwerk (3 vols.) *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland. Ihre Eingliederung und ihr Einfluss auf Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik und Geistesleben.* Edd. Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich Edding, Kiel: Ferdinand Hirt, 1959. A collection of Lemberg's articles would bring out clearly his profound grasp of a new aspect of education forced on Germany by what he has made the topic of a publication in 1950: *Die Entstehung eines neuen Volkes aus Binnendeutschen und Ostvertriebenen.*

The Library of Congress FRITZ T. EPSTEIN

DZIEWANOWSKI, M. K., *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. Pp. 369. $7.50.

In the present stage of the relationship between the Soviet Orbit and the Free World, Khrushchev maintains that he has reversed the famous "doctrine of containment" and that the Communist bloc is now containing the Western World until the organic law of capitalistic economy forces the free societies to surrender.

A growing number of thoughtful men in the United States and elsewhere are looking for chinks in the totalitarian structure of Communism which would signify the internal disintegration of that system. In this connection Poland and her "October of 1956" has stimulated the interest of the West in herself as the weakest link in the Soviet Empire.

Between 1918 and 1945 the story and the problems of that unfortunate country were told in the West either by Germans or by Russians, neither of whom was particularly interested in an objective presentation of facts. Almost all Western experts on Poland were disciples of that generation of teachers. Now their contribution to knowledge in this particular country is being supplemented by former natives of Poland—many of them all too conscious of the political and social shortcomings of pre-war Poland—but who are also familiar with the positive facts. One of these dedicated scholars is the author of this book.

Professor Dziewanowski of Boston College is unquestionably an outstanding authority on the history of the Communist movement in Poland. The above mentioned book is an admirable example of what historical writing means. In it he traces the historical development of the Communist Party in Poland from 1838 to the Sejm election of January 20, 1957. It is based on original sources available in the West and on numerous interviews conducted here and in Poland.

The book is divided into four major parts. The first part covers the emergence of Communism from 1932 to the beginning of W. W. I. The second part reconstructs formation of the party in 1918 and the events which led to Stalin's decision first to purge the party of its top leadership and then to its dissolution in 1938. Part III deals with the wartime history and tactics of the Communists in Poland and their methods of capturing power. The final section of the book discusses the successes and failures of the totalitarian state established by Moscow through its agents in Poland.

In the final analysis it is the story of Rosa Luxemburg, Julian Marchlewski, Feliks Dzierzyński, Karol Radek, Władysław Gomulka and the Kremlin versus the people of Poland, who wanted to be free but who were sentenced by geography and the imperialistic policy of Stalin and Khrushchev to be ruled by Moscow. Professor Dziewanowski supplies details and facts, and provides their scholarly examination. Those who since 1956 have hoped that Gomulka's nationalism can outweigh his ideological commitments will do well to ponder over the author's conclusion: "no really essential and lasting changes in Poland's domestic structure are possible as long as the country remains within the Soviet orbit."

The recent systematic withdrawal of the reasonable concessions which Gomulka made to the masses who helped him to recapture power in 1956 indicate that Communists of any nationality will be concerned primarily with power and not with liberty or social justice, and that their allegiance to Moscow is of supreme importance.

University of Colorado **Edward J. Rozek**

Sterling, R. W., *Ethics in a World of Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. Pp. 318. $6.00.

Ethics in a World of Power is a very useful study of the thought of Friedrich Meinecke in that it serves to make the essence of this great German's contributions more easily available to the English reader. It concentrates on Meinecke's thought as such, describing his intellectual antecedents and his environment only as Meinecke himself saw them without giving them any extensive critical treatment.

The ideas of the great historian are presented separately, in so far as this is possible. Each one of them is introduced along with the historical interpretations Meinecke used to support it, the framework in which he conceived it, and its development during his lifetime. This arrangement inevitably involves a considerable amount of repetition, since Meinecke's concepts are closely inter-related, but it does serve to present his thought from a variety of vantage points.

Meinecke emerges primarily as a seeker after ethical values, and his ideas center in ethical considerations. The basic feature of his thinking is to be found in his concept of "polarities," which sees all ethical values as dialectical in nature. As one adopts ethical values in this world of power one is always forced to keep in mind the weight of their polar opposites. Meinecke's devotion to the nation-state, for example, cannot free him from his responsibility to his own conscience. The historicist, who believes in the sanctity of his origins and uses reason to suit his own purposes, must occasionally yield to the rationalist, and uphold reason even to the detriment of his heritage. Nor may one relax and be a moral relativist, for the concept of "polarities" itself has its polar opposite, and one must be responsible to an absolute even if one is prepared to deny his own concepts of it.

Mr. Sterling intends his work to help modern Americans "to achieve wisdom in the conduct of foreign policy," and it is indeed easy to see a need for this. But if this is the purpose of *Ethics in a World of Power,* then it should include a critical appraisal of Meinecke's thought in the light of our own problems. If, alternatively, the book is to portray the relation of Meinecke's thought to contemporary German problems, then it should deal with these problems as they were rather than only as Meinecke saw them. In fact, the book neither criticizes Meinecke's thought, any more than Meinecke himself did, nor discusses the relation of this thought to German problems except in Meinecke's own terms. It simply sums up what Meinecke said from Meinecke's own point of view. This it does very well.

Precisely because he is uncritical, Mr. Sterling succeeds in catching much of the flavor of Meinecke's writing. His admiration for Meinecke, however, leads him to be unduly severe with those who presume to criticize his protagonist, and makes his own analysis less than objectively accurate, even if it is subjectively valid. His contention, for example, that Meinecke's search for an ethic was a continuous forward progress throughout his life is a distortion. The only ethical affirmations Meinecke ever reached were by dint of utterly wanton mingling of what is and what should be, reaching their climax of illogic in his last writings, in which he sees a glorious future for Germany and the world if everyone will only read Goethe and synthesize Ranke and Burckhardt, as if statesmen could somehow be made less subject to the dictates of necessity by simply reading good books. This is not forward progress for the truly immortal Meinecke of *Idee der Staatsräson,* who amassed such a preponderance of historical evidence to support Machiavelli's sobering dicta concerning necessity that no one can ever again presume to challenge him seriously so long as the world is made up of political units. Meinecke's significance does not lie in his ethical affirmations, unless one wants to call his concept of "polarities" an affirmation. On the contrary he failed utterly to find any philosophically acceptable ethical affirmation, and in his search for it helped to destroy what illusions of ethical unity were left to us. Mr. Sterling's book reflects the profundity of Meinecke the historian, and it is because of this that it is of value. That it emphasizes Meinecke's occasional sentimental aberrations as if these were contributions only distorts the picture.

Princeton University GEORGE L. YANEY

SHORTER NOTICES

Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs. 10. Band. Vienna-Horn: Ferdinand Berger, 1957. Pp. 554.

The tenth volume of this learned journal is large in size and rich in contents. The subjects treated in several articles range widely, and while some of them pertain to local history, others have bearing on major problems of European history. In his study of contacts between Austria-Hungary and the Vatican from 1870 to 1878 Professor Engel-Janosi pointed out the causes of disharmony marking that period. It originated partly in the international orientation of the Dual Monarchy, partly in the liberal policy of the Austrian cabinet following the abrogation in 1871 of the Concordat. Dr. E. Weinzierl-Fischer presents a related topic, Bismarck's distrustful attitude to the Vatican Council and its decrees. Her principal sources were the reports of Count Wimpffen, the Austrian envoy to the Prussian Court, covering the critical years 1869 to 1871. Written with unconcealed dislike of the Chancellor, the dispatches reveal Bismarck's keen interest in the work of the church assembly as well as in the policy of leading Catholic powers. His attempts to organize them for an energetic intervention foreshadowed his activities in Prussia, leading up to the Kulturkampf. Two articles shed new light on the foreign policy of the Habsburg monarchy around 1880: Alexander Novotny writes on Austria-Hungary and Turkey at the time of the Berlin Congress and thereafter, Ernst R. Rutkowski sketches laborious and mostly barren negotiations between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Turkey in 1881-82. Professor William A. Jenks contributed to this volume of *Mitteilungen* a detailed study in English of "Taafe's Cabinet and the Nordbahn Controversy, 1883-85."

Founded in 1948 by the Austrian Staatsarchiv to stimulate research activities of its staff, the *Mitteilungen* widened the original scope and increased the size of individual volumes. Apart from articles, based as a rule on painstaking research in unprinted documents, each volume contains reports from Austrian archives, national as well as provincial, accounts of congresses or specialized conferences, and other news from the learned world. Attention should be called to a large number of book reviews and short notices. In the tenth volume this section has been introduced by an exhaustive survey of recent publications concerning Austria and the Ottoman Turks from the pen of Rudolf Neck.

Ten volumes of *Mitteilungen* is an impressive series on which both the editors and the contributors should be heartily congratulated.

University of Pennsylvania OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK

Kleine Slavische Biographie, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1958. Pp. 832, DM 34.

A handy Slavic biographical dictionary has been a desideratum for a long time. The present work satisfies the demand for something "handy." It is almost pocket size. The paper is thin, the print clear, the separate rubrics distinct. There is much useful information in a small space, presented with almost as much effective brevity as the *Sachwörterbuch zur deutschen Geschichte.* So far, so good. It is not quite so clear on what principle names were chosen and space assigned. Edvard Beneš does not appear; Anna Pavlova gets the same space as Bishop Strossmeyer. The select bibliography at the end of the book is not completely fortunate. Some of the titles make one wonder whether by any chance the one who listed them ever had them in hand. But then we should not be too hard on those who have to select.

S.H.T.

SANTIFALLER, LEO and EVA OBERMAYER-MARNACH, edd., *Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon, 1815-1950.* Publ. by Österreichische Akademie d. Wissenschaften, Graz-Köln: Böhlau. Lieferung 7-9. 1958-1959. DM 6.50 per Lieferung.

The beginning of this useful *Lexikon* was noticed in the *Journal* in July 1955. The publication of succeeding fascicles has proceeded apace, and the profile of the whole undertaking now begins to take clear shape. The core of the subject is still

strongly Austrian. The minority peoples of the Empire receive attention, but the treatments are somewhat more reserved. Whereas quite minor Austrian artists, composers, men of letters and industrialists receive substantial notice, their Slavic or Magyar counterparts will seldom appear. It is good to know so much about so many.
S.H.T.

BYRNES, ROBERT F., ed., *Bibliography of American Publications on East Central Europe 1945-1957*. Slavic and East European Series, No. 12. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Publications, 1958. Pp. 213, $2.50.

SHAW, J. T., ed., *The American Bibliography of Slavic and East European Studies for 1958*. Slavic and East European Series, No. 18, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Publications, 1959. Pp. 112, $2.00.

The useful series of publications of the Indiana Slavic and East European Center continues to bring us necessary tools for study and research. Professor Byrnes, who too modestly disclaims any special competence in the area, has compiled, over the thirteen years from 1945 to 1957, a formidable list of publications concerned with the peoples and problems of the smaller countries between the three seas. The gleaning has been very thorough and comprehensive. He has perhaps been charitable in including some things more by title than by content. Listing is according to place of publication, so that, e.g., Edvard Beneš appears in the list. The very considerable foreign language press in the United States and Canada seems not to have been considered. They publish monographs as well as newspapers and journals. The East and South Baltic States are included, but not the Ukraine (The Carpatho-Ukraine, i.e., Ruthenia, is listed), the western part of which is certainly East Central Europe. This is not criticism—only a remark on the problems implicit in any bibliographical listng. Almost as mportant as the bibliography itself is Professor Byrnes' introductory remarks on the necessity facing American scholarship to sharpen its awareness of the whole area, and his pinpointing of some of the needs for scholarships in this region. It is a humbling as well as a bracing statement which I should have been happy to sign.

Professor Shaw, in his 1957 as well as in the present issue, has expanded his previous bibliography (*J.C.E.A.*, April, 1958, p. 69) which restricted itself to language, literature and folklore, to include the social sciences. There are, in all, 1380 titles listed. At times any bibliographer is faced with difficult decisions as between purely journalistic and essentially pointless production and the significant. A principle of inclusiveness is the usual conclusion. Propaganda, polemic and solid stuff rub elbows. In any event, the total of substantial production in this area is reassuringly impressive. The study of the area is a new discipline, and it is but natural that much of it should be of a mediocre quality. Nevertheless, to a marked degree, the Bibliography argues against Professor Byrnes' complaint that the area is inadequately covered.

S. H. THOMSON

LONG, JOHN, *Modern Russia; an Introduction*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. Pp. 179. $6.00.

The publishers are guilty of enormously overpricing this book as well as of advancing the absurd claim that it assembles "all the known facts about modern Soviet Russia . . ." The author more modestly states that it is intended for "the serious, non-specialist reader who requires a brief, factual commentary on post-Stalinist Russia," and offers the book as a "bridge" between academic monographs and popularizations of the subject. Mr. Long's acknowledgments suggest a period in the Royal Air Force, but his present whereabouts are not mentioned.

Political and geographical features of the USSR receive the main attention. The chapters are entitled "The Physical Setting" (29 pages), "The Peoples of the USSR" (23 pages), "The One-Party State System" (38 pages), "The Planned Economy" (53 pages), and "Soviet Russia in the World Today" (11 pages). Thus the chapter on the economy is the longest, but much of it is devoted to industrial and agricultural geography rather than the operation of the system. There is a good deal of facile equation of Tsarist and Soviet characteristics, and the epigraphs to each chapter except one are taken from accounts of early Western visitors to Russia. There is, in fact, no serious attempt at overall institutional analysis of Russia of any period. The difficulty in trying to bring books on the USSR "up-to-date" is well illustrated by the appendices: Appendix C (the Council of Ministers as of February 1957) lists the names of the seven members of the "inner cabinet," of whom only one was left a year later and even his title had changed. The author is inclined to more combativeness than his 158 pages of text can easily hold, and he sometimes fights unnecessary battles, as when he sharply challenges an estimate of Bulganin (p. 66), which subsequent events make appear quite as tenable as his own, although neither rests on much evidence. His fundamental evaluation of the Soviet system and Soviet intentions is sound, although not very successfully integrated with his account of particulars. The factual errors are rather few.

In sum, the book is likely to do little harm and perhaps much good to the general reader for whom it is intended.

University of Washington DONALD W. TREADGOLD

RADICA, BOGDAN, *Supilova Pisma Ferrerovima*. Buenos Aires, 1957. [Reprinted from *Hrvatska Revija,* VII, 4 (28), pp. 349-405.]

This is a collection of nineteen letters written by Frano Supilo to Guglielmo and Gina Lombroso Ferrero, his friends for many years, to which Bogdan Radica has added a biographical essay and appreciation. Eleven of the letters (including five from 1917, the year of Supilo's death) have been published previously, partly in Salvemini's *L'Unità* (1918) and partly in the Zagreb *Obzor* (1929). The remaining eight were recently uncovered by Radica in the Ferrero estate and appear for the first time in print. All are given in the original Italian as well as in Croatian translation and cover the years 1905-1907 (4 letters), 1910 (2), 1914 (1), 1917 (11).

The collection as a whole offers intimate glimpses into Supilo's political ideas and personality. It contains little that is startling or significantly novel. It serves rather as a brief and, of necessity, sketchy self-portrait of a remarkable political figure who emerges anew as a man of great vision and moral force, of changing moods and of uncommon human warmth. Though an able political tactician, Supilo was primarily an idealist, a fact deeply reflected in these letters. Politics did not interest him except as a medium for translating ideals into reality and his correspondence reveals him as an unrelenting fighter, before 1914, for Croatian emancipation from Magyar domination, and, during World War I, for the creation of a united Yugoslav state. While two of his final letters abound with a premonition of impending death, which came prematurely in his forty-seventh year, he even then refused to curtail his political activity.

As is only to be expected, Supilo's letters to the Ferreros bear more upon Italy's policies towards the Yugoslav movement than upon the movement itself. Supilo had abiding faith in Italian liberalism and he sought the aid of Italian liberals, such as Ferrero, Salvemini and others, in his efforts to influence Sonnino and nationalist public opinion. The letters plead for Italo-Yugoslav cooperation, but warn at the same time that the Consulta must not seek to replace Budapest and Vienna in the Balkans or the Adriatic if it wishes lasting peace. An adversary, as he called himself, rather than an enemy, he was in fact an admirer of Italy. It was, therefore, not without reason that Wickham Steed, in a letter reproduced in Radica's introduction, wrote Mme. Ferrero on October 9, 1917 that in Supilo's death Italy has suffered "a loss perhaps even more portentous" than that suffered by his own nation.

Yale University IVO J. LEDERER

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ZEITGESCHICHTE AND THE NEW GERMAN CONSERVATISM

by Robert Koehl

IN THE galaxy of postwar German institutes, the Institut für Zeitgeschichte might pass unnoticed if it were not such a unique institution. Scholars throughout the world interested in National Socialism recognize the excellence of the publications of this Munich institute. It is less well appreciated that here is a small group of scientific historians subsidized by the federal and state governments of Germany whose task it is to disclose fearlessly the history of their country's most shameful experience. Their publications, and the backing of the *Bund* and *Länder* governments for their work deserve to rank beside the material reparations still being paid to the victims of Nazi barbarism. Indeed, the determined search into the Nazi era in order to make amends and see justice done which marks the work of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte is a symbol of postwar German *Zivilcourage.*

Originally founded in Stuttgart as the *Deutsches Institut für Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Zeit* by the *Länder* of the American zone on October 7, 1947, the fledgling institute was prevented by financial and technical difficulties from beginning its activity until September 1950. At this time an agreement between the new Federal government and the government of Bavaria, until then the sole financial support, made possible the establishment of a regular budget, a Board of Administrative Directors (*Kuratorium*) and an Advisory Board (*Wissenschaftlicher Beirat*). There are two Directors representing the federal government and one each from Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Hessen. The Advisory Board consists of leading German historians.[1] The Institut is directed by a Secretary General; the untimely death of Hermann Mau, the first Secretary General, on October 25, 1952, was a second set-back, effectively transcended by the succeeding occupants of this important position, Paul Kluke, and since 1959, Helmut Krausnick.[2]

Theodor Eschenburg, one of the Administrative Directors, and Hans Rothfels, one of the Advisory Board, began to publish the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* in January 1953 under the sponsorship of the Institut, renamed the Institut für Zeitgeschichte. Helmut Krausnick has served as managing editor of the journal and as one of the Institut staff with a special interest in military history. Thilo Vogelsang, the librarian of the Institut, is also a military historian. The latter's *Bibliographie zur Zeitgeschichte*, which appears as a supplement to the *Vierteljahrshefte*, includes magazine articles and unpublished dissertations which have appeared since 1951. Franz Herre and Hellmuth Auerbach have assembled a bibliography for publications from the period 1945-1950 which was printed and issued by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte: *Bibliographie zur Zeitgeschichte und zum zweiten Weltkrieg für die Jahre 1945-50* (1955). Besides topical listings of publications on the Weimar Republic, the history of National Socialism, the inner development of the Third Reich, the foreign policy of the Third Reich, the military and economic history of the second world war, and the political history of the second world war, the bibliographies have categories for general European history, national histories, biography, the postwar era, and methodological materials. The addition of numerous subcategories make the bibliographies very efficient and a joy to use.

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[1] "Übersicht über deutsche Institute auf dem Gebiet zeitgeschichtlicher Forschung," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* I (1953), 195-196.

[2] *Vierteljahrshefte,* II (1954), 115.

The Institut staff is not large for the many services it performs. There are five regular staff members, three assistants and four secretarial workers. This personnel has essentially two duties: the assembly of documents and copies of documents (e.g. photostats and microfilm), books, periodicals, testimony and judicial records as sources for the Nazi era; and the analysis of these materials in such a fashion that their contents can be made available to the learned world, the administrations of the German Federal Republic and the *Länder*, and to the mass media. The Institut already has an archive of considerable importance, consisting of the Nuremberg trial documents and transcripts, a growing microfilm and photostat collection of other Nazi records, as well as the records of de-Nazification proceedings and German trials, interrogations and personal communications of historical figures to the Institut. Nearly 40,000 volumes on the history of National Socialism give the library first-rate significance.

An important part of the work of the Institut staff is the preparation of *Gutachten* or expert opinions on matters of historical controversy for the use of German Federal administrative or judicial bodies responsible for decisions in reparations or pension cases. The Institut averages about 150 such opinions per year, of which 69 have been printed in a collection by the Institut: *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte* (Munich, 1958). These are studies of the agencies and procedures of Nazi political control, manipulation, and persecution. Of 400 pages of text, 160 pages are devoted to Jewish persecution and over 100 pages deal with details of state and party organization. Staff member Hans Buchheim has contributed 35 of the 69 opinions. Martin Broszat, Helmut Heiber, Hellmuth Auerbach and Hermann Graml provide the rest. The first two are on the permanent staff.

Beside the Herre-Auerbach bibliography and the *Gutachten*, the Institut has published on its own: *Die höheren Dienststellen der deutschen Wehrmacht 1933-1945*, a handbook edited by Fritz Frhr, v. Siegler (1953); and

Das Dritte Reich und Europa. Bericht über die Tagung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte in Tutzing, Mai 1956 (1957). Siegler's work provides order of battle material, personnel information, and organizational and procedural data for the three services, allied formations and occupied territories. The conference at Tutzing, Bavaria was an international affair at which papers were read and criticised. Four themes were discussed: 1. the armies of totalitarian states; 2. the relations of European states with Hitler, 1933-1939; 3. the theory and practice of National Socialist expansion; 4. collaboration and resistance. *Das Dritte Reich und Europa* presents the papers, the critiques, and the discussion following each, as well as an opening address by Theodor Eschenburg on the European democracies between the two world wars. This volume underscores one of the basic strivings of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte—the furtherance of truly international scholarship in the field. This same tendency appears in the *Vierteljahrshefte* and in the publications sponsored by the Institut.

The Institut für Zeitgeschichte is also authorized to aid and support publication of research done by persons outside the immediate staff. The Institut has a series known as the *Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte* of which six numbers have thus far appeared.[3] Three other publications, one of them by Hans Buchheim of the staff, have appeared with the inscription *Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte*;[4] two earlier works appeared as publications of the old *Deutsches Institut für Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Zeit*.[5] Hedwig Conrad-Martius' *Utopien der Menschenzüchtung: Der Sozialdarwinismus und seine Folgen* (Munich, 1955) was commissioned by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte.

The *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* have provided an arena for the debate of the scientific questions of international scholarship in the field of twentieth-century European history. The exchanges between American and German scholars have been particularly vigorous; for example, the Weinberg-Seraphim-Hillgruber discussion of the background to Hitler's decision to attack the U.S.S.R.[6] A concomitant virtue is the exchange of research information such as the articles by John L. Snell, "American Dissertations in Contemporary History,"[7] and Fritz T. Epstein, "Foreign Materials in the Archives and Libraries of Washington, D.C.",[8] and the notices by the editorial staff of the *Vierteljahrshefte* concerning the work of German and foreign institutes engaged in research in recent European history. Not the least of the contributions is the reproduction of little-known documents of contemporary history.

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[3] Band, I, Peter Schneider, *Ausnahmezustand und Norm. Eine Studie zur Rechtslehre von Carl Schmitt* (Stuttgart, 1957); Band II, Bernhard Vollmer, ed., *Volksopposition im Polizeistaat. Gestapo- und Regierungsberichte 1934-1936* (Stuttgart, 1957); Band III, Boris Celovsky, *Das Münchener Abkommen. 1938* (Stuttgart, 1958); Band IV, Louis de Jong, *Die deutsche Fünfte Kolonne im zweiten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart, 1958); Band V, *Kommandant in Auschwitz. Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen von Rudolf Höss* (Stuttgart, 1958); Band VI, Albert Krebs, *Tendenzen und Gestalten der NSDAP* (Stuttgart, 1960).

[4] Erich Matthias, *Sozialdemokratie und Nation. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der sozialdemokratischen Emigration 1933-1938* (Stuttgart, 1952); Hans Buchheim, *Glaubenskrise im Dritten Reich. Drei Kapitel nationalsozialistischer Religions-politik* (Stuttgart, 1953); Walter Hofer, *Die Entfesselung des zweiten Weltkrieges. Eine Studie über die internationalen Beziehungen im Sommer 1939, 2. Aufl.* (Stuttgart, 1955).

[5] Henry Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941-42*, Im Auftrag des Deutschen Instituts für Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Zeit, geordnet, eingeleitet und veröffentlicht von Gerhard Ritter (Bonn, 1951); Hermann Foertsch, *Schuld und Verhängnis. Die Fritsch-Krise im Frühjahr 1938 als Wendepunkt in der Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Zeit* (Stuttgart, 1951).

[6] *Vierteljahrshefte*, I (1953), 301-318 and II (1954), 240-254.

Writing under the title "Zeitgeschichte als Aufgabe," Hans Rothfels defines the goal of the *Vierteljahrshefte* as "the greatest possible degree of objectivity in getting at the facts, but not neutrality toward the tradition and principles of European morality." The very concept of *Zeitgeschichte* as Rothfels uses it, "rests upon the view that a new epoch of universal history began to take shape around the years 1917-1918." Thus the task of the *Vierteljahrshefte,* and of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte as well is to study and encourage others to study not only the history of the National Socialist era and the Weimar era before it, but the international scope of the world revolutions of our day. Rothfels points out that, much as we object to greater specialization, the demands of this new era are different enough to require a special set of critical tools, special institutes and special journals. But above all, *Zeitgeschichte* is our responsibility because of its political value. We have this obligation precisely because we are all the objects of these world revolutions, and *Zeitgeschichte* is a discipline which can help us to train ourselves in moral decisions pressed upon us by our new epoch.[9]

Unlike Ranke, who thought *Weltgeschichte* was rooted in national developments, Rothfels, and indeed nearly all the Institut writers, try to understand German history in terms of *Weltgeschichte.* Yet in a higher sense, the spirit of the Institut's publications is Rankean. "Wie es eigentlich gewesen ist" is much more than a pious truism for men who have taken as their field the controversial and even treacherous terrain of "die nationalsozialistische Zeit." Determined to let the documents speak, or, better, to make the documents speak, without thought of sparing their countrymen's tender consciences, but equally without rancor and vengeance, the workers of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte have known how to protect themselves against inevitable charges of bias with the armor of impeccable scholarship. Their work would deserve attention and support if only for this faithful stewardship of the facts. But furthermore, in their espousal of *Zeitgeschichte,* the men of the Institut have opened the windows of their research on to the wider perspectives of Rankean *Weltgeschichte.* Just as the great nineteenth-century historian complemented his insistence upon the uniqueness of the historical features of the German people and their state by an emphasis upon the larger world processes of which they were a part, highlighting the German experience by comparative studies of other nations, so the Institut has chosen to place Germany's National Socialist experience into a mosaic of studies of our contemporary age. This decision is particularly important because we are becoming increasingly suspicious that National Socialism or fascism may be as much a malady of our own era as a specifically German historical denouement.

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[7] *Vierteljahrshefte,* I (1953), 289-296.

[8] *Vierteljahrshefte,* II (1954), 313-325.

[9] *Vierteljahrshefte,* I (1953), 1-8.

In the staff members' own writings, in the books they choose to publish, and in the articles by German writers which appear in the *Vierteljahrshefte*, a basic theme appears, which might be identified with the spirit of the new conservatism which permeates Western Germany today. This conservatism represents a *critical* acceptance of the Western tradition. It has nothing in common with the right-wing flirtations of the 1920s of conservative thinkers.

For the Institut writers, Hitler was not a historical accident. But neither was he the inevitable result of German history, the final outpouring of the collective German soul. In a sense he was Europe's fate—the result of European forces, and even world-wide processes of dislocation such as industrialism. National Socialism may be said to be a symptom of spiritual sickness in the West. Its German character is significant—but not decisive. Germany was only Europe's weakest vital organ, in which the disease came into focus. Beside the Italian, Spanish and East European fascisms, there have been authoritarian, anti-democratic currents in the great and lesser democracies and above all, the lasting, and perhaps growing phenomenon of totalitarian Bolshevism.

National Socialism and its sister phenomena are said to be the result of structural faults in the organization of European states, internally and as a community, and equally—perhaps more essentially—of faulty habits of thinking and valuing by Europeans. These flaws are not so much the result of failure to adapt to the powerful forces of social, political and economic change released in the world since 1789, as they are the consequences of improper adaptation over the centuries. The impropriety of the adaptation is traceable to lack of insight into the intrinsic nature of man.

Hedwig Conrad-Martius, in her study of Social Darwinism, *Utopien der Menschenzüchtung*, is most emphatic in this respect. She traces a spiral of intellectual development from medieval ideas of social hierarchy based on metaphysics, through Hobbes, Rousseau, the Manchester School, Socialism and "humane" Social Darwinism to the "biological hierarchy" of the inhumane Social Darwinists, who sound exactly like Hitler and Himmler.[10] The "naive atomistic theories of the Enlightenment" seem to Conrad-Martius the source of an inevitable reaction toward social hierarchies and the root of the error of Social Darwinism of erecting self-seeking individualism into the prime mover of nature.[11] Without denying social and economic change, Conrad-Martius concentrates on changes in patterns of thinking; we are led to believe that changes in social and political thought were historically necessary, and were related to social and political change; but both thought and society developed badly. Like many neo-orthodox religious thinkers, Conrad-Martius attacks modern man's striving after social utopias, stressing instead the perfection of the individual's moral and spiritual character.[12] Hans Rothfels, in other respects a quite different thinker, who objects to "looking for philosophical and literary antecedents for National Socialism," shares Conrad-Martius' belief that in seeking after an ideal society, whether of race, nationality or political orthodoxy, European man has erected a tower of Babel "to reach heaven" and been punished by a metaphysical Jehovah for the attempt, which was doomed from the start.[13]

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[10] Hedwig Conrad-Martius, *Utopien der Menschenzüchtung. Der Sozialdarwinismus und seine Folgen* (Munich, 1955), 283-299.

[11] Conrad-Martius, 21-57.

Rothfels in the same article, "Zur Krise des Nationalstaats," refers to two pregnant concepts which have been extensively analyzed in Institut publications: the state as mortal god (Hobbes) and the pseudo-religious nature of modern nationalism (*Religionsersatz*).[14] The political and legal doctrines of Carl Schmitt at least provided "window-dressing" if not real support of Nazi totalitarianism. In his study of Schmitt's writings, Peter Schneider shows the ambiguity and, indeed, ambivalence of Schmitt's attack on "political theology."[15] Schmitt was good at demonstrating the myths of liberalism and democracy in connection with the Weimar Republic, yet he was himself the worst variety of utopian in Conrad-Martius' terminology, for he identified sovereignty with total power and objected to all checks upon and division of sovereignty.[16] While Schneider is less than totally opposed to the work of Schmitt, in contrast with Conrad-Martius, he too underscores the false line of intellectual development, which he claims to lie at the root of Schmitt's and Nazi error, in this case, positivism.[17] Just as with Conrad-Martius, we are treated to a dialectical explanation. The positivist denial of *essential* truth and *essential* rights, which can be traced to the underlying instrumental character of the liberal concept of both, is said to be the cause of the profound rejection of legal and political relativism by the movement of which Schmitt and the Nazis were only a part, *but also to be what is wrong with Schmitt's own doctrines!*[18] Since Schneider makes much of the psychologist C. G. Jung, we might speak of "a return of the repressed."[19] Schneider stresses the need for re-establishing continuity in the law, creating a jurisprudence which is essentially related to man's nature and the nature of truth, and to the development of human consciousness, human responsibility for oneself and others, and political participation. While he puts these goals forward with special reference to German needs, he is adamant in his insistence that these are European or rather world problems.[20]

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[12] Conrad-Martius, 67-73, 87-89, 138-139.

[13] "Zur Krise des Nationalstaats: Fritz Hartung zum 70. Geburtstag (12. Januar 1953)", *Vierteljahrshefte,* I (1953), 138-152, esp. 149-150.

[14] *Vierteljahrshefte,* I (1953), 139, 149.

[15] Peter Schneider, *Ausnahmezustand und Norm,* 21-22, 193-296. Schneider reveals Schmitt's mythology in connection with *Nomos* and *Recht*, 33-41, *Kat-echon,* 43 and 221, *Souveränität der Freiheit,* 104-105, *der Sündenfall des Liberalismus*, 107, and *Mutter-Erde*, 232, 285.

[16] Schneider, 95-96, 110-11, 122-125.

[17] Schneider, 19-20, 293-294.

[18] Schneider, 18, 49-51, 96-99, 108-109, 116-122, 138, 189-193, 283-284, 283-284, 287-288.

[19] Schneider, 11-15.

In his *Glaubenskrise im Dritten Reich,* the historian Hans Buchheim of the Institut staff delineates the phenomenon which he terms *Religionsersatz* (not *Ersatzreligion*).[21] While referring specifically to Hitler and his supporters, Buchheim's observations obviously apply far beyond Germany. Many twentieth-century Germans apparently experienced a deep craving for religious and metaphysical reassurance, which gave rise to religious substitutes like the *Deutsche Christen* and the *Glaubensbewegung.* These movements, for Buchheim, were sincere but misguided efforts to re-establish essential relationships between man and nature, man and the Divine Spirit, and between *artverwandte* (essentially similar) men.[22] Especially the latter concept indicates the heretical break with Christian orthodoxy, for Christ's mission of salvation was for us all, and not for a chosen few. What remains an elusive error on the part of *völkische Erneuerer* becomes in the mind of Adolf Hitler the full-blown and self-evident abuse of men's religious and emotional needs. Hitler is the product of a pagan century which seeks to copy the techniques of the Roman Catholic Church without acknowledging its substance.[23] Religion for Hitler, and indeed all faith, even political faith, is nothing but a scheme for tapping the deep springs of human motivation. The absolute rejection of others as *beings* and the conversion to *means* is the reciprocal of the characteristic Hitlerian misapplication of metaphysics to the temporal world of politics. A lost war is treated as a moral tragedy and the historical entity known as Jews becomes not even a symbol of evil but metaphysical Evil itself.[24]

The work of Erich Matthias, *Sozialdemokratie und Nation,* pursues the same topic in a different dimension. In his study of the changing outlook of the German Social Democrats in exile in Prague, Matthias too points out the emotional impoverishment of twentieth-century Germans. While in positions of political responsibility the German Social Democrats were too rationalistic, too sober, too modest—one might almost say "too responsible" in the short run[25]—and only very slowly from their "high ideological tower" in Prague did they discern the immense spiritual craving of the German people which backed up Hitler's ultra-nationalism and which Hitler so basely betrayed.[26] We may speak here of an *Ersatzsozialismus* (*National Socialism!*) which runs parallel with Nazi pseudo-religion, and was made possible by the isolation of the SPD not only from the German people as a whole, but even from its own rank and file. The German workers had not been prepared to take to the barricades in January 1933—indeed they had scarcely been prepared to see Nazi promises of socialism for what they were—and the rest of the German people were politically less mature than the workers.[27] On the other hand, when the German Socialists in Prague tried to warn the West about Hitler, and even to warn Beneš and the Czechs about the weak spots in their Sudeten policy, they found themselves Cassandras. Narrowly conceived national self-interest blinded British, French, Czech, and even Soviet statesmen.[28] Yet the majority of the German Socialist exiles stubbornly thought through their errors even to the abandonment of the first early simplifying explanations based on a return to orthodox Marxism or Leninism.[29] They came up with a renewed emphasis on liberty and democracy and on pan-European cooperation. In his emphasis on the problem of consciousness, on the nature of political responsibility and on increasing political participation of all (not just of the working class), Matthias underscores the shortcomings of nineteenth-century society and social thought.[30]

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[20] Schneider, 18-19, 27-28, 293.

[21] Hans Buchheim, *Glaubenskrise,* 38-39.

[22] Buchheim, 45-59, 157-160.

[23] Buchheim, 147-156, 201-204.

[24] Buchheim, 9-38. For the semantic origins of modern antisemitism, see Alexander Bein, "Der moderne Antisemitismus und seine Bedeutung für die Judenfrage," *Vierteljahrshefte,* VI (1958), 340-360.

[25] Erich Matthias, *Sozialdemokratie und Nation,* 15-18, 61-81.

[26] Matthias, 149-161.

In "Max Webers Antrittsvorlesung in zeitgeschichtlicher Perspektive" Arnold Bergsträsser details the pitfalls and limits of the social thought of the great sociologist, the author of the much-abused concept of charismatic leadership. Bergsträsser concludes that not only was Weber the victim of the nineteenth-century illusion of a valueless science, but Weber reacted to this illusion by embracing a "demonic" value-giving force, which he identified with the group, the nation, and the instruments of power.[31] We will not be surprised to hear him mentioned in the same breath with Hobbes, to learn that he thought in a pagan fashion of nature as "eternal battle of the gods," and that his political odyssey led from the Pan German League to Friedrich Naumann's national socialism, which was not unlike the totalitarian democracy favored by Carl Schmitt.[32] Bergsträsser seconds Weber's 1895 appeal to educate the German people to maturity, and at the same time urges the reunification of *Sozialpolitik* with a philosophy of human nature.[33]

The great ideological error of the nineteenth century, Eduard Spranger tells us, was at once the denial of the efficacy of ideas and the somewhat contradictory espousal of the theory that ideas are "nothing but instruments." Germany is the horrible example of historicism and relativism.[34] The modern age echoes with the birth cries of new ideologies, new myths, and the West is experiencing a *Wiedergeburtssehnsucht* which reminds us of Buchheim's diagnosis. Spranger identifies what he calls *Kulturwille, Kulturgewissen*, and *Kulturverantwortung*, all of which rest upon moral decisions. Upon the right moral decisions rests the efficacy of political ideologies, and not vice versa.[35] While seeming to deny the importance of ideology, Julius Kraft in "Theologische und juristische Formen modernen politischen Wunderglaubens" really makes the same attack on positivism. The positivist's denial of the force of non-representational words (e.g. freedom) when insisting that emotive sentences are nonsense, is itself non-empirical dogma which can and did lead to political passivity and cowardice in the face of dictatorships. Like Conrad-Martius, Rothfels and Buchheim, Kraft inveighs against the theologising of the mundane, and calls for a middle-of-the-road social and moral course which resembles the orthodox Christian injunction to remain in the world, but not of it.[36]

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[27] Matthias, 48-52, 89-104.

[28] Matthias, 137-148, 178-185, 263-265.

[29] Matthias, 25-41, 246-249.

[30] Matthias, 172-174, 185-189, 204 ff.

[31] *Vierteljahrshefte*, V (1957), 209-219, esp. 214-215.

[32] *Vierteljahrshefte*, V (1957), 209, 213, 217-218.

[33] *Vierteljahrshefte*, V (1957), 219.

[34] "Wesen und Wert politischer Ideologien," *Vierteljahrshefte*, II (1954), 118-136, esp. 129-133.

In turning to the specific structural ills diagnosed by our writers, we do not, of course, leave behind the spiritual ills. Kurt Sontheimer, for instance, in his "Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik," is working more in the realm of political sociology and in the sociology of ideas, and less with the moral and spiritual absolutes referred to above, yet he cites Montesquieu to the effect that virtue is the principle of democracy and indicts the intellectual leadership of Weimar Germany for its lack of effort to make democracy work.[37] He also blames the formal democracy of the Weimar Constitution, the reparations and the world depression, but finds the ideas of the German thinkers of the Twenties to be centrally significant. They could not find their way to the cultural synthesis of Western European humanism, which Ernest Troeltsch warned them contained moral truths which could not be abandoned. Their anti-Westernism and the specific political constellation of 1918-1923 warped their judgment.[38] This same observation is made by Hans Buchheim in his study of Ernest Niekisch's ideology of resistance: out of the "necessity" for passive resistance in the *Ruhrkampf* and a personal pessimism, Niekisch erected a political ideology which could only lead to fascism, no matter how demonic he might later recognize it to be.[39] The chameleon-like politics of Niekisch is reminiscent of what Schneider has to say about Carl Schmitt, and suggests a bloody dilettantism of which Hitler was the ultimate example and issue.

Karl Dietrich Erdmann in "Die Geschichte der Weimarer Republik als Problem der Wissenschaft" raises the question whether the history of the era 1918-1939 in Europe might be dealt with as Maurice Baumont did under the rubric "La Faillite de la Paix," and rejects this theme for "Der Fehlschlag der Freiheit."[40] Erdmann examines and rejects three popular theses regarding the structural causes of the collapse of the republic. (1) The burdens of the Versailles treaty were systematically reduced. (2) The failure of the social revolution of 1918-1923 actually strengthened the Weimar Republic. (3) The presidential dictatorship contained in the constitution only came into action when every other avenue of republican government failed.[41] But Erdmann's own suggestions for future research also deal with structural flaws with profound ideological roots: the failures of "the good years" of the republic, 1925-1929, traceable to Eschenburg's notion of an authoritarian tradition too strong for a pluralistic and mechanistic political system. He calls for detailed investigation of the development of the parties and the churches to see why and where "they went wrong."[42]

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[35] *Vierteljahrshefte,* II, (1954), 123-128, 134-136.

[36] *Vierteljahrshefte,* V (1957), 173-182.

[37] *Vierteljahrshefte,* V (1957), 42-62, esp. 42-43.

[38] *Vierteljahrshefte,* V (1957), 46-62, esp. 62. See also Sontheimer's "Thomas Mann als Politiker", *Ibid.,* VI (1958), 1-44; and his "Der Tat-Kreis", *ibid.,* VII (1959), 229-260.

[39] *Vierteljahrshefte,* V (1957), 334-361.

[40] *Vierteljahrshefte,* III (1955), 1-19. esp. 2.

Theodor Eschenburg is less sanguine about the effects of Versailles. France sought to use the treaty to extort from Germany the western territories she failed to receive from Lloyd George and Wilson; so Germany hastily improvised a democracy the Germans did not believe in, to win and hold the friendship of Britain and America. They only barely succeeded, and the cost was bitterness and soulless political mechanism of compromise internally and externally, instead of the virtue cited as necessary by Montesquieu. The orientation of the constitution toward emergency conditions (*Ausnahmezustand*), reflecting the uncertain conditions of 1919, and the Bismarckian-Wilhelmian tradition was risky, but not actually the cause of the Hitler dictatorship, which resulted from a stupid and unrelenting destructive pressure from the right and a failure of nerve and energy by the executors of the constitution.[43] "Improvised democracy" was the prevailing wind in 1919 all over Central and East Europe, with similar evil consequences in Italy, Poland, the Baltic States, etc. Eschenburg distinguishes the German dictatorship essentially from the conservative (non-fascist) dictatorships of East Europe, as well as in the Iberian lands, and even from its ideologically related neighbor to the south, by the social relationships involved.[44] He makes the extremely incisive observation that precisely because Germany was socially so similar to the Western democracies, Hitlerian dictatorship was driven to the most extreme measures of self-protection, imperialist adventure and destructive fury.[45]

Hans Rothfels sees the fateful influence of the Versailles treaty in its moral pretensions. The war guilt thesis seems to Rothfels thoroughly pernicious and demonstrably false.[46] While also rejecting the thesis that the German General Staff sought a negotiated peace in 1918 to plan for another war, he does point to a structural defect in the German military establishment of 1918 and after, which preoccupies many of the Institut writers. This is the narrow professionalism of the Prussian tradition which taught that what is good for the Prussian officers' corps is good for Germany. Far from being blood-thirsty militarists, they shunned all risks which might harm the organic unity of their caste.[47] Helmut Krausnick and Hermann Foertsch in their studies of the Wehrmacht help us to understand the defensive orientation of the Reichswehr, but they too find a fateful self-deception in the theory of *Überparteilichkeit*.[48] Exclusive preoccupation with restoring Germany's *Wehrwille*, revealed even in the letters of the hero of the resistance, Helmut Stieff, blinded men who wielded one of the few intact instruments of decency and order in 1933.[49] They were pathologically unable to see the long-run consequences of their alliance with Hitler until it was much too late. The failure of France and her allies to disarm provided the international setting for this tragic oversight.[50]

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[41] *Vierteljahrshefte,* III (1955), 16-17.

[42] *Vierteljahrshefte,* III (1955), 9-10, 17-19. For a fascinating discussion of authority in a democracy which took place in Weimar Germany in 1929, see "Zur Frage der Staatsführung in der Weimarer Republik", *ibid.,* VII (1959), 85-111.

[43] "Das Problem der deutschen Einheit nach den beiden Weltkriegen," *Vierteljahrshefte,* V (1957), 107-113 and "Die europäischen Demokratien zwischen den Weltkriegen" in *Das Dritte Reich und Europa. Bericht über die Tagung des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte in Tutzing/Mai 1956*(Selbstverlag des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, 1957), 4-9, 16-23.

[44] *Das Dritte Reich und Europa,* 9-16.

[45] *Das Dritte Reich und Europa,* 23-24.

[46] "Zehn Jahre danach," *Vierteljahrshefte,* III (1955), 231.

Like Matthias, Hermann Mau has pointed out that the Weimar régime failed to dramatize and impress upon the German people the large gains made by Germany in foreign relations in the era 1924-1932.[51] On the other hand, Boris Celovsky in *Das Münchener Abkommen* feels that Locarno and the Paris Peace Pact were great French victories in that Germany was made to pay heavily for much less than equality, that Stresemann's policies were a failure due to French and even British intransigence, and that Hitler rode to power on a long wave of German disillusionment with Western promises.[52] Both Matthias and Paul Kluke have stressed how little genuine Pan-European cooperation there was in the inter-war years, even in the socialist camp.[53] Arnold Bergsträsser, too, scores the immaturity of all the nations in matters of economic cooperation as one of the causes of Nazi hegemony;[54] and Andreas Predöhl seems to feel that a European economic regionalism was all that could have saved Germany and the rest of Europe from the consequences of welfare economics and the rise of self-sufficient *Grossraumwirtschaften* in the western hemisphere and the U.S.S.R. In the case of Germany, the consequence was Hitler's economic nationalism and imperialism.[55]

Wilhelm Treue seems to feel that the British and French were babes in arms in competition with Schacht & Co. in the economic rivalry for the Balkans. By pursuing such conventional international economic policies in the years 1933-1936, they allowed the Balkan states to become thoroughly dependent on Hitler, so that even Schacht's finesse became unnecessary, and Hitler could substitute Göring's brutality.[56] Krausnick and Celovsky seem to echo this indictment of British conventionality on the diplomatic scene. The British insistence on believing in diplomacy-as-usual lamed the free world in competition with a politician who had learned to take the *Ausnahmezustand* as *Norm*. When the slow-thinking German military minds had discovered this truth about Hitler's methods and assumptions, and communicated their views to the British, the British still persisted in the old pattern of thinking about Germans and international policies, thus frustrating the contemplated generals' coup of September 1938.[57] According to Celovsky, Munich was the last great European congress, and already one of the parties was only going through the motions. It was made possible by the anti-bolshevism of the British and French, who completely lacked a positive European regional conception. In a sense, Hitler's strength derived from Europe's weakness, a weakness which was not only reflected in the determining rôle of the outsider-states, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., but in a sense was caused by the peculiar anti-European stance of these two powers since 1920. The destruction of Europe was not begun by Hitler—only completed.[58]

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[47] *Vierteljahrshefte*, III (1955), 229, 231-232.

[48] Helmut Krausnick, "Vorgeschichte und Beginn des militärischen Widerstandes gegen Hitler," *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens.* Herausgegeben von der Europäischen Publikation (Munich, 1956), 182-184.

[49] Hans Rothfels, ed., "Ausgewählte Briefe von Generalmajor Helmuth Stieff (hingerichtet am 8. August 1944)," *Vierteljahrshefte*, II (1954), 291-305, esp. 295-298.

[50] Foertsch, *Schuld und Verhängnis*, 13-15, 197-215. See also the two articles by Wilhelm Deist, "Die Abrüstungsgespräche von Bessinge," *Vierteljahrshefte*, V (1957), 265-272; and "Schleicher und die deutsche Abrüstungspolitik," *ibid.*, VII (1959), 163-176.

[51] Matthias, 120-122; Hermann Mau und Helmut Krausnick, *Deutsche Geschichte der jüngsten Vergangenheit 1933-1945* (Tübingen, 1956), 73-75.

[52] Boris Celovsky, *Das Münchener Abkommen*, 9-16.

[53] Matthias, 180-184; see Kluke's commentary on J. Joll's paper "Theorie und Praxis der nationalsozialistischen Expansion," *Das Dritte Reich und Europa*, 116-118; also Matthias' commentary on the same paper, 130.

[54] "Deutsche Einheit", *Vierteljahrshefte*, III (1955), 335-344, esp. 339.

[55] "Die Epochenbedeutung der Weltwirtschaftskrise von 1929 bis 1931," *Vierteljahrshefte*, I (1953), 97-118, esp. 109-113.

No doubt all the people of Europe experienced in the Twenties and early Thirties a heightened sense of being "objects" and not "subjects" of policy—indeed, objects of elementary forces over which no one, or else a mysterious and powerful côterie alone had control. The Germans especially, however, were prepared for their rôle as "chosen people" by their meteoric rises and descents politically and economically. Individuals were especially enabled to identify their "undeserved fate" with that of their nation (*Volk*). The German middle class in particular was still struggling with a national identity which Englishmen and Frenchmen had acquired in earlier centuries. Schneider points out Carl Schmitt as an example of a man who wrestled with the political and social questions of the Twenties, especially of the Weimar society, and finally succumbed himself to the insuperable contradictions, the *chaos* of contending forces which he thought to ban in his totalitarian utopia. The domestic peace-at-any-price that lay at the root of Schmitt's intellectual striving was achieved by the identification of the object of power with the power-source, precisely the solution achieved by the German bourgeoisie of the Second Reich and the bourgeois followers of Hitler.[59] The impossibility of making, in the Weimar era, a similar identification with any state authority is thus the tragic flaw of the *Systemzeit*.

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[56] "Das Dritte Reich und die Westmächte auf dem Balkan: Zur Struktur der Aussenhandelspolitik Deutschlands, Grossbritanniens und Frankreichs 1933-1939," *Vierteljahrshefte*, I (1953), 45-64.

[57] See Krausnick's commentary on E. Anchieri's paper, "Die europäischen Staaten und der Aufstieg des dritten Reiches 1933-1939," *Das Dritte Reich und Europa*, 92-93; and his "Vorgeschichte und Beginn des militärischen Widerstandes" in *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens*, 325, 327-330, 336-337, 346-354.

[58] Celovsky, 17-21, 476-477.

[59] Schneider, 275-277, 290-291, 194-296.

Though in one sense a special case, the plight of the ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe between the wars reveals in heightened form the processes which led to the triumph of Hitler. In spite of the efforts of true Europeans like Paul Schiemann and of the Congress of European Nationalities, the Germans of the Baltic States, Poland, and the Balkans were all but abandoned by the League of Nations to the tender mercies of the rabid nationalists of those regions. Although the Weimar Republic was much more active on behalf of German minorities abroad than its enemies admitted, it failed to dramatize or even utilize these efforts to consolidate German loyalties to democracy. Faced locally with an aging political and cultural leadership that could achieve only small and temporary concessions toward German cultural and economic survival, ethnic German youth turned to demagogues, who were soon brought under the control of the Berlin Nazis. Ultimately the ethnic Germans were degraded into pawns for Hitler's game of power politics. While it is true that the ethnic Germans were victims of their own craving for a single national identification, even those bilingual ethnic Germans who tried to make a satisfactory adjustment to the life of the successor states were caught between the violent emotions and class conflicts of the newly independent peoples and the ruthless conspiracy and pressure-techniques of the Nazi cells.[60]

In Germany itself years of depression and social dislocation prepared listeners on street-corners, in beer-halls and sports coliseums for an identification with the ethnic German mentality of Adolf Hitler. Much more than Hitler's antisemitism stemmed from Vienna. Hitler, Rosenberg, and the *völkisch* movement from which they came, were all preoccupied with the need to stand up and fight for an identity. Therefore the definition of friend and foe had to assume a central place in personal values. [61] The conditions of *Volkstumskampf* were identifiable with the thought-patterns of the First World War: the comradeship of the trenches, so favorably contrasted with the competitiveness of civilian economic life, and the sense of total enmity toward the hereditary foe, were also readily carried forward to the post-Versailles world. The street-fighting, the parliamentary factionalism, and the brewing social revolutionary mood of the years 1930-1932 also heightened the resemblance between the mental structure of the Nazi leadership and the everyday realities of German experiences.[62]

There is remarkable agreement in Institut publications regarding the mentality of the Nazi leadership and the nature of National Socialism.

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[60] Hans von Rimscha, "Paul Schiemann als Minderheitspolitiker," *Vierteljahrshefte*, IV (1956), 43-61; *Gutachten* of Martin Broszat, "Die Anfänge der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft in Danzig," "Die memeldeutschen Organisationen und der Nationalsozialismus 1933-1939," "*Jungdeutsche Partei* und *Deutsche Vereinigung* in Posen-Pomerellen," *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte* (Selbtverlag des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, 1958), 392-400, 404-408.

[61] Hans Buchheim, *Glaubenskrise im Dritten Reich*, 11, 34, 37.

[62] Matthias, 101-104. The personality and mental structure of the *alte Kämpfer* is the subject of vol. VI of the *Quellen und Darstellungen:* Albert Krebs, *Tendenzen und Gestalten der NSDAP* (Stuttgart, 1960).

There is also wide agreement that the differences among Nazi followers and nominal Nazis were tremendously varied and complex. Three interrelated qualities stand out as Nazi characteristics in the Institut writings. (1) The Nazi leadership was exclusively means-oriented. Everything and everybody must be usable—or useless. Uselessness was tantamount to being a hindrance. (2) National Socialism meant permanent conspiracy. Fronts and deception were essential elements in a continuous revolutionary process. (3) This mentality acknowledged no limits and basically denied everything. The trait of destructiveness was given full rein. All "positive" traits, all apparent constructiveness were pseudo-traits, perversions of healthy tendencies in the Nazis and in others.

Hitler, says Hans Buchheim, had no real conception of truth. As a matter of fact he seemed to think there was some kind of eternal contradiction between life and "pure truth" which could only be bridged by geniuses like Luther, Frederick the Great and himself. Even in such cases he only assigned truth the "honorary chairmanship" of the *Bewegung*. He had little real faith in the power of truth or reality. He thought somehow that truth required "protection" from the evil forces in the world. Because he dimly perceived that a belief in absolute truth gave security, he absolutized his own prejudices as party dogma, but he never quite lost the knowledge that it was his will, after all, which had created "the truth" of National Socialism. Thus he and his movement were completely relativistic, for all their dogmas.[63]

Gerhard Ritter, in his introduction to the *Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941-42* (as recorded by Dr. Henry Picker) points out that Hitler never seemed to lack confidence in himself. On the other hand he never seemed to trust anybody else. Even the German people ultimately did not seem to him worthy of his "self-sacrifice" in not becoming an artist, as he had intended.[64] Hitler's self-confidence attracted gifted supporters who desperately needed his charisma, and of course many who were not gifted. While Goebbels belonged to the first category, the psychological dependence on Hitler of Göring, Himmler, Hess, Rosenberg and other equally mediocre dilettantes gave National Socialism many of its most characteristic features. These "men of chaos" were essentially directionless, full of sound and fury, utterly incapable of systematic work.[65] How then could they capture the hearts of a systematic and hard-working people like the Germans?

First of all they were not opposed soon enough by men of equal courage and stamina. But almost more important—the Nazi leadership camouflaged itself by its followers and its allies on the Right, so that National Socialism seemed to be a national awakening of the German people, the first step in the restoration of the Christian Social *Obrigkeitsstaat*, possibly even the monarchy. Buchheim, Rothfels, Eschenburg, Mau and others leave no question in readers' minds that the German people were dupes, and especially on the Right.[66] At no time were the Nazis conservatives; they were not driven against their will into radicalism. Indeed, they were radicals at heart, who learned but slowly how to moderate their immediate demands and their totalitarian ambitions in order to amass the necessary leverage. Hermann Mau is not the only Institut writer who makes much of the Potsdam theatrics as successful camouflage. "Seldom has a revolution seen a people flock more willingly to its banners."[67] Hitler's "moderation" in the disarmament negotiations helped to maintain his popularity in 1933.[68] Karl Dietrich Bracher also distinguished between the stages of the *Machtergreifung* (seizure of power): 1. a first revolutionary era culminating in the "voluntary" dissolution of all parties except the NSDAP and the announcement that the revolution was over; 2. a legalistic phase of reassurances in which the authoritarian-minded were lulled into believing that a temporary and self-limiting dictatorship was possible; 3. a second revolutionary era from the winter of 1933-1934 to the culmination of the Röhm purge; 4. the legalistic unification of the offices of *Reichskanzler* and *Reichspräsident* and the legalistic Reichswehr oath to Hitler, followed by the long, persistent, legalistic hollowing out of the remains of all the old institutions culminating in the second, but legalistic, purge of the army and the Foreign Office prior to the Austrian adventure. "In the era of mass democracy the battle against the total state must be waged before the first step toward power. . . ."[69]

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[63] Buchheim, *Glaubenskrise*, 13-24.

[64] "Zur Einführung," *Hitlers Tischgespräche*, 14-15, 28.

[65] Erwin Faul, "Hitlers Über-Machiavellismus," *Vierteljahrshefte*, II (1954), 344-372.

The belief that "the people" (*das Volk*) were behind Hitler was one of his assets in dividing the opposition to him among the army, the bureaucracy and the business world.[70] If the latter groups erred in exaggerating popular unanimity in supporting the Nazi measures, the Social Democrats in Prague tended to indulge in wishful thinking about a popular revolt against the Nazi dictatorship.[71] An enlightening picture of the reality, at least in one district, that of Aachen, is provided in Bernhard Vollmer's *Volksopposition im Polizeistaat.* These Gestapo reports from the years 1934-1936 on an ultra-Catholic district reveal a persistent though weak Marxist resistance, largely supported from across the frontier, and especially via the distribution of forbidden newspapers and Marxist pamphlets.[72] The main burden of the reports, however, has to do with the spasmodic, but often strong resistance of the Catholic hierarchy and the devout populace. Hitler's failure to live up to the Concordat of 1933, the low quality of National Socialist news media, youth organizations and cultural evenings, and Rosenberg's racist paganism all left the Nazis open to severe competition from the skilled and experienced Catholic priesthood. The reports reveal how many opponents of the Nazis, even Socialists, joined the ranks of the Church to continue their opposition.[73] It is amusing to read the first naive, optimistic report of a new Gestapo man, Seetzen, and then watch him gradually chime in with the older complaints about the special characteristics of the Aachen Germans and of course about the Church hierarchy.[74] But it is sad to watch the steel grip closing on even the few brave priests and laity who found little ways to resist Nazi barbarism. By 1935 the Aacheners were not enthusiastic Nazis; they were largely passive collaborators, afraid of the police, of a foreign attack, and of each other.[75]

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[66] Buchheim, *Glaubenskrise,* 41-44; Rothfels, "Zehn Jahre danach," *Vierteljahrshefte,* III (1955), 231-232; Theodor Eschenburg, "Franz von Papen," *Vierteljahrshefte,* I (1953), 153-169; Mau-Krausnick, *Deutsche Geschichte der jüngsten Vergangenheit,* 11-21, 44-45; Hans Schneider, "Das Ermächtigungsgesetz vom 24. März 1933," *Vierteljahrshefte,* I (1953), 197-209.

[67] Mau-Krausnick, 19-20, 35-44. See also Krausnick, "Vorgeschichte und Beginn des militärischen Widerstandes gegen Hitler," *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens,* 207.

[68] Karl Dietrich Bracher, "Das Anfangsstadium der Hitlerschen Aussenpolitik," *Vierteljahrshefte,* V (1957), 63-76.

[69] "Stufen totalitärer Gleichschaltung: Die Befestigung der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1933/34," *Vierteljahrshefte,* IV (1956), 30-42.

[70] Hermann Rauschning, quoted in Foertsch, 59-61.

[71] Matthias, 176-178.

[72] Einleitung," *Volksopposition im Polizeistaat,* 9-23; Marxist resistance: 28-29, 52-54, 81-82, 95-98, 108-110, 125-126, 241-245, 303-304.

The Röhm purge contributed mightily to this atmosphere of insecurity and passive shoulder-shrugging. This puzzling episode becomes one of the most enlightening at the hands of Institut writers, who reject the conventional "counter-revolution" interpretation of the June 1934 days. In *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens* Helmut Krausnick points out that Hitler's real anxiety in the spring of 1934 was *to protect the revolution* from a right-wing coup at the death of Hindenburg, which was believed imminent. Hitler, the great improvisor and theatrical stage-manager, was able to dramatize his elimination of the right-wing's excuse for a coup (Röhm and the disorderly SA) as a "counter-revolution." Thus he bought off the Reichswehr leadership at the same time that he paved the way for his "cold revolution" in which the SS and Gestapo were to predominate. Göring and Himmler probably helped Hitler by pushing the purge farther than Hitler's nerve might have carried him; Göring thus eliminated his rival for the position of commander-in-chief of the National Socialist army of the future while Himmler cleared the way for Sepp Dietrich's legions. The motives of the plotters were revolutionary motives, but they aimed at preventing future independent and spontaneous revolutions.[76] They had nothing in common with restorative or even conservative counter-revolutionary ideals such as were cherished in the Reichswehr. The Reichswehr was so cleverly bilked that it was made to appear the victor both at home and abroad.[77] When it and the thinking section of the German people realized the real state of affairs, Himmler had created for himself an impregnable position *jenseits von Partei und Staat—eine überstaatliche Macht.*[78]

Both Hans Buchheim of the Institut staff, and the former German journalist, Karl O. Paetel (now active in New York) have presented the SS as essentially *Techniker der Macht.* This is to be understood as the common denominator of the otherwise highly differentiated SS, and of the "totalitarian" state itself. Given a party like the NSDAP, only good at destroying the *rechtstaatlich* apparatus of the state bureaucracy, which was a dangerous process if it once got out of control, the reservoir of specialists in all the professions selected for their controllability which composed the SS was an invaluable aid to Hitler.[79] For the SS was Hitler's own tool. Buchheim reveals the Nazi constitution in all its nakedness: Hitler was the sovereign—not the state, and not the party. This is why the SS cannot be understood in terms of either the state or the party. The state was too low in the order of importance in Hitler's scale of values: it was merely executive. While the party was exalted into the "conscience of the state" and the voice of the *Volk,* it was too amorphous, too "ideal and spiritual" for Hitler.[80] For Hitler, the *Techniker der Macht* par excellence, only equally flexible and adaptable anti-ideologists like Heydrich and Sepp Dietrich could be trusted to carry on the revolution without passion, relentlessly. Ultimately, in Bormann Hitler found a more efficient technician than Himmler, who had his fantastic side. In the later war years, however, the party was in dissolution, the state had been destroyed from within with nothing to replace it, and Hitler himself began to show signs of creeping insanity.[81]

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[73] Vollmer, 30-33, 89, 111-112, 184-186, 202-206, 237-239, 334, 336.

[74] Vollmer, 196-210 (report of May 8, 1935); 237-254 (report of July 5, 1935).

[75] Vollmer, 250-251, 314-318, 356-357, 376-383.

[76] "Vorgeschichte und Beginn des militärischen Widerstandes gegen Hitler," *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens*, 217-238. *Cf.* Hermann Mau, "Die 'Zweite Revolution'—Der 30. Juni 1934," *Vierteljahrshefte*, I (1953), 119-137, esp. 130-137.

[77] Krausnick, *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens*, 256-257.

[78] Hans Buchheim, "Rechtsstellung und Organisation des Reichskommissars für die

It is far from accidental that Himmler's SS serves as a focus of so much of the analysis of Institut writers. Embodying as it does the essential conviction that life is the *bellum omnium contra omnes* of social Darwinism, we find the SS serving as the horrible denouement of Conrad-Martius' utopias,[82] as well as the realization of Carl Schmitt's exaltation of the *Ausnahmezustand* as *Norm.*[83] The SS thus appears as the outburst of an infernal relativism, disguised as its eternal opposite: order. Like all revolutionaries, the Nazis fed on *Zersetzung,* and the SS most of all. From their rôle in the Potempa murder, scarcely distinguishable from that of the SA,[84] to the Röhm purge, where they killed their erstwhile brothers in arms,[85] to the skillfully manufactured frame-ups of Blomberg and Fritsch,[86] SS men operated as conspirators, as political soldiers, as *Techniker der Macht.* The justification of "emergency" and of "total war" was always on their lips.

Festigung deutschen Volkstums," *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte,* 139-279, esp. 242-243, 278-297. See also Hans Buchheim's "Die Rolle der SS in der Entwicklung der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft (Aus einem Vortrag während des Historikertags in Ulm)," *Colloquium. Eine Deutsche Studentenzeitschrift* (Berlin), XI (1957), Heft 3, 14-15, Heft 4, 16-17.

[79] Hans Buchheim, "Die SS in der Verfassung des dritten Reichs," *Vierteljahrshefte,* III (1955), 127-157; Karl O. Paetel, "Die SS. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Nationalsozialismus," *Vierteljahrshefte,* II (1954), 1-33.

[80] *Vierteljahrshefte,* III (1955), 142-150, 156-157.

[81] *Colloquium,* XI (1957), Heft 4, 17.

[82] Conrad-Martius, 100-108, 127-128, 177-178, 264-268.

[83] Krausnick, *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens,* 267-268; Buchheim, "Rechtsstellung und Organisation des Reichskommissars für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums," *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitegeschichte,* 277.

[84] Paul Kluke, "Der Fall Potempa," *Vierteljahrshefte,* V (1957), 279-299.

[85] Paetel, *Vierteljahrshefte,* II (1954), 4-9.

[86] Foertsch, 90, 93-94, 118-125, 136-140, 147-149.

Peter Schneider, author of *Ausnahmezustand und Norm*, has presented and analyzed an SS version of Schmitt's reasoning in "Rechtssicherheit und richterliche Unabhängigkeit aus der Sicht des SD." He points out in a speech by Otto Ohlendorf, given October 1942, how this Division Chief of the Reich Security Office managed to translate the dictates of an embattled Nazi hierarchy to judges and police officials into legality and judicial independence through the all-too-familiar medium of "German freedom." Executions of hostages by the SS were legal acts rather than arbitrary despotism because they were based on express orders of the Führer and carried out willingly and joyfully by free German men for the German people and for the good of a postwar Europe. The abuses of elementary logic and decency by the SS and police had become by then so apparent that Ohlendorf found it necessary to take direct issue with no less a figure than Hans Frank, the official Nazi head of the legal and judicial "estate," (*Rechtsfront*) for his defense of "abstract law." Schneider concludes that the speech illustrates a utopian political mythology all too characteristic of our age.[87]

Helmut Heiber, of the staff of the Institut, presents a trio of horrible examples of relativistic Nazi injustices in the Eliáš, Grünspan and Gauleiter Kube cases. In the first example we see how the luckless Minister-President of the puppet régime in the Protectorate became a pawn in the power struggle between Heydrich himself and the brutal SS opportunist, Thierack.[88] In the case of the insane murder of the Secretary of Embassy, Ernst vom Rath, Heiber illustrates the totally instrumental (and cynical) use of the anti-semitic theme; there is a grim and tragic humor in the manner in which Grünspan outwitted his tormentors with his story of homosexual relations with vom Rath. The real cause of the murder was the deportation of Grünspan's parents to Poland on orders of the Foreign Office.[89]

Heiber's third contribution is a documentary note accompanying three items from Kube's dossier in the Himmler files. The first item illustrates beautifully what a "sorcerer's apprentice," as Heiber calls Kube, would stoop to: an anonymous letter accusing the wife of Supreme Party Judge Walter Buch of Jewish ancestry. It is the other items, however, to which Heiber devotes his attention: a file note and a correspondence file from 1943 concerning Kube's resistance to the removal of "his Jews" in the *Generalkommissariat Weissruthenien*. The trouble with Kube was that he had no imagination; he hadn't thought through the inexorable logic of calling Jews bacilli—extermination.[90]

Institut writers seem to lay upon themselves the obligation to investigate to the last grim detail the part played by the German people in the persecution of Jews, the Catholic Church, eastern peoples and minorities of all kinds. In his introduction to the memorandum of Kurt Gerstein, "Augenzeugenbericht zu den Massenvergasungen," Hans Rothfels says "It (our epoch) has shown here and elsewhere, and still shows, how thin the veneer of civilization has become over the dark forces of the abyss, and what it means once these forces are released."[91] Helmut Krausnick characterizes Himmler's memorandum on the treatment of eastern peoples, of May 28, 1940, printed in the April 1957 issue of the *Vierteljahrshefte*, as "a classical document of National Socialist hybris."[92] The Institut's collection of *Gutachten* presents a conscientious résumé of the persecutions of the Nazi régime. Heiber has made a study of the deportations of Polish Jews in October 1938, fixing the blame on the Foreign Office and not the Gestapo;[93] Hermann Graml has described the treatment of part-Jews, the peculiar Nazi "crime" of *Rassenschande*, and several international aspects of Nazi anti-semitism (e.g., the course of emigration, the fate of Jews in Danzig and Upper Silesia in the Thirties, and of foreign Jews in Germany).[94] Martin Broszat, also of the Institut staff, points up the manner in which this theme is bound up with the international aspects of National Socialism. Broszat's work is noteworthy for the careful manner in which he delineates the anti-semitic policies of Germany's East European satellites in the setting of Hitler's foreign policy. He shows that National Socialist Germany drove the satellite governments relentlessly onward toward the destruction of European Jewry, and that these "fascist" governments often were capable of foot-dragging to preserve Jewish lives. This is a significant and courageous judgment for a German scholar to make in the face of the often repeated German slogan that "the Nazis did not have to teach eastern Europeans anti-semitism." The Germans converted an often cruel but inherently spasmodic persecution into the paramount test of loyalty to Germany in Hungary, Roumania and Slovakia.[95]

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[87] *Vierteljahrshefte*, IV (1956), 399-422. See also Martin Broszat, "Zur Perversion der Stafjustiz im Dritten Reich", *ibid.*, VI (1158), 390-443.

[88] "Zur Justiz im dritten Reich: Der Fall Eliáš," *Vierteljahrshefte*, III (1955), 275-296.

[89] "Der Fall Grünspan," *Vierteljahrshefte*, V (1957), 134-172.

[90] "Aus den Akten des Gauleiters Kube," *Vierteljahrshefte*, VI (1956), 67-92.

Hermann Graml's little study of the terrible episode known in Germany as the "crystal night", *Der 9. November 1938*, is a revealing vignette of Nazi conspiratorial "illegality" in stirring up German anti-semitism. It cuts both ways: while the German people could not legally be persuaded into anti-semitic outrages, they were only too ready for lynch rituals.[96]

Martin Broszat's commentary on Rudolf Höss' autobiographical sketch of 1946 is also a distinct contribution to the revision of our conception of Nazi and especially SS brutality. If Höss was indeed the model concentration camp commander, and there is evidence that Himmler so regarded him, then the cruelty and suffering he inflicted at Auschwitz become not the result of sadism and hatred, but of a perverse bureaucracy, a schizoid technocracy of death which tried to avoid blood, violence and screams. In his shrewd introduction Broszat points up the identification Höss continually made with the inmates, partly because of his stay in prison in the Twenties. Broszat's notes are essentially factual additions, which are of great value for those working on the SS, the concentration camp system, the persecution of the Jews, and on Nazi personality. In the last regard, it is unfortunate that Broszat could not include the valuable personality sketches of SS personnel made by Höss, and published in the Polish edition of 1956. Nevertheless, the Institut has boldly made available to the world's scholarship a document of infamy, the like of which few state-supported research institutions have ever published. No more fitting symbol of German desire to face the facts and make amends is imaginable.[96a]

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[91] *Vierteljahrshefte*, I (1953), 177-194, esp. 178.

[92] *Vierteljahrshefte*, V (1957), 194-198, esp. 194.

[93] Helmut Heiber, "Die Ausweisung von Juden polnischer Staatsangehörigkeit im Oktober 1938," *Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte*, 90-93.

[94] *Gutachten*, 72-76, 79-90.

[95] "Das Dritte Reich und die rumänische Politik"; "Das deutsch-ungarische Verhältnis und die ungarische Judenpolitik in den Jahren 1938-1941"; "Das deutsch-slowakische Verhältnis 1939/40 und seine Rückwirkung auf die slowakische Judenpolitik," *Gutachten*, 102-200, 221-229.

[96] Hermann Graml, *Der 9. November 1938: "Reichskristallnacht,"* Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst, Heft 2 (Bonn, 1957), 64 pp.

Hans Buchheim's essay "War die katholische Kirche eine vom nationalsozialistischen Regime verfolgte Organisation?" in the *Gutachten* is a model of clarity and compactness. Designed mainly to serve as a legal opinion, it nevertheless contains pithy and significant historical judgments. Buchheim is probably the most brilliant of the Institut writers. The Catholic Church *had* to be persecuted when Hitler discovered what he really had failed to grasp even in 1933, that Christians *must* draw consequences from theology! Even during the war Hitler lagged behind Bormann, however, in virulent enthusiasm for a "final solution" of the Catholic question. He wanted to wait until after the war.[97]

The Institut publications are uniform in blaming Hitler for "unleashing" the war. The international impact of National Socialist Germany preceding the war and during the German occupation has received considerable attention. Boris Celovsky's *Das Münchener Abkommen 1938* is a tremendously detailed study of the Sudeten crisis, of Rankean proportions if not of Rankean objectivity. In spite of its sharp critique of British policies, the book squarely accuses Hitler of masking bottomless ambition for conquests under the appearances of old-style nationalistic diplomacy. Hitler and his followers made German nationalism the cruel, dynamic force with which no pacts were possible.[98] Walter Hofer's *Entfesselung des zweiten Weltkrieges* is especially praiseworthy for its combination of careful *Distanzierung* from German foreign policy prejudices of long standing and its insistance that psychiatric and moral evaluations of Hitler are a part of the political and diplomatic history of our times. We have the duty to call crimes and lies, crimes and lies. Our task is not to make history an art, but *an ethic.* Historians are under the obligation to retain the personal in history.[99] In spite of these un-Rankean pronouncements, Hofer is more truly Rankean than Celovsky. It is a sound little book.

[96a] *Kommandant in Auschwitz* (Stuttgart, 1958).

[97] *Gutachten,* 13-45. Postwar persecution was foreshadowed in Nazi-occupied Poland: Bernhard Stasiewski, "Nationalsozialistische Kirchenpolitik im Warthegau, 1939-1945," *Vierteljahrshefte,* VII (1959), 46-74.

[98] Celovsky, 93-96, 151-153, 159-160, 167-168.

American scholars will probably regret that the Institut für Zeitgeschichte did not choose to provide German readers with a translation of Louis de Jong's original doctoral thesis, which appeared in 1953 as *De Duitse vijfde Colonne in de tweede wereldoorlog* (Arnheim: Van Loghum Slaterus). Instead, the fourth volume of the *Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte* is essentially the shortened English version which appeared in 1956 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). De Jong is at his best in drawing shrewd parallels between past hysterias about secret agents and the different stories about fifth column activities. He shows how carelessly the term was used to apply to any and all activities of Reich Germans, persons of German speech, local fascists, and various oppositional elements. The German version omits nearly all of his stress on the Austrian, Czech and Memel cases, as well as the reasons he gives for ethnic German collaboration with Hitler. Nonetheless, the Institut has thus made available to Germans a balanced interpretation of what has long seemed to many Germans to be merely "anti-German propaganda."[99a]

Among the special interests of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte is Nazi occupation policy. Hans Buchheim has made an excellent contribution to this field in his study of the office of the *Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums.* Millions of Germans and non-Germans alike were shunted hither and thither in Europe during the war at the behest of this agency without ever hearing of it. All they knew was that Himmler and his SS were involved. Buchheim presents considerable organizational complexity in forty pages, never getting lost in the SS bureaucracy, but instead emphasizing the techniques by which Nazi imperialism concealed its mechanisms and shielded the responsibile decision-makers from public awareness of their inhuman and often uneconomic schemes. Buchheim shows that the SS as an institution was entrusted with the management of ethnic German resettlement and, indeed, all ethnic German affairs, and that the SS recognized very early the invaluable leverage available to it in the German manpower in Eastern Europe, which was inaccessible to the usual German state agencies, including the Wehrmacht. This arrangement was perhaps serviceable to the Reich, for few Germans, even Nazis, were prepared to "Germanize the East" as ruthlessly as the SS; but how many struggles for power were fought over this SS empire![100]

Ultimately the balance sheet on Nazi occupation policy, and especially in regard to police state methods, must show a deficit. Paul Kluke speaks of "die armselige Primitivität des nationalsozialistischen Auslaufes zur Weltmacht."[101] Hitler's New Order depended on a modicum of sincerity on the part of the Nazis with regard to "collaboration." Voices of reasonableness and cooperation raised in countries like France indicated that the times were ripe for a "European movement" in 1940, but the Nazis did not know how to make concessions to the defeated. Collaboration with the Nazis was a one-way street. If the SS with its "nordic community" propaganda managed to capture a few Danes, Norwegians and Dutch, partly owing to the antibolshevik crusade, the antireligious and ultra-biological mythos of the SS repelled even more. Undoubtedly the round-up of Jews in northwest Europe established a solidarity between the subject peoples and the victims of Nazi bigotry too strong to be conquered by imports of German antisemitic literature. Kluke suggests that the German New Order was most effective in the economic field, and points up the successes of the Foreign Office economic experts, Wiehl and Clodius.[102] Much of this success took place in Southeast Europe, and indeed Professor J. Matl of Graz University argues that there was a more solid foundation of collaboration in this area, based upon the very realistic local fear of Communist envelopment. He also stresses the admiration of the military virtues in these regions, which is certainly borne out by Waffen SS recruiting success in Muslim areas. A third observation of value is the blending in Southeast Europe of resistance and collaboration as found in Horthy and above all, Mihajlović. Matl, too, is agreed that the Nazis did a poor job as conquerors, even as compared to the Austrian K.u.K. forces in 1914-1918![103] Undoubtedly there were brave and resourceful Germans such as are described by Constantin Graf Stamati, a former member of Rosenberg's *Ostministerium,* who knew how to win friends for Germany among the subject peoples. Governor Wächter in Galicia was an Austrian of this type, and Otto Abetz was probably sincerely pro-French.[104]

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[99] Hofer, "Vorbemerkung," 7-13, 28-29, 42, 55-57, 99-102, 176-177.

[99a] Louis de Jong, *Die deutsche Fünfte Kolonne im zweiten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart, 1958).

[100] "Rechtsstellung und Organisation des Reichskommissars für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums," *Gutachten,* 239-279. *Cf.* Robert L. Koehl, *RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-1945* (Harvard U.P.: Cambridge, Mass., 1957).

[101] Commentary on J. Joll's paper in *Das Dritte Reich und Europa,* 119.

Another favorite topic of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte is the history of the Reichswehr and the related theme of "the other Germany," the military resistance to Hitler. In spite of the "structural defect" of professionalism referred to earlier, Institut writers seem on the whole to place the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht intrinsically on the side of "the other Germany." This puts the military in the "inner emigration" and breaks sharply with the non-German historical tradition of blaming German aggression on Junkerdom and Prussianism. Hans Meier-Welcker insists that the special political rôle of the Reichswehr in the Republic was almost forced on Germany by the allies, and that no *machtpolitisches Streben* was involved.[105] Thilo Vogelsang, of the Institut staff, underscores the loyal (anti-Nazi) stance of the Prussian Reichswehr during the tense days and hours of the

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[102] Kluke, *Das Dritte Reich und Europa,* 115-122.

[103] Commentary on L. de Jong's paper "Zwischen Kollaboration und Resistance," *Das Dritte Reich und Europa,* 152-163.

[104] "Zur Kulturpolitik des Ostministeriums," *Vierteljahrshefte,* VI (1958), 78-85; J. Joll, "Theorie und Praxis des nationalsozialistischen Expansion," *Das Dritte Reich und Europa,* 110, 112-113.

[105] Die Stellung des Chefs der Heeresleitung in den Anfängen der Republik," *Vierteljahrshefte,* VI (1956), 145-160.

November 9, 1923 coup.[106] Loyalty to the Republic is taken for granted in the article "Reichswehr und Rote Armee" by Helm Speidel, whose objective-technical tone leaves no room for the question whether the "cult of secrecy" in these years was good training for conspirators like Schleicher.[107] The tendency is to insist on Schleicher's secret operations, his distance from the main body of the Reichswehr, and to keep the political rôle of the extreme Right quite separate from that of the Reichswehr.[108] On the other hand, Heinrich Stuebel of the Institut has described the conspiratorial cooperation of the Reichswehr with Schacht as early as May 1933 in the development of the notorious *Metallforschungsstelle* to finance secret rearmament.[109] The Reichswehr Press Officer Hermann Foertsch in *Schuld und Verhängnis: Die Fritschkrise* declares that "the army, its leadership, and the individuals involved were all objects not subjects of the crisis, only weakly and rarely intervening in its course, and unable to intervene." He cites Hans Rothfels' dictum that no one can judge in matters of conscience who has not shared these problems personally. Foertsch accepts, as do most Institut writers, the views of Friedrich Hossbach as to conditions in the Wehrmacht during the Nazi era. Thus the decent soldiers are continuously being victimized by a few ambitious generals: Reichenau, Blomberg and Keitel.[110] Even Brauchitsch is treated gently. Hermann Mau has noted succinctly: "Brauchitsch became Army Commander-in-Chief under personal conditions which made him obligated to Hitler."[111]

Helmut Krausnick is more generally critical of the military. Brauchitsch is portrayed as weak and unwise. Krausnick makes it plain that Hitler did not wait until November 1937 to reveal his aggressive plans to the soldiers. In February 1933 and again in February 1934 Hitler spoke of Germany's necessary *Lebensraum*; but his remarks were disregarded. Krausnick also refuses to exaggerate the rôle of the "resistance" of Blomberg and Fritsch at the November 1937 conference in their later dismissal. They were victims of the machinations of Himmler and Göring whom Hitler was willing to sacrifice because they could not move fast enough for him.[112] Thus Krausnick, too, is preoccupied with the weakness and ignorance of the military class stemming from its professionalism rather than with the implications of its politics.

Thilo Vogelsang in his commentary on G. Castellan's talk on "Das Heer im totalitären Staat" at the Tutzing meeting, comes closer to the political implications of the bargain struck for the Reichswehr by Hammer-stein, Blomberg and Reichenau. Instead of weakening the national prestige of the military caste by participating in civil war, the Reichswehr leadership resigned its historic rôle to the party troops, first to the SA, later to the SS. By not intervening in the disorders following the Reichstag fire, the Reichswehr entered the bargain, sealed on August 2, 1934, with the fateful oath to Hitler personally.[113] Vogelsang and Krausnick thus return a verdict of guilty against persons, but shy away from blaming an institution, perhaps because this smacks of collective guilt.

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[106] "Die Reichswehr in Bayern und der Münchener Putsch 1923," *Vierteljahrshefte,* V (1957), 91-101.

[107] *Vierteljahrshefte,* I (1953), 9-45.

[108] Werner Conze, "Zum Sturz Brünings," *Vierteljahrshefte,* I (1953), 261-266; Helmut Krausnick, *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens,* 193-196. *Cf.* also Thilo Vogelsang, "Zur Politik Schleichers gegenüber der NSDAP", *ibid.,* VI (1958), 86-118.

[109] "Die Finanzierung der Aufrüstung im Dritten Reich," *Europa Archiv,* VI (1951), 4128-4136.

[110] Foertsch, 30-32, 39-40, 46-48, 54-56, 64-694, 95-101, 197 ff.

[111] Mau-Krausnick, 97.

[112] Krausnick, *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens,* 203, 219, 260-263, 281-297.

In a fair and balanced analysis of the modern controversy over the rôle of the German army Hans Herzfeld points out what is especially irritating to Germans in the works of some English and American writers. This is the search for a common denominator across the centuries, in Prussia, in the German people, or even in "militarism."[114] Herzfeld is like many of the Institut writers who, on the one hand, argue that the rôle of the military has been overrated as a factor in German history, and on the other hand manage to use the theme of the military to draw together an amazing number of the strands of German development.

The same observation might be made regarding the special interest of the Institut in the German underground resistance to Hitler. There is a strong will to defend the memory of these men against charges from within Germany of treason and against the shoulder shrugs of foreign observers who will not take them seriously. Here, too, the manifold strands of German history mingle with *Zeitgeschichte* as a whole. An essential factor in the resistance movement of the military was the Christian-pietist tradition.[115] Tresckow and others, Krausnick told the participants in the "Deutsche Gespräche über das Recht zum Widerstand," were defending not "German honor" but the honor of mankind. They were bearing witness to human decency regardless of the chances of success.[116] Krausnick remarked in this same discussion that any attempt to judge the conspirators of July 20, 1944, by the standards of normal times is wrong, because of the *Ausnahmezustand* which Hitler's dictatorship represented.[117] Here, too, we touch on the theme of the essential falsity of National Socialism, which is at once the justification for resistance, and the reason why the decent men of the Wehrmacht and others did not recognize the evil of their bargain. Krausnick makes amply clear that foreign statesmen made the same mistake, so that we may say that Western civilization's inability to see this falsity for what it was rendered resistance unto death the only ultimate answer for all men.

Answering the charge that the men of the German Opposition were quite unrealistic politically, Krausnick says that the conspirators' call for a stiffened British resistance to Hitler's demands on Czechoslovakia in September 1938 did not depend on the assumption that Hitler could be persuaded to keep the peace, but on the necessary conditions for popular support of the anti-Nazi coup. If Hitler was mad enough to plunge Germany into a unpopular war after a clear British warning, a peace-saving coup had a chance of being popularly supported. Furthermore, Hitler *did* hesitate when he thought the British meant business. The British acceptance of the conference proposal did much to destroy the self-confidence of the oppositional leaders.[118]

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[113] *Das Dritte Reich und Europa,* 42-44.

[114] "Zur neueren Literatur über das Heeresproblem in der deutschen Geschichte," *Vierteljahrshefte,* VI (1956), 361-386.

[115] Hans Rothfels, "Das politische Vermächtnis des deutschen Widerstands," *Vierteljahrshefte,* II (1954), 331-332, 343; *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens,* 112, 274-279.

[116] *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens,* 59-60.

[117] *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens,* 20-21.

In his chapter on the resistance in the *Deutsche Geschichte der jüngsten Vergangenheit* Krausnick is even more specific in linking the task of the resistance with morality. The Nazis' reduction of all action to the criterion of utility forced "the other Germany" to return to the most basic of human standards of value, the foundations of Western civilization. Furthermore, this common moral standard was all that really bound together the disparate groups of brave men who had to face the ever-present reality of practical impotence. The sense of having to take a stand in spite of one's impotence is one of the great themes of *Zeitgeschichte.* In surveying the political and social tendencies of these groups, Krausnick finds aristocrats, businessmen and socialists, soldiers and theologians, German patriots and good Europeans joined by a conception of human dignity but separated in their reform ideals, a true mirror of Germany, and of course of Europe today and yesterday.[119]

Hans Rothfels specifically defines this position as existentialist in his "Das politische Vermächtnis des deutschen Widerstands." In ringing tones Rothfels declares that the real German miracle is not her material come-back but the human miracle of the resistance. He cites approvingly the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung's* observation that we may measure the new Germany by its position in regard to the men of the 20th of July. He finds that George F. Kennan has referred to Count Moltke's call for a "reinstatement of humanity" as the last hope of East Europe and Asia. The *Durchbruch ins Freie,* by which the "inner freedom" of the German spirit must find its way to action, is both a statement of the German Opposition's conviction that democracy is obligatory on man and that attack (not defense) against the Nazis is an eternal battle. "The Nazis" may well include other forms of totalitarianism, Rothels implies. He is careful to dissociate himself from the maneuvers of Kleist and Salomon, who appear to admit "Hitler in ourselves," but in effect admit nothing.[120]

Rothfels has led the attack of the Institut writers on Neo-Nazism and Nazi apologetics. In a literary exchange with *Nation Europa* reprinted in the *Vierteljahrshefte,* the co-editor of the journal of the Institut unmasks the pretensions of scientific impartiality of the self-styled "European movement."[121] Paul Kluke, the second Secretary General of the Institut, has shown special interest in the Nazi perversion of the Pan-European movement.

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[118] Krausnick, *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens,* 362-368.

[119] Mau-Krausnick, 172-189.

[120] *Vierteljahrshefte,* II (1954), 329-343, esp. 329-334, 343.

[121] "Um den Begriff Neo-Nazismus," *Vierteljahrshefte,* III (1955), 223-226.

His "Nationalsozialistische Europaideologie" is a determined effort to puncture the growing legend of a National Socialist Europe defending European institutions and values against the two barbaric cultures of America and Russia. He points to the German Resistance as the true heir of the European ideal.[122] Helmut Krausnick, the present Secretary General, throws the calm light of reason and cool factuality upon the heated charges and claims of Ribbentrop's English "expert," Fritz Hesse, and upon the efforts of the latter-day Nazis to claim Rommel for themselves even after Hitler forced him to commit suicide.[123] Hans Buchheim identifies Peter Kleist, the author of the apologetic *Auch Du Warst dabei,* as one of the intellectual elite of the SS who helped to prepare the instruments of Hitler's technology of power. Buchheim has the relatively simple task of comparing passages from an earlier work of Kleist in which he told half truths (*Zwischen Hitler und Stalin*) with spurious revisions in the later work.[124]

It seems, then, to be the function of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte to bear witness in our time not only to what was, but to what was not, and is not. This noble conception of history *als Pflicht* is in the best German tradition, just as it represents a reaction against the well-known German *Historismus.* Relativism and positivism, history as myth and history as propaganda have all become so identified for Institut writers with the totalitarian *Weltanschauung,* that they have sought in the roots of their traditions the basis for a sounder scholarship. They seem to have found a threefold foundation in (1) the Christian ethic of responsibility, (2) the classical universality of the *Aufklärung,* and (3) the critical empiricism of scientific history. While open to the possibilities of the behavioral sciences, the publications of the Institut are conservative in their use. Thus the image of German scholarship that emerges from a study of the work of this new German institute is remarkably similar to our observations on Adenauer's Germany as a whole.

A profound rejection of National Socialism as utterly false rather than merely ineffective marks the publications we have examined. This rejection represents the rejection of *any* totalitarianism. Communism is studied as a parallel phenomenon, never as antithesis. The charm and magic of myths and myth-making are decidedly thrust aside, whether proffered from the Left or the Right. At the same time, Institut publications repeat a consistent warning against mechanistic liberalism as embodied in efforts to return to the nineteenth-century atomistic economy, and in so-called "progressive" constitutions which merely attempt to mirror economic pressure groups. The objection of these writers to both totalitarianism and the "democracy" too often practiced in the past lies in the relativism of both. This relativism is a basic philosophic error of our time. It contradicts man's essential nature. The laws of man's existence will not permit the random manufacture of myth or the reconstruction of truth for utilitarian purposes even when the "utility" is widely accepted.

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[122] *Vierteljahrshefte,* III (1955), 240-275.

[123] "Legenden um Hitlers Aussenpolitik," *Vierteljahrshefte,* II (1954), 217-219; "Rommel und der deutsche Widerstand," *Vierteljahrshefte,* I (1953), 65-70.

[124] "Zu Kleists 'Auch Du Warst dabei'", *Vierteljahrshefte,* II (1954), 177-192.

The conception of human nature in Institut publications is a conservative one. Men are not good or bad, but good and bad. Human reason is much less powerful than human passion, but only human reason allows men to tap the forces of science. Reason may also be used to understand the irrational, which does not mean that we accept the irrational as the norm even when it is understood. The propensity to create utopias is a human trait derived from the over-estimation of human reason; but the impossibility of human perfection does not allow men merely to "adjust" to their environment, or to their biological nature.

Nationalism turned out to be the great evil of our time because it is (1) utopian, (2) un-Christian and anti-universal, (3) collective rather than personal. We all share a common fate as human beings, which nationalism denies. Just as Adenauer's Germany seems profoundly aware of the indivisibility of the East Germans' fate from that of Europe as a whole, so the collaborators of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte emphasize that the problems we associate with the National Socialist era—nihilism, systematic persecution, resistance and collaboration, "guilt by association," are our common problems, the heritage of our time. We must all study *Zeitgeschichte* in order to recognize our situation. Then we may be capable of working together, not on some utopian ideal, but on the tasks set for us by our technological advances and our all-too-human nature. The broad-gauge conservative tone of these publications echoes the new German dedication to preserving the Western heritage by using it in the cause of human freedom. Stress is placed not on "progress" or on bold, tradition-shattering innovation, but rather on rediscovering the age-old demands of man's nature. An emphasis on human dignity cannot be accidental in German thinkers but recently emerged from the shadow of Nazi dictatorship and now threatened by a Communist dictatorship equally virulent. They oppose the idolization of the state *and of man himself,* because only concrete individuals, men not "man," are capable of personal responsibility, the essential ingredient of the Western tradition, if not of all human beings as such.

The Institut für Zeitgeschichte could perform no greater service to the German people than to continue to aid the world's scholars to understand this new era in which we find ourselves in the light of common traditions. In the spirit of enlightened conservatism they symbolize the new Germany.

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA

FINLAND'S POSITION IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, 1905-1910

by John H. Hodgson

FOR SOME ninety years after Finland became part of the Russian Empire she enjoyed an autonomous status in the Empire and lived in relative harmony with Russia. But during the last decade of the nineteenth century, particularly during the period when General Bobrikov was Governor General of Finland,[1] a course of repression and russification was initiated. and except for a brief interlude following the events of 1905 this oppression by the Russian Government continued during the first decade of the twentieth century. It reached a high point in 1910, when a law was passed by the State Duma and the State Council which reduced the power of the Finnish Parliament and tended to make Finland more a Russian province than an autonomous unit in the Russian Empire.

In February 1899, a manifesto had been issued that was designed to take away some of the power of the Finnish Parliament and to strengthen Russian control over Finnish affairs. The Russian language was introduced into the Finnish civil service in 1900, and in 1901 the Finnish Army was abolished as an independent unit, Finish soldiers being absorbed into Russian units. Two years later General Bobrikov was given dictatorial powers, and his powerful position in Finland was terminated only by his assassination in 1904. During this period the question naturally arose in Finland as to how to resist Russian oppression and protect Finnish constitutional rights, and there developed two main strains of thought.

One group of Finns felt that a policy of passive resistance should be followed; another felt that Finland should follow a policy of conciliation towards Russia. In December 1900 an "open letter" written by the head of the Finnish Party. Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen, appeared in one of the conservative newspapers in Finland, and in this letter Yrjö-Koskinen called for a conciliatory policy towards Russia; he also wrote that there should be no cooperation with the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland,[2] which constituted about one eighth of the population at this time. This letter was in part responsible for the deep cleavage that developed between the so-called "Old Finns," who favored a conciliatory policy towards Russia,[3] and the

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[1] The Governor General was the Emperor's representative in Finland, and he resided in Helsinki. A Minister State Secretary for Finnish Affairs resided in St. Petersburg, and on the Finnish side there was also a Diet and a Senate. The Diet and the Senate were the key bodies in Finland's governmental structure; it should be noted that the "economic" department of the Senate corresponds to what we would call a cabinet. In the following pages when mention is made of the Finnish Government this will mean the Senate and, more specifically, the cabinet section.

[2] Arvi Korhonen (ed.), *Suomen historian käsikirja,* II (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1949), 316f., and J. K. Paasikivi, *Paasikiven muistelmia sortovuosilta,* I (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö), 5f.

[3] A concise statement of the stand by the Old Finns in regard to Russia appears in the memoirs of J. K. Paasikivi, one of the leaders of the Old Finns: "An attempt had to be made in a careful manner both by negotiations and compromises with the Russians to find a solution to the difficulties and controversies which would meet the fundamental demands

"Constitutional Group," which favored a policy of passive resistance. The latter group consisted of Young Finns (an opposition group which arose within the Finnish Party in the 1880s) and the Swedish element in the population. It should be pointed out that the aim of all the Finnish parties—the Old Finns, the Young Finns, the Swedish Party, and the Social Democratic Party—was to defend Finland's constitutional rights, but the parties differed widely on the method to be followed in achieving this end.

There were some elements in Finland who were satisfied neither with a policy of passive resistance nor with a policy of conciliation, and consequently a movement known as "Activism" came into being. At a meeting of the Constitutional Group in Sweden in 1904 it was decided to send two delegates, A. Neovius and Konni Zilliacus, to the Paris Congress of parties working for Russian liberation; at the Paris Congress a resolution was passed which called for the abolition of Russian autocracy and which recognized Finland's special status in the Russian Empire and called for a restoration of Finnish constitutional rights that had been infringed upon during the rule of Bobrikov.[4] For internal political reasons the Constitutional Group notified its two delegates to the Congress that they should not sign this resolution, and when Zilliacus received this communication he decided to break completely with the Constitutional Group and to found the Finnish Active Opposition Group. In the name of this group Zilliacus signed the Paris resolution, and on November 17, 1904, the Finnish Active Opposition Group was formally founded in Helsinki.[5]

The Activists were in fact a very small group consisting mainly of the extreme left-wing elements of the Constitutional Group, who were quite often of Swedish descent; Activism also drew some support from the workers. The Activists during the years 1904-1905 embarked on a series of assassination attempts, many of which were successful; they also endeavored to smuggle arms and ammunition into both Finland and Russia. In part, Activism was the result of the political crisis that Russia was going through, namely that arising from the Russo-Japanese War, and the Activists, led by Zilliacus, were in close contact with officials of the Japanese Government.[6] In addition to receiving moral support from the Japanese, the Activists also received money with which they could purchase weapons and ship this contraband into Finland and Russia.[7]

The high point of the attempts of the Activists to smuggle arms into Finland and St. Petersburg occurred in the fall of 1905 and centered around the "John Grafton" incident. Zilliacus had managed to purchase a ship named the "John Grafton," and several unsuccessful attempts were made to

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of the Russians, but which would not crush and would not destroy the necessary preconditions of the life of our nation." Paasikivi, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[4] Antero Manninen, *Suomen kansan ajantieto* (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1948), p. 330.

[5] E. W. Juva, *Suomen kansan aikakirjat*, IX (Helsinki: Kustannus-osakeyhtiö Otava, 1937), 247. All dates follow the Gregorian calendar.

[6] Korhonen, *op. cit.*, p. 341; and V. M. Smirnov, "Revoliutsionnaia rabota v Finliandii 1900-1907 gg.," *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, January, 1926, p. 129.

[7] Korhonen, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

deliver its cargo of arms to Fininsh and Russian revolutionaries. In September the ship was sunk in the Gulf of Bothnia, and with this the most adventurous undertaking of the Finish Activists came at an unsuccessful end.[8] Activism continued to exist, but it did not enjoy the support of the Finnish population as a whole, and the Constitutional Group and the Old Finns were vigorous in denouncing the activities of this small militant element of the Fininsh population.

On October 31, shortly after the general strike had broken out in Russia, a general strike began in Finland. The leading elements in this strike were the Socialists and the Activists, and it should be noted that, for the first time, the Socialists appeared on the political arena in Finland as a decisive force. In addition to the Socialists and the Activists, the Constitutional Group and other segments of the Finnish population were drawn into the strike, and it was really a united effort enjoying support throughout Finland. The main purpose of the strike was to bring about a restoration of Finnish constitutional rights that had been infringed upon during the Bobrikov era, but a new element also entered the picture. Some Finns were now demanding full independence from Russia.

The left elements in the population were particularly strong in the industrial city of Tampere, and it was there that on November 1 the so-called "Red Manifesto" was issued. This Manifesto demanded the resignation of the Finnish Senate, the calling of a National Assembly, and the formation of a Provisional Government which was to rule until a National Assembly could meet and decide on a constitution for Finland.[9] But even in the "Red Manifesto" there were signs that a desire for a break with Russia was not the motivating force behind the actions of those responsible for the Manifesto. One part of the Manifesto stated:

> We have no special desire to break away from Great Russia if only we get assurances that the best elements of the Russian people will take the Russian State Government into their hands, and if the course of events does not make such a detachment necessary.[10]

On the first day of the strike the police also left their work, and this gave rise to the formation of two guard units to keep order in the country, the Protection Guard (or, as it is sometimes called, the White Guard) and the Red Guard.[11] The Protection Guard was under the control of Captain Gösta Theslöf, and the Red Guard was commanded by a former Finnish Army officer named Johan Kock. Officially the Red Guard was an organ of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, but in actuality it was an independent organization because the Social Democratic Party had little effective control over the Red Guard. On November 6 the strike was declared over, but the Red Guard was inclined to continue the strike. Red Guards attempted to prevent stores from opening, and after a clash between employees and Red Guards near one of the largest stores in Helsinki the Protection Guard was called out. The two guard organizations confronted each other, but at that time there was no bloodshed due to the fact that Captain Kock restrained his men and withdrew.

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[8] For further information on the "John Grafton" and two other ships in Zilliacus' "fleet", see Juva, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-292.

[9] Juhani Paasivirta, *Suomen itsenäisyyskysymys 1917*, I (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1947), 41. For the full text of the Manifesto. see Sigurd Roos, *Nationalstrejken i Finland*, Helsingfors, 1906, pp. 392-394.

[10] Quoted in Juva, *op. cit.*, p. 326; Roos, *op. cit.*, p. 393; and Ia. S. Il'inskii, "Revoliutsionnyo 1905 god v Finliandii," *Voprosy istorii*, December, 1955 (No. 12), p. 53.

[11] Juva, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

Early in the morning of November 4 Emporer Nicholas signed a Manifesto that had been prepared principally by the leading member of the Finnish Constitutional Group, Leo Mechelin. The Manifesto suspended the February 1899 law and other decrees issued during the Bobrikov period until future legislation could deal with the questions and arrive at a satisfactory solution. The Manifesto also entrusted the Finnish Senate with the task of drawing up a new Diet order and a new electoral law based on universal and equal suffrage.[12] The Manifesto was regarded as a noticeable improvement, but it is true that not everyone considered it the final achievement.

On the first day of the strike the members of the Finnish Senate, Old Finns, had announced their desire to resign, and on December 1, 1905, a new Senate was named. Leo Mechelin became the head of the new Finnish Government, which consisted entirely of Constitutionalists (Swedes and Young Finns) except for one Socialist.[13] Mechelin had high hopes for his Government, but there were serious problems ahead. The Constitutional Group drew much of its power from the Swedish element in the population, and later it will become evident that this was a source of weakness in the conduct of Finnish relations *vis-à-vis* Russia. Furthermore, Mechelin rested his policy on the assumption that the liberal current in Russian politics had come to the fore to remain the guiding factor in the Russian Government. He did not envisage the return to power of the reactionary elements in Russia, and he was not prepared to cope with this change when it took place.

In January 1906, on the initiative of the small Activist Group, the *Voima liitto* ("Strength Union") came into existence. Ostensibly *Voima* was a sports organization designed to carry on various athletic activities, such as the preparation of skiing trips, but in reality this organization provided its members with a modicum of military training. The aim of the Activist leaders of *Voima* was to prepare for a struggle for Finland's independence, and with no Finnish Army the semi-military training given by *Voima* could help fill the gap. In addition to support from the Activists, *Voima* drew a considerable amount of strength from the young people in Finland, but there is room for doubt as to whether the rank and file of *Voima* knew of or supported the aims of the leaders, who often were of Swedish origin and thus disliked by many Finns.

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[12] For the full text see *Seimovyi ustav Velikogo kniazhestva Finliandskogo,* s prilozheniiami, Spb.: 1913, pp. 188-190.

[13] A former secretary of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, K. J. Kari, was included in the new Government, but his entrance into a "bourgeois" government led to his expulsion from the Social Democratic Party at its Congress in Oulu in August 1906.

The leaders of *Voima* made numerous attempts to smuggle arms into Finland, especially from Sweden, and although the efficacy of these operations was often exaggerated, there were instances which pointed to success. In the middle of September 1906, a cache of weapons belonging to *Voima* was discovered in Helsinki. This led to reports in the Russian reactionary press of an imminent armed uprising, and the situation was made more tense when circulars began to appear calling for an armed revolt. The situation was so fraught with complications and suspicion that the Finnish Senate decided *Voima* would have to be dissolved. On November 9, 1906, the Senate ordered the bureau of *Voima* to disband the organization, and this was done.

The year 1906 produced another incident that proved to be fodder for the Russian reactionary press. On July 30 a revolt broke out among the Russian soldiers stationed on the island fortress of Viapori (today called Suomenlinna), at the entrance to the Helsinki harbor. On July 31 Captain Kock, head of the Finnish Red Guard, issued a proclamation calling for a general strike throughout Finland. The leaders of the Social Democratic Party had not been given any previous notification of Kock's intentions,[14] and when the Social-Democratic leaders learned of the call to a general strike they tried to limit it to the capital. The strike turned out to be far from complete in Helsinki, and it was even less successful in other parts of Finland.

One of the aims of the Red Guard during the Viapori Revolt was to enforce the strike Kock had called for, and in this connection, on August 2, the Red Guard came into armed conflict with the Protection Guard. In the clash several members of both the Protection Guard and the Red Guard were killed; this foreshadowed the events to come in 1918 when the Finnish Civil War broke out.

In addition to trying to enforce the strike, some two to three hundred members of the Red Guard actually fought with the Russians revolting in Viapori, and when the revolt was finally suppressed, on August 2, there were some sixty-six Red Guards among the captured.[15] These Red Guards were tried by a Finnish civil court, only two of the prisoners receiving a sentence of more than two years.[16] The Russian mutineers, on the other hand, were tried by a military court, and many of them were executed. The leniency of the Finnish courts in general was a thorn in the side of many Russians, and the action of the Finnish courts in this instance did not promote harmonious relations between the two countries.

On August 3 the Finnish Senate decided that the Red Guard would have to disband, and issued an order to that effect. The Red Guard, however, paid no attention to this order, and it was not until the Fifth Congress of the Finnish Social Democratic Party met, in Oulu on August 20-27, and called for the dissolution of the Red Guard that the Guard did disappear from public view.[17] It nevertheless continued to exist underground and was to reappear openly in 1917.

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[14] Akademiia Nauk SSSR, *Pervaia russkaia revoliutsiia 1905-1907 gg. i mezhdunarodnoe dvizhenie*, chast' 1 (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1955), 333.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 335.

[16] Mentioned by Zamyslovskii in *Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskie otchety*, tretii sozyv, sessiia 1, chast' 2 (February-May 1908) (Spb.: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1908), 2950.

The Red Guard was one of the main threads that ran through the attacks on Finland in the reactionary press in Russia, and the press utilized the activities of this organization as a pretext for demanding that Finland be brought under the control of the Russian State as a unit enjoying no special status in the Empire. The facts above indicate rather clearly that the Red Guard did not enjoy wide support among the Finnish population—in fact it came into armed conflict with a segment of the population—and the Finnish political parties reproved the actions of the Red Guard. Even the Social Democratic Party, to which the Red Guard was nominally subordinate, deemed it necessary to order the Red Guard to dissolve.

On July 20, 1906, the Emperor approved a new Organic Law of the Diet for Finland, which had been presented by the Finnish Government. The new Law replaced the Law of 1869, and it should be pointed out that the essence of article 71 of the Law of the Diet of 1869 was repeated in the new Law. Article 71 of the 1869 Law had stated: "A fundamental law can be made, altered, legally explained, or repealed only on the representation of the Emperor and Grand Duke, and with the consent of all the Estates."[18] Article 80 of the new Law confirmed the existence of a constitutional law that could be changed only by common consent of the Emperor and the Finnish Diet.

The new Law of the Diet also provided for extensive changes in the electoral law as well as for a reform of the Parliament. The Finnish Parliament was henceforth to be a unicameral legislature elected every three years and meeting in three-month sessions, with the Emperor reserving the right to dissolve the Parliament. The old four estate system passed out of existence in 1906, and elections of the two hundred deputies to the new Parliament were to be held in March 1907, on the basis of a new electoral law. There would be universal suffrage; all men and women who had reached the age of twenty-four were given the right to vote (with some minor exceptions); the vote would be equal and secret; and the vote would be proportional.

The approach of the elections based on these reforms evoked a considerable change in the makeup of the various Finnish political parties, with all parties striving to make their programs as attractive as possible. The Old Finns who had consistently been losing ground to the other parties now became the champions of fairly radical social reforms in an attempt to regain their old position.[19] They also pursued a sharp policy towards the Swedish element in the population and tended to follow the formula "Finland for the Finns." This latter attitude was particularly manifest with regard to the question of the place of the Swedish language in Finland. The policy of the Old Finns *vis-à-vis* Russia continued unchanged. They were still advocates of a conciliatory policy towards Russia, thinking that by pursuing this policy Finland would eventually regain the rights that she had lost in the previous years.

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[17] Sosialidemokraattinen Puoluetoimikunta, *Sosialidemokraattinen puolue 25 vuotta*, Tampere: Tampereen Työväen Kirjapaino, 1924, p. 52.

[18] Quoted in *Finland and Russia. International Conference in London, February 26-March 1, 1910* (trans. from the French) (London: Harrison and Sons, 1911), p. 27.

[19] Göran von Bonsdorff, *Suomen poliittiset puolueet* (Helsinki: Kustannus-osakeyhtiö Tammi, 1957), p. 29; Korhonen, *op. cit.*, p. 397; and Paasikivi, *op. cit.*, I, 186f.

The new election law hit the Swedish Party hardest of all. Under the old system the Swedish-speaking Finns had enjoyed a position of power and were the aristocrats of Finland. Due to the 1906 reforms, however, the Swedish Party was bound to suffer defeat in the coming elections owing to the fact that the Swedish-speaking Finns were a minority in the population. The most that the Swedish Party could hope for was to capture all the Swedish votes, irrespective of the class to which the voters belonged, and with this aim in mind the Swedish People's Party was founded, in May 1906. The main unifying element in the program of the Swedish People's Party was language—which, as will be seen, had a weakening effect on the Finnish Government.

In the fall of 1906 the Young Finns formulated a program for their party. Like the Old Finns, the Young Finns favored a policy of rather radical social reform, but they were not so vigorous as the Old Finns in pressing for an acceptance of the Finnish way of life (*suomalaisuus*) by the Swedish element of the population. The Young Finns, like all the Finnish parties, continued to emphasize a restoration of Finnish constitutional rights.

The Finnish Social Democratic Party was growing rapidly, and most people underestimated the real amount of power that this party enjoyed. From 1904 to 1906 the party membership had increased slightly more than fivefold, from 16,610 to 85,027.[20] The party had a worker base, but there were also a number of intellectuals who controlled and guided it. Two different trends were present in the Social Democratic Party, one group favoring socialism by revolution and the other advocating the achievement of socialism by parliamentary methods; at the Fifth Congress of the Social Democratic Party, in August 1906, there was a definite split between the moderates in the party and the militant left-wing element (the so-called "Siltasaarilaiset"). But the Party was united with regard to safeguarding Finnish rights and in its expressions of solidarity with the Russian liberation movement.

The elections took place in March 1907, and the results were a surprise to everyone. Out of the 200 seats in Parliament the Socialists captured 80. The other seats were distributed as follows: Old Finns 59, Young Finns 26, Swedes 24, Agrarian Union 9, and the Christian Workers' Union 2.[21] The unexpected Socialist victory meant that the position of the Constitutionalist

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[20] Akademiia Nauk SSSR, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

[21] von Bonsdorff, *op. cit.*, p. 37. The Agrarian Union was formed in Oulu on May 1, 1906, by small landowners; for purposes of this discussion it is important to note only that in their attitude towards Russia the Agrarians supported the Young Finns. The Christian Workers' Union appeared during the elections, as did several other smaller groups that did

Government of Leo Mechelin was untenable. The Constitutional Group could not quite match the number of delegates that the Old Finns had succeeded in getting elected, and the Constitutional Coalition fell far short of the eighty delegates that the Socialists had. Furthermore, the Constitutional Group had begun to split again into two distinct factions—the Young Finns and the Swedes—due to the importance that was being attached to the language question.

The Finnish Government was being undermined further by perpetual inter-party disputes. All the Finnish parties were united in the aim of restoring Finland's rights *vis-à-vis* Russia, but, as has been seen, their methods in pursuing this aim varied, and the parties were uncompromising on this point. This attitude did not meet the tactical requirements of the situation, and it weakened the front that the Finnish Government could present in the face of the increasing attacks by Russia on Finland's autonomy. The inter-party disputes were even sharper when it came to domestic issues, and this, too, had the effect of undermining the Finnish Government's ability to meet the Russian threat.

The Finnish Government crisis of 1908 illustrates the weakening effect that these inter-party disputes had on the Government, and it shows how these disputes complicated the relations between Finland and Russia. By 1908 the attacks on Finland's autonomous position in the Russian Empire were reaching fever pitch in reactionary circles in Russia, and as a result of the deteriorating situation the Finnish Parliament demanded that the Government give an explanation of its conduct of Finnish-Russian relations. On February 26, 1908, Leo Mechelin replied for the Government, the essence of his speech to the Parliament being that the Government was doing its best and hoped that the situation would improve. The Government's answer was sent to a commission, which decided that the Government should be given a vote of confidence. This, however, suited neither the Old Finns nor the Socialists, and both groups introduced their own proposals.

The Old Finns accused the Government of not taking advantage of all the possibilities to improve relations between Russia and Finland, and, while making their proposal condemning the Government, the Old Finns also utilized this opportunity to attack the Swedish element in the Government. The Socialists accused the Government of giving in too much to the reactionary circles in Russia, and, in addition, criticized the Government for not having put through certain social reforms.

A vote was taken on the commission's report calling for a vote of confidence and on the various other proposals that had been introduced. In the Finnish Parliament it is customary to vote on proposals by pairs. The proposal which is victorious on one vote is matched against another proposal, and the proposal of a commission is always voted on last. The first vote in this case was on the Socialist formula versus that of the Old Finns, and the Old Finns warned the Constitutional Group not to contribute to a victory of

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not succeed in getting delegates elected, and on the whole it can be said that the Christian Workers' Union supported the Old Finns.

the Socialist measure over their proposal.[22] However, the Constitutionalists did vote with the Socialists; in retaliation the Old Finns abstained from further voting. This resulted in a Socialist victory, and the Government was condemned for not being able to ward off the Russian attacks and for not improving the lot of the proletariat.[23] The outcome of the vote could have only bad effects.

It caused the resignation of Leo Mechelin and three other Senators, and a new Cabinet was formed under the leadership of a Young Finn, Edvard Hjelt.[24] The new Senate was made up of Constitutionalists and Old Finns; it is interesting to note that one of the Old Finns who entered the new Government, J. K. Paasikivi, was to become the dominant Finnish political figure in the period following the Second World War.

It comes as no surprise that this Socialist victory in the Finnish Parliament was received adversely by the Emperor and the reactionary circles in Russia; the result was that the Emperor for the first time dissolved the new democratic Finnish Parliament, in April 1908. New elections were held in the summer, and there was a slight strengthening in the position of the Socialists and a decided diminution in the strength of the Old Finns. The Socialists gained three seats, the Old Finns lost five.[25]

The Finnish Question was coming to a head. In the spring of 1908 a heated debate took place in the State Duma as a result of three interpellations. The first interpellation, introduced by the Octobrists, called for an explanation from the President of the Council of Ministers of actions by the Minister State Secretary for Finnish Affairs that allegedly favored local Finnish interests to the detriment of Imperial Russian interests.[26] According to a law of 1891 the Minister State Secretary was to decide whether a matter affected Imperial interests; if in his opinion it did, he was to submit the bill or question to the Council of Ministers for preliminary examination before taking action. The interpellation introduced by the Octobrists asserted that the Minister State Secretary had failed to observe this law and had not consulted with the Council of Ministers on certain matters that were regarded by the Octobrists as being of Imperial interest.

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[22] M. Russobtovskii, *Istoricheskoe osveshchenie finliandskago voprosa* (Spb.: O. N. Popovoi, 1912), p. 180; and Paasikivi, *op. cit.*, II, 10.

[23] It has been suggested that the sharpness of the proposal made by the Socialists was in part due to the fact that they were sure that their proposal would not be adopted by Parliament. Paasikivi, *op. cit.*, II, 5.

[24] Due to party dissensions there was considerable difficulty and delay in forming a new Government, and it was only after the Governor General threatened to put the question of a new Government in the hands of the Council of Ministers that a coalition government was immediately formed. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[25] von Bonsdorff, *op. cit.*, p. 37. J. K. Paasikivi, a leading figure in the Old Finn Party, has advanced three reasons for the defeat of the Old Finns at the polls: because of the Party's advocacy of radical social reforms, particularly with respect to the lot of the tenant farmers—whom the Party hoped to elevate to the status of small independent landowners—it lost some support from the large landowners, who constituted the backbone of the Party; secondly, the newly formed Agrarian Union had at least a slight effect in bringing about the Old Finns' defeat at the polls; and, finally, the "irrational" and "unreasonable" attacks on Finland by Stolypin's Government caused former supporters of the Old Finns to react against the conciliatory policy that the Old Finns had been advocating. Paasikivi, *op. cit.*, I, 229-231.

[26] For the text of this interpellation, see Duma debates, *op. cit.*, tretii sozyv, sessiia 1, chast' 2, 2915.

The other two interpellations were put forth by the Right deputies in the Duma and touched on the question of revolutionary activity and "secret organizations" (the Red Guard and *Voima*) in Finland.[27] There is some reason to believe that all three of these interpellations were drawn up with the foreknowledge of the President of the Council of Ministers, P. Stolypin;[28] there is a definite relationship between the interpellation introduced by the Octobrists and an idea that was foremost in Stolypin's mind: the need for an extensive legislative project which would give Russia closer control over Finnish affairs and which would reduce Finland's position in the Empire to that of a Russian province.

On May 18, 1908, Stolypin gave his answer to the interpellations.[29] He began his speech with a vivid report on bristling revolutionary activity in Finland, giving a decidedly one-sided account of the situation, which heated the emotions of the nationalist deputies to the boiling point. From here Stolypin went on to the main point of his speech, namely, that a legislative project was needed to put Russo-Finnish relations in their right perspective. The oration ended on a rousing nationalist note, and one of the deputies on the extreme Right, Purishkevich, called it a "brilliant patriotic speech."[30]

The Russian Government lost no time in taking the first steps towards a comprehensive legislative scheme dealing with Finland. On June 2, 1908, the Emperor approved the special minutes of a meeting of the Council of Ministers which provided the Council of Ministers with the prerogative of examining all bills proposed by the Finnish Government before they were submitted to the Emperor. Previous to this time the Minister State Secretary for Finnish Affairs had been able to go directly to the Emperor, although it has been noted that a check had been put on his actions in 1891, when an ordinance was passed which stated that if the Minister State Secretary thought a legislative proposal touched the interests of the Empire he should communicate with the appropriate Russian Minister before going to the Emperor. Now all proposals and bills should go to the Council of Ministers, and the Council of Ministers would henceforth decide what questions were of Russian State interest and should be dealt with by State legislation, and what matters were of purely local Finnish importance and could be dealt with by the Finnish Parliament. If the decision of the Council of Ministers should not meet with the approval of the Finnish Government the latter could register its disagreement, but neither the Minister State Secretary nor the Governor General could go directly to the Emperor in a case of disagreement unless accompanied by the Russian Prime Minister or the Minister concerned with the particular problem.

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[27] For the text of these interpellations, see *ibid.*, pp. 2913-2914.

[28] This point is asserted by Babianskii in *Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskie otchety*, tretii sozyv, sessiia 3, chast' 4 (April-June 1910) (Spb.: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1910), 2349.

[29] For Stolypin's speech, see Duma debates, *op. cit.*, tretii sozyv, sessiia 1, chast' 2, 2919-2941.

[30] *Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskie otchety,* tretii sozyv, sessiia 1, chast' 3, (May-June 1908) (Spb.: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1908), 687.

In February 1909 the Speaker of the Finnish Parliament, P. E. Svinhufvud, gave a speech opening the session of the Diet, and in this address he bitterly complained of the measure passed on June 2, 1908. The consequence was that the Emperor dissolved the Finnish Parliament, and new elections were held. From the election results one can see that the current of Finnish public opinion continued to move to the Left. The Socialists gained one seat, bringing their representation in Parliament to 84; the Old Finns won only 48 seats (a loss of six seats).[31] The new Parliament met in June 1909, and much to the annoyance of Russian reactionary circles Svinhufvud was re-elected Speaker.

During this election campaign the situation was complicated by another Finnish Government crisis. The Finnish Parliament that had been dissolved as a result of Svinhufvud's speech had passed an urgently needed bill concerning a land rent law, and this bill had been forwarded on to the Council of Ministers and then to the Emperor. After some delay Nicholas signed the bill, but he attached a preamble stating that no bill coming from a dissolved Parliament was legal and that it was only due to the urgent need for the bill that he had decided to make an exception and approve it.[32]

This caused a furor in the Finnish Senate, and a debate followed as to whether this bill should be promulgated. The Emperor's appended preamble constituted a violation of Finland's constitution, and the members of the Senate feared that promulgation of the bill and note would set a precedent for future action by the Russian Government. The Old Finns in the Cabinet felt, nevertheless, that the bill should be issued, and the Emperor demanded it.[33] The Constitutionalist members of the Cabinet refused to take part in action which they regarded as sanctioning a violation of Finland's constitution, and then resigned from the Cabinet, leaving the Old Finns alone at the helm of the Finnish Government.

On October 7 of the same year, 1909, the Emperor signed a military manifesto dealing with the question of Finland's contribution to Russia's defense effort. The manifesto provided that Finnish men would continue to be exempt from personal service and that, in lieu of personal service, the Russians would expect yearly monetary compensation to the amount of ten million marks for 1908 and 1909 and a steadily increasing sum thereafter until the fixed sum of twenty million marks yearly should be reached, in 1919. This would be the arrangement until State legislation could make everything definite.[34] This procedure constituted a violation of the Finnish constitution, and the manifesto caused even the mild, conciliatory, Old Finns to resign from the Government. This shows how uncompromising the Russian Government was in its attitude towards Finland, for it had succeeded in driving even the Old Finns into the arms of the opposition. A member of the State Council pointed out that the Russian stand on the Finnish Question caused the Old Finns to unite with the other political parties in opposition to Russia: "We united them; we were able to make realizable what formerly had not been possible."[35]

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[31] von Bonsdorff, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

[32] Russobtovskii, *op. cit.*, p. 196f.; and Paasikivi, *op. cit.*, II, 56-58.

[33] After the bill had been promulgated Nicholas felt it necessary to say that his note would not set a precedent. See Russobtovskii, *op. cit.*, p. 198; and Paasikivi, *op. cit.*, II, 64f.

[34] A. R. Cederberg, *Suomen uusinta historiaa 1898-1942* (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1943), p. 114; and Paasikivi, *op. cit.*, II, 73. The question of Finland's military obligations to Russia was one of the most difficult problems confronting the two countries. On March 29, 1905, the Finns received some satisfaction when a decree was issued which stated that the law of 1901, which required personal military service in Russian units,

In November 1909 the Finnish Parliament refused to approve the military manifesto, and this resulted in the dissolution of the Parliament. New elections were held the following February, and there was a slight, but continued, shift to the Left, with the Socialists returning 86 delegates and the Old Finns 42.[36]

On March 28, 1909, the Emperor appointed a mixed Finnish-Russian commission to deal with the question of the issuance of laws of local Finnish and Imperial State interest. The commission consisted of five Finns and five Russians with an additional Russian, Kharitonov, presiding over the meetings as president. By a vote of 6-5 the Russian "proposals" were victorious, and they were sent on to the Council of Ministers. This was really the last chance to plug the dike and stem the flood, but the unwillingness of the Russian Government to make any attempt at compromise and reconciliation meant that after the closing session of the commission the course of events moved on to a climax.

On March 27, 1910, an Imperial Manifesto ordered that a legislative project drawn up by Stolypin, which was very similar to the "proposals" of the Kharitonov Commission, be introduced into the State Duma and State Council. The consistent defenders of Finland in the Duma—the Social Democrats, the Trudoviki, and the Constitutional Democrats—registered their immediate disapproval of the bill and opposed its even going to commission for discussion. The vote, however, was for the formation of a committee.

When the bill came out from committee the next question was whether one should proceed to an article-by-article discussion. The Social Democrats said they would refuse to attend a discussion of the bill, and they put forward a proposal that: a) labeled the project illegal from the point of view of both Finnish and Russian law, and b) said that an article-by-article discussion of the bill would sanction this illegal act. In view of these two points

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would no longer be considered in force on the condition that the Finns pay a certain amount of money as monetary compensation. In April, 1905, the Finnish Diet approved the sum of 10 million marks for the year 1905, but the Russians had expected that a sum would be allotted for three years, 1905-1907, and so were not satisfied and the question remained a point of contention. Finally, in 1907 the Finnish Parliament voted to pay 20 million marks into the Russian treasury as compensation for the years 1906-1907, and this was where the issue rested when the Manifesto of October 7, 1909, was issued.

[35] Stakhovich in *Gosudarstvennyi Sovet. Stenograficheskie otchety,* sessiia 5 (October-June 1910 (Spb.: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1910), 3731.

[36] von Bonsdorff, *op. cit.,* p. 37.

the Social Democrats proposed to take the item from the Duma's agenda.[37] The Social Democratic proposal was defeated 199-116;[38] this caused the Social Democrats to announce that they could no longer participate in the proceedings, and they walked out of the Duma.[39]

The Trudoviki made it known that if it was voted to go to a discussion of the bill they would not participate in any further proceedings.[40] Miliukov, speaking on behalf of the Constitutional Democrats, the Progressive Fraction, the Polish Kolo, and the Mohammedan Fraction, said that these groups opposed attending an article-by-article discussion of the bill, but that if this was voted they would consider it their duty to remain until the end, hoping that by their presence perhaps some minor changes—although admittedly insignificant—could be effected.[41] As was expected by all, it was voted to proceed to a discussion of the bill.

Miliukov introduced two proposals designed to permit full discussion of each of the nineteen points in Section I, article II, of the bill, which listed those areas that were regarded as of Imperial importance and, consequently, were to be dealt with by State legislation.[42] When Miliukov's proposals were both voted down, he announced that the delegates in opposition would no longer take part in the proceedings. Maintaining that the aim of producing even minor changes in the bill could not be realized, Miliukov, together with the opposition, walked out of the Duma.[43]

On June 10, 1910, the final vote on the bill was taken, the outcome surprising no one. The bill was passed 164-23, and this occasioned the famous remark of Purishkevich: "finis Finlandiae!"[44] The remark indicates the tone that the Rightists took during the debates on Finland; they were interested only in destroying Finland's autonomy—using any pretext they could to achieve this end. The majority of the Octobrists cast ballots with the Right deputies, and due to the combined strength of the Center and the Right the Government's legislative project emerged victorious.

Both the Finns and the Russians acknowledged the necessity of some sort of legislation delimiting the spheres of Finnish and Imperial legislation, and if the Russians had really been desirous of effecting a solution satisfactory to both parties this could have been achieved. In a penetrating speech during the Duma debate on Finland in 1910 Maklakov said that a solution could be reached if the Russians went about it in good faith, using the figure of a man entering a house: it was not enough for a man to have the desire and the right to enter a house; he must know where the door was and should not start by smashing in the roof and the walls.[45] The reactionaries in Russia were not interested in looking for the door. They wanted to smash Finland, and they used the revolutionary movement in Finland, and other arguments, as pretexts which would enable them to achieve their end.

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[37] Duma debates, *op. cit.*, tretii sozyv, sessiia 3, chast' 4, 2393.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 2412.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 2425f.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 2418.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 2417.

[42] Some of the nineteen fields, to list just a few, were: schools; press; public meetings, associations, and societies; customs; the monetary system; railways; military service; the use of Russian in Finland; and the internal administration of Finland. Any laws promulgated on the basis of this bill repealed all conflicting laws that might exist in Finland, and article III of Section I provided that on the initiative of the Emperor changes or additions to article II could be effected, and this in effect relegated Finland to a position of a Russian province rather than an autonomous unit in the Russian Empire. For the full text of the bill, see *Prilozheniia k stenograficheskim otchetam Gosudarstvennoi Dumy*, tretii sozyv, sessiia 3 (1909-1910), vol. II (Nos. 290-438), Number 389, 53-72.

[43] Duma debates, *op. cit.*, tretii sozyv, sessiia 3, chast' 4, 2473.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 2582.

From the Duma the bill was sent to the State Council, and there, as in the Duma, a minority came out in opposition to the bill. The opposition was voiced in a more conservative and dignified atmosphere, yet criticism of the projected bill was severe. One member of the State Council voiced great anxiety over the nineteen points listing areas to be controlled exclusively by Russian legislation and stated, "I see that these points open not only a door but whole floodgates for the inundation of all Finland."[46] Furthermore, this speaker was not content with assurances that the bill would be used with caution, and he stated that everything pointed to the contrary: "Against this speaks the famous cry 'finis Finlandiae,' which came from that group which knows about the future projects of our Cabinet better than the Cabinet itself because they are conceived there."[47] The speaker continuing in this vein, the President of the State Council, Akimov, finally interrupted him to say that one can criticize but must not slander.[48]

Such opposition in the State Council was not strong enough, however, to affect the outcome of the bill. It was hastened through the State Council with no amendments and no corrections, and on June 27, 1910, the bill was approved by a standing vote.[49] On June 30, 1910, the Emperor signed it into law, and called a special session of the Finnish Parliament in order to elect deputies to the Duma and State Council and to discuss two new bills, one dealing with payments in lieu of personal military service, the other with the problem of the rights of Russian citizens in Finland.

When the Finnish Parliament met in September 1910, President Svinhufvud, with the unanimous backing of the Parliament, announced that it could not proceed to a discussion of the questions for which the special session had been called. This refusal to discuss the issues was not due to the content of the bills, however objectionable this might have been, but rather to the fact that the issues presented for discussion in the Finnish Parliament had been introduced by means considered illegal. The bill of 1910 had not received the approval of the Finnish Parliament—which was necessary for it to become law according to provisions of the 1772 Form of Government and the 1906 Law of the Diet—so this bill and all projects based on it were contrary to Finland's constitutional setup and legal procedure.[50] The position taken by the Finnish Parliament led to its dissolution; the new Parliament, elected early in the following year, was faced with the problems which had been ushered in by the law of 1910 and which constituted a further phase in Russo-Finnish relations.

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[45] *Ibid.*, p. 2134.

[46] Korvin-Milevskii in State Council debates, *op. cit.*, p. 3716.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 3719.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 3719f.

[49] From the two instances during the debate in which balloting occurred one can assume that about 145 out of the 196 members of the Council took part in the final vote, and no more than 53 voted against the bill. See *ibid.*, pp. 2210, 3969.

From an analysis of the period under discussion in this article four points stand out in particular relief; one's attention is drawn first of all to the fact that during most of the nineteenth century Finnish nationalism was not a real problem to Russia. It had been growing from the middle of the nineteenth century, but it was only under the oppressive measures started during General Bobrikov's rule and carried on through the first decade of the twentieth century, reaching a high point with the passage of the June 1910 law, that Finnish nationalism really budded and blossomed forth.

Secondly, one cannot deny that in Finland there was a Red Guard; that *Voima* did exist; and that the Finnish Activists were eagerly working for Finnish independence. However, the Red Guard did not enjoy wide popular support in Finland; in fact, it has been seen that it came into armed conflict with other elements of the population. The Activists were an even smaller group, and the more extreme features of this organization had largely disappeared by the beginning of 1907. The *Voima* Union, on the other hand, did have considerable support in certain areas of Finland, but here, too, the reports of the Russian reactionaries were exaggerated. The Finnish political parties censured the activities of all the militant elements in the Finnish population, and Finland was not at all the armed camp ready to revolt for independence that many Russians would have had one believe. One further comment should be made in this connection, and that is that the peak of the activity of the revolutionaries in Finland was during the years 1904-1906, which was an abnormal period throughout the Russian Empire—not just in Finland.

Another justifiable conclusion is that both the Finns and the Russians acknowledged the necessity of delimiting spheres of legislative jurisdiction, and if the Russian Government had really been desirous of separating local Finnish matters from those of general State importance in a manner satisfactory to both countries, an acceptable solution could have been arrived at. But this desire was lacking, and the concessions made to Finland following the events of 1905 were the result of the political crisis and the panic on the part of the Russian Government. The concessions were to be withdrawn if a suitable moment arose, and the fruit of this policy was to cause disappointment and disillusionment even among the most moderate elements of the Finnish population.

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[50] In February-March 1910 a conference of European lawyers took place in London to discuss the legal aspects of the Finnish Question, the decision reached by this group being that Finland did occupy an autonomous, but not sovereign, position in the Russian Empire, and that the approval of the Finnish Parliament was needed before changes in existing Finnish laws could be considered legal and before Russian State legislation pertaining to Finland was valid. London Conference, *op. cit.*, p. 66. European sentiment in general favored Finland, and various protests by individuals and groups outside Russia were sent to the Russian Government. But the effect on the Government of these protests is shown by Purishkevich's comment to the Duma: that a protest had just been received from tiny Holland and that this was the height of humor. He stated, "We recognize the Dutch rooster, we recognize Dutch linen, we recognize Dutch cheese, but a Dutch protest?" Never. And he proceeded to tear up the protest before the Duma deputies. Duma debates, *op. cit.*, tretii sozyv, sessiia 3, chast' 4, p. 2242.

Finally, it should be emphasized that all the Finnish political parties were striving to protect Finland's rights and autonomy, but the methods used in order to achieve this end varied considerably. The parties were uncompromising towards each other on the question of methods, and this did not meet the requirements of the situation. The ability of the Finnish Government to present a strong front *vis-à-vis* Russia was undermined by this dispute over methods, and it was further weakened by inter-party disputes on domestic issues. The inability of the Finnish political parties to work together certainly simplified the Russian task and contributed to the ease with which the law of 1910 was passed.

ORFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

THE FIRST AUSTRIAN REPUBLIC AND SOVIET HUNGARY*

by Alfred D. Low

THE MILITARY defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and of her German ally in the First World War ushered in the disintegration of the centuries-old multinational Habsburg Empire. From its ruins arose in November 1918 the new Austrian Republic and the Hungarian Republic. The preceding month the other nationalities of the old monarchy had cut their ties with the formerly dominant German-Austrians and Magyars, and had either established their own independent national states or linked their fortunes to already existing adjoining states in which their brother-nationals lived.

The new Austria began her life under the most pressing economic conditions. The new state had lost the markets for its industrial goods as well as the sources of raw materials and foodstuffs. Cut off from the other newly established and often hostile succession states, which erected high tariff barriers, her economic life was beset by staggering problems; it was further aggravated by the continuance of the Allied blockade even after the conclusion of the armistice. The dissolution of the army and growing unemployment added to the general misery and deepened the wide-spread feeling of hopelessness which had seized broad masses of the Austrian population.[1]

The Cabinet which had been formed in November was a coalition comprising Social Democrats and Christian Socials. The former, though supported by little over two fifths of the population, were the dominant partner. This was a period when propertied groups and the "bourgeois" parties had lost their traditional support in the army and police, were still overawed[2] by the revolution, and were on the defensive. The Austrian Social Democrats, as distinguished from the German and Hungarian socialists, had managed to maintain their organizational unity in face of heavy pressure from the small but vociferous group of Austrian communists and from broad masses of the working class which leaned toward radicalism. Prevailing opinion among large sections of the Austrian proletariat was sympathetic to communism—a political new-comer—and was vaguely pro-Russian.

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[1] For a full bibliography on Austria during the years 1918 and 1919, see Gulick, Charles A., *Austria from Habsburg to Hitler* (Un. Calif., 1948); also I, ch. iv.

For sources published since and cited here, see especially *Foreign Relations of the United States. Paris Peace Conference 1919,* VII (Washington, 1946); valuable as a source for Entente policy toward Austria.

The Coolidge Mission: German-Austria. *Ibid.,* XII (Washington, 1947), pp. 240-312.
The Halstead Mission: German-Austria. *Ibid.,* pp. 528-606.

[2] Schuschnigg, K. v. *My Austria* (New York, 1938), p. 46, admits that many were "intimidated"; H. Allizé, *Ma Mission à Vienne* (Mars 1919-Aout 1920) (Paris, 1933), p. 74, speaks of a "panique" in Vienna after the Soviet Republic was set up in neighboring Hungary.

It was in October 1918 that the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, established by the Compromise of 1867, was declared void by the Hungarians. The Magyar act of self-determination, however, merely stimulated the national ambition of the Rumanians, the Slovaks, and the South-Slavic peoples, and precipitated the disintegration not only of the Dual Monarchy but also of the Hungarian half of the state. On October 31st, 1918, the liberal and republican statesman Michael Károlyi, a man of title and wealth, known for his anti-German and pro-Allied sentiments, was made premier. The new Cabinet comprised many personal followers of Károlyi as well as Social Democrats.

The defeat and the dissolution of the monarchy, the secession of the formerly oppressed nationalities and the involuntary separation of several millions of Magyars, combined with the harsh treatment of the Hungarian nation and of the new Cabinet by the Allies, made people desperate; a mood aggravated by the general effects of the war. Under these circumstances the example of the Russian October Revolution and the propaganda efforts of the Russian-trained communists made a deep impression upon the shaken and agitated Hungarian people.

On March 20th, 1919, the Károlyi cabinet received from Lt. Colonel Vyx, military representative of the Allies, an ultimatum, which laid down new, and worse, lines of demarcation, taking purely Magyar districts from Hungary. Count Károlyi, having reached the bitter conclusion that Hungary had little to expect from the victorious Western democracies, resigned. The socialist ministers, without his knowledge, had entered into an agreement with Béla Kun, the imprisoned Bolshevik leader, for a union between the Social Democratic Party and the Communists. Béla Kun was made head of the new government and Commissar for Foreign Affairs.[3]

From its first day the new Soviet Republic was threatened by irreconcilable neighbors who began to undertake military preparations against her. The newly established or greatly enlarged states, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania—all beneficiaries of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy—had included within their boundaries unwilling Hungarian minorities, which were denied the right of self-determination and faced oppression. Besides, these new nations disliked and feared Bolshevism, which had now secured a base in Hungary and appeared to them as the enemy of their own national revolution. And the powerful Allies, whom they were anxious to please while the peace treaties were being drawn up in Paris, held Hungarian territory as a bait before them and left little doubt that they wished them to crush the new Soviet Republic. Under these circumstances, Austria's position in regard to Soviet Hungary was of great consequence.

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[3] For the most complete bibliography on Hungary during the years 1918 and 1919, see Téleki, Paul, *Evolution of Hungary and its Place in European History* (1923), Macartney, C. A., *Hungary and Her Successors.* The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1917-37 (London, 1937), and Deák, Francis, *Hungary and the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1942).

For other sources cited here, see:

Visit of Mr. Hugh Gibson to Countries of the Former Austro-Hungarian Empire, *Foreign Relations of the United States. Paris Peace Conference*, XII (Washington, 1947), pp. 228-39. The Coolidge Mission: Hungary. *Ibid.*, pp. 372-468. The Halstead Mission: Hungary. *Ibid.*, pp.606-634.

Memoirs of Michael Károlyi. Faith Without Illusion. Transl. by Catherine Károlyi, intro. by J. P. Taylor (London, 1956), esp. ch. 9.

Soviet Hungary's patent desire was the establishment of a Soviet Austria, which could be expected to strengthen her own position and break the hostile encirclement. The Entente's wish was that Austria should deny weapons and volunteers to Hungary, perhaps even diplomatic recognition, and refuse assistance to her in any way.[4] The maximum goal of the Entente was to complete the encirclement of Soviet Hungary, already invaded by Rumania and Czechoslovakia and threatened by Yugoslavia, perhaps to embroil Austria with the Soviet Republic by the transfer of West Hungary, and to use her, if necessary, as a military base of operations for Entente troops against Red Hungary, thus speeding her downfall.

The socialist-dominated Austrian Cabinet was the target not only of strong external, but also of powerful internal pressures that originated partly with the small Communist Party, partly with the strong leftist currents within the Social-Democratic Party itself, which had been emboldened by the recent Hungarian events.

Austria's desperate internal situation just after the establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic has been well described by a perspicacious American diplomatic observer, Professor A. C. Coolidge. Returning to Vienna after a few days of absence, he wrote on April 7th, 1919 to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris, that he had found Johann Schober, President of the Vienna police, "like almost everyone else I have seen here in a depressed state of mind." There was "a shortage of almost everything. . . . Prices are soaring ever higher. The number of unemployed is great. . . , the economic and financial situation is disastrous." His own "impressions of the situation here" were "depressing."

> There is an undoubted growth of Bolshevism. Its progress has been slow indeed—rather surprisingly so—and I do not believe it is yet either very deep-rooted or wide-spread. But for months conditions have been such as to promote its increase, and now the example of Hungary has undoubtedly given a stimulus to those who favor a similar movement here. Relations between Austria and Hungary are still close, and what happens in Budapest inevitably affects Vienna, and vice versa. Some 800 or 900 men of the *Volkswehr* have joined the Hungarians, and this will react here; and from Hungary several prominent agitators are said already to have come

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[4] Count Deym, the Austrian envoy at Kopenhagen, reported to Dr. O. Bauer that the American envoy had informed him that "the establishment of diplomatic relations" between German-Austria and Bolshevik Hungary had made "a very bad impression in official circles of the Entente and especially on Americans." (*Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv,* Wien, listed in the following as *HHSA*. Fasz. 262, Präsidialakte des Staatssekretärs Dr. Otto Bauer 1918-19, Folder ix: Ungarn, Apr. 3).

> to Vienna to begin work. If Bavaria goes Bolshevik, the situation will be blacker still.[5]

After the victory in Hungary, Soviet Russia, too, expected the further rapid expansion of communism. She already saw herself as an "immediate neighbor" of the "Hungarian comrades" and a "main avenue" laid out "for the march of communism into Central Europe."[6] Vienna had already "begun to blush" in the eyes of communist Budapest and "soon would be entirely red."[7] The Hungarian revolution was expected to strengthen the "communist movement in Austria," to "threaten" "the Austrian counterrevolution" and to "extend"[8] the Soviet base "to Austria and Southern Germany."[9]

Diplomatic observers in Austria in the spring of 1919 were agreed as to the country's precarious economic and political situation. While, in their opinion, Austria did not yet stand on the brink of the precipice, she was perilously close to it and in real danger of losing her uneasy balance. They also understood the importance, from an all-European and world-wide point of view, of halting the Bolshevik waves in Austria. "German-Austria," wrote the American Captain Dellschaft,

> is the bridge-head of Western Civilization in regard to the Orient; when the bridge-head falls, Italy, Spain, and France will be at the mercy of Bolshevism almost instantaneously.[10]

Some of the Western representatives therefore did not hesitate to bring pressure to bear upon the Austrian Government, especially after the establishment of a Soviet Republic in neighboring Hungary.

Only a few days after the Soviet Government had been set up, Cnobloch, the Austrian envoy in Budapest, who was accredited to the former government of Michael Károlyi, sent a "very secret" report to Austria's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Otto Bauer, perhaps the most prominent of the Austrian socialist leaders, concerning his meeting with the British representative in Vienna, Colonel Thomas Cunninghame, who happened to be in Budapest at that moment. Cunninghame had visited him and had assured him "repeatedly that he personally was a great friend of Austria and would do everything in his power to help German-Austria." However, he would "urgently advise [us] to abandon Hungary completely and to seek orientation toward England and America."

> Sir Cunninghame impressed upon me to present this point of view to you, and to speak also in this sense to Chancellor Dr. Renner and to

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[5] *Foreign Relations of the United States. Paris Peace Conference,* XII (Washington, 1947), 287. Professor A. C. Coolidge of Harvard University is referred to in the article "Hungary" in the *Bol'shaia Sovietskaia Entsicl.* (1951) as the "American spy Coolidge," VII, 183, sent by his government to organize the struggle against the Soviet Hungarian Republic.

[6] *Izvestiia,* April 1.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Pravda,* March 26.

[9] *Izvestiia,* March 25.

[10] *For. Rel. U.S.,* XII, 246-47, Jan. 31, 1919. The American Mission to Negotiate Peace in Paris considered Austria to be in extreme danger. In a letter of March 31st to the American Minister in Switzerland it reckoned with the possibility of the fall of the Austrian Government by the time "this letter reaches you" (XII, 281).

> Secretary of State Dr. Deutsch, since there was no hope even of obtaining food from her [Hungary]. On the other hand, the Entente would try to provide German-Austria with foodstuffs also via the Elbe."[11]

On March 22nd Cnobloch had reported Michael Károlyi's resignation and the formation of the communist-dominated government, and had asked for instructions. Otto Bauer directed the Austrian envoy by telephone to visit the Hungarian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Béla Kun, and to explain to him that German-Austria

> had always entertained the best and most friendly intentions toward the Hungarian state. These sentiments will not not undergo any change—irrespective of the internal policies of the new government. German-Austria will abstain from bringing any influence to bear upon the internal situation in Hungary; on the other hand, it will have to demand that any propagandizing and any attempt to influence our internal politics be avoided.

In regard to the possibility of a proletarian dictatorship in German-Austria, Austrian conditions were entirely different from those in Hungary. Even the most determined adherents of proletarian dictatorship had to admit that a régime such as had been set up in Hungary was bound to lead, in Austria, to a breakdown within a few days.[12]

Bauer thus deflated any hope which Béla Kun and Hungarian Bolshevism may have entertained as to the willingness of the Austrian Social Democratic Party to jump on the Soviet bandwagon. Though, in this first diplomatic message, he apparently thought it inopportune to state his ideological opposition to Bolshevism, he made clear Austria's complete dependence on the Entente due to the country's special geopolitical situation. These points were to be repeated by Otto Bauer and most of the other leaders of Austrian Social Democracy during the next months, until the Hungarian régime succumbed.[13] The latter, however, was to cling to the hope that the Austrian socialists, prodded by Austria's Communist Party and with its own cooperation so willingly proffered, might be persuaded or forced to change their views, as also Hungarian Social Democracy, under the force of circumstances, had reversed its first negative position on collaboration with the Communist Party and had cast its lot with Bolshevism.

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[11] *HHSA*, Fasz. 262, folder ix, Cnobloch, March 27, 1919. News of the anxiety of the Entente about the course of events in Hungary and of the danger of communism spreading to Austria reached Vienna not only from Budapest, but also from the Austrian envoys at Bern and Kopenhagen. "Concern of the Entente on account of the events in Hungary is on the increase" (*ibid.*, Baron de Vaux, Bern, March 28).

[12] *HHSA*, Ex 887, folder: Innere Lage in Ungarn; Cnobloch, March 22, and note of Dr. Bauer's instructions given over the telephone.

[13] The leaders of Austrian socialism repeatedly pointed out that Austria was at the mercy of the Allies, that the latter would never permit the establishment of a Soviet Republic in the very heart of Central Europe, that Austria, small and weak as she was, was rather a pawn in history than a potent force, and that sharp limits were thus set to revolutionary action in Austria. Friedrich Adler held in May 1919 that "the opportunities of the proletariat in German-Austria" were "rather modest today" ("Schicksalsschwere Entscheidung," *Der Kampf*, May 24, 1919, p. 306). In another article in the same month he wrote: "We poor German-Austrians are impotent. In these great world events we are merely an object of world history . . . we are not shoving, but are merely shoved. Our fate does not lie in our own hands, but is almost exclusively dependent on the international situation" ("Machtfragen und Formfragen," *ibid.*, May 3, 1919, pp. 242-44). The same view that Austria's future was contingent on Western decisions was expressed by R. Hilferding: "The fate of the social revolution is ultimately decided in the victorious states" ("Die Internationale," *ibid.*, Aug. 9, 1919, p. 570).

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Budapest and Vienna was a victory for Hungarian Bolshevism. None of its other neighbors nor the great Western powers extended recognition to the Soviet Hungarian régime. The recognition by the Austrian Government thus broke Hungary's diplomatic isolation and opened a window to the West. Though Soviet Hungary on this occasion pledged non-interference in Austrian affairs, she began immediately to engage in a most vigorous agitation across her borders.

First, Soviet Hungary extended her hand eastward. In a radio dispatch sent to Soviet Russia, Lenin was informed of the establishment of the "proletarian" dictatorship in Hungary and saluted as "the leader of the international proletariat." The Hungarian Government then asked for a "treaty of alliance" with Russia and requested "pertinent instructions."[14] Simultaneously, in an appeal "to all," "the Hungarian Socialist Party, as the party, even after the fusion of Social Democrats and Communists, called itself, extended its greetings to the working classes of Great Britain, France, Italy, and America, and called on them not to tolerate the "infamous campaign of their régimes against the Soviet Hungarian Government." It also appealed to the workers and peasants of Bohemia, Rumania, Serbia, and Croatia to form "an armed alliance against the boyars, estate-owners, and dynasties."[15] Finally, it called upon the workers of German-Austria and of Germany "to follow the example of the Hungarian proletariat, to make a final break with Paris and to link up with Moscow." It seemingly set its highest hopes on the proletariat of German-Austria and also of Germany, countries where defeat, just as in Hungary, had sharpened revolutionary consciousness.

Immediately after the foregoing appeal the new Soviet Government, in the name of the "Hungarian proletariat," addressed a proclamation to the Austrian working class alone:

> We appeal to you, class-conscious proletarians, not to stay aloof in this gigantic fight for our very existence . . . . Declare war against tyranny and join with us to erect jointly the true union of the proletariat of all countries. . . . Long live the Soviet Government! Long live the revolutionary German-Austrian proletariat![16]

The Executive Committee of the Austrian Workers' Councils, however, gave Béla Kun's urgent call to arms a courteous but cold reception. They seemingly agreed with Kun's thesis that "today, after the breakdown of the German and Austro-Hungarian imperialism," the Entente imperialism was the "chief enemy."[17] Replying to his appeal to follow the Hungarian example, they temporized: "We would very much like to do so, but at this moment, unfortunately, we can't." A famine for Austria would be the consequence, since the Entente probably would immediately impose a blockade: "We are convinced that the Soviet Russian Republic would leave nothing unturned to help us. But before it could assist us, we would starve." It was no doubt of little encouragement to the Hungarian Soviets that, as they were informed, the Austrian Executive Committee had "decided" to "expand the Soviet organization" within the country.

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[14] *Pravda,* March 24.

[15] *Arbeiterzeitung,* March 23.

[16] *Soziale Revolution,* March 26.

The official socialist organ, the *Arbeiterzeitung,* openly admitted the strong appeal the Soviet Hungarian Government exerted upon the Austrian working class:

> Already many an eye shines brighter, already many a heart beats faster. Is our situation not the same as that of our Hungarian brothers? Is not here—in German-Bohemia and in the Sudetenland, in South Tyrol, Carinthia and Lower Styria—German soil threatened by an insolent victor who disposes of peoples as if they were cattle?"

Yet the Austrian proletarians, the editorial develops further, were in a "much worse situation" than their brothers in Hungary:

> True, we could dethrone the bourgeoisie of our own country as easily and rapidly as they have done; a few battalions would suffice. But in regard to the Entente bourgeoisie we are chained in a manner quite different from that of the Hungarian proletariat. . . . Dictatorship of the proletariat here would be identical with a declaration of war . . . . The Hungarians advise us to separate ourselves from Paris and to link up with Moscow; but Moscow is far away, the Soviet armies are still more than 1000 km. from us, Poland and the Ukraine shut us off from every contact with them.

Requisitioning either from the rich or from the peasants would be of little if any help, and Hungary would be unable to assist Austria, since those of her areas that were rich in grain were occupied by foreign troops. "The Entente bourgeoisie holds us in chains . . . and it holds protective hands over our own bourgeoisie." Yet there was no reason to despair. In spite of everything,

> the Soviet dictatorship proves that our cause is on the march. Unrelentingly, the wave of social revolution rolls from east to west. The hour will strike when the working classes of England, France, and Italy will break the chains. . . . Today we are powerless; but when the proletariat of the Entente countries rises against their bourgeoisie, then, in alliance with it, we too shall break our chains.[18]

While identifying (perhaps only claiming to do so) the cause of Hungarian Bolshevism and of Austrian socialism as "our cause," the Austrian Social Democracy made it amply clear that it would not move toward social revolution, unless the proletariat of the Entente was also ready "to break the chains." The Austrian Social Democracy thus virtually abandoned the hope for seizing power in the foreseeable future.

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[17] *Arbeiterzeitung,* March 23.

[18] *Ibid.,* "Hungary and We".

The major political lines of the foregoing editorial of the *Arbeiterzeitung* were to remain unchanged in the following months, until the downfall of the Soviet Hungarian régime in August, 1919. The decision of the Austrian Social Democratic Party not to follow the Hungarian example had already been reached. While admiration was expressed at the "courage" of the "Hungarian brothers," the praise was ambiguous; a lack of cool judgment was implied, and questions were raised regarding the preparedness of the Hungarian working class. Nevertheless, a far-reaching identification with the objectives of the Hungarian revolution was undeniable.

In the weeks and months to come, however, the *Arbeiterzeitung* as well as the theoretical Party journal *Der Kampf* were increasingly to question the methods of the Hungarian dictatorship, to the point of rejecting them outright. They disapproved of the harshness of the régime, of the dictatorship over the proletariat itself, questioned the likelihood of ultimate success, and finally denounced the Hungarian régime for its ruthless attempts to impose its will on the Austrian people and even on the Austrian workers themselves; attempts which were in violation not only of international law and practice, but also ran counter to proletarian solidarity. While indignation occasionally burst out from the pages of the *Arbeiterzeitung*, there was, on the whole, a good deal of restraint in judging too harshly the Soviet régime; this reluctance to rebuke openly the Soviet Government was prompted by the unquestionable sympathy of the Austrian workers for what, in spite of everything, was considered a "proletarian" and "socialist" régime in neighboring Hungary, and by the refusal to stab it in the back while it warded off capitalist and imperialist invasion. Furthermore, there was a disinclination to permit even justified resentment at the interference of the Soviet Government in internal affairs to divert Austria from her precarious neutral course, which was considered imperative.

For many years prior to 1914 the Austrian socialists had striven for broad political democracy. Now that they had secured it, they were not unmindful of its values and not inclined to underestimate its significance. If dictatorship of the proletariat was not rejected outright, the concept was interpreted broadly enough as being identical with democratic rule by the majority, i.e. the industrial proletariat and allied groups, against the bourgeoisie, a mere minority of the population. Russian Bolshevism, however, was seen as a dictatorship directed not only against the majority of the population, but also against a majority of the proletariat itself, and was also spurned on this ground. Max Adler, one of the theoreticians of the dominant left wing of Austrian socialism, rejected Bolshevism—though he admitted that it was "fiery" and "dynamic"—as a kind of deviation from Marxism, and extolled the "old way of Marxism," based on "unceasing political and economic enlightenment" and on "intellectual reform," as the correct method.[19]

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[19] "Sozialismus und Kommunismus," *Der Kampf,* 1919, p. 252f.

The rejection of Bolshevik methods in Austria is also clearly revealed by Otto Bauer in his analysis of the attitude toward Bolshevism of the noted German socialist theoretician and leader, Karl Kautsky. Bolshevism and terrorism were inseparable, Bauer held. Bolshevism precluded freedom of the press and freedom of speech. Kautsky, however, had pleaded for "communism in material production," for "anarchy in intellectual production." A "sharp separation" from the Bolsheviks was imperative, especially since the "present mood of the masses" was rather averse to hostility against the Soviet Union. As Bauer remarked critically, only a few in Kautsky's own party, the U.S.D.P. in Germany, openly took his side against Bolshevism.[20]

Communist propaganda and agitation carried on across the borders of Hungary was from the outset a major goal of the new Soviet régime. Realizing how weak was the ground on which it stood, the new government saw its only way to survival in extending the narrow communist base[21] to neighboring countries, particularly to Austria. About two weeks after the establishment of the Soviet Government in Hungary, the Austrian envoy in Budapest, Cnobloch, stressed this very point in the following report to Dr. Bauer:

> The main endeavor of the Hungarian Government is directed toward leading all her neighboring states, and first of all German-Austria, toward communism. The most radical Hungarian rulers . . . avoid no sacrifice to reach their goal. Propaganda abroad is . . . the only activity in foreign policy. . . . The agitation directed against German-Austria is carried on with all means available. Agitators incessantly transmit the orders of the Party leaders to their confidants in Austria. Trains, cars, and planes, financial means, pamphlets and the Press are at their service without limit. Since the day the Soviet Hungarian Government was set up, the column 'German-Austria' has a surprisingly large spread in the papers. Hardly a day passes without detailed reports on the 'growth' of the movement.

In Hungarian communist circles it was expected that

> German-Austria will soon abandon the reactionary orientation and will completely remove the traitors to the socialist cause—among whom the names of the Chancellor and of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs are usually listed.[22]

"During recent days," reported Cnobloch on the 7th of April, "a series of declarations of an official nature" showed clearly that the most influential persons in the Soviet Hungarian Government considered "propaganda abroad" as its "most important task."

> Pogány had said: 'We must carry the revolution beyond our borders, for the social revolution can be only a world revolution!' Kunfi in the same

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[20] "Karl Kautsky und der Bolschewismus," *ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1919, pp. 664-67.

[21] The following remarks in *Izvestiia* on May 6 are most conclusive: "If the existence of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic can be secure only under conditions of a world revolutionary movement, then one may claim the same with even greater right regarding the future of Hungary and Bavaria." The public statements and activities of the Hungarian communist leaders in regard to Austria were in complete accord with the Russian analysis and policy recommendation.

[22] *HHSA*, Ex 881, Liasse Ungarn I, 3; Cnobloch, April 4.

> assembly had remarked as follows: 'If one of our neighbors quickly follows our example, then the flood of communism in today's crisis of capitalist production will spread to the entire world.'

Numerous other utterances of Béla Kun, Alexander Garbai, and Wilhelm Böhm were quoted, pointing to the same over-all interest in extending communism beyond Hungary's boundaries. Böhm had remarked that the proletarian revolution must

> 'commence its victorious march from Hungary toward the West, conquer German-Austria, Bohemia, Germany, and also penetrate the countries of the Entente.' The policy followed by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs corresponds indeed to these and numerous similar utterances.

This propaganda, for obvious reasons, was aimed first and foremost at German-Austria.

> The leading persons in the present government are firmly convinced of the success of this agitation and do not conceal that they expect the overthrow of the Government in German-Austria within the shortest time.[23]

Prior to mid-April, when a serious communist threat arose in Austria, Cnobloch sent numerous warnings to Vienna. On the 4th of April[24] he wrote that he had heard from confidential sources of a planned *Putsch* against the Austrian Government within the next fourteen days. On the 13th he reported that he had learned "from the immediate surroundings of Béla Kun"[25] that a coup was prepared in Vienna for the 16th: "The astonishing amount of travel of emissaries of the Hungarian Government which I have reported in the last days, may be connected with it." In a telephone message, which was received in Vienna ten minutes after the foregoing one, Cnobloch notified the Austrian Foreign Ministry that the Hungarian Minister of War had just submitted thirteen passports of public officials who wished to obtain visas for Austria. Among them were those of Béla Kun, Josef Pogány, Wilhelm Böhm, and Jacob Weltner; he asked for instructions as to whether the visas should be granted or refused on some technical grounds. Two days later, however, Cnobloch reported that Kun and Pogány would probably not leave for Austria.[26] For a time at least Béla Kun had thought the planned *Putsch* in Vienna of sufficient importance to consider personally taking a leading hand in the affair.

The Austrian envoy was then clearly alarmed and raised the question whether, "in view of the scope the propaganda originating here" had assumed,

> German-Austria is in the position to protect herself against the danger of a communist coup, if present close relations with Hungary (diplomatic relations, trade, travel) continued. . . . The answer to this question, in my opinion, ought not be delayed for even a single hour.[27]

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[23] *Ibid.*, April 7.

[24] *Ibid.*, Ex 262, Präsidialakte des Staatssekretärs Dr. Bauer, Folder ix, April 4.

[25] *Ibid.*, April 13.

[26] *Ibid.*, April 15.

[27] The Entente representatives in Vienna were likewise well aware of the impending

The Austrian envoy's warnings were well founded and his fears justified. On April 17th a large demonstration was called in front of the Austrian parliament on the Ringstrasse. The Parliament building was stormed and set afire. In the ensuing fighting six persons were killed and fifty-six seriously wounded. Julius Deutsch, Social-Democratic Minister of War, called out the *Volkswehr,* which, within a few hours, scattered the demonstrators and quelled the revolt. The entire Viennese press, including the rightist *Reichspost,* bestowed in the following days high praise upon the new army.[28] When the communists in the Central Workers' Council of Vienna moved for a vote expressing lack of confidence in the socialist members of the Cabinet, they were overwhelmingly defeated.

The failure of the Austrian communists in mid-April 1919 was a decisive defeat for them as well as a debacle for the communist movement in Central Europe as a whole. It came only ten days after a new Soviet Bavarian Republic had been set up in Munich. Austria was then "edged in" between Bavaria and Hungary,[29] and the Russian *Pravda* rejoiced that "the triumph of the proletarian revolution in Germany is now a question of the immediate future." Pointing to the growing communist movement in Austria, it prophesied: "Austria will now be seized by revolutionary fires from two ends; in the east from Hungary and in the west from Bavaria."[30] In this critical hour the forward march of communism in Central Europe was halted in the streets of Vienna.

It was a major achievement, since communist expansionism for a brief historic moment had attained an aura of invincibility. G. Zinoviev, first President of the Communist International, which had just been founded in March 1919, rejoiced that so soon after the "baptism" of the Third International two new Soviet Republics, namely those in Hungary and Bavaria, had joined the company of the Russian Republic:

> No one will be surprised if, at the time when these lines appear in print we shall have not three but six or an even greater number of Soviet Republics. Old Europe races toward the proletarian revolution at a mad tempo.[31]

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threat. On the 13th of April the *Neue Freie Presse* reported an interview with Colonel Cunninghame in which he warned that, if "political unrest" spread, no imports of any kind, including food, could be counted upon. Immediately after the mid-April clashes, to prevent further outbreaks, placards were posted on the walls and boards all over Vienna, quoting these words of warning (*ibid.*, April 19). From the very beginning the Entente had fully recognized the decisive importance of food in the political and social struggle in Central Europe. Herbert Hoover, addressing the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers in Paris on July 17, pointed out that only "Allied help" in sending food to Austria "had hitherto kept Austria from Bolshevism" (*For. Rel. U.S., Paris Peace Confer.*, VII, 174).

[28] *Reichspost,* Vienna, April 18: see also *Neues Wiener Tagblatt,* Apr. 19. For the effective anti-communist action of J. Deutsch in the mid-April days of 1919, see *Geschichte der Rep. Öst.*, H. Benedikt, ed., p. 53.

[29] *Neues Wiener Tagblatt,* Apr. 8.

[30] *Pravda*, Apr. 9; see also Bukharin, *ibid.*, April 11, for the Bavarian Soviet Republic and its significance.

[31] G. Zinoviev, "Perspectives of the Proletarian Revolution," *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, No. 1, May 1919, p. 38.

And Lenin, writing then in the same vein, held that there would soon be established new Soviet Republics, and in countries with a "higher culture, with greater power and influence on the part of the proletariat."[32]

The aftermath of the mid-April attempt of Austrian and Hungarian communists to seize power in Austria was a heated press campaign and a crossfire of diplomatic notes between Budapest and Vienna. "The Hungarian Government," charged the *Arbeiterzeitung*, "agitates in Vienna in the most incredible manner and insolently interferes in the internal affairs of our Republic."[33] The Hungarian Government, on the other hand, to blunt Austria's accusation, raised spurious charges of its own against the German-Austrian embassy in Budapest; it also accused the Austrian Government of supporting the Hungarian counterrevolution from Austrian soil and of publishing in the Austrian press unfriendly and hostile articles about the Soviet Government.[34] These charges were rejected by the Austrian Government as "unjustified and unproven."[35] The government, it was pointed out, which had helped to overthrow "the Habsburg dynasty and had banished it from the country," was not giving help to a party that had come out "for the restoration of the Habsburg throne and the power of the aristocracy"; it was not supporting "any counterrevolutionary machinations against the present Hungarian governmental system." The Austrian Government raised the countercharge that the Soviet régime meddled on "German-Austrian soil," using "considerable means" and "organs of the state" in its surreptitious schemes. To settle all outstanding disputes between the two countries, the Austrian Government suggested that these be submitted to an arbitration tribunal, declaring itself willing to turn over to it documents which would prove "that the Soviet Hungarian Government has interfered in the internal affairs of German-Austria in a manner violating international law."

After the setback in Vienna in mid-April, the Hungarian communists directed their eyes toward the next promising target, namely May 1st. Huge demonstrations were expected on that day, which usually had brought proletarian masses onto the streets. Communist plans for this day were well developed.[36] On the third of May, Cnobloch reported having obtained a document signed by one Silbermann, dated April 16, 1919, which bared the plans the communists had entertained for May 1st; it also showed Austrian communist agents working not only hand in glove with the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, but actually sending their orders to their Viennese comrades from a bureau of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry itself. The "interesting" document is signed by Silbermann, who calls himself "the deputy at the Hungarian Secretariat of Foreign Affairs." The document carries the designation "Command No. 19" and reads as follows:

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[32] V. Lenin, "The Third International, Its Place in History," *ibid.*, p. 32f.

[33] *Arbeiterzeitung,* Apr. 2.

[34] *Ibid.*, Apr. 22 and 24.

[35] *Ibid.*, April 26. While these and similar charges were unfounded and while there can be little doubt about the aggressiveness of Soviet Hungary against the Austrian Republic, it appears that some Hungarians were plotting against Hungarian Bolshevism on Austrian soil to rid their country of what they considered a deadly menace. In a letter to Dr. Renner in early May Dr. Bauer pleaded with him "urgently" to "move energetically against the here existing Counter-Revolution. . . . We can not permit that under our régime Vienna become a Hungarian Coblenz." (*HHSA*, Fasz. 262, Präsidialakte. . . folder IX). See also Dr. Bauer's letter to Schober (May 11). On the 24th of July Schober reported that in the printing establishment of the *Reichspost* handbills were printed calling on the Hungarian people to overthrow the Soviet régime (*HHSA,* Ex 881, Ungarn I-9).

[36] In a talk on April 30th with Cnobloch, Béla Kun asserted that "in his opinion the 1st of May would be quiet here [in Budapest] and in Vienna, but he could not be equally certain in regard to the 2nd of May." He voiced confidence regarding the "impending victory of the communist idea in neighboring countries" (*HHSA*, Ex 887, folder: Innere

> I order hereby that from Wednesday to Thursday, the first of May, the entire forces of the *Volkswehr* and *Stadtschutz* [city police] are to be taken over. Between 1 A.M. and 5 A.M. placards are to be posted in all 21 districts, including Kagran and Jedlersee, and one must proceed in accordance with commands 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The Landesgericht and Bezirksgericht [Court of the State and of the District] are to be transformed at once into revolutionary tribunals.

On the back of this document appears Command No. 20 of the Headquarters of the Communist Party, Vienna I., Stubenring No. 2, 30th of this month [April]: "It is hereby ordered that all current activities are to be postponed until further notice."[37] The collusion between the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and the leadership of the Austrian Communist Party emerges beyond doubt; the extent of their preparations for the *coup* on May 1st is well illustrated by the foregoing document.

Even the improvement of the military situation of Soviet Hungary during the month of May did not change the view of the Austrian Social Democratic Party that the high tide of communism in Central Europe and in Austria had been passed. Otto Bauer's instructions of May 27 to Cnobloch reveal clearly that the Austrian Government's fear of an internal communist *coup*, in combination with a move by the Hungarian Government and Hungarian troops, had diminished. The German-Austrian Government, the Austrian Secretariat explained, had no interest in an early overthrow of the Soviet Government: "1) Our chances in the West-Hungarian question are more favorable *vis-à-vis* Soviet Hungary than *vis-à-vis* a Hungary which is actually ruled by a government oriented toward the Entente."[38] As long

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Lage in Ungarn). See also Cnobloch's telephone message to Vienna, April 29: "In Hungarian government circles the most far-reaching hopes are fixed on May 1st. . . . If the expectations especially in regard to Vienna and Prague turn out to be vain, then the present régime will indeed fade away" (*ibid.*).

[37] *Ibid.*, Ex 881, Liasse Ungarn I/3.

[38] *Ibid.*, Präsidialakte, folder ix, Bauer, May 27. That Austria's "diplomatic situation" in relation to the West was "very favorable" after the Hungarian Soviet régime was set up—"provided the movement does not spread to Austria"—was pointed out to the Austrian Foreign Ministry by Baron de Vaux, Austria's envoy in Bern, then a center of diplomatic activities (*ibid.*, Fasz. 262, folder ix, March 28). The Austrian Government, according to Allizé, French envoy in Vienna (*op. cit.*, 78), realized fully that the Bolshevik *coup* in Hungary had improved its bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the Entente. Serious as the danger of Bolshevism was in Austria in 1919, the Austrian Government tended to maximize the peril to obtain help from the Entente not only in terms of food supplies, but also better peace terms. Chancellor Dr. Karl Renner revealed to Captain N. Roosevelt that the Austrian Government had already decided to resign, "just as the Károlyi Government in Hungary had done," if German Bohemia and German-inhabited South Tyrol should be

as Soviet Hungary existed, the Entente would look more favorably upon various Austrian requests and also would not enforce a solution to Austria's economic and political problems opposed by a great majority of her population. The Entente might be more willing to give largely German-inhabited West Hungary to Austria. It would, without Hungary, be unable to establish a Danubian Confederation—supported by many in the West, but opposed, among others, by the Austrian Social Democracy, which ardently desired *Anschluss* with the then socialist-ruled German Republic.[39] Otto Bauer continued,

> 2) The overthrow of the Soviet Government would make it easier for the Entente to force us into a Danubian Federation and thereby not only make the *Anschluss* impossible for the moment, but also make it more difficult later on.

If, however, the Soviet Government were to be overthrown "after the conclusion of our peace treaty," the Austrian Social Democracy would maintain "a free hand to regulate our relations" with Germany "in accordance with our wishes."

> 3) The overthrow of the Soviet Hungarian Government would bring to power none but a counterrevolutionary movement in German-Austria and would conjure up the danger of civil war. . . . The Soviet dictatorship in Hungary no longer constitutes a danger to the existence of the present German-Austrian Government. . . . The communist wave has ebbed.

Yet, contrary to Otto Bauer's view, the communist tide had returned by mid-June.

After the failure of the communist *coup* in Vienna in mid-April, the Austrian communists had set the stage for another and more carefully planned *Putsch*. The preparation for it originated again in Budapest. In May 1919 Béla Kun sent a Dr. Bettelheim as representative of the Soviet Hungarian Republic to Vienna.[40] Bettelheim dissolved the Executive of the Austrian Communist Party and succeeded in wresting the leadership from the Austrian communists. He set up a secret "directorate" and laid his plans for a communist seizure of power. Though the communists had no military

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taken from Austria, and "to turn the government over to whoever would take it. He added that this would mean inevitably Bolshevism" (*For. Rel. U.S. Paris Peace Confer.*, XII, 282). Professor A. C. Coolidge interpreted this utterance of the Austrian Chancellor as a "direct threat" (282). In the end Austria neither retained German Bohemia nor South Tyrol, yet the Government did not surrender power to any communist party, either foreign or domestic.

[39] The Paris Peace Conference was to prohibit the *Anschluss*, but assigned West Hungary to Austria.

[40] For Bettelheim, see O. Bauer, *Die österr. Revolution*, (Vienna, 1923), pp. 138-42; also K. Radek, "History of a Coup which Failed," *Komm. Internatsional*, 1920, No. 9, 1257-88; W. Böhm, *Im Kreuzfeuer zweier Revolutionen* (Munich, 1924), like Radek, asserts that Bettelheim, who was considered in Vienna as an emissary of the Third International, had no Russian mandate. According to Böhm, he also had been given no assignment by Béla Kun (449). Böhm's account, however, of Bettelheim's role in Vienna contains some contradictions. He admits for instance that Kun "recalled" Bettelheim, but that he "refused to obey the command" (499). Also, according to Böhm, Kun late in July desired that Bettelheim turn over to the Austrian Communist Party 400,000 kronen, a sum which, no doubt, he had previously received from Budapest! See also J. Schober on Bettelheim, *HHSA*, Ex 262, Präsidialakte, folder IX, July 5 and 9.

force of their own, they had a following in some units of Austria's new army, the *Volkswehr.*

When the Entente demanded that the *Volkswehr* be reduced by 25% by June 15, the communists seized immediately upon this issue and caused serious embarrassment to the Austrian Government. A reduction of the forces of the *Volkswehr* was not only opposed by those to be dismissed, but was bound to have a most harmful effect upon the morale of the entire army. It was also disliked by the workers, who looked upon the *Volkswehr* in which proletarian and socialist influence then prevailed, as the guarantee of their newly won position in the Austrian Republic. An assembly of the Viennese Soldiers' Councils revealed the tremendous appeal of the communist position in this matter when 71 votes were cast for the communists as against 174 votes for the socialists, reducing considerably the usually overwhelming majority of the Social Democratic Party.

After socialist members of the Austrian Cabinet had learned of communist plans involving the occupation of Austro-Hungarian frontier regions by Hungarian troops simultaneously with internal seizure of power by the Austrian communists, they made, on June 12th, urgent presentations to the Entente regarding the reduction of the *Volkswehr;* the Entente finally reversed its position, but the momentum of the communist-inspired protest movement could not be halted any longer. On June 13th, in a session of the Workers' Councils of Vienna, Friedrich Adler demanded that the Austrian communists bare their plans for the following Sunday, June 15th.[41] The Council simultaneously denounced the "small groups" which "under cover of anonymity" were openly preparing a *coup.* The communists, on the other hand, appealed once more to the soldiers and again demanded a dictatorship of the Workers' Councils, again with no avail.

While Béla Kun's emissary was plotting in Vienna, Kun himself, directing Hungarian "foreign policy" from Budapest, engaged in several manoeuvers which were all designed to distract attention from the scheming of his agents in the Austrian capital. On June 11th Kun sent a telegram to the Council of the Arsenal in Vienna in which he called on the workers to prevent ammunition produced at the munitions factory in Wöllersdorf from being shipped to the Czech border for use, as he claimed to know, against Hungarian Red troops.[42] At the same time he sent a note to Otto Bauer protesting that Hungarian White Guards were gathering at Steinbrück on Austrian soil for the invasion of Hungary. After the demonstration of the Vienna *Volkswehr* against the threatened demobilization he had sent a telegram to its command expressing "deep sympathy" for their "heroic struggle against the impudent attempt of the bourgeoisie to wrest the weapons from your hands. . . . The later the proletariat seizes power and begins to transform society. . . . the more difficult will the transformation to socialism be for you." He also dispatched a telegram to the Austrian Communist Party congratulating it on "yesterday's demonstration" and its "work of enlightenment," but at the same time prodding it: "The demonstration is a promising beginning which can be developed further. It is in your power to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat without bloodshed. No return is possible."[43]

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[41] *Arbeiterzeitung,* June 14.

[42] *Soziale Revolution,* June 12.

Literally at the last hour the Austrian Social-Democratic leaders decided not to await the impending blow, but to strike first. Eldersch, socialist Secretary of State for Interior Affairs, ordered the arrest of 115 leaders of the Communist Party during the night of June 14 to 15. At dusk of June 15th *Volkswehr* units had occupied the Inner City at the order of Julius Deutsch. The communist 41st battalion had been confined to its barracks and orders had been given to prevent it, if necessary by force, from leaving its quarters. In spite of all these precautionary measures, bloodshed was not avoided. Five thousand men attempted to storm police headquarters; twenty people were killed in the attack.

In a bitter denunciation of the Communist Party, the editorial of the *Arbeiterzeitung* of June 16 levelled heavy accusations against it. The communist Committee of Four had appealed to the soldiers to participate in the demonstration "with weapon in your hand"; it had dared "to seize that power which the working class, in whose behalf they claimed it, had denied them."[44]

While officially a war of diplomatic notes raged between Vienna and Budapest, the Austrian Foreign Secretary, Otto Bauer, the day after the turbulent events in Vienna, on June 16th, penned the following half private, half official, letter to Béla Kun.[45] In calm language, in contrast with the sharp and bitter tone of the published exchange of diplomatic notes, and without any recrimination, Béla Kun and the Soviet Government were clearly informed of the determination of the Austrian Social Democratic Party to oppose any extension of Bolshevism to Austria:

> Dear Comrade! I would be very pleased to make your acquaintance, in order to be able to consult with you in a historically decisive moment. Unfortunately, weighty considerations militate against it at this time. Our meeting could not remain secret, its importance would be vastly exaggerated by the Press here and abroad, and the Entente Press would point to it as proof that the alleged conspiracy between Berlin and Vienna, Budapest and Moscow existed indeed. This, at the moment, would have dangerous repercussions for German-Austria and would

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[43] *Ibid.;* then Béla Kun sent the following telegram to the Viennese communist directorate: "I have prepared everything. Shrewdly and courageously forward! Life or death depends on the outcome" (quoted by O. Bauer, *Die öst. Revolution,* 140).

[44] *Arbeiterzeitung,* June 16. The communist *Soziale Revolution* denied any responsibility for the clashes in mid-June: the communists had "never plotted any *Putsch.*" Yet at the same time it wrote thus about the demonstration which had led to violence: "Of course, what the will of the proletariat would be, that the proletariat would demand a Soviet Republic, that we knew" (June 18). For how close Austrian communism came to seizing power in mid-June, see the *Neue Freie Presse of* June 17: "Yesterday the dictators of Hungary almost became the rulers of German-Austria also."

[45] *HHSA,* Fasz. 262, Präsidialakte, Folder IX, ixb "Ungarn und Varia," June 16.

> probably be countered by the Czechs with hostilities[46] that now would be fraught with danger to us. I must therefore regretfuly decline your suggestion to meet you, much as I myself would like to do so.

However, Bauer promised to send his "friend Danneberg in my stead" and voiced the hope that "the purpose of mutual information" might be accomplished this way. He went on to give Béla Kun his "personal view" of the present situation, confining himself

> to presenting to you the facts; I shall leave it to you to draw conclusions from them.
>
> First of all about our situation in German-Austria: I consider dictatorship of the proletariat in our country impossible at the present stage.[47] And for the following reasons: 1) German-Austria is no state, but a very loose agglomeration of provinces . . .;[48] socially thoroughly different from

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[46] For Austrian fears of an occupation of the country by Czech troops, see *Neue Freie Presse*, Apr. 19. The possibility of Austria's occupation by the Czechs is often mentioned in different connections. H. Allizé, *op. cit.* pp. 73-84, warned the Austrian Government that setting up a Soviet régime in Austria would bring about Czech occupation of the country. Actually, Austria in 1919 feared not only a Czechoslovak invasion, but also, especially in the spring, a Hungarian attack; the occupation of Austria by Allied troops likewise seemed to Austrians at times by no means a distant possibility. Dr. Karl Renner, soon after the Hungarian *coup* in Budapest, warned that an occupation of Austria by "Allied troops" for the purpose of preventing Bolshevism would likely have an effect opposite from that intended, since it would arouse the Austrian working class and drive it into the arms of radicalism (*For. Rel. U.S. Peace Confer.*, XII, 282); see also *HHSA*, Ex 881, Ungarn I/10, Heerwesen an Bauer, June 20. On the other hand, Johann Schober, President of the police in Vienna, was merely one of many who favored occupation of the country, "though in as disguised a form as possible" (*ibid.*, 286, April 7).

[47] An examination of the position of O. Bauer as well as of the entire Austrian Social Democratic Party in regard to political democracy and dictatorship of the proletariat in 1918-19 reveals that, though lip-service was paid to radicalism, proletarian dictatorship was interpreted broadly enough not to exclude political democracy. Nevertheless, the concept of proletarian dictatorship repelled many genuine democrats, especially since the Austrian Social Democracy, though opposing Bolshevism internally, did not seem clearly to repudiate the Soviet Government in Hungary, and also appeared to object to it on Austrian soil largely for opportunistic-tactical reasons, only "at the present stage." The *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* pointed correctly to the circumstance that Austrian socialism, judging by the utterances of its leaders, seemed theoretically not to oppose a Soviet régime in Austria as such, but objected merely to the particular moment which the Hungarians had chosen as ill-timed and inopportune (June 16). Actually, Austrian socialism opposed Bolshevism in all its major aspects; the pressure from the Left, however, was so strong that the Social Democratic Party, at least verbally, had to appease it. In this connection the evaluation by A. Halstead, though not always an unbiased observer of the Austrian scene (*For. Rel.*, XII, 538), of the position and the outlook of the Austrian Social Democratic Party and of Otto Bauer in particular merits attention. He reported to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris that Dr. Bauer "in his expressions of opinion" had "shown his disagreement with communism. and in the talks I had with him there was no sign of even a theoretical sympathy with communism" (*ibid.*, 533), and he discarded therefore the opinions of those who had charged that Dr. Bauer and Dr. Deutsch were "really communists" as "manifestly" "unfriendly views." On Dr. Bauer, see also pp. 532, 544, and especially p. 548. Likewise, for the impression of theoretical, and a good deal of practical, radicalism, but opposition to Bolshevism on the part of another influential socialist. Friedrich Austerlitz, editor of the *Arbeiterzeitung*, see Captain Nicholas Roosevelt, *For. Rel. U. S.*, XII 529f., and 291.

[48] During the years 1918-19 strong separatist forces were at work in Austria, especially in Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and Salzburg. For separatist trends in some of the Austrian Länder, see A. Halstead's Memorandum of July 16, 1919, to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace (*For. Rel. U. S. Paris Peace Confer.*, XII, 543). As late as December 1919 Halstead held that the "separatist trend" was "growing" in Austria (605).

> Vienna, they hate Vienna and daily toy with the idea of tearing themselves away from the metropolis upon which the power of the proletariat rests and which deprives them of their food. The power of the workers in the provinces, in which there are few towns, is by no means large enough to overcome these centrifugal tendencies. It is the less so, since even the working class has the inclination to prevent the exportation of food surplus to Vienna and the bent to come itself under the influence of particularist tendencies. . . . Therefore, the proclamation of a Soviet dictatorship would, in all likelihood, lead to the immediate separation from Vienna of the overwhelmingly peasant-inhabited, therefore clerico-agrarian provinces . . . the authority of the proletarian government would be confined to Vienna, the industrial area of Wr. Neustadt and upper Styria; thus the provisioning of this area would be literally impossible, and under the pressure of hunger the dictatorship would succumb within the shortest time.
>
> 2) The feeding of Vienna and of the industrial regions depends on imports from the Entente. The Entente, however, would stop them simply for the reason that it would look upon Bolshevik German-Austria as not being a fair risk. The mere stoppage of food imports would result in dire starvation. Simultaneously, coal imports from Czechoslovakia and from Poland would be discontinued, gas and electricity works and all factories would have to close down immediately. After a few days even coal for home and kitchen would be lacking. The masses, literally threatened by death from hunger and starvation, would rise against the dictatorship.
>
> 3) Our military situation *vis-à-vis* the Entente is an entirely different one from that of Hungary. The Entente cannot submit to being barred via Vienna from Czechoslovakia and Poland, since its entire power structure would then crumble. Vienna is for the Entente an incomparably more important post than Budapest.[49] In addition, it also would be much easier for the Entente to suppress us than Hungary. It would leave us no time to organize a Red Army, but would occupy us first. . . . Militarily this would be very easy. Italians have occupied Tyrol and Carinthia . . . within a few days they could move several brigades to Vienna. The Czechs are only one hour by express train from Vienna, and a glance at the railway net shows that an operation against Vienna would be for them an incomparably easier task than any operation in Slovakia.[50] In the entire operation, surely, no more than three divisions would be required; Czechs and Italians between themselves could assemble as many troops without difficulty. Italian troops are ready to move.

And Italy would be "inclined," "because it generally is part of her plans to make German-Austria an area of economic exploitation." Therefore it was

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[49] This very point had been made to Dr. Bauer and the Austrian Government by Colonel Cunninghame at the climax of the April crisis: "Austria and especially Vienna," Cunninghame was quoted as having said, "occupy a position quite different from Hungary, mainly on account of the international importance of the great railroad center Vienna over which not only Austria and Hungary, but also countries allied with the Entente must be provided." (*Neue Freie Presse,* Abendblatt, April 18). The warning was unmistakable.

[50] Bauer refers to the fighting between Czechs and Hungarians in and over Slovakia, where the latter, temporarily, had scored impressive gains.

"most likely" that a Soviet dictatorship in Austria would entail "occupation" by foreign powers.

> Under these circumstances I believe that it is our duty to avoid an adventure which very soon would end in defeat and in complete disarmament of the proletariat. Our duty, it rather appears to me, is to wait, to preserve the strength and resources of the proletariat until the further course of events makes the chances of a determined undertaking appear more favorable.

Bauer, then turning to a discussion of various alternatives in Europe and the world at large, points to the crucial importance of the impending decision of the German nation concerning the Versailles Peace Treaty for the fate of the revolution in Central Europe. Until then,

> we, in small countries, can't do anything but preserve our fighting capacities. . . . The events in Hungary I consider with the greatest sympathy. Every counterrevolution in Hungary would be the greatest threat to us, as vice versa a victory of the counterrevolution here or an occupation of our country by foreign troops would make Austria a base of attack against Hungary. This connection between our destinies establishes between us a far-reaching solidarity of interests, in spite of all differences of views and tactics, which in my opinion originate in differences of the economic and military situation. . . . I hope that this exposition of my views will not be without interest to you. With best greetings. . . .

That Dr. Bauer minimized the differences between Austrian socialism and Hungarian Bolshevism as being merely "tactical" ones may hardly have satisfied Béla Kun. The same may be said of Bauer's final assurance to Kun of a "far-reaching solidarity of interests" between Hungary and Austria, since such "solidarity" was rooted rather in geopolitics and history, the comradeship-in-arms of the last war, and not in the adoption of the communist course in Austria. Soviet Hungary is reminded that an occupation of Austria—the likely result of a Bolshevik *coup* in the country—would endanger Soviet Hungary's own military situation.

It appears that Soviet Hungary and the Austrian Communist Party were not discouraged by the failure of the mid-June *coup*, but were ready to stage a quick come-back. On the 19th of June Cunninghame informed an Austrian liaison officer of the name of Seiller that he had learned from "the very best source" that on the 17th of June in the Vienna Hungarian Embassy at the order of Budapest an action plan had been agreed upon for the immediate future:

> The offensive against Pressburg would at the moment be stopped, yet the attempt be made to effect a Bolshevik *coup* in Vienna through combined action from without and within, to obtain this way not only a new ally and a new base of operation against Pressburg, but also . . . the rich financial means in Vienna.

The new communist *Putsch*, in combination with simultaneous Red Army moves against Feldbach, Wr. Neustadt, and Bruck a.d.Mur, was planned between June 24 and 26, and "the Hungarians hoped that the German-Austrian forces would be no match for this twofold surprise move."

Cunninghame drew attention to the fact that this information ought to be taken "most seriously" and requested to be notified

> as soon as possible whether the German-Austrian government believed itself able to prevent the realization of this plan with its own forces or whether it needed support from the Entente, since, if necessary, he would have to request immediately . . . speediest dispatch of these troops.

The Austrian Government let Cunninghame know that

> an immediate move of Entente troops was not necessary at the moment[!] . . . we could defend ourselves with our own forces the better, since in case of an actual invasion of Austria by Hungary we could surely count upon the *Volkswehr* and, beyond it, upon the resistance of the entire German-Austrian people. . . . Cunninghame accepted this communication with evident content and said that if we knew how to ward off Bolshevism with our own[!] forces, this would considerably strengthen our position with the Entente.[51]

The conference of the Austrian Soviets in late June and early July brought new disappointment to the Austrian Communist Party and Soviet Hungary. The communist paper *Soziale Revolution* criticized the position of the Austrian Soviets, which was then largely identical with that of the Social Democratic Party, as one of "waiting first for the revolution in the countries of the Entente."[52] Special regret was expressed on account of the position of Friedrich Adler, the son of Viktor Adler, long the leading figure in Austrian socialism. In 1916 Friedrich Adler had assassinated the Austrian Prime Minister Count Stürkgh in protest against the war and Austrian war policy and had thus gained an unusual reputation among Austria's revolutionary workers. The editorial of the communist paper lamented that Friedrich Adler "who had the talent to become the Lenin of Austria, has become her Noske."[53]

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[51] *HHSA*, Ex 881, Ungarn I/10, folder: Truppenkonzentrationen an der westungarischen Grenze, Report June 20. These reports were taken most seriously by the Austrian Government; see especially the letter of J. Schober of June 20 and that of J. Deutsch of June 21 to Dr. Bauer, *ibid.* While the Austrian Government after mid-June showed growing confidence in its ability to resist any *coup* by Hungarian or Austrian communism, the Entente in July seemed at times genuinely alarmed over the peril to Austria. On July 5th, Herbert Hoover, addressing the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers in Paris, warned that "the next probable victim" of Hungary "was Austria" (*For. Rel. U.S.*, VII, 21); a few days before, in a note to Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, he had pointed to the danger of the "disorganization of German-Austria" (*ibid.*, 30) in consequence of the Hungarian developments. On July 9th, Lansing in Paris echoed this warning when he stated his belief that "Bolshevism would spread to Austria, if it appeared to be successful in Hungary." Balfour too held then that "at the present time Vienna was in danger" (24), and the French General Pellé, then military commander of the Czechoslovak troops, in a letter of July 8th, warned of Hungarian Bolshevik goals of seizing Vienna (115). Since it was in the month of July that the powers in Paris considered seriously military intervention against Hungary (see especially *U. S. For. Rel.*, vol. VII, which contains rich evidence in this respect), the conclusion that they may have been inclined to magnify the danger to Austria, real though it was, in order to justify a possible military intervention, cannot be entirely disregarded.

[52] *Soziale Revolution*, June 28.

[53] *Ibid.;* the Austrian Communist Party had actually offered Friedrich Adler the headship of the Party; however, he rejected it to their bitter disappointment (see the account of Gruber, the Austrian representative at the founding Congress of he Comintern, *Der*

When, in the month of July, the situation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic rapidly deteriorated, the Communist International called for a general strike on a world scale for July 21st. The cry for help was also echoed in the Vienna communist press.[54] The last-minute appeal of "Soviet Hungary to the Proletariat of All Countries" sounded the same note: "The liberated but still suffering proletariat" of Hungary "addresses to you its fraternal word." There is "only one kind of internationalism, that of revolutionary action."[55] The message was unmistakably clear.

The Social Democratic Party thus feared that the demonstration of July 21st might be steered by the communists into their own waters. In an appeal of July 18th the socialists announced that the local Councils would decide whether the planned demonstrations were to take place Sunday or Monday, thus opening the door for demonstrations on a day other than that already designated by the Austrian communists and the Communist International. The Austrian workers were warned that any "link-up" of the demonstration "with other demands" was likely to diminish its "real purpose."[56] On the occasion of the District Workers' Council in Vienna, Friedrich Adler remarked:

> In past days the communists have believed that when the new harvest began they would be able to set up the Soviet dictatorship in German-Austria. We are agreed that on the 21st of July the Soviet dictatorship will not be proclaimed.[57]

On Sunday, the 20th of July, in a page-long appeal in the *Arbeiterzeitung* the workers were called on to demonstrate for "international solidarity" as well as against "rapacious imperialism, exploiting capitalism, against the intrigues of the counterrevolution," but, at the same time, they were admonished to carry out the demonstration in all "quiet and dignity."[58]

The appeal of the Communist International to the workers of Europe fell upon deaf ears; the international strike, the Executive Committee of the Comintern admitted in its public statement of July 24th, had failed.[59] G. Zinoviev charged subsequently that the socialists, having taken control of the strike movement, had throttled it.[60]

The publication of the Austrian peace terms of St. Germain in late July was taken as another last-minute opportunity of appealing to the Austrian proletariat's not only revolutionary but also patriotic sentiments to estab-

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erste Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale (Hamburg, 1921), pp. 99-105; also F. Adler's presentation in *Der Kampf,* Dec. 13, 1919, and *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional,* No. 4, 1919, 521-24 and No. 5, 671f.).

[54] *Soziale Revolution,* July 9.

[55] *Ibid.,* July 19.

[56] *Arbeiterzeitung,* July 18.

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] *Ibid.,* July 20; F. Adler, "Dokumente zur Geschichte des 15. Juni," *Der Kampf,* Oct. 4, 1919: "It is necessary to establish clearly that the communists planned coups not only for June 15th, but also for July 21st." For some communist preparations for July 21st, see the report of J. Schober to O. Bauer, July 9. *HHSA,* Fasz. 262, Präsidialakte.

[59] *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional,* No. 3, 1919, p. 553f.

[60] "Zwei Daten," *Komm. Internationale,* No. 2, 1919, pp. 437-46.

lish a Soviet Republic; a Soviet Austria, of course, would deflect the deathblow from Hungary. The acceptance of the peace terms would be "suicide" for the Austrian proletariat. The "only salvation is a Soviet government."[61] Countering the argument that the Entente might meet a rejection of the peace terms by the Austrian Government with the occupation of the country, the communist *Die Rote Fahne* asserted that "occupation" threatened in any case. "But an occupation after a struggle for a proletarian republic" would make quite a different impression upon the French, English, Italian, and American proletariat.[62] Even the Communist Party had reached the conclusion that a challenge of the West was a rather futile gesture, but apparently considered it heroic and in accordance at least with the long-range "proletarian" interest; with the interest of the world proletariat, if not with that of Austria proper. Though saving the Soviet Hungarian Republic was the primary motive in the desperate attempts of Austrian communism to rouse the proletariat to battle in late July, not even the promise was held out that effective action on the part of the Austrian working class could still save Soviet Hungary. It was merely pointed out that the acceptance of the "murderous peace of St. Germain" would render the German-Austrian proletariat "helpless." The peace was also designed, it was charged with reference to disputed West Hungary, to arouse the Austrian proletariat to the attack against the Hungarian brethren under the deceiving slogan of national self-determination.

> We communists recognize only the self-determination of the proletariat. . . . The peace, acceptance of which would lead to the enslavement and colonization of Austria, merely aimed at erecting a Western wall of the powerless vassal states of Wilson—consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria

and at "strangling the Russian and Hungarian Soviet Republics."[63]

Russian and Hungarian communism, threatened by the hostile Western powers, looked then on Austria and Germany, defeated countries and humiliated by the victors, as especially promising targets; it hoped that a repetition of Allied political blunders, such as had been committed already in Hungary and had prompted Károlyi's resignation and the Bolshevik seizure of power, might drive these vanquished nations in despair into the arms of communism. This explains the special commiseration shown in communist publications for Austria and Germany[64] and the fury with which the Bolsheviks attacked the peace treaties.

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[61] *Rote Fahne,* July 26.

[62] *Ibid.,* July 31.

[63] *Ibid.*

[64] On the occasion of the publication of the peace treaties the Soviet Russian press exhibited special solicitude for the defeated nations such as Germany and Austria (*Pravda,* May 13). The peace would be a "symbol of enslavement for the German and Austrian proletariat" (*Izvestiia,* May 16). A study of the views of the Russian press on the international situation in 1918-19 shows that great hopes were fixed upon the victory of communism in the vanquished Central European nations. (A. D. Low, *Austria between Two Soviet Republics. In the Mirror of the Russian Press of 1919.* [Unpublished Essay. The Russian Institute, Columbia University, 1956], pp. 45-48). The "Theses on the

Just as the Soviet Russian régime from the very beginning had been beset with doubts as to its capacity for survival, so the Soviet régime in Hungary was plagued by similar uncertainties. Its geographic isolation, encirclement by hostile neighbors, and military vulnerability, made its survival doubtful, especially when the promised and hoped-for Russian military assistance was not forthcoming. The short-lived military successes of the Soviet Hungarian régime did not remove the cloud of doubt even from the mind of the Hungarian communist leaders.

For some time negotiations had been going on for the purpose of replacing the Hungarian Soviet Government with a trade-unionist and socialist one, but one excluding communists, a government considered likely to be acceptable to the Western powers and one with which peace could be concluded. In these negotiations representatives of the Western powers, among them especially Colonel Cunninghame, head of the British mission in Vienna, Wilhelm Böhm, leading Social Democrat, former Commander of the Hungarian Red Army, and since mid-July Hungarian envoy in Vienna, as well as Hungarian trade-union and socialist leaders, and also Dr. Otto Bauer, Austria's foreign secretary, figured prominently. Most of these negotiations took place with the full knowledge of the entire Hungarian Cabinet and of Béla Kun himself.

On June 2nd Colonel Cunninghame visited Dr. Bauer and told him that the representatives of the Budapest trade unions, the metal workers' union and others, had approached Captain Freeman, the English representative in Budapest, asking him

> whether the Entente would recognize a government formed by the leaders of the trade unions and whether the Western powers would then lift the blockade and conclude peace with Hungary. . . . Their intervention had, as it appears, been made with the knowledge of Béla Kun. This is the more astonishing since the military situation of Hungary is excellent.[65]

Colonel Cunninghame, informing Dr. Bauer of the recent talks concerning the formation of a new Hungarian government, apparently believed that the Austrian Foreign Secretary might be interested in bringing about a change in the Hungarian Cabinet, which would benefit Austria and also correspond to the political interests of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. Bauer and the Austrian socialists could be expected to welcome the transformation of the Bolshevist régime into one led by Hungarian trade-union leaders and Social Democrats.[66] Such a government in Hungary would not only remove communist adventurism in a neighboring country and thus prevent Bolshevik flames from spreading into Austria, but would also

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International Situation and the Policy of the Entente," adopted by the founding congress of the Comintern in March 1919, also commiserated especially the "defeated nations," which were the object of a "continuous campaign of hate in the Entente press"; the Entente's policy "condemned to death the people of Germany and of Austria" (*Kommun. Internatsional,* No. 1, May 1919, p. 113).

[65] *HHSA,* Fasz. 262, Präsidialakte. . . , folder IX, ixb, note of June 3.

[66] Böhm, *op. cit.,* 499, acknowledges the support given by the Austrian Social Democratic Party to Hungarian socialist leaders in July 1919 to "prevent the victory of the counterrevolution in Hungary and to save the political power of the proletariat."

prevent the Hungarian nation from swinging to the opposite extreme, that of reactionary counterrevolution, which, like Bolshevism, might not halt at Austria's borders.

Long before the Hungarian Soviet Republic was actually overthrown, the communist-dominated Government had considered, however reluctantly, the possibility of having to turn over power to a new government. This became apparent on May 1st, after serious military reverses had been suffered at the front.[67] During the night session of the Cabinet on May 1st, Siegmund Kunfi suggested that the "socialist" Government of German-Austria be approached to enter into exploratory negotiations with the Entente for the cessation of hostilities and discussion of the connected problem of a new Hungarian Cabinet. Tibor Szamuély, however, one of the die-hard communists and also notorious for his terrorist activities during the Soviet period, rejected the idea of Austria's mediation, which, he warned, "would destroy the unity of the Party."[68]

Whether the initiative in these negotiations was taken by Béla Kun, by the Hungarian trade-union and socialist leaders, or by the Entente missions in Vienna, is difficult to ascertain. Actually, the Italian Mission in Budapest, at the suggestion of the Entente Missions in Vienna, had already asked Béla Kun several weeks before Böhm had been ordered to the Austrian capital to send Social-Democratic leaders, such as J. Weltner and J. Peyer,[69] to Vienna. It seems most likely that each side appeared eager to negotiate with the other, the communist-dominated government to save whatever possible of the Soviet régime, the Entente representatives to assist the desperate communist leaders in a peaceful and speedy transformation of the Government, offering them their personal safety in return and thus saving the Western powers from the necessity of a more forceful intervention involving perhaps Entente troops directly.[70]

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[67] *Ibid.*, p. 352.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 356.

[69] Kun had then ignored this suggestion, *ibid.* p. 500.

[70] O. Bauer, in a letter of July 16 to W. Böhm who had briefly returned to Budapest, informed him of a visit of Allizé and Cunninghame: "Both told me on their own initiative without any prodding on my part, that the Entente powers would be very happy if they would not have to employ force against Hungary. They would very much like to negotiate with a purely socialist government." (*HHSA*, Fasz. 262 Präsidialakte. . . , ixb.) For the reluctance of the Entente to intervene directly, and more vigorously, see also Bauer to Renner, May 27, about a talk of Cunninghame (*HHSA*, Ex 462, folder: Telegramm aus St. Germain). On the other hand, vol. VII of *For. Rel. U.S. Paris Peace Conference* contains ample evidence of Allied military plans to crush, if necessary, the Soviet Hungarian régime either through its neighbors, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, or in combination with French and possibly other Allied troops. Though actually the French Government refrained from using its own forces against the Béla Kun Government, since it wished to avoid the risk of engaging in military action without English, Italian, and American support, Clémenceau indicated in the session of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers on July 26th, 1919, that his decision to wait for the outcome of the then Hungarian offensive against the Rumanians and also for a possible replacement of the Soviet Government by one dominated by Social Democratic and Trade Union leaders did not mean "that he would never act" (VII, 322). A recent Soviet evaluation, however, of the actual measures taken by the West against the Soviet Hungarian Republic distorts historic truth. L. N. Nezhinskii, in "Reaction in Soviet Russia to the Hungarian Proletarian Revolution of 1919," *Voprosy istorii*, Feb. 1959, p. 108, writes: "The ruling circles of the Entente

On the 10th of July Böhm submitted his resignation as Minister of War. At the suggestion of the People's Commissar Eugen Varga, the Cabinet urged him to continue his services in a different capacity, namely to accept the post of Hungarian envoy in Vienna. The previous Hungarian diplomatic emissary, Czobel, had been recalled at the insistence of the Austrian Government, which had accused him of flagrantly violating his diplomatic obligations by interfering in Austria's internal affairs. Varga pointed out that "we need Austria's support" and that Böhm, "in view of his friendship with some of the leaders of the Austrian Social Democracy," could greatly help the Hungarian cause. After consultation with socialist leaders such as Kunfi, Garbai, Weltner, and others, Böhm decided to accept the post, but not without demanding the fulfillment of several conditions on the part of the Government. First, he wished to ascertain from Dr. Bauer whether the Austrian Social Democrats would welcome his appointment; secondly, he insisted upon cessation of Hungarian propaganda in Austria and of any further material support for it; thirdly, he demanded the right to ascertain the intention of the Entente through her representatives in Vienna and, "if necessary, to negotiate" with them. Böhm wrote: "Kun accepted these conditions in presence of Landler with the greatest of joy. . . . He authorized me to enter into talks with representatives of the Entente."[71] When Böhm informed Dr. Bauer of these developments on July 14th, Bauer seemed pleased, but insisted on a pledge of non-interference in internal Austrian affairs.

Immediately thereafter, on the 16th of July, Dr. Bauer wrote to Dr. Karl

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powers and of the United States adopted quickly measures to strangle the Soviet Hungarian Republic. In mid-April of the year 1919, the imperialists of the Entente urged on by the American monopolists, began an armed intervention against Soviet Hungary"; the author mentions in particular French troops. Yet neither French nor English, Italian, or American troops were, due to contrary decisions reached in Paris, ever actually involved in fighting Hungary's Red Army.

[71] Böhm, *op. cit.*, p. 497. As Hungarian envoy, Böhm represented, of course, the Soviet Government and felt bound by the instructions of Béla Kun. On the other hand, his task, manifestly, was to bring about a negotiated settlement with the Entente, which would be based upon the transformation of the then Hungarian Government and the elimination of the Soviet régime. O. Bauer looked upon Böhm "as a representative" of Hungarian Social Democracy (*For. Rel. U.S.*, XII, 549). Böhm himself reveals that at a secret conference of the leaders of the Hungarian Social Democrats in Budapest on July 5th, about five days before his resignation as Minister for War and approximately ten days before he assumed his new post as Hungarian envoy in Vienna, he had come out for the overthrow of the Soviet Government and had declared himself ready to take charge of military operations against it (*op. cit.*, 493). Most likely, Béla Kun was aware of Böhm's opposition when he "authorized" him to proceed to Vienna to "enter into talks" with the representatives of the Entente, and, though he may not have trusted him fully, probably considered his connections with Austrian Social Democratic leaders and with Allied representatives in Vienna valuable at that time. In the course of the negotiations of the Entente representatives with Böhm, the former suggested to him a most active role in the elimination of the Kun goverment (*For. Rel. U.S.*, VII, 310) and he agreed to it, though somewhat reluctantly (XII, 616). Böhm appears to have demanded one month time for the ouster of the Kun régime (VII, 320); actually the Soviet Government was to fall much sooner, as the result of military defeat. The Allies in Paris, while permitting their representatives in Vienna to carry on their negotiations and talks, issued in reply to Böhm's request for specific guarantees merely a general declaration of policy (VII, 317), which revealed beyond any doubt their resolute opposition to the Kun government.

Renner, Social-Democratic Austrian chancellor heading his country's delegation at St. Germain, that a "change in Hungary was imminent." An attempt was made to "reach an agreement with the Entente via Vienna. . . . In this case I probably would have to mediate [*vermitteln*]. Whether, however, this will come about, I am unable to say."[72]

It came about quickly. Two days later, Halstead, American representative in Vienna who had succeeded Professor A. C. Coolidge, sent a telegram to the United States Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris to the effect that Otto Bauer had told Colonel Cunninghame he would discuss with Böhm the

> possibility of ousting Béla Kun and Bolshevik extremists. Bauer desired to know whether he should negotiate or whether Cunninghame and I desired to do it. He was informed he should talk with Böhm.[73]

Dr. Bauer thus played the rôle of mediator in the negotiations concerning the formation of a new Hungarian Cabinet, which was to take over power from the Soviet Government; he seemed to enjoy the confidence of all parties concerned, including the English and American representatives, who were interested in "eliminating extreme radicalism"[74] in Hungary.

The negotiations entered into by Böhm and Dr. Bauer were ultimately continued between the former and Colonel Cunninghame. On Böhm's first meeting with Cunninghame on July 23rd, the latter, in view of the critical military situation of Hungary, stressed the "necessity of a peaceful agreement with the Entente"; Cunninghame told Böhm that he, in agreement with other representatives of the Entente,[75] would, within the next days, make a half-official recommendation to Paris concerning a peace treaty with Hungary. In his talks Cunninghame demanded that the Soviet Government and Bolshevism be eliminated, that a dictatorial government take over temporarily until a new government by representatives of all classes was formed. Then the blockade would be lifted, and Hungary would be supplied with food and coal.[76]

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[72] *HHSA,* Ex 462, Präsidialakte, folder: Telegram aus St. Germain.

[73] *For. Rel. U.S.*, XII, 544.

[74] *Ibid.,* p. 549. On the 26th of July Otto Bauer resigned as foreign secretary though he remained in the Cabinet. Yet it appears that this move was dictated partly by his failure to bring about the *Anschluss* with a then social-democratic Germany—an endeavor opposed by the Allies, and less keenly pursued by the Chancellor Dr. Karl Renner—and his apparent failure to reach a satisfactory agreement with Italy on South Tyrol. In their firm opposition to Soviet Hungary's attempt to expand by force into Austria, the left and right wings of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, led by Bauer and Renner respectively, were united. The Entente was less concerned about Otto Bauer's Hungarian policy, which neither before July nor during this month actually ran counter to that of the Entente, than about his German policy; Otto Bauer had rather become identified in Allied eyes with the *Anschluss* policy (see Halstead to the Commission, July 27, *For. Rel. U.S.*, XII, 551-53; see also O. Bauer, *Österr. Revolution,* pp. 133-35.

[75] *For. Rel. U.S.*, XII, 615-16. The American Commission, i.e., the Department of State, however, though actually hostile to the Soviet Hungarian régime because of its radicalism and expansionist ambitions, was careful to preserve the appearance of strict neutrality and non-interference and restrained its representatives in Vienna from participating in negotiations aimed at replacing the Soviet government with a non-communist, more representative one. On July 26th the Commission in Paris sent this telegram to Halstead: "Commission does not wish you to carry on any negotiations with Böhm. You should have nothing whatsoever to do with the matter directly or indirectly" (*ibid.*, 619). Actually, in spite of these instructions to the American representatives, the American Commission was most interested in the possibility of an overthrow of the Kun Government by General Böhm (*Ibid.,* see H. Hoover, 306, 320, and H. White, 256, 306-07). Yet the brief reference in the article "Hungary" in the *Bol'shaia Sovietskaia Entsiclopediia* (1951), VII, 383, to the American Government's attempting to "mobilize reactionary forces" to battle the Soviet Hungarian revolution is a gross distortion of the actual position and policies adopted by the U. S. Government and repudiated by the record (see especially

In the meantime, the military situation of Hungary deteriorated rapidly. Though the Entente declaration of July 26th had denounced the Hungarian Soviet régime and Béla Kun in particular on several grounds, including the recent resumption of the Red Army's offensive against the Rumanians, Kun apparently entertained the illusion that the Bolshevik Government in Budapest might still be saved through negotiations with the Entente. This may explain his consent in the first place to negotiations to be carried on in Vienna. However, when he learned of the Entente's resolution that Bolshevism must be eliminated, he appears to have made a series of desperate and disconcerted moves. He sent other Social-Democratic leaders, Weltner and Peyer, to Vienna, perhaps trying to obtain more favorable terms; in addition, on the 30th and 31st of July, he met these men and Böhm at the border station of Kiralyhida.[77] Also, when he learned of the peace treaty of St. Germain, which recognized Austria's claims to West Hungary, he sent a telegram to Böhm asking him to urge Bettelheim to turn over 400,000 kronen to the Austrian Communist Party and to inform the Austrian communist leader Tomann that the Austrian proletariat could, without any struggle, obtain everything that the Entente had promised, but only on condition of proclaiming a Soviet Republic! "Three days before the fall of the Hungarian Revolution," writes Böhm,

> Kun deceives himself and the country . . . , believes that one could tempt the proletariat of starving Austria to plunge into a new revolution, into the proclamation of a Soviet government, by offering 400,000 kronen and a childish promise, and after the terrifying example of Hungary.[78]

Böhm informed Béla Kun that he could not carry out these instructions which "contradicted our agreements of non-inference in [Austria's] internal affairs." The following day the instruction was revoked.

At the meeting in Kiralyhida on July 31st Béla Kun asserted that the troops had "never been so enthusiastic as just now" and "instructed us . . . to enter into no agreement, since the case of the Soviet Republic was so favorable that it was unnecessary."[79] Apparently, Kun had satisfied himself that the terms offered by the Entente made no concessions to Bolshevism, and he was therefore resolved to hold out.

The picture which Kun had drawn of the military situation was false throughout. On the 29th of July Rumanian troops had crossed the Theiss

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U.S. For. Rel., vols. IV and VII; this writer is currently completing an essay "The First Soviet Hungarian Republic and the Paris Peace Conference").

[76] Böhm, *op. cit.*, p. 500f.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 505; for the Entente's declaration of July 26th, see *For. Rel. U. S.*, VII, 317.

[78] Böhm, *op. cit.*, p. 506.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 508.

river, and the Red Army, after suffering catastrophic defeat, disintegrated. A last-minute appeal of Kun's to Lenin, in which he asked for military assistance, was answered by the latter with the assurance of Russia's interest and sympathy for Soviet Hungary. By the time this telegram reached Budapest, Béla Kun had fled.

On August 1st, in a joint session of the directorate of the Party and of the Cabinet, J. Weltner's motion of the previous day to surrender power to a new government, which was to consist of trade union-leaders, was, at the suggestion of Kun himself, unanimously adopted. On this occasion the participants of this conference, as if to reassure themselves, referred to the talks and the understanding reached between the Soviet Hungarian delegates and the Entente representatives in Vienna. The new government, chosen by the Workers' Council, was headed by Prime Minister Julius Peidl, a leader of the printers' union and previous minister for social welfare under the Károlyi government, who had withdrawn when the Social Democrats on March 21st had concluded the fateful agreement with the Communists. In its proclamation the new Cabinet asserted that the Soviet Government had yielded to the ultimatum of the Entente and that it was also at the wish of the Entente that the new provisional Cabinet of trade unionists had been formed. In the meantime, Kun and several other communist leaders had requested asylum in Austria, the country which they had tried so hard to conquer. The Austrian Government, after making inquiries at the Vienna Entente missions, granted asylum to the communist leaders, though severely restricting their freedom of movement and their activities.[80] The English mission in Vienna supported the plea for asylum, especially since even Hungarian rightists favored the escape of the communists who had still many followers in Hungary, in the interests of a peaceful political transition.

One of the most significant post mortems was delivered on August 4th by Friedrich Adler in the District Workers' Council in Vienna. Adler saw in the breakdown of the Hungarian Soviet régime a defeat for the "proletariat of all countries," not merely for the Hungarian workers.

> Reaction exploits this occasion in order to attack the proletariat and socialism in general, not merely Bolshevism. . . . Decisive for our situation remains the fact that in the vanquished countries the will to fight capitalism is admittedly the strongest; however, the possibility of introducing socialism, unfortunately, is in every respect a very reduced one.

This was the "sad truth." In any case, events had shown that

> the tactics which we have pursued have proven to be correct, difficult to comprehend though they may have been for many a worker. Had Austria followed the Hungarian example she would have succumbed much earlier.[81]

While the Austrian Social Democracy congratulated itself for having chosen the correct policy and weathered the storm, international communism directed bitter accusations against the Second International and against

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[80] *Arbeiterzeitung*, Aug. 4.

[81] *Ibid.*, Aug. 5; see also editorial of Aug. 2.

Austrian Socialism in particular. In a proclamation of August 5th, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Comintern held that the socialist International bore the main responsibility for the breakdown of the Hungarian Soviet régime: "The Soviet régime in Hungary has succumbed under the pressure of the imperialist robbers and due to the gigantic treason of the social traitors."[82] About a year later Karl Radek and Béla Kun sounded the same note. Friedrich Adler and Otto Bauer, Radek charged, had "virtually betrayed" the Hungarian proletariat.[83] And Béla Kun accused socialists in the Czechoslovak Cabinet as well as Viennese Social Democrats, whose "internationalism" had expressed itself in their alliance with the Entente against the Hungarian proletarian dictatorship, of the same crime. [84]

Yet the socialist-dominated Austrian Government had not been "allied" with the Entente against the Hungarian Soviet régime. It had merely warded off the attempts of Soviet Hungary to extend the narrow base of communism in Central Europe to Austria. The new democratic state, which it had helped to establish in November 1918, held out great promises to the strongly entrenched socialist Party, which might reasonably hope in a not too distant future to gain its socialist objectives by the "means of democracy,"[85] by gaining the support of a majority of the Austrian population.

Austria's foreign policy, as conducted by the Social Democratic Party in 1919 and Dr. Otto Bauer in particular, was primarily designed to avoid the entanglement of the new and, economically and militarily, weak Republic in new wars and to establish in the heart of Central Europe a bastion of neutrality[86] between East and West, and of political democracy. Though the Austrian Government was resolved to refuse any assistance to the Western powers and the immediate neighbors of Soviet Hungary in blockading the latter or in mounting an offensive against her, being dependent on the Entente for food and raw materials, it had to move cautiously; it could neither afford, nor did it wish, to pursue any anti-Western policy, especially not at a time when the peace treaties were being written. Though it indulged quite often in criticism of Western "imperialism," the peace terms, and the Entente's opposition to the *Anschluss,* the new Austrian Republic felt threatened from the East rather than from the West. The Austrian Government was bound to clash with the communist drive for a link-up of Russia and Hungary with the Soviet base in Bavaria and for an expansion of the "proletarian" revolution into the rest of Central Europe.

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[82] G. Zinoviev, "To the Proletariat of the Entire World," *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, Aug. 1919, No. iv, 541-42. This appears to be still the line in current Soviet Russian and Soviet Hungarian historical writing; see F. Münnich, "The October Revolution and the Hungarian Red Army," *Voprosy ist.*, March 1959, p. 53, where reference is made to Social-Democratic "treason" and "traitors."

[83] K. Radek, "The History of a Coup . . . ," *Kommunist. Internatsional,* 1920, No. ix, 1257-88. In the same article in which he also scathingly denounced the Austrian Communist Party ("few experienced educated leaders," "adventurous elements," "hyenas of the battlefields," "swindle manoeuvres" of Bettelheim) he wrote: "Should the German-Austrian proletariat in its majority have accepted and carried out the ideas of Soviet dictatorship, this would have strengthened the Hungarian Soviet Republic." On just this ground Radek should have acquitted the leadership of the Austrian Social Democratic Party.

[84] Blasius Kolozsvary (Béla Kun), *Von Revolution zu Revolution* (Vienna, 1934), p. 55. B. Kun, *O. Bauers Weg von der Anerkennung des Ständestaats zur Anerkennung der Diktatur des Proletariates* (Basel, 1934), p. 10, analyzing the "causes" of the debacle of Austrian socialism in the civil war of February, 1934, traces its origin back to the "treason against the proletarian revolution . . . since 1918."

[85] O. Bauer, *Bolschewismus oder Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1921), p. 112f.

[86] That neutrality was Austria's policy, was conceded by Böhm, *op. cit.*, p. 499. A major objective of the foreign policy of the Austrian Social Democracy and of Dr. Bauer in 1918-1919 was the *Anschluss* with the German Republic, which was felt to be an imperative on economic, social, and national grounds. Frustrated therein by the victorious Entente, the Austrian socialist party had to accept the "solution" of an independent Austria—the viability of which seemed doubtful to many contemporaries—a democratic republic, which it hoped might become socialist in a not too distant future. In the meantime, the new Republic would stand not only geographically, but also ideologically between western democratic capitalism and "imperialism" and eastern "proletarian" but dictatorial "socialism", trying to pursue an uncertain course somewhere between these rival ideologies and power blocs.

The Austrian Social Democratic Party was in 1919 by no means the only stumbling block to Bolshevik expansionism, but in view of its intellectual preeminence in the world of socialism it was the natural ideological adversary of Russian Bolshevism, which had always taken ideological disputes most seriously; Austria's Social-Democratic leaders were under constant and most vituperative attack on the part of Hungarian and Russian communism in 1918 and 1919. Besides, controlling a country of great strategic significance at a crucial historic moment, Austrian socialism became an actual opponent of Bolshevism in a struggle which was to decide the fate of its expansion in Central Europe.

YOUNGSTOWN UNIVERSITY

NOTES

The Fourth Session of the Summer School of Slavonic Studies will be held in Prague this August 2-30, under the patronage of the Rector of Charles University and of the Rector of the Prague School of Russian Language and Literature. Those taking part in the School, depending on their level of knowledge and particular interests, will have a choice of three parallel series of lectures: (a) Czech and Slovak linguistics, (b) literary history, (c) the history of Czechoslovakia. There will be accompanying seminars on themes treated in the lectures.

The Summer School is intended for university teachers and advanced students of Slavonic languages and literatures. Enrollment was limited (deadline April 30) so as to ensure maximum attention to each individual.

* * *

The Institut Imre Nagy des Sciences Politiques was founded in the Spring of 1958 in Brussels, and is presently under the direction of Dr. Georg Heltai. It deals specifically, according to the November 1959 issue of *Osteuropa*, with those facets of anti-communist political and social activity which led to the Hungarian Revolution and its aftermath, which can serve as the foundation of a new historical perspective.

The Institut publishes *The Review* quarterly. The address of the Institut is 477 Avenue Louise, Brussels, Belgium.

* * *

In the May issue of *Österreichische Ost-Hefte* appears the announcement of the first Work Session of the Internationale Kommission zum Studium der Geschichte der slavischen Philologie, which took place in Vienna on May 3-6 of this year. The delegates represented the Slavic countries of Eastern Europe and those non-Slavic nations such as Germany, France, and England where Slavic philology has been offered for some time in the leading universities. For every country represented a separate program was to be set up for the historical study of Slavic philology, following upon a mutual determination of subjects for discussion. Eventually the Kommission, now under the chairmanship of N. K. Gudzij, plans to collate the findings of the individual national representatives into a unified body of material on the present status of the field of Slavic philology. The rich archives of the Vienna National Library and other centers of Slavic study in Vienna offer ample material for the researches of these scholars.

* * *

The first issue of the *Journal of Croatian Studies* has come to the Editor's desk. The contents are largely historical and political in nature, ranging over the whole field of Croatian history. There are a number of book reviews of recent books and a statement on the rise and development of the Croatian Academy of America, which publishes the *Journal*.

We welcome with great pleasure this addition to the growing list of publications by the several national groups of Central Europe.

* * *

In the July 1958 number of the *Journal* there appeared a notice of the sentencing of Professor Stranjaković, renowned historian at the University of Belgrade, to "from four to six years of rigorous imprisonment."

The Editor has recently been informed of the Professor's release, on parole, along with that of Krekić and Pavlović, on February 28 of this year. It is probable that their early liberation is at least in part due to the indignation aroused on both sides of the Atlantic at the sentencing of these men.

* * *

The Department of State has deposited in the National Archives 1463 containers of microfilms of documents from the archives of the former German Foreign Office relating to the Weimar period. With completion of this transfer the bulk of the microfilms relating to the period 1918-1933 is available at the National Archives. Inquiries concerning the purchase of copies of these microfilms should be addressed to the National Archives and Records Service, Washington 25, D. C.

* * *

The Second Annual Meeting of the Western Slavic Conference in Los Angeles (see *Journal*, April 1960, p. 91) was successful in achieving its goals of a large participation, representation of many facets of Slavic study, and the reading of brief, interpretive papers rather than research papers. Professor Treadgold, of the University of Washington, was elected chairman, and it was agreed that the next meeting should be held at San Francisco State College. The practice of handing out dittoed copies of the papers to the participants to read before the author's presentation, a very well-taken innovation at this year's Conference, will be continued at future meetings.

* * *

The historical profession and particularly that portion of it interested in Central and Southeastern Europe suffered a grievous loss in the untimely death at the age of fifty-one years of Professor Fritz Valjavec on February 10 of this year. Professor Valjavec was the author of a number of significant and carefully-documented works on German-Balkan cultural and political relations, the most recent being the three-volume study *Geschichte der deutschen Kulturbeziehungen zu Südosteuropa*, and the editor of the *Südost-Forschungen* and other journals. At the time of his decease he was also the director of the Südost-Institut in Munich, a position he had held since 1955.

BOOK REVIEWS

FEGER, OTTO, *Die Deutsch-Ordens-Kommende Mainau, Anfänge und Frühzeit.* Lindau and Constance: Jan Thordecke Verlag, 1958. Pp. xii, 137. DM 12.50.

In this little book Dr. Feger, the municipal archivist of Constance, reveals to us the historical scholar at his best, illuminating the larger issues and movements of society with a vigorous description of the local scene.

It would not normally be supposed that the original Irish impulse given to monasticism in the region of Lake Constance would be ultimately transformed into the local efforts of the Teutonic Order to organize Germany for the conquest and colonisation of Prussia and Livonia. Yet this is the larger theme of this attractive monograph. It is the account, built up carefully from the documents, of the inability of the old Irish-Benedictine house of Reichenau to cope with the new economic and social forces of the mid-thirteenth century, and prevent the intrusion into its aristocratic midst of the upstart Knights, who did identify themselves with these new forces and, when necessary, with their violence. The author refers to *"die Robustheit [der] Methoden"* of the Order (p. 80).

By the 1250's Reichenau was an appanage of the upper nobility. The few monks (7 or 8) were recruited from its sons, and the abbots almost exclusively from its families. When it chanced that an abbot (Heinrich von Klingenberg, the Bishop of Constance) was elected from the lower nobility, his coat-of-arms was not permitted to be carved upon his tomb-stone in the abbey church lest the lofty aristocratic peace of its interior be rudely disturbed. By this date the extensive holdings of the monastery had long been dissipated into fiefs of the old families of the Constance area. But not altogether so. Many were now held by representatives of the lower nobility, these originally unfree ministerials who had arisen in the service of kings, princes and clergy in the course of the centuries. These were the von Steckborns, the von Feldbachs, the von Sandeggs and the von Langensteins who resented the decadent pretensions of the high nobility and its monastic parasite. It was they who endowed the first commandery of the Teutonic Order south of the Unter-See at Sandegg from what were strictly speaking Reichenau fiefs. It was they also (the von Langensteins) who gave the island of Mainau in the Uberlinger See (originally Reichenau property) to the German Order as the site of a second commandery, and endowed it further with lands on the south shore. The abbot of Reichenau knew that if he did not resist, this alliance between ministerial families and Teutonic Order (north and south of Reichenau) would ultimately crush him. As overlord he could forbid the alienation of fiefs from ministerials to Teutonic Order and did so. The von Langensteins then descended upon Reichenau and its possessions with force and the helpless abbot was obliged to give up all hope for damages and to agree to an arrangement (August 1272) which returned Sandegg to him and permitted the Order to expand from Mainau north and south of the Überlinger See. The abbot of Reichenau and the Commander of Mainau continued to fight in a kind of Bodensee schism. At Wollmatingen they both held courts to which all peasants were summoned. Each sent agents to the sessions of the other to protest and pronounce the judgments void. Eventually the abbots of Reichenau had to recognize a kind of protectorate exercised by a Council of Ministerials (before 1291) whose consent was necessary for the settlement of all important monastic business *(ad quorum consilium omnia negotia nostri monasterii nos adstrinximus gubernanda).*

And so while the monks of Reichenau were begging food from their friends and relatives at the middle of the fourteenth century, the Commandery of Mainau, governed by ministerial families, built up its little state (it even moved into Constance), welcomed into its ranks the sons of the lesser nobles and even of wealthy bourgeois, and, after a few years, sent them off to Prussia and Livonia to carry on the crusade against the heathen. Under these circumstances Reichenau succumbed in 1540 but the Commandery of Mainau prolonged its life until 1805.

Brandeis University EDGAR N. JOHNSON

PIPES, RICHARD, *Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia. A Translation and Analysis.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. Pp. xiv, 266. $5.50.

Nikolai Karamzin is well known to the western world as one of nineteenth century Russia's prominent historians, conservatives, and literary figures. His multivolume *History of the Russian State* has had many editions since its first volumes began to appear in 1818, and has acquired a respected place in Russian historiography. His role as a journalist and prose writer is known from his editorship of *Moskovskoi Zhurnal* and *Vestnik Evropy,* from the reception given his *Letters of a Russian Traveler,* and from many short stories and novels. More recently Karamzin's influence on the Slavophile movement and on the autocracy of Nicholas I has been established, and now his political views have been clarified through a new edition and translation of his *Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia.*

Richard Pipes' interest in Karamzin arose from a larger concern for the sources and nature of Russian conservatism. Interpretations of modern Russian history, Pipes feels, have failed to explain in intellectually and psychologically acceptable terms the motivation of Russia's rulers of the nineteenth century. The usual explanations advanced of their loyalty to autocracy, i.e. historical blindness, class interest, or incompetence, he finds unsatisfactory. He seeks, instead, for more reasonable explanations of why so many able Russians of the time "tried to conserve rather than to change" and hopes to find answers in the lives and works of men who identified themselves with the conservative regime. As a beginning, he has redirected attention to Karamzin and to the work which most clearly elucidated the historian's political views.

The Karamzin that emerges from Pipes' edition and translation of the *Memoir* is a far more understandable figure than has appeared in his other writings. The work was written in 1810 when Napoleon's armies still dominated Western Europe and were regrouping for an eastward advance. Karamzin feared for Russia's future and interrupted his labors as imperial historiographer to direct an appeal to Alexander I in the form of a memoir. Karamzin, without naming names, denounced Alexander's counsellors and the policies and practices they had formulated and tolerated. For him autocracy was "the Palladium of Russia" and Alexander must reassert the virtues of the institution, choose wiser counsellors and renounce the political and economic innovations that had weakened the state. The autocracy he envisaged was near that of Catharine II—a contractual relationship between crown and the gentry in which the crown recognized the rights and role of the latter. It was not an unlimited tsarist authority that he urged. The test of good government for Karamzin was the degree to which it succeeded in assuring the citizens the maximum of legality and civil liberty consistent with its own security. These are samplings of Karamzin's "autocracy" that a rereading of his *Memoir* brings to light, and they represent substantially different views than those commonly associated with Karamzin the conservative.

In denouncing tsarist policies and suggesting changes, Karamzin's arguments often lack cogency. He generalizes to excess, oversimplifies, and exaggerates. In the short survey of Russian history included in the *Memoir*, Karamzin shows, along with many brilliant insights, the same want of historical objectivity that characterizes his later *History*. Nor do his arguments have the degree of boldness that Pipes would have us believe. Although deeply scornful of Alexander's policies, Karamzin takes care to protest his loyalty to the tsar and to absolve him from responsibility for the perils suffered by the empire. Pipes' assertion that "never before had a Russian subject dared to address his monarch in similar terms" [p. 75] is, therefore, an overstatement, particularly when one recalls the writings of earlier critics of tsarist policy, such as Prince Kurbsky.

Pipes has accomplished several worthwhile goals in this undertaking. He has rescued one of Karamzin's most important works from virtual oblivion and given it an excellent new edition and English translation. He has accompanied it with extensive notes and comments and an introductory essay that provides a clear analysis of the genesis of an influential Russian conservative's political views. With the latter he has also gone a long way toward initiating the larger reappraisal of conservatism with which he is primarily concerned. This is a book which all who are interested in Russian conservatism will want to read, ponder, and acquire.

University of California, Davis C. B. O'BRIEN

RÖSEL, HUBERT, *Dokumente zur Geschichte der Slawistik in Deutschland,* Teil I: *Die Universitäten Berlin und Breslau im 19. Jahrhundert.* (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin: Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Slawistik, herausgegeben von H. H. Bielfeldt, Nr. 12) Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1957. Pp. xiv, 409. plates.

This book of Hubert Rösel deals with the beginnings of Slavic studies at German universities. The author was induced to undertake his work by his interest in the history of Czech and Slovak literature in the nineteenth century. Research in the relations of Paul Joseph Šafařík and František Vladislav Čelakovský with Germany led to the discovery of files of unpublished documents, preserved in the *Deutsches Zentralarchiv* at Merseburg (the former Prussian State Archives). These documents, preceded by a lengthy introductory essay, form the bulk of the present book.

After a quick glance on the early development of Slavic studies in Western Europe, the author turns to the first, unsuccessful, attempt to establish a chair of Slavic philology in Prussia, which took place in 1830-32. The Academic Senate of the University of Breslau (now Wrocław) submitted to the government a proposal to create a Slavic chair, and to invite Šafařík as its occupant. For some two years an inconclusive exchange of views continued between Berlin and Breslau. Finally, the project was shelved. The determining factors were the increasingly reactionary character of Prussian policy in the last years of Frederick William III, and a stiffening attitude towards the Poles, caused by the Polish revolt against Russia, in 1830-31.

The change on the throne in 1840 also meant a significant shift in policy. Frederick William IV issued, on January 15, 1841, an order-in-council (*Kabinettsorder*), which created chairs of Slavic studies at the Universities of Berlin and Breslau. This was a gesture of goodwill towards the new king's Polish subjects, as the measure was motivated by the cultural needs of the Prussian Poles. The order-in-council of 1841 must be regarded as the official birth certificate of Slavic studies in German universities. Prussia was, in this respect, ahead of other countries. In Russia, chairs of Slavic studies had been created, but were as yet unoccupied. Austria possessed the best Slavic scholars, but the foundation of Slavic chairs in Vienna had to wait for the 1848 revolution.

The practical difficulty, confronting the Prussian authorities, was the selection of qualified professors. The supply of trained Slavicists was slight, and they were not to be found among the Germans, or the Prussian Poles. As in 1830-32, one name invariably emerged, as the recognized scholarly leader in the field, P. J. Šafařík. But although, when unofficially approached in 1830, he had responded enthusiastically, now he was no longer interested in a call to Prussia. Earlier, he had lived in a provincial town in southern Hungary, where he taught in a secondary school; this he regarded as his "spiritual exile." But in the meantime he had moved to Prague, and the Czech capital provided the great son of Slovakia with congenial surroundings. Now Šafařík rejected the flattering and financially advantageous proposals, directed to him by the Prussian Minister of Education, Eichhorn.

However, Šafařík consented to come to Berlin for consultation with Eichhorn and high officials of the Ministry of Education. He submitted a memorandum, dated May 16, 1841, containing his suggestions for the development of Slavic studies at Prussian universities. This is a highly significant document, probably the most interesting single piece contained in Rösel's book. It illustrates admirably the clarity and breadth of Šafařík's views. Šafařík stresses the distinction between the utilitarian and the scholarly aspect of Slavic studies. Both have to be taken into account, but the latter must predominate. The work ought to be centered around a systematic comparative study of the five chief Slavic "dialects" and literatures: Church-Slavonic, Russian, Polish, Czech and "Illyrian" (Serbo-Croatian). In the future, this might be expanded to include Slavic archeology, ethnography, and cultural and political history, as well as the study of less known "dialects": Bulgarian, "Little Russian," and Lusatian Serb. Šafařík, in accordance with the tenets of Romantic Pan-Slavism, consistently speaks of *one* Slavic language, whose subdivisions he describes as dialects. He saw a need for texts and reference books: grammars, dictionaries, readers, anthologies, histories of literature. A primary task of the Berlin and Breslau Slavic professors, assisted by their students and other scholars, would be to fill this gap. Finally, for the promotion of creative research, a quarterly journal, in German, ought to be founded. This last idea found its realization, in a later generation, in the *Archiv für slavische Philologie,* which began to appear in Berlin, in 1876.

Following Šafařík's refusal, the Berlin chair remained unoccupied, but courses in Slavic philology and literatures were offered, from 1841-42 on, by the young Polish scholar, Adalbert Cybulski, who had the humble academic rank of a *Privatdozent.* Cybulski hoped to be appointed professor later, but this was prevented by his participation in the revolutionary events of 1848. Cybulski remained a *Privatdozent* in Berlin until 1860. The first regular occupant of the Berlin Slavic chair—33 years after its creation!—became, in 1874, Vatroslav Jagić. The Breslau chair had but little more luck. Its first holder, from 1842, was the eminent Czech ethnographer and poet, F. L. Čelakovský, who had been strongly recommended for this position by Šafařík. However, in 1849 Čelakovský received a call to the new Slavic chair at the University of Prague, and returned to his home country. In 1860 Cybulski, after laboring for nearly twenty years as a *Privatdozent* in Berlin, obtained the professorship in Breslau, but he died in 1867. He was succeeded by another Pole, Władysław Nehring, who remained active in this position until the early years of the twentieth century. From 1870 on, Germany possessed a third Slavic chair, outside Prussia, in Leipzig.

It is interesting to note that while, in our times, Slavic studies in Europe and America are predominantly oriented toward Russia, in nineteenth century Germany the stress was on the Western Slavs. This may be explained by the presence of a large Polish group in Prussia, and also by the fact that, at that time, the scholarly leadership of the discipline rested with the Czechs and Slovaks. The development of Slavic studies in Germany was, as Hubert Rösel stresses, impeded by unfavorable political conditions, and by a contemptuous neglect of all things Slavic, widespread among German university men and students. Still, Germany was in this respect ahead of other European countries. The documents Rösel provides illustrate convincingly the intelligence and fairness of the Prussian administrators, responsible for higher education. In summary, this work is a valuable contribution to the history of Slavic-German cultural relations.

La Salle College, Philadelphia, Pa. IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY

ROTH, PAUL, *Deutschland und Polen.* Schriften des Arbeits Kreises für Ostfragen 4. München: Isar Verlag, 1958. Pp. 115. DM 9.80.

This interesting booklet is dedicated to a discussion of the mutual historical relations and present problems existing between Germany and Poland. In the first of its eight chapters existing misconceptions are discussed and the problems are outlined. Chapter two presents a survey of German-Polish relations up to the partitions of Poland while the third is dedicated to these partitions and the fourth to the resurrected Poland after World War I. The fifth chapter discusses Poland between the World Wars and the sixth treats of Poland during World War II. Chapter seven presents the new enslavement of Poland and the recent "thaw" period which ended in a re-Stalinization. The last chapter focuses on the Oder-Neisse frontier problem and on the background of the many questions connected with it. The book contains a selected bibliography, an index and two maps.

Paul Roth was an official of the press administration during the German occupation of Poland. As a result he is well qualified to take the floor in the discussion between distinguished German and Polish scholars which started soon after World War II. These discussions led to numerous publications from both sides and eventually to a joint meeting of the historians. Thus did the tragedy of Germany's division and of the common enslavement of its eastern part and of all Poland stimulate the consciousness of their common European heritage.

The author, in a style that produces highly condensed chapters, tries to be objective and often gives the proper qualifications for the Hitler crimes in Poland. He also uses harsh terms for the treatment of the so-called minorities by the Poles and for the expulsion by Poland of the Germans from their eastern provinces after World War II. In addition, Roth attempts to correct the image of the mutual hereditary enmity of the two neighbor nations. More than that, however, he tries to gather all facts which link them together in order to subordinate the fate of both nations to the idea of a European community which is put in fundamental antagonism to the political and cultural imperialism of the new Soviet Russia. As a condition for this European conception the future free Poland has to agree to a revision of the Oder-Neisse line.

The reviewer has to limit himself only to the most important critical remarks. Paul Roth is often brilliant but he is also rather superficial at times. Thus the worn out phrase "if you scratch a Russian you find a Tartar" is not the right approach to the present Russian world outlook—and after their experiences with Hitler such sayings certainly do not appeal to the Poles. The medieval frontier of the European community was not the eastern frontier of Poland but, as O. Halecki in his *Borderlands of Western Civilization* convincingly proved, the eastern frontier of the Kievan Ruś whose Scandinavian dynasty was intermarried with all the leading dynasties of Western and Central Europe. Even for present day constructions of a European community the Lithuanians, Beloruthenians (Belorussians), and Ukrainians cannot be eliminated because for centuries they formed a common cultural sphere in the old *Rzeczpospolita.* The Gothic style reached Lubny (on the left bank) Ukraine, the German Law penetrated deep toward the east and was finally halted in Kiev only in 1866, while the Baroque style created a special chapter in the east, the Mazepian Baroque. The author, in fact, proposes to present Soviet Moscow a sort of a division of the spheres of influence in Europe in which unified Germany and liberated Poland would form the other partner. But these new *Realpolitik* plans include a violation of the right of self-determination not only of the nations mentioned but also of the Baltic nations and it can hardly be morally justified. I do not question the good will and intentions of the author but his conceptions do not take into consideration the hard facts connected with the Oder-Neisse line. Those facts are: the problem is far more complicated because it cannot be separated from the similar German-Czech ethnographic frontier problem; Soviet Moscow has no intention of discussing a negotiated peace treaty in Central Europe; its present aim is the perpetuation of the division of Germany and the gradual decomposition of the rest of Europe led by the United States; and lastly, the Russian Communists back this program by atomic and hydrogen weapons and rockets. Russian conditions for the unification of Germany are: neutralization, disarmament, and voluntary cooperation or integration into the "Socialist Commonwealth" and for that kind of a new Rapallo Moscow would eventually grant even frontier concessions to Germany. It is consequently easy to see that the author's conceptions are based upon the assumption of an existing free and unified Germany and a free Poland. They are, therefore, unrealistic and only theoretical possibilities for the future. This is not to deny, however, that Paul Roth's book contributes considerably to a clarification of the German point of view on Eastern problems in the present tragedy of Europe.

Marquette University ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

BENEDIKT, HEINRICH, *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in der Franz Josef Zeit.* Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1958. Pp. 200. AS 108.

A highly complex and important subject, the economic development of Austria in the time of Francis Joseph, i.e., from 1848 to 1916, is here discussed in the compass of a short and discursive book. The author, Professor Benedikt, recently retired as professor of modern history at the University of Vienna, in his foreword projects this book more as a matter of commentary than as an incisive analysis of Austria's economic progress. Though the expectations of the reader are unduly aroused by the title of this volume, it would probably be unjust to criticize it on that basis rather than on that of the intent of the writer. Within this framework it is still germane, however, to discuss the contribution that Benedikt has made towards a better understanding of the problem and towards its eventual analysis. Unfortunately, one finds more comment than commentary; more random thoughts concerning particular events and subjects than an incisive discussion of any one of them. There are comments on agriculture, with sugar production receiving much attention. The total abolition of serfdom in 1848 was a spur to the development of sugar beet cultivation, which lends itself to capitalistic organization. Benedikt approves of sugar beet cultivation but is quite equivocal about the destruction of serfdom. The labor services of the serf to his lord Benedikt finds hardly onerous (nicht . . . drückend) (p. 8) and discovers that "peasant liberation" (his quotation marks) meant for the unburdened peasant ("Entlasteten") merely an increase of burdens, e.g., taxes (p. 9).

When it comes to the question of industry, Benedikt makes an important point in emphasizing the large number of entrepreneurs of foreign origin. Ever since the Thirty-Years' War the Habsburg dominions have benefitted from the immigration of foreigners not only in the economic sector but in the military and governmental areas as well. This particular phenomenon deserves much closer attention than it has received in the past. Benedikt's mention of it may help but one might well have wished that he had brought out more of the pertinent information. To call Austria an industrial colonial area (p. 27) because of this immigration, seems, however, an over-simplification.

The role of the government looms rather large throughout the book. Partial justification for this emphasis is that in the Habsburg monarchy the government traditionally played an important part in the economy. Its tariff policy, its monetary adventures, its direct involvement in business and industry do indeed deserve attention. Whether one can say, however, that the governmental policies were such a tremendous blessing, especially to the economy of the "Sudeten" lands (p. 5) is difficult to see. A government constantly on the brink of bankruptcy, able to raise state loans only with the greatest difficulty, could hardly have inspired confidence and promoted stability, requisites for a strong, free economy.

In concluding his book, Benedikt makes the assertion that ". . . for the Danubian, Sudeten, and Carpathian lands there was never a better nor more prosperous time than that of the old Emperor" (p. 181). This is more a declaration of faith in the old monarchy, it seems to me, than a statement of fact. As a matter of fact, the book itself provides much material to indicate that the time of Francis Joseph was in many respects rather chaotic. In general, Benedikt's present book contributes little to an analysis of the economy of the Habsburg monarchy in the nineteenth century. His entrepreneurial biography of Alexander Schöller recently published, it should be added, however, does more in this direction than this more ambitious book.

Brooklyn College HERMAN FREUDENBERGER

ČUBRILOVIĆ, VASA, *Istorija Političke Misli u Srbiji XIX Veka.* Istoriska Bibloteka. Kolo I, Knjiga 1. Uredjuje Društvo Istoričara Narodne Republike Srbije. Izdavačko Preduzeće Prosveta. Beograd, 1958. Pp. 578.

In a work of great significance, *The History of Political Thought in Nineteenth Century Serbia,* Vasa Čubrilović, professor of history at the University of Belgrade, deals extensively with political thoughts and ideas from 1800 until 1914. Developments between 1914 and 1941, however, are discussed in a summary fashion.

Focusing on Ilya Garashanin's *Nachertanye* as the major source of Serbian political sentiment for a Greater Serbia, or a Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia, Čubrilović insists that it was the recurrent blueprint for all Serbian statesmen from 1800 until the start of World War II. Garashanin himself, Jovan Ristic, Nikola Pashich, and King Alexander all viewed the expansion of Serbia as well as the formation of Yugoslavia from what the author calls a "narrow Serbian" viewpoint. "When it came to the formation of Yugoslavia in 1918, the spokesmen for conservative, bourgeois, bureaucratic, and militaristic Serbia reflected the same thoughts about the internal organization of the state as Ilya Garashanin had expressed" (p. 195). As soon as Serbia became a suzerain state under Milosh Obrenovich, it attracted all the South Slavs (both Croats and Serbs) from the Hapsburg Empire. Yet, according to Čubrilović, the prevailing idea in the mind of Garashanin as well as Obrenovichs and Karageorgevichs and the Serbian politicians and conservative intelligentsia, in general, was, first of all, to bring together all the lands inhabited by the Serbs. The Yugoslavs, then, were of secondary importance. Both groups were to be adjusted to Serbian patterns and to the "narrow Serbian" conception of the national interest. Thus during the Serbian Revolution and after the Balkan Wars, Serbian leaders viewed the formation of Yugoslavia as the out-growth of a "narrow Serbian and orthodox (pravoslavni) character" that drew upon the concept of the Serbian orthodox medieval Nemanjich's state along with the Kossovo ethics, in origin Byzantine and in its more recent form Ottoman and Balkan.

In reality, therefore, neither Garashanin nor Ristic nor even Pashich (who witnessed the formation of Yugoslavia) conceived of the new state as a part of revolutionary, liberal, nineteenth century nationalism. To them it meant the continuation of the old Serbia and its peculiar centralist and bureaucratic structure molded from the Ottoman legacy and the prevailing Byzantine conception of power. There could be "no strong state without a strong central power." Even though liberal undercurrents affected Serbian political life in the twentieth century, the army and the Orthodox Church still served as the main pillar of support for the ruling dynasty. Čubrilović argues that all the major political groupings—from the conservative advocates of a strong state under an equally strong monarch to the constitutionalists (Ustavobranitelji), the Liberals, and, still later, the Radicals—saw the Yugoslav problem only in terms of an enlarged and exclusively dominant Serbia.

Čubrilović, for the first time, points out that Garashanin was advised by Frano Zach, a Czech who was Count Czartoryski's emissary, that unification of the South Slavs could best come about if he considered the different historical backgrounds of the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes who lived under the Habsburgs. The author of the *Nachertanye,* however, only saw the realization of Yugoslavia as a part of a greater Serbia. "Ultimately Garashanin did not propose the formation of a Yugoslav but a Serbian state. That is why in his *Nachertanye* he changed the expressions 'South Slav,' 'Yugoslav,' and 'Yugoslav state' as Zach had suggested to Serb, Serbian, Serbia, and Serbian Empire (p. 178).

Actually, nineteenth and twentieth century Serbian statesmen were anxious to enlarge Serbia through union with Montenegro and through annexation of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina so as to gain direct access to the southern Adriatic. According to Čubrilović, only the socialist leader Svetozar Marković and the Radical Party before it became the organization of the Serbian rightist "bourgeoisie" and the leading spokesman for Greater-Serbism under Pashich opposed these views.

Čubrilović also deals with the Croatian response to these developments. From the time of the Illyrian Movement and from Bishop Strossmayer to the Serbo-Croatian coalition led by Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbić, he shows how leading Croatian intellectuals favored a new state that was both national and democratic, Yugoslav in essence and in form. New generations of Croats and Serbs during the Dual Empire supported an "integral Yugoslav" nationalism. Only after the "narrow Serbian" viewpoint was imposed upon the Croats and the other Yugoslav nationalities did these groups talk of federalism. Finally, only after Croatian independence was threatened by Serbian centralism did Croatian sentiment deteriorate into a movement for complete separation from Serbia.

The author also believes that the St. Vitus Constitution, the victory of the centralist state, the weak legislature and the strong, uniform executive power invested in the Serbian crown, and the Royal dictatorship of 1929 led to the disintegration of the multi-national state and brought the old Yugoslavia to the catastrophe of 1941. According to Čubrilović, the failure of Serbia to function as Piedmont did in Italy and the inability or unwillingness of Pashich and King Alexander to view Yugoslavia as a completely new state drove the Croats back to Ante Starčević's "narrow-Croat" concepts. He also argues that Radich's Croat Peasant Party, particularly after Radich's death, identified itself with the rising Croatian nationalism. Pre-war Yugoslavia, therefore, perished because the conflict between the "narrow-Serb and broad Yugoslav concept" could not be reconciled. Not surprisingly, Čubrilović insists that the Yugoslav nation was reconstructed by the Yugoslav Communist Party which resurrected Marković's ideas of socialist federalism. He neglects to point out, however, that some Croat and Serb non-socialist politicians also advanced a federal program.

This volume also introduces new socio-economic notions into Yugoslav historiography. The most original of these is Čubrilović's characterization of the Serbian peasant's patriarchal democratic life. The same analysis is applied to a lesser extent to the Croatian peasant in the Dinaric areas. The author argues that the absence of democracy in Serbia, except between 1903 and 1914 and in the whole of pre-war Yugoslavia, resulted from the rise of a merchant and town bourgeoisie as well as the emergence of an industrial class that ignored and finally eliminated the peasant from the political scene. He believes that the peasantry never succeeded in achieving the status of a "class" and therefore remained "inert" during the so-called "bourgeois" era. Had Marković's socialist notions been brought about by the Radical Party the patriarchal peasant community would have been preserved and adapted to the modern economy. Instead, under Pashich the Radical Party degenerated into the ruling elite composed of the upper strata and the city *charshya* which perpetuated the concept of Great Serbia with its medieval Kossovo connotations and protected the bureaucratic, military, and church "narrow-Serbian" elements against the new state. In an indirect fashion, he similarly blames the Croat Peasant Party for associating peasant interests with those of the Croat bourgeoisie and with "narrow-Croat nationalism" and Catholic clericalism.

In treating these events as well as in describing the role of the Communist Party, Čubrilović follows the official "pattern" and his analysis is neither objective nor scholarly. The current struggle between the Serb and Croat Communists on both Party and state policy-making levels (admitted by Tito himself in his recent denunciations of inter-party and inter-state "chauvinism," "nationalism," "localism," and "regionalism") proves that the Communist Party faces the same organic obstacles that tripped up the Serbian and Croatian "bourgeoisie" in the old Yugoslavia. Just as the author tells us that the Karageorgevichs used "the army and exposed the Yugoslav people to a *fait accompli*" (p. 533), in December 1918, so, too, did the Communists use the military in April 1945 to establish their own dictatorship. Their federal political structure has been, in fact, dominated by a monolithic "democratic centralism" which inevitably divests federalism of its vigor and true democratic meaning.

In spite of these criticisms of the latter portions of Čubrilović's study, the volume still remains a major event in Yugoslav historiography. It is the first attempt to evaluate critically the political thought that preceded the formation of modern Yugoslavia. While it is often repetitious and must be used with care, it also is a work that no serious student of nineteenth century Serbia can ignore. Čubrilović, a Serb, has made an important contribution to the understanding of Serbo-Croatian relations and presented much new material courageously, responsibly, and often truthfully.

Fairleigh Dickinson University
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BOGDAN RADITSA

Grosse Österreicher, Vol. XIII (Neue österreichische Biographie ab 1815). Zurich-Leipzig-Wien: Amalthea-Verlag, 1959. AS 138.

The thirteenth volume of the "New Austrian Biography, 1815 to date" comes up to expectations. Among its 22 character portraits are those of quite a few of lasting international significance or fame such as the writers Lenau and Anzengruber, the composers Gustav Mahler and Hugo Wolf, Francis Joseph's empress consort Elizabeth, the literary historian Wilhelm Scherer, the medieval historian Oswald Redlich and the leading statesman of the neo-absolutist period, Alexander Bach. Particularly strong are the essays on Scherer by Herbert Cysarz, on Bach by Friedrich Walter and the one on the empress by Johann Heinrich Blumenthal. The biography of Hugo Wolf by Erich Werba is extremely well written though its bibliography is entirely inadequate.

Of the lesser lights discussed in the biography, the essay on the industrialist Alexander von Schoeller by Heinrich Benedikt is an interesting contribution to nineteenth-century Austrian economic history, and the one on the Sudeten German historian at the university of Prague, Adolf Bachmann, by his grandson Harold Bachmann is an equally revealing contribution to the history of the German-Czech language conflict in Bohemia at the turn of the nineteenth century.

The essays on figures of lesser importance obviously bring up the problem of selection and adequate coverage. Two contrary standpoints are conceivable; either to allot space to the authors of these essays in proportion to the importance of their subjects, or, since men of genius are generally known and discussed or at least referred to in other biographical works, to reserve the restricted space available largely for the minor figures, who owe a limited immortality almost exclusively to the *Biographie*. Obviously, also, a compromise between both lines of thought might be possible; but if the editors have had this alternative in mind, they still lean heavily toward the second point of view in this volume. Thus the article on an industrialist hardly known beyond the Austrian borders takes up nearly three times as much space as the essays on two of Austria's foremost writers, Anzengruber and Lenau. Quite apart from their conciseness these two articles are, by the way, among the less satisfactory of the volume. Another example: the essay on Hugo Wolf, one of the greatest nineteenth-century *Lieder* composers, takes up hardly more than half the space of an article dealing with the custodian of the Egyptian collection in the Austrian federal museum of arts. The author of the biography of this respectable official acknowledges himself that "he certainly did not belong to the great conquerors of egyptology but he was a pioneer who tried honestly within the frame of his potentialities to put together many little pieces in the service of his discipline." While this may be an exceptional—though by no means a unique—case, there is no question that the selection leans heavily toward the official representatives of academic disciplines, some of them truly outstanding, all of them respectable, but quite a few of very minor significance. If representatives of literature, journalism, politics and the formal arts were not, on the whole, submitted to much tougher selective screening than academicians and their administrative counterparts, interest in the noble and in many ways very successful enterprise of the *Neue Österreichische Biographie* would undoubtedly increase still further.

A national biography cannot and should not be confined to lights of the first order; still, it should be limited to those whose light shines beyond the shadow of the parish church. As to the admittedly most complex problem of allotment of space, it might be a good principle to acknowledge that efforts toward making the obscure better known must never lead to curtailing discussion of the genius and his work.

Rutgers University ROBERT A. KANN

BECKER, OTTO, *Bismarcks Ringen um Deutschlands Gestaltung.* Herausgegeben und ergänzt von Alexander Scharff. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1958. Pp. 963. DM 58.

When Otto Becker died in 1955, he left behind an almost complete manuscript which has now been brought to conclusion, edited, and published by Alexander Scharff, his colleague at Kiel and himself a noted German historian. The result is an enormous book exhibiting the lifelong research and mature conclusions of a leading Bismarck scholar. Though it includes discussions of Bismarck's early life and his career at the diet of the German Confederation, it is mainly concerned with the decade of the 1860s, which it treats on a scale and with a thoroughness unmatched, to my knowledge, since Sybel. It is also more concerned with what happened then, rather than fifty years later.

In so massive a work as this a reviewer hesitates to make generalizations. If there is a single thesis, however, it is that Bismarck's course was neither that of irresponsible day-to-day improvisation, as A. J. P. Taylor contends, nor that of long-range conspiracy, equally irresponsible. Bismarck, as portrayed here, realistically assessed Prussia's place in Germany and Germany's place in Europe, taking some calculated risks but never rashly or with dogmatic assumptions, whether ideological or strategical. His goal was German unity on a *kleindeutsch* basis, but ideally he would have preferred a *Bundesstaat* north of the Inn within a *Staatenbund* that included Austria.

This last raises the much disputed question of dualism, and Becker's treatment of it is pivotal to the rest of the book. Elaborating on an article he published in the *Historische Zeitschift* some ten years ago, he presents an eclectic argument based on Prussian archival materials. In contrast to Chester Clark, Erich Eyck, Walter Lipgens and others, he believes that the Schönbrunn conferences of August, 1864, and the Gablenz mission of May, 1866, were sincere efforts by Bismarck to make dualism work. What makes them appear as mere tactical diversions is the national-parliament proposal of April, 1866, which on the face of things was (1) *gesamtdeutsch* in tendency and (2) patently unacceptable to Austria. But, says Becker, several internal Prussian memoranda written between April and July, 1866, by the *Vortragender Rat*, Rudolph Hepke, show that Bismarck's private plans for the parliament (1) allowed for regional differences in its competence so that North Germany could still have been more tightly unified than the rest—the *Bundesstaat*-in-*Staatenbund* idea; and (2) did not call for equal suffrage, hence might have been acceptable to Austria after all. This is evidence that earlier believers like Rudolph Stadelmann and Erich Marcks did not have, and I find it most persuasive, especially as the Hepke memoranda fit well into the federal-reform question as it stood at the time and also lead naturally to another document, the

Grundzüge of June 10, 1866, which became the basis of all subsequent constitutional drafts for the North German Confederation.

Nevertheless, says Becker, returning part way to the majority opinion, dualism was only an intermediate stage in Bismarck's planning, the North German Confederation a way-station on the road to unity. If all appeared chaos from 1866 to 1870 it was because only piecemeal progress was possible: first *Zollparlament* ties with the South German states, then military alliances, and finally federal union. Having once considered extending the three-class voting system to the Reichstag, Bismarck turned to universal and equal suffrage as alone adequate to balance particularism.

These and many other subjects Becker discusses brilliantly and exhaustively, stressing German affairs rather than Bismarck's European policy, and showing Bismarck as a rule in the best possible light. He writes from a point of view that may be characterized as national-liberal—even to making excuses for Bismarck while reprimanding him about the military reform bill and hailing the indemnification bill, not without reason, as a liberal victory. Regarding the Hohenzollern candidacy for the Spanish throne, he underestimates the influence of trends in Germany on Bismarck's actions and does not regard the Ems dispatch as proof that Bismarck wanted war. The book is also a reply to Srbik's *Deutsche Einheit* published twenty years ago. It is a gentlemanly rejoinder but Prussian nonetheless. Thus the largely hypothetical *Rheinbündlerei* of the middle states is deplorable while Bismarck's own dealings with Louis Napoleon are not inimical to German interests. Relative to the free-trade treaty of 1862, Prussia's position is equated with the interests of the Zollverein. The old Bund had some value but only "so long as Prussia was not willing or capable of forming a national state" (p. 79). By assuming that what was good for Prussia was good for Germany, Becker is able to return to the older view that Bismarck was at bottom a German nationalist. Actually the evidence assembled here seems to me to make Bismarck more than ever the Prussian particularist.

The complexities of the book and a certain prolixity will probably prevent the wide circulation the author hoped for. Nevertheless, the writing is far more lucid than one would expect to find in a work containing 120 pages of closely printed notes. Despite the author's sovereign grasp of the sources, there are a few noteworthy omissions. Not all readers will accept Arnold Oskar Meyer as a substitute for Erich Eyck, whose less laudatory biography of Bismarck is not mentioned. Other pertinent studies by Gustav Rein, Rudolf Morsey, W. E. Mosse, and George G. Windell were published only after Becker's death. In the concluding chapters Scharff attempts to fill the gaps, explicitly devoting a full paragraph (p. 700) to Windell (*The Catholics and German Unity*, [Minneapolis, 1954]), but he wisely refrains from amending Becker's work. For the latter stands on its own solid foundations, a major contribution to scholarship, and a monument to the man who wrote it.

University of Kentucky ENNO E. KRAEHE

FISCHER, GEORGE, *Russian Liberalism from Gentry to Intelligenzia*: Russian Research Center Studies, vol. XXX. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. $4.50.

The author's thesis is that the "militants within Russian liberalism who were on the rise . . . came to influence Russia's history more and more" (p. ix). He states that his thesis has been shaped "by the historical context of have-not liberalism: an underdeveloped society," (p. viii) and he discusses the dilemma of trying to attain liberalism "in an illiberal, underdeveloped society" (p. 203).

He shows that the less militant gentry liberals, because of the power of the state, settled in the 1860s to 1890s for "small deeds" largely within the *zemstva,* whether idealizing reform from above, attempting to strengthen autocracy as a guarantor of non-political individual liberties, or promoting a constitution with the crown under the law. The intelligenzia or professional class, working in professional organizations and the *zemstva,* advocated either moderate liberalism close to that of the gentry or stressed the need for social reforms which precluded any real *rapprochement* with the gentry. Elements prepared to collaborate with liberals, such as "legal" populism, "legal" Marxism and "Economism," were a "Third Force" reinforcing stress on social reform. Paradoxically, when the needs of industrialization were inducing state economic intervention, the active liberal movement, coalescing immediately before the Revolution of 1905, stressed democracy. In the turmoil attendant on the Russo-Japanese War, the division widened between moderates who were patriotic and militants who anticipated political triumph through military defeat. The constitutionalism of the gentry liberals won with the help of some of the professional intelligenzia. The militant liberals' desertion in 1917 signaled the final failure of liberalism.

The author proves his thesis only partially, for he demonstrates the temporary triumph of the gentry liberals. It is in his projections into Russia's history from 1905-1917, which is not the subject of his book, that support for his thesis may be found; nonetheless, he demonstrates the important rôle played by the "professional" liberals. His concern with the dilemma of underdeveloped societies, i.e. whether to seek liberal goals by illiberal means, is of vital significance to political theorists and politicians today. How did Russia's underdevelopment in fact produce the dilemma? Unfortunately he merely postulates the necessity of a *bourgeoisie* with business interests, asserts its absence in Russia, and thereto ascribes the fateful success of the militant intelligenzia liberals.

The author might be criticized for not having explained his methodology. At root he appears to have his own methodological dilemma. He seems basically to be testing a hypothesis, not merely interpreting data. He apparently alternates between typological analysis, dear to the sociologist, and the interpretation of data in chronological sequence characteristic of the conventional historian. Consequently parts of his book seem more clearly to indicate patterns through representative persons or events while others, especially Chapter IV, describe developments in great detail. A further consequence is that some definitions, such as that of liberalism, are constants while other definitions, such as that of the intelligenzia, shift.

Generally accurate, the author minimizes that state activity prior to 1850 which created the need for a professional middle class (p. 48).

The useful and extensive bibliography does not contain in recognizable form all items to which there are references in footnotes. Roughly one item in six is missing. A good index, remarkable freedom from misprints, and an attractive and readable type deserve mention.

Despite some of the aforementioned shortcomings, the author challenges us through his often brilliant insights to reconsider the significance of Russian liberalism and the application of sociology to history.

University of Kansas **Oswald P. Backus**

Kalninš, Bruno, *Latvijas Social Demokratijas 50 Gadi* (Fifty Years of the Latvian Socialdemocratic Party). Stockholm: L.S.D.S.P. Arzemju Komitejas Izdevums, 1956. Pp. 377.

This book can be thoroughly recommended as a clear, well-organized, and interesting account of the fifty years' history of the Latvian Socialdemocratic Party. For a long time there has been a need for a work dealing with the role of the Latvian Socialist Party in recent Latvian history.

But the author is in danger of being criticized for what he has not done, instead of being praised for what he has done. It seems that an impartial and well-rounded recent Latvian history cannot be reasonably expected from a leading Socialist writing the history of his own party. In so far as the history of the Latvian Socialist Party is concerned, the author has demonstrated many outstanding qualities. His style is characterized by clarity and precision. The author is by no means a doctrinaire, for he has stressed the necessity of adapting the party's program to the changing needs and conditions in Latvia. The work shows an open-minded attitude. The author has presented several valuable and original interpretations. Above all, the book expresses a highly critical attitude regarding the shortcomings and defects of the Socialist Party, especially its left wing. The Latvian Socialist Party is criticized by Kalninš for its strong disinclination to form coalition governments with the Latvian bourgeois parties, unless the Socialists would have had a majority in such governments (p. 223). Considered as a whole, the criticism of the bourgeois parties is constructive rather than destructive. Kalninš has both the advantages and disadvantages of being an eyewitness of the most significant events described in his book—namely, those dealing with creation of the independent Latvia, the period of its independence, the fall of Latvia, the foreign domination of Latvia, and the Latvian Socialists in exile. The author has correctly emphasized the role of the Socialist Party in the independent Latvia in regard to the framing of the Constitution of Latvia, the radical land reform of 1922, and the promulgation of many laws of social legislation.

Although the book is by no means primarily concerned with history, it seems that some biases and misinterpretations concerning historical facts should be mentioned. The author is strongly inclined to be overcritical of the activities of the Farmers' Union, the strongest bourgeois party in independent Latvia, disregarding the fact that this party usually formed the core of the coalition governments. Above all, Kalninš tends to misinterpret the policies and to deny the great achievements of the leader of the Farmers' Union, President Karlis Ulmanis, the actual creator of Latvia and its strong man. The author ignores the fact that most Latvians have considered and still consider Ulmanis as an epoch-making personality in Latvian history. Kalninš does not give due consideration to the fact that the moderate and benevolent dictatorship of Karlis Ulmanis was a result of the rise of dictatorships in Soviet Russia, Poland, Germany, Lithuania, Estonia, and most other European States in the period between the two world wars. From the historical point of view it seems that the dictatorship of Ulmanis was a historical necessity rather than the result of the allegedly vicious tactics and attitude of Ulmanis. The author even asserts that during the dictatorship of Ulmanis the democratic constitution of Latvia was abolished (p. 334), although, in fact, Ulmanis only suspended (1934-1940) the operation of some of the constitutional institutions.

Regardless of the fact that most Latvians will not agree with several of the author's interpretations, it should be recognized that he has written the work with a deep love for his native country. If his book cannot be recognized as a work of

Latvian history, it nevertheless contains many substantial primary sources and materials which will be valuable to historians dealing with Latvian history.

High Point College ALEXANDER V. BERKIS

KISZLING, RUDOLF, *Österreich-Ungarns Anteil am Ersten Weltkrieg*. Vienna: Stiasny Verlag, 1958. Pp. 96.

Rudolf Kiszling, former imperial-royal general staff officer, retired director of the Austrian military archives and well-known author of volumes on the revolution of 1848 in Austria, on Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, and most recently on the history of the Croats, has set himself a new task. In a small volume of less than 100 pages he presents the history of Austria-Hungary's military "share in the First World War." This title is insofar a misnomer as the discussion of the substantial activities of the Austro-Hungarian navy are confined to one chapter heading and a footnote in another chapter. Mr. Kiszling refers to the official seven-volume treatise of the Austrian War Archive, "Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, 1914-1918" as his most important source. The use of any other sources is not easily discernible since the volume contains neither a bibliography nor bibliographical footnotes. In spite of the briefness and succinctness of Kiszling's presentation and the commendable simplicity and lucidity of his style, the absence of an index in the discussion of a complex subject with so many interdependent theatres of action makes orientation rather difficult for the reader.

Kiszling's previous works have been characterized by a definite preference for the authoritarian personality, the German-centralistic approach to the empire's problems, with heavy emphasis on the word "German" and a somewhat uncritical but altogether praiseworthy respect and love for the old monarchy. All of these features make their appearance in the present volume. The author's main hero is Conrad, undoubtedly a military leader of brilliant strategical abilities but not unchallenged achievements. Anyway, an overall impartial evaluation of Conrad cannot dwell on his strategy alone but has to take his military policy into account as well, which should lower the score considerably. As to Kiszling's national preference, it is particularly apparent in his conclusions which rate the Austrian national groups according to military proficiency, largely based on the casualty rates in national percentages. Whether such an argumentation is conclusive may be open to doubt, yet it seems certain that the pattern of such discussion is not in line with the supranational tradition of the bygone army.

To be sure, this tradition means much to the author. If further testimony to the courage and endurance of the imperial-royal forces were needed, then Kiszling offers an additional piece of evidence. Does this evidence pertain to the overall leadership of the army as well? It is less easy to answer this question. For once the author's presentation compares with the analysis of a game of chess, where only the moves of one player are analyzed and those of the opponent—Austria-Hungary's enemies—are largely ignored. True, this manner of treatment is typical of many an official military history including Kiszling's above-noted main source. If this may serve as an excuse, the briefness of the author's presentation may not. On the contrary, the reader of the voluminous official works of military history will inevitably supplement his knowledge by perusal of the official military works of the other side. The reader of Kiszling's terse narrative will hardly have that opportunity. Accordingly a more critical analysis, not only of success but of reasons for failure—for instance Potiorek's campaign in Serbia in December 1914 or the defensive against the Brussilow offensive in Galicia in summer 1917—would have been desirable. Such a critical approach would not have impaired the standing of Austria's in many ways imaginative and resourceful military leadership, it would have given Kiszling's positive evaluation much greater weight. A student of recent works on Austrian military history, such as Regele's biographies of Conrad and Radetzky and now Kiszling's study, cannot help thinking that less unqualified praise would command more respect for more than respectable efforts.

Rutgers University Robert A. Kann

Prokopowitsch, Erich: *Das Ende der österreichischen Herrschaft in der Bukowina.* Buchreihe der Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission, Munich: Oldenbourg, vol. 2, 1959. Pp. 70. DM 7.50.

This small study, based on extensive research in the Austrian archives, gives an interesting picture of the last months of Austria's rule in her easternmost crownland, the Bukovina. An impartial and concise account is rendered of the Austrian provincial administration, the final struggle between the two major national groups, Rumanians and Ruthenians, and the transfer of power executed with a minimum of bloodshed. Of particular interest is the publication of a secret addendum to the peace treaty of Brest-Litowsk between Austria-Hungary and the new Ukrainian republic, according to which East Galicia and Bukovina were to be united in a new crownland with a Ruthenian majority. Such a change was to be brought about within the following months by all constitutionally admissible means. Since such constitutional means obviously could not be employed against Rumanian and above all Polish opposition, Austria was forced to renounce this agreement and thereby create an additional reason why the widely publicized "Brotfrieden" with the Ukraine proved to be a complete disappointment. The incident of this irresponsible promise confirms also the impression of a minor tragedy within the major one of the Austrian collapse; namely that in the most critical period of the war two of the most unfortunate statesmen were largely in control of the affairs of the monarchy, the brilliant but cynical and shifty Count Czernin as foreign minister and the narrow Cisleithanian Austrian prime minister, von Seidler, perhaps the least imaginative holder of this office in Austria's constitutional period.

The charge of irresponsibility and ineptness does not apply to the crownland administration of Bukovina and not to many other crownland administrations at that either. The author rightly points to the character of a humane, judicial and clean management of affairs which succeeded in maintaining law and order under the most difficult conditions. This type of Austrian government has left a record which compares well with that of the Turkish past and the national Rumanian and Russian Soviet future. While an impartial supranational administration was unable to stir up enthusiastic approval, it succeeded in maintaining loyalty among the population as long as the empire stood a fair chance of preservation, though certainly not beyond that situation.

Unfortunately Mr. Prokopowitsch misses the opportunity to analyze reasons for the relatively favorable situation in the Bukovina. The phenomenon of national equilibrium as consolidating political factor is not discussed, though—apart from Istria—Bukovina was the only crownland without an absolute national majority and consequently without national minorities in a technical sense. The ingenious crownland constitution of 1910 which gave six national groups representation on the basis of personal autonomy, is not even mentioned.

On the other hand, some cliché concepts might well have been avoided. This side of the Iron Curtain the declaration that imperial Austria was not a "Völkerkerker" has grown as stale and superfluous as just about any phrase used in historical texts. More irritating is the allegation that the national irredenta movement in the crownland was exclusively due to the machinations of the radical Rumanian and Ruthenian intellectuals—in plain English the eggheads. If there is one thing clear in the controversial history of national movements, it is the fact that such movements in their earlier political stages cluster around groups of educated leaders and spread from such a nucleus. To be sure, extraneous forces have quite arbitrarily intervened in the affairs of the peoples of the Bukovina, but neither before nor after 1918 have their actions supported the notion of a narrow basis of regional nationalism.

Within the limitations outlined, Mr. Prokopowitsch's study is a decidedly useful contribution to the history of the last phase of nationalism in imperial Austria.

Rutgers University ROBERT A. KANN

KOSTIĆ, LAZO M., *Sporni Predeli Srba i Hrvata.* Chicago: The American Institute for Balkan Affairs (1525 W. Diversey Parkway, Chicago 14), 1957. Pp. 492. $5.

The literature on the national problem in Yugoslavia has never suffered from a shortage of pamphleteers who have tackled the subject from a variety of angles and motives. Since the formation of Yugoslavia most of this literature, ephemeral rather than scholarly, has been the work of writers denouncing the new state as a manifestation of Serb hegemony and as a source of friction in the Balkans. The rulers of Yugoslavia, whether monarchist or Communist, usually tried to refute these charges by insisting in their propaganda that they had solved or were on the point of solving the national problem, and that the opposition to the Yugoslav state was confined to an insignificant minority, acting for a foreign power or out of selfish class interests.

The repeated demands for independence on the part of a significant section of Croat opinion and the large-scale massacres of the Serb population in the wartime "Independent State of Croatia" gave rise to a particular school of thought among Serbs in exile, to which Dr. Kostić belongs. This school has devoted its attention to a re-examination of Serbo-Croat relations, to a refutation of the arguments used by Croat intellectuals against Serbs, and the presentation of the Serb case for certain territories in Yugoslavia, to which Croat nationalists have laid claim. Importance is attached to the territorial issue because complete separation or clearly defined frontiers between the two nations, joined at most in a loose confederation, is thought to be in the best interests of Serbs and Croats, in view of the difficulty of running Yugoslavia successfully on democratic principles.

Dr. Kostić, a native of Dalmatia and a former professor on the law faculty at Ljubljana and Belgrade universities, is the author of several books on this theme. All of them are marred by a certain shapelessness and a rather diffuse style. The one under review deals with the Serb population on territory comprising the present People's Republic of Croatia. The student of Yugoslav affairs, who has the patience to wade through a mass of ill-digested material, mostly culled from non-Serb sources, will come across a certain amount of interesting information, statistical and otherwise. This covers Serb migration into Dalmatia and Croatia from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, the status Serbs enjoyed under Habsburg rule, the attempts of the existing authorities and of the Croats to absorb or expel them, and of the Catholic church to convert them. Though the methods used varied a great deal and pressure was seldom absent, the Serbs refused in many instances to give up their faith, and resisted to the best of their ability. The existence and numeric strength of the Serb element in several parts of Croatia was noticed by many foreign observers, whom Dr. Kostić quotes at some length in support of his thesis. Much attention is also devoted to the brutal wartime massacres by which the Croat Ustasi hoped to get rid of this resilient minority and widen the gulf between the two nations. Not that very much was needed to achieve the latter, as readers of Dr. Kostić's book might well conclude.

University of Manitoba IVAN AVAKUMOVIĆ

SCHMIDT-HANNOVER, OTTO, *Umdenken oder Anarchie, Männer-Schicksale-Lehren.* Göttinger Verlagsanstalt, 1959. Pp. 393.

To Germans, to whom the work is addressed, and to students of twentieth century German affairs, for whom the volume is required reading, the author is well-known. He was a prominent member of the German National Peoples Party (DNVP) of Weimar days, the young right-hand man of its leader, the indomitable Alfred Hugenberg, a *Stahlhelmer*, and continues to be a representative of the conservative, monarchical, Prussian-German, national Right whose colors are those of Imperial Germany, Black-White-Red. Perhaps not so well-known is the author's role in the various crises which mark German developments since the World War I, e.g., the presidential candidacy and election of Hindenburg in 1925, the split of the DNVP in 1929-30, Harzburg 1931, party negotiations in 1932-33, or his relations with other prominent persons of that time, Hindenburg, Tirpitz, Brüning, Papen, Schleicher, et al., which the volume discloses in detail.

In this sense it is a "memoir," but actually the volume is a work of many facets. It is, in part, a biography of Hugenberg, a memorial to his patriotic service, not without criticism of his official mistreatment and neglect by the Bonn Government. It is, in part, a political polemic; in part, a philosophical treatise; in part, applied history.

It proposes, idealistically, a new Germany, involving resettlement of the expellees, burying of divisive resentments, checking the present anarchy—a collective, forward-moving task to be guided by the evidence of history. "To help point out this evidence is the reason for writing the book, its justification, and its appearance at this time" (p. 77).

Furthermore, the whole work is set philosophically within the frame of its title. It opens with recognition of the present world anarchy, world revolution, sparked by Marx and his disciples. The present dismemberment of Germany is reminiscent of the primitive anarchy of the Thirty Years War and furthers "das Umdenken." (p.12) It closes with recognition that the reality of the present can be illuminated by the light of truth and suffering only "wenn wir umdenken lernen." (p. 375)

In between, the author introduces his involved concept of "Gegen-Idee" (chapter 5), a counter-idea to the anarchical world situation, a force against anarchy as counter-revolution is a force against revolution. Thus, the counter-idea is the naturally healthy against the diseased, respect for life and the dignity of man against mass thinking and collectivism, sanity against insanity, the spiritual against the mechanistic. Conservatism against Socialism. "The counter-idea has an extraordinary intellectual and linguistic confusion to overcome." (p.64) In statements of Hoover, Dulles, Nehru, Grenfell et al., "we meet the counter-idea." (p. 65) And again, the splitting of the German national middle class into two parties, DNVP and DVP, "weakened the driving power of the counter-idea." (p. 166) Meanwhile, the author elaborates the thesis of his title, applied to Germany, partly in historical narrative, partly in a running commentary on Prussian and

German history, partly in a critique of past and present errors, partly in analysis of historical "ifs", partly in defense of the correctness of "deutschnationale" warnings and prophecies, and wholly from a conservative point of view.

Schmidt-Hannover writes with that passionate, patriotic, oratorical eloquence which once defeated Goebbels. He quotes extensively from his wide reading to make his points, or to question those of others. He describes familiar landscapes and historical geography with romatic flair. He extols in glowing terms the role of Prussia, the values of the Prussian tradition, in Germany history and reminds his countrymen of the artificiality of the present situation. Above all he writes sincerely out of deep concern for the destiny of Germany, the preservation of her Prussian inheritance, the world situation, and calls upon the Germans to think through on the *whole evidence* of their history the answer to anarchy.

University of California, Santa Barbara HENRY M. ADAMS

BURGHARDT, ANDREW F., *The Political Geography of Burgenland.* (National Research Council Publication 587) Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1958. Pp. xii, 352. $2.00.

This is the first attempt in any language at a comprehensive historico-geographic analysis of the entire *Burgenland*, the western half of former Western Hungary, and now the easternmost province of Austria. Its author investigated the area under the financial sponsorship of the Geography Branch, Office of Naval Research. The result of the on-the-spot original research is a fascinating and unique study of the operative integration of a province, "lacking all that seems essential to a European political unit." In 1961 the Burgenland will be 40 years old. It is now a province with a useful network of communications, with a viable economy, with a proud consciousness of provincial patriotism—all lacking in 1921. 11 tables and 43 carefully drawn maps enhance this study.

Its core is geographic and geo-political descriptive analysis, following Prof. Richard Hartshorne's conceptualization. Against the background of minute detail in climatic, demographic and physical geography, Burghardt explains the making of the new political frontier and the Sopron plebiscite of 1921. The Burgenland is fragmented by typographic features. It did not have a capital city with government buildings until 1930. The principle of national self-determination, moreover, had disrupted natural trade areas. It was really not until after 1945 that the Burgenland progressed rapidly towards viability.

This province contains three minorities, the Croats, Magyars and Lutherans. Despite constitutional protection and a vital and thriving folkloristic life, the statistics show a steady process of Austrianization, due, mainly, to economic pressure. Yet, in the 1951 Austrian census of the 320 Burgenland "Gemeinden", 39 had still a Croat and 3 a Magyar majority, 12.6% and 2.8% respectively of the total population. (1920: 15%-8%; 1923: 14.1%-5.2%; 1934: 13.2%-3.5%.) In this connection one should mention the excellent study, also used by Burghardt, of this process of assimilation in Burgenland's Croatian villages, Josef Húrský, *Vylidňováni a asimilace slovanských obci v Gradišti,* Slovanský ústav v Praze, 1952, pp. 372. 13 maps.

It is to be expected that the historian and political scientist will criticize some historical and political aspects of the study. Burghardt would be less vulnerable had he utilized some of the most recent Burgenland literature, bearing directly on the historico-political development of the Burgenland.

Two handsome surveys of the history, cultural and economic developments of the Burgenland are Dr. F. F. Horomy, *Das Burgenland-Buch*, Vienna, Burgenland-verlag, 1950, pp. 161, 40 ill.; Burgenländisches Volksbildungswerk, *Mein Heimatvolk-Mein Heimatland,* Eisenstadt, 1951, pp. 361, 8 ill.

The province's outstanding historian offers a detailed analysis of early Burgenland history: Dr. Fritz Zimmermann, *Die vormadjarische Besiedlung des burgenländischen Raumes,* Eisenstadt, Landesarchiv, 1954, pp. 130. The evidence presented in it—$1/3$ of all villages have Slavic names; Croats settled in the 16th century preferably in Alpine Slovene villages (example: Steingraben/Bojane-Boolinja-Bonyancze); archeological evidences of Illyrian, Celtic, Avar Slav continuous settlements, besides later Bavarian and Magyar outposts; and much else—contradicts Burghardt's adoption of the Magyar "catastrophe" theory in their settlement of 900 A.D.

Linguistic research continues to unearth new evidences for a continuous settlement theory; Ivan Dobrovic, *Iz stare domovine u nepoznatu,* Sauerbrunn, Selbstverlag, 1952, 64 pp., 4 ill.; Karl Semmelweis, *Verzeichnis der burgenländischen Ortsnamen nebst ihren Bezeichnungen in magyarischer und kroatischer Sprache,* Eisenstadt, Landesarchiv, 1954, pp. 36; Eberhard Kranzmayer & Karl Bürger, *Burgenländisches Siedlungsbuch,* Eisenstadt, Landesarchiv, 1957, pp. 300, 6 maps. The last study presents entirely new material undermining the conventional view. Settlement continuity is proven in innumerable cases. Strongest appears to be the Alpine Slovene tenacity ever since the sixth century. Lombard settlements have been discovered and among the so-called Magyars of 900 A.D. some Petchenegs and Poles have been identified. Later, Rumanians came also with the Croats, making little Burgenland a composite of many peoples.

Finally, two publications series were started by the provincial government, the *Allgemeine Landestopographie des Burgenlandes,* and *Urkundenbuch des Burgenlandes.* In the former, vol. I, *Der Verwaltungsbezirk Neusiedl am See,* Eisenstadt, Landesarchiv, 1954, pp. 431, 105 ill., 1 map, is indispensable for the political geography of the Burgenland. Equally important and handsome is vol. I in the second series, *Die Urkunden von 808 bis 1270,* Graz, Böhlau, 1955, pp. 482, W. Goldinger, R. Neck, H. Wagner and E. Zöllner present 585 documents in their Latin original with German text summaries.

Burghardt describes also the Burgenland gypsies. Unfortunately he overlooked the standard work by Johann Knobloch, *Romani-Texte aus dem Burgenland; Berichte, Erzählungen und Märchen der burgenländischen Zigeuner, aufgezeichnet, übersetzt und mit sprachlichen Bemerkungen versehen,* Eisenstadt, Landesarchiv, 1953, pp. 100. Tragic in this study is Knobloch's "laboratory"—the Nazi concentration camp of Lackenbach where Burgenland's gypsies were exterminated from 12,000 (1938) to 4,000 (1951).

The special student of the Czech corridor theory, of the Burgenlanders in the United States, of Austrian-Hungarian relations and the like, as well as the student of Central European affairs in general, will be highly rewarded by consulting all of the above. Burghardt deserves thanks for opening the question for the American reader.

Iona College ERNST F. WINTER

MARKERT, WERNER, *Osteuropa-Handbuch: Polen.* Köln, Gratz, Böhlau Verlag, 1959. Pp. xxxii, 829. $11.82.

This mammoth study of well over eight hundred pages is the second volume of the series of handbooks on Eastern Europe to appear in Germany. The first volume dealt with Yugoslavia; the second is devoted to Poland.

When perusing this big work one receives a highly favorable impression. Individual chapters are written by excellent specialists, to mention only such historians as Gotthold Rhode, Hans Roos, or Werner Conze; the book is produced with a thoroughness of which the Germans can be rightly proud; statistical tables, lists of governments and treaties, brief biographical notices, extensive bibliographies, maps, and an excellent index—all these make the volume a mine of easily accessible and well-arranged information.

A more careful analysis of the volume reveals certain shortcomings and raises some doubts. To begin with the general organization, the book is divided into three parts, the first dealing with prewar Poland, the second with the wartime period, the third with Poland after the second World War. The last part is by far the longest, which seems only natural given the character of this publication. The first part appears sizable enough to give a fairly good picture of the old Polish Republic. It is, however, the middle part which raises doubts. To devote fifty-six pages to the war period might perhaps be defensible if we adopt a strictly arithmetic formula—after all, only six years are discussed here—but if one thinks of the tremendous influence of the war and Nazi occupation on present-day Poland the brevity of this section appears striking.

Without being unfair to the editor one has the feeling that this brevity is not accidental, and a careful reading of the introduction reveals a tendency which seems to pervade most of the book.

Werner Markert strikes an interesting note in his opening remarks. He tries to introduce a more balanced approach to the study of Poland by Germans, and while doing so emphasizes the elements which made for good-neighborly relations in the past and plays down such notions as *Erbfeindschaft* (hereditary enmity). This is laudable enough but leads at times to a rather euphemistic treatment of differences. It is doubtful if by minimizing German anti-Polish policies and playing up, though very discretely, anti-German moves by Poland one obtains a balanced picture. Will such a book fulfill its educational purpose with regard to the German public? This is more doubtful still.

Constant references to Western Polish territories as *Ostdeutschland* may well be understandable in the context of present-day German politics, but it may baffle a less sophisticated Western reader, who generally uses this term for Eastern Germany or the "German Democratic Republic." Why practically all maps include the pre-1944 German borders in the East is more of a puzzle. Surely the object of the editor could not be to remind the German reader of the *Brennende Grenze* resulting form the *Diktat* of Versailles? Even the present German government does not claim any territories prior to 1937. These may be small things, but in a scholarly volume aiming at a fair presentation of Poland to the German public in a spirit of realism one may doubt if they were absolutely necessary.

The section which deals with prewar Poland contains good historical chapters by Conze and Roos. They are critical of Polish statesmanship, and one cannot help feeling that this criticism could have been moderated by a more sympathetic attitude which might lead at times to more genuine understanding. The chapter on economics does not put sufficient stress on the destruction of Polish economy by the First World War, and this devastation has surely to be borne in mind to explain many of the postwar shortcomings. In the discussion of churches in Poland there is a good deal of interesting material, but also some that is debatable. One is struck by a tendency to equate the Protestant churches in Poland with *Deutschtum,* at best an oversimplification. There is no mention of the Arminian-

Catholic rite, nor can one find any reference to the outstanding Archbishop of Lwów, Teodorowicz.

The chapter by Beranek on the Jews is even more questionable. The author devoted one (1) page to the extermination of Polish Jewry during the second World War. His remarks about the ghettoes are a masterpiece of understatement. After this laconic and unimaginative description Beranek moves on rapidly to postwar conditions and, as if to offset the impression created by the previous page, describes postwar "Pogroms" which "*über Tausend Opfer forderten*" (p. 125). This is startling information, and Beranek does not reveal his source. According to all existing accounts no such pogroms took place in postwar Poland, except for the Kielce riot almost certainly provoked by the security police. Unless Beranek produces some evidence to support his allegation, which smacks of the familiar German propaganda after the First World War—one remembers well the contemptuous German reference to Poland of 1919 as the "pogrom zone"—the reader will feel that perhaps there are more things in this book which need to be treated with a measure of skepticism.

The length of the chapter dealing with the German minority in Poland—twenty-nine pages—is understandable because of the special interest for the German reader, but it may appear exaggerated to an outsider. This chapter touches naturally on very delicate political problems and it is hard to expect a hundred per cent objectivity. To make it more balanced the author should have mentioned in his background remarks the *Kulturkamf* and the *Hakate,* two terms well-remembered by Poles who lived side by side with Germans in Poznania. Polish policies toward the German minority after Versailles were surely colored by such souvenirs of the past. When discussing the growth of National Socialism among the Germans in Poland the author's leniency toward them is remarkable and his general tone that of an apologist. The Germans living outside the Reich saw only the brightest sides of Nazism; their subsequent co-operation with the Nazi rule in Poland after 1939 was half-hearted and reluctant. On the other hand, the German minority before the war is represented as "*mit Vernichtung bedrohte Minderheit*" (p. 152) and two authors in the volume, Walter Kuhn and Hans Roos, relate with seeming gusto the "*Bromberger Blutsontag*" of September 3, 1939. While this "massacre" of the Germans was grossly exaggerated by Nazi propaganda—the figure then given was 60,000 Germans—Kuhn and Roos, fully aware of the exaggeration, speak of some 7,000 victims. They fail to produce convincing evidence for this figure (Roos in fact quotes Kuhn). However reprehensible the killing of Germans in Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) on the third day of Nazi aggression on Poland, one must remember also the Polish side of the story, namely the shooting by the Germans of Polish troops which seemingly started the riot. An impartial investigation would certainly be called for to establish the facts once and for all.

Whatever one can say about the forcible transfer of the Germans from Poland after Potsdam, and Walter Kuhn says plenty, his final remark that the departure of the Germans severed one link binding Poland to the West is perhaps not very happy. It sounds like an echo of a well-known phrase about the German mission in the East and the "*Kulturträgers.*"

The section dealing with Poland during the Second World War, apart from its brevity, is also characterized by a laconic style. It certainly could not give an idea of what the Poles went through during the years of the German occupation and why they still regard it as a nightmare. It is surprising indeed how a historian of Roos' reputation could write a chapter in which neither executions of hostages nor the names of any of the infamous concentration camps are so much as mentioned. KZ Majdanek does not even appear in the index. Rhode's section on Polish activities abroad relegates the story of the armed forces to a footnote which contains, however, a reference to the once overpublicized incidents concerning desertion of some Jews from the Polish army in England. Since Rhode refers to these, possibly Soviet-inspired incidents, by using such terms of *"Massdesertionen und Rassenhass"* (p. 206), one can only hope that he is misinformed about their real nature. In discussing internal Polish problems under the German occupation there is no reference to the program of Underground Poland of 1944 which foresaw far-reaching social reforms. The small but influential Democratic Party (SD) is also ignored.

The limits of this review do not permit a thorough examination of the bulky third part of *Polen* which deals with postwar Poland. Much of it is of a noncontroversial character and represents a large accumulation of information and data. The numerous chapters on economics are somewhat unimaginative; they shun analysis and in the few cases when such analysis is attempted it is clumsy. There are occasional gaps and minor mistakes in the other chapters.

The section devoted to Poilsh learning and culture ought to have mentioned such philosophers as Fathers Michalski and Bocheński, whose names should have also appeared with several others in the chapter on the Catholic Church (this chapter, moreover, is presented in a far too critical fashion which does not take into account many of the Church's intellectual achievements). A sculptor such as Marian Wnuk, and painters such as Jacek and Marek Zulawski and Juliusz Studnicki, to mention only a few, should have appeared in the text. Among some of the mistakes—remarkably few in a volume of this size, a tribute to the thoroughness of the editor—one finds reference to Bishop Sapieha (who was an archbishop), Andrzej Witos as being a nephew of Wincenty instead of his brother, Ochab's age as twenty-nine (which is contradicted in the biographical note), and Józef Lipski as a German officer in the First World War, whereas he was in exile in Switzerland.

The bibliography at the end of the volume is selective and well chosen. One could mention two omissions in the writings on the Second World War, namely Edward Rozek's *Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland* and this reviewer's *Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers: 1940-1943.*

This review naturally cannot do full justice to such an immense work as the handbook on Poland. My object here was to emphasize the informative character of this publication, which is impressive, draw the reader's attention to the usefulness of the volume as a work of reference, and warn him at the same time about some more obvious shortcomings which, to my mind at least, result partly from a certain tendency which pervades the entire work.

Indiana University PIOTR S. WANDYCZ

KOS, MILKO, ed., *Letopis Slovenske akademije znanosti in umetnosti* (Yearbook of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts), Book IX, 1958. Ljubljana: Slovenska Akademija znanosti in umetnosti, 1959. Pp. 195. 400 din.

The Slovenes are a nation in an organic more than in a formalistic sense of the word. Unlike "historic" nations, they have not filled the pages of history with dynastic names or achievements of organized militarism. What bound them together, across the provincial borders, was mainly their language, which they have preserved through centuries, protecting it from becoming a mixed language and ultimately making it into a worthy tool of artistic as well as scientific expression. Thus, it is psychologically understandable that the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (called before and during World War II the Academy of Sciences and Arts) is for the Slovenes not merely a lofty institution but, in a certain sense, also a symbol of their nationhood.

The 1958 *Yearbook* gives an informative picture of the activities of the Academy in that year, during which it had 32 regular and 22 correspondent members. Longer articles commemorate the members deceased in 1958: Rajko Nahtigal, Jagić's disciple; Izidor Cankar, art historian; Franc Ksav. Lukman, Church historian; Andrija Štampar, former president of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb, who contributed greatly to the growth of Yugoslav medicine; and Kazimierz Nitsch, Poland's eminent Slavic philologist. Poet Oton Župančič (1878-1949) and architect Jože Plečnik (1872-1957) were also members of the Academy during their lives. Plečnik's Zaherlhaus in Vienna, built at the turn of the century, helped to introduce modernistic architectural tendencies still prevailing today. Already before World War I, and along with Ivan Meštrović, Plečnik took the leading role in Yugoslav art. In Prague he restored the Hradčany, and his numerous buildings in Ljubljana have left a lasting imprint on that city.

Much of the work of the Academy takes place in its institutes. Somewhat unique is the Institute for the Research of the Karst, appropriately located in Postojna, whose cavern is a mecca for speleologists from all parts of the world. In Postojna is also the Speleobiological Laboratory of the Biological Institute. The research of new Orientalistic Institute, which began its work in 1958, is devoted to study of the law systems of the cuneiform writing cultures. In the Institute for the Slovenian Language, work on the *Slovenian Dictionary* has been continued; 158,000 new excerpt cards were made in 1958, extending the total collection of vocabulary cards beyond the two million mark. For the *Slovenian Etymological Dictionary*, 1500 sheets have been filled with entries so far, and the systematic work on letters A and B has been completed. Incidentally, the etymological manuscripts of the late Anton Breznik of the Academy were destroyed by the National Socialists during the German occupation, together with the rich library of Bishop's Junior College, north of Ljubljana. The size of the *Slovenian Orthography* going to press in 1960 exceeds the 1950 edition by one third, with many additions in technological and special vocabulary. Scheduled for printing in 1959 were the ninth volume of the *Slovenian Biographical Lexicon* and the first book of Fran Levac's letters.

The so-called "big institutes": the Chemical Institute "Boris Kidrič", the Institute for Electrical Economy, and the Institute for Turbine Machines, are financially independent of the Academy. Their total personnel numbers 200.

The Library of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts (not to be confused with the National and University Library in Ljubljana) contains 70,000 volumes, some of which are located in the institutes. The 1958 accessions of the library numbered 7,000. Although only a negligible amount of foreign currency has been allotted to the Library for purchases of books abroad, a considerable number of foreign publications were acquired in exchange for the publications of the Academy. There are 690 foreign institutions which exchange publications with the Academy; for example, the Library of Congress, the Laboratory of Physiological Hygiene of Minneapolis, the Australian Speleological Federation, Moskovskij institut heimičeskogo mašinostroenija, and Hidh íslenzka fornleifafjelag of Reykjavík.

The Academy's activities in 1958 are certainly laudable. Although it published less in 1958, mainly because the printers were overloaded with work, there was an increase in manuscripts received for publication. Members of the Academy had works published in Yugoslavia and abroad. And through the increased travel of scientists to and from Yugoslavia, associations with institutions in other countries were broadened and intensified.

Aberdeen, S. D. Northern State Teachers College TOUSSAINT HOČEVAR

KRÁL, VACLAV, *Otazky hospodarskêho a socialniho vyvoje v Českých zemich, 1938-1945,* Volume III. Prague: (Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences), 1959. Pp. 377. 32.50 KČS.

This book, The Problems of Economic and Social Development in Czech Lands, focuses its attention on the critical period of the Czech economy, that of the Nazi occupation during World War II. The economy of the subjugated Czechoslovakia had to perform an unwelcome assignment: to serve the Nazi economy in a war effort which, if successful, was to spell doom for the Czechs. Although the Nazis did not hide their contempt for the Czechs, and although they made it clear that they are determined to dispose of the Czech question once for all either by forceful transfer or through germanization they could not help but attempt to marshal every bit of strength. Due to their "inferiority" the Czechs could not be integrated into the Nazi armed forces but Czech manpower was by all means to be utilized in production and other menial tasks. Czech feelings obviously did not matter. Pressure, intimidation, reprisals and executions were designed to take care of that problem.

The Czechs were needed for productive work in heavy industry and munition plants for they were vital and were increasingly deserted by the German workers who were urgently needed at the front; they were leaving behind production tasks to older workers, women, youth and workers from occupied countries.

As early as December 1938 the German Embassy in Prague turned to the Czechoslovak Government with a "request" to send to Germany an unlimited number of unemployed workers. It soon became evident that a "request" was to be interpreted as an "order." That there was an attempt to resist the German pressure is seen from the fact that the Czechoslovak Government of Premier Rudolf Beran under Dr. Emil Hácha's presidency on December 17, 1938 decided first to give the Germans an evasive reply. Only under further pressure did the Czech Government promise to "cooperate." In the fall of 1939 the number of men employed in German manufacturing industries stood at 7,618,000; a year later it was 6,792,000. The Czechs, on the other hand, continued to be reluctant. This resentful attitude was intensified after the Czech workers, who were either drafted or induced by promises to go to Germany, reported that the Germans did not keep their word and did not fulfill their promises but treated the Czech workers virtually as prisoners. In December 1939 there were 87,540 men and 3,981 women, totalling 91,521 Czech workers in German factories. A year later, in December 1940, after considerably more pressure there were 126,579 men and 7,494 women, a total of 134,073 Czech workers in German factories. Of these 90,000 were employed in construction work, 22,000 were metal workers and the rest worked in transportation and in other fields. Despite the fact that unemployment continued in the Czech Lands (in January 1939 there were 186,375 unemployed; in January there were still as many as 21,918 unemployed and in January 1941 the number of unemployed increased, rather than diminished, to 30,459), Czech workers did all they could to save themselves from having to go to Germany. They avoided the Manpower Offices as much as the dreaded Gestapo and did not register. In some cases they inflicted wounds upon themselves. Young girls tried to save themselves by early marriages and pregnancy. The management in the Czech factories in Bohemia and Moravia faced a precarious situation: on the one hand they identified themselves with the Czech cause and aided the Czech resistance, on the other hand however they jeopardized their own position. What is more, increasing sabotage invited severe reprisals. The worst threat was of course the taking over of the direction of the Czech plants by German management with the assistance of the Gestapo and the forced transfers of workers to Germany. These and other methods, including imprisonment and executions, were employed.

One has to overlook the rather frequent references to the Communist propaganda appeals and other activities of the Communist Party functionaries (Klement Gottwald), pictured here as practically the only leaders of Czech resistance. This presentation does not correspond to the facts. The book contains valuable information on the tensions and problems of the economy of an unwilling satellite.

University of Pittsburgh V. E. Andic

Schramm-von Thadden, Ehrengard, *Griechenland und die Grossmächte im Zweiten Weltkreig* (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Band 9), Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1955. Pp. vii, 244; 4 plates, map.

The story of Greece during the first twenty months of the Second World War and the events that preceded it, is told in this volume by the author of *Griechenland und die Grossen Mächte, 1913-1923,* which first appeared twenty-three years ago. Ehrengard Schramm-von Thadden visited Greece on two occasions since the end of the war, and she draws her material from the published sources and related works in Greek and other languages. She also depends upon personal reminiscences of some Greeks who held high positions at the time of the conflict. Normally, reliance upon such informants might tend to give a book an official, governmental touch, and a careful examination of its contents will confirm this impression. She rarely misses an opportunity to give the point of view of the Metaxas regime. Hence, so far as the domestic scene goes, Frau von Thadden's book is clearly one-sided. Typical of her attitude is the concluding paragraph of the last chapter. This chapter describes the German operations in 1941, up to the last Greek resistance in Crete. One would naturally expect the author to say something about the broader import of the struggle, for the Greeks, for the Germans, or for the belligerents then and later. Speaking of the Greeks, the author could not have been unaware of the tragic after-effects of the invasion, which was destined to cast a shadow over Greece's history in subsequent decades. And yet, with a narrowness of vision that goes along with partisan spirit, the author focuses her attention on the person of King George II, with whose portrait she begins her volume. "For the third time in his life," says she, "was King George compelled to leave his country. The first time, 1916 [correct date: 1917], when he was a young crown prince, he was ousted by the Western Powers: the second time, 1924, by his own people; and now, 1941, by the nation from which his mother came. Once again, a time of exile began for him" (p. 202).

Such statements occur several times in each chapter. Frequently, too, controversial figures are depicted with a kind of naive enthusiasm that sounds discordant after many pages of smoothly written, reasonably unbiased historical exposition. An outstanding example is the unrealistic character sketch of John Metaxas (p. 9). "This man disliked big words—no rabble-rousing speeches (Volksrede), no parades, and, above all, no Potemkin's villages." Such a description could hardly be endorsed by anyone who remembers "the first workman, the first peasant, the first soldier, the first sailor of Greece", who claimed to have created the "third Greek civilization" and who mobilized large numbers of country people to celebrate the establishment of the regime (August 4, 1936) and used the backs of bus tickets, as well as the

Greek press, to popularize his ideas. The reader is also told that Metaxas "turned his attention primarily to the army and to the economic development of the country; that he was successful in these [aims] no one can dispute" (p. 8). The author forgets the fact that in post-war Greece opinions were divided on the question of military preparedness in 1940-41, and there was a widespread belief, even among nationalists, that economically, too, the position of the country was far from enviable. In any event, many details were published after the war—in books and articles, some of which are listed by the author in her bibliography but are otherwise ignored.

In the slippery field of comparisons of the characters of historical figures, it would be very hard to convince anyone, unless he happened to be a confirmed Metaxist, that the creator of the regime of the Fourth of August "lacked the unscrupulousness of the Cretan [Venizelos]" (p. 9). The first elections, after the return of George II, were held on January 31, 1936, not in the summer of 1936 (p. 8). Concerning Balkan affairs, it must be noted that the Bulgarians, and not the Greeks and Serbians, were the discontented and aggressors in 1913 (p. 4). Similarly, it would be misleading to state, without any qualifying clause, that in 1915 Venizelos invited the Entente Powers to send troops to Salonica "behind his king's back" (pp. 4-5). The king, Constantine, was not driven out in 1916, but on June 12, 1917 (p. 5). But these and similar errors, undesirable as they are, belong to the periphery of the subject to which the book is devoted. It must be stated that, on the whole, the subject matter is well organized and convincingly presented.

It is pointed out that from the outset George II and Metaxas were determined to avoid the mistake of Constantine and to go along with Britain, which ruled the Mediterranean (p. 11). On the other hand, economic ties with Germany and the presence of the Italians in Albania (after April 7, 1939), suggested a policy of caution. Mussolini's assurances that Greece had nothing to fear came at the same time as his orders to his general staff to plan for the occupation of the Ionian Islands, Lepante, and Salonica (p. 14). Mussolini's desire to attack Greece (or Yugoslavia) was checkmated by his ally Hitler, who was unwilling to see the conflict extended in the Balkan Peninsula, in view of his plans against the Soviet Union (p. 54). Hitler was seriously concerned about British recognition of Soviet interest in the Balkans (June 12, 1940) and the opening of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. (June 25). When Mussolini sent his legions into Greece (October 28), the Führer angrily declared his intention to "let the Duce eat his soup alone" (p. 125). Greece's victories over the Italians made Mussolini ridiculous in the eyes of the world and he was bitterly aware of his humiliation. Meanwhile, after Molotov's demand to give Russia a free hand in Finland, Bulgaria, and the Straits was rejected, Operation Marita (invasion of Greece) was decided upon in Berlin (November 12), the attack being scheduled for the opening of 1941 (pp. 127-28). Yugoslavia's neutrality was purchased with the offer of Salonica (p. 131). In the Axis camp, Bulgaria was reduced to inactivity by a concentration of Turkish troops in Thrace and by fear of a Russian occupation of Varna. Though Turkish defection made Hitler's plans easier, he still hesitated to attack Greece because he was weighing the opportunities and risks of penetration in Spain and hostilities against Russia. At the height of the Greek offensive in Albania (December, 1940), he thought of playing the role of a mediator between Greece and Italy, and Ambassador Argyropoulos in Madrid, Security Minister Maniadakis in Athens, and Metaxas himself were contacted unofficially with offers of an armistice (pp. 139-51). The author fails to note that Plastiras, then in exile in France, was likewise approached on this subject—a fact that was used against him later to force him out of the government in 1945. Even if taken at their face value, Hitler's offers involved the withdrawal of the British from Greece—a demand that made them unacceptable to King George and Metaxas. Hitler's promise that Greece would be given North Epirus, already held by the Greek army, did not prove to be convincing. With more Greek victories announced in the Albanian front, Hitler was contemplating sending German reinforcements to the Italians, but the idea was given up for psychological reasons (p. 157). The arrival of British forces in Greece gave Hitler a plausible excuse to invade Greece (and Yugoslavia, which had reversed her policy) on April 6, 1941 (pp. 174-77). The death of Metaxas late in January had no effect on subsequent developments. Korizis, the new premier, was Metaxas's nominee. While the king was determined to remain loyal to Britain, whose forces in Greece were tragically inadequate, and General Papagos continued urging the corps commanders to fight on "for the honor of Greece", General Tsokakoglou signed the armistice of April 21. Korizis shot himself, the king fled, the Germans entered Athens on April 27, and the last resistance ended in Crete on June 2.

A brief epilogue, playing up the idea of Greek honor, an appendix with a few documents, such as the armistice agreements, and a fairly inclusive bibliography close this interesting volume, which despite its shortcomings, sheds light on many hitherto unknown or unnoticed corners of the Greek phase of the war.

University of Texas G. G. Arnakis

Berliner, Joseph S., *Soviet Economic Aid: The New Aid and Trade Policy in Undeveloped Countries.* New York: Praeger, 1958, Pp. 232. $4.25.

This small but well documented book deals with two important segments of foreign economic relations of the Soviet Bloc. The first part of this book deals with the aid which the U.S.S.R. is extending to its own allies, as well as the aid which the Bloc countries are granting to various undeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and South America. The second part deals with the foreign trade between the Soviet Bloc and these countries. The author discusses the magnitude of this aid and trade programme, compares it with similar programmes launched by the Western Countries, and attempts to ascertain whether or not Soviet Bloc countries are capable of expanding their aid and trade in the years to come. He concludes his study by drawing a parallel between the Soviet economic planners of today and the proverbial Greeks who also came bearing gifts.

Dr. Berliner shows, among other things, that the Western aid to undeveloped countries exceeds in size the aid of the Soviet Bloc by a very considerable margin (p. 73). Still, by channeling their smaller aid into a few politically sensitive areas, and by extending mainly long-term credits—rather than grants and private investments as do the Western countries—the Soviets have been able to achieve substantial impacts on the countries concerned (p. 66). "A petroleum refinery built and operated by a U. S. firm has a very different impact from an identical refinery built by the U.S.S.R., and owned and operated by e.g. Indians. A million dollar gift is soon consumed; a million dollar factory is a long-standing monument" (p. 75).

In the sphere of foreign trade proper, Western countries are likewise trading with various undeveloped countries much more than do the Soviet Bloc countries. For example, whereas as much as 31-45% of all United States foreign trade is conducted with undeveloped countries, the U.S.S.R. allots them no more than from 3 to 6% of its overall turnover (p. 89). Yet once again, the Soviet Bloc managed (in 1956) to "monopolize" the foreign trade of Egypt (34% of Egypt's exports and 14% of imports were with communist countries), Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and some other countries (p. 92).

As to the Soviet capacity to expand its aid to undeveloped countries, the author gives the following answer: "In overall monetary terms, the Soviet economy can support a programme even as large as that of the United States without entailing a very great sacrifice. But, if the requests of the recipient countries concentrated on a few types of industrial construction projects (such as hydroelectrical and steel plants) Soviet capacity could not satisfy them all . . . without seriously cutting into domestic investments" (p. 115).

Professor Berliner's informative and thought provoking book deserves no doubt serious attention by students and general readers alike.

University of British Columbia H. E. Ronimois

Bochenski, Joseph M., and Gerhard Niemeyer, edd., *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus* (Manual of World Communism). München: Karl Aber, 1958. Pp. 762. DM 24.80.

It would perhaps be impossible to assemble a more impressive galaxy of talent than the authors of the individual chapters in this Manual which, in fact, is an encyclopedia of World Communism and of the Russian foreign and domestic policies of our times in all their practical and theoretical aspects.

The book consists of four parts which is not, however, indicated in the table of contents or in the formal organization. The first three chapters deal with the theoretical aspects of communism in terms of basic philosophical, sociological, economic and political doctrines. The second part, consisting of two chapters, describes the theory and methodology of the Party organization and its political activities and launches the reader into the last two parts. The third part consists of two chapters describing communism in action as a conquering force, winning an empire for the new *Weltanschauung* and new type of society, while the fourth describes the various aspects of the régime. Beginning with the legal system, it moves through a description of the Communist economic order, the fate of the peasantry, a treatment of belles lettres, art, science and religion, and culminates in a general description of the individual in the Soviet type of society. Professor Bochenski concludes the manual with a short summing up of the criticism of Communist doctrines and policies.

The fact that the Manual is one of the more successfully executed projects is primarily due to the fact that the editors were able to achieve great uniformity of all the contributions in terms of methodological approach, while at the same time preserving the individuality of the different chapters. On the one hand, the encyclopedic character of the Manual is maintained in the form of short formulations, directly illustrated by relevant material and with proper reference to the basic literature on each subject. On the other, the individual chapters give the impression of organic treatment, each having its own treatment of a detailed subject and at the same time being an integral part of the whole.

Another evidence of the well-conceived plan and excellent organization of the book is the absence of repetition and constant recurrence of the same facts. It is enough to glance through the index to perceive that, with few exceptions, each subject is treated comprehensively in one place, and mostly by one author alone. The only exceptions to this general picture of judicious balance and distribution of tasks are chapters eight and nine, both of which describe the penal system in the Soviet Union, to which chapter nine is chiefly devoted, and which perhaps gives the more competent treatment.

One of the great attractions of Communism for its students is that there has never been a period during which it has not been marked by some important events and developments. Even during Stalin's harshest rule, when everything was firmly set in the pattern of supreme personal absolute rule, profound changes occurred in every field of Russian life, and in every direction of Communist world policies. This is at the same time an advantage and a drawback. There is always the danger that while a book is in the press, or almost immediately after it has appeared, some new development will make it outdated. And it is a proof of the great skill with which these individual contributions have been produced that the Manual has withstood the impact of change, although the times which may now legitimately be called the Khrushchev Era are times of change. The spirit of change is present throughout the Manual and the individual contributions, atlhough mostly concerned with information on facts, have managed to project the present tendencies into the future.

It is difficult to overestimate the vaule of the Manual. Its encyclopedic character, wealth of precise information, and valuable analyses against a solid background of fact should place it on any reference shelf. One can learn from it detailed facts, obtain quick information on sources, literature, statistics, governmental policies and practices, personalities in the Communist world, etc. The carefully selected bibliography, which covers almost seventy pages of small print, provides an excellent initial bibliography on practically any point. Other strong points are the numerous quotations from important contributors to Communist doctrine, which makes the Manual an important reference tool in this field also, and an excellent index, which adds to its usefulness as a source of quick information.

Washington 7, D. C. KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI

SHORTER NOTICES

HOLT, ROBERT, *Radio Free Europe.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. Pp. 249. $5.00.

Holt's study will probably attract a wider public than the title would indicate at first glance. Americans who have served in Europe since World War II, students of the Cold War, and our citizens of Polish, Czechoslovak, or Hungarian origin are interested in the voices with which the American people speak to those behind the Iron Curtain. Readers who have worked in or studied psychological warfare will be interested in the complicated organizational set-up of Radio Free Europe. Its system of news-gathering from many sources, of policy-making and control, how it defeats jamming are enlightening and reassuring.

The heart of the book, however, is in the chapters giving actual content of programs broadcast to meet specific developments in target countries. The samples given at some length make absorbing reading as one lives again through the crises from the Berlin riots to Poznań, internal Party crises in the USSR and its satellites after Khrushchev denounced Stalin, the Polish and Hungarian revolts in 1956. Holt has the gift of portraying a situation vividly and then quoting RFE's telling psychological attacks couched in restrained and convincing language.

The leaflets delivered by balloons to Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1954 and 1955 proved an effective means of driving home specific campaigns before elections in those countries. Holt's chapter evaluating results of both forms of information—by radio and in print—indicate effectiveness far beyond what the average American expected.

One of the most telling distinctions in the book is that RFE gives a complete home broadcasting service for people behind the Iron Curtain, whereas the Voice of America and B.B.C. confine their programs largely to events in the West which can be documented. Escapees state that listeners highly appreciate news and comments on events in their own countries, which Communist news media suppress, as well as RFE's polemical and satirical treatment of Soviet leaders, policies and drives, such as "voluntary" labor in construction and agricultural brigades, elections with only one party allowed to present candidates, theatrical trials and "rehabilitation" of executed Party leaders.

Most effective are the "Black Book" programs exposing Communist agents and spies—giving names, addresses and criminal acts. Also the blistering broadcasts by defected Party agents like Swiatlo. These are the programs which cause the most violent reaction in the Party press and radio, indicating that they hurt the régime.

Washington, D. C. BRACKETT LEWIS

TOMASEVICH, JOZO, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia.* Stanford University Press, 1955. Pp. 743, $7.50.

The vast majority of the world's population is classified as "peasantry." The study of the phenomenon "peasantry" is a belated, but most rewarding undertaking. The impact of the modern world upon Central-Eastern European peasantry has aptly become a subject of study, which can supply some answers to the experiences of revolutionary transition in Latin America, India, China and the like, not to mention the Soviet orbit.

Tomasevich has done us an invaluable service by providing such a model in his *magnum opus.* He has examined the varied types of peasantry in Yugoslavia against the background of history, politics and economics. The result is an intelligible and competent work. It is divided into three parts: a brief history of the various South Slav lands prior to 1914; a brief description of the Southern Slavs during World War I; and an extended descriptive analysis of the peasantry and peasant agriculture from 1918-1941. By far the major portion is part three, supported exhaustively by South Slav, English, German and French sources. The analysis and presentation of data on the natural resource base of Yugoslav agriculture, agricultural overpopulation, agrarian reforms, size-structure of farms, agricultural production, health in rural areas, agricultural credits and taxation, will remain a scholar's point of departure and standard work for quite some time to come. The methodology and analytical mechanism, in fact, appear applicable to the study of peasantry in other parts of the world.

It is with this in mind that this reviewer pleads for additional investigation and analysis. The sociological and anthropological description and interpretation of the peasantry *per se* and of peasant culture must be extended (see Kötter, Redfield, Wrench, to name a few), in order to broaden the basic approach to the peasant phenomenon by economists and political scientists. Secondly, the premise that *the* solution to the "peasant problem" is to be found in the industrialization of agriculture (pp. 260, 336, 338) must be further examined, particularly in the light of recent experience with the cooperative movement and the solutions practiced by various soil associations. Thirdly, the inter-relationship of the above to the entire problem of producing sufficient and healthgiving food for a growing world population has become the subject matter for the nascent discipline of political ecology. The excellent bibliography can be of assistance in all these tasks.

The student of the peasantry is grateful to Tomasevich's pioneering and hopes for a post-1941 sequel. How would the examination of developments under Tito turn out in the light of the statement that "any régime . . . has to consider the peasantry as one of the basic political forces of the country" (p. 251)?

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THE SZÉCHENYI PROBLEM

by George Bárány

FOR OVER a hundred years, Louis Kossuth, leader of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-49, has been considered in this country to be the embodiment of Hungary's best traditions. In popular imagination, in political oratory, and in American history textbooks as well, the name of Kossuth is a symbol of his nation's desire for progress and its struggle for independence. From the days of the "Kossuth excitement" in the early 1850's to the exhibition of Kossuth documents in the Library of Congress at the end of 1958 and to the Kossuth stamps in the "Champions of Liberty" series, this century-old Kossuth tradition has been a very special historico-psychological manifestation of the United States' interest in Central Europe, particularly in Hungary: its ideological foundations had been expressed in classic terms by the two resolutions "in Behalf of Hungarian Freedom" supported by Abraham Lincoln in September, 1849 and January, 1852.[1]

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[1] Ray P. Bassler, *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln,* II (New Brunswick, N. J.: 1953), 6; 115-16. The best studies and bibliographies concerning the "Kossuth excitement" in this country are: Merle Curti, "Austria and the United States, 1848-1852," *Smith College Studies in History,* XI (April, 1926,)139-206; and Arthur May, *Contemporary American Opinion of the Mid-Century Revolutions in Central Europe* (Philadelphia: 1927). The most important documents about the diplomatic background of Kossuth's visit in the United States were published in *Doc. No. 279, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 1909-1910. Sen. Docs., Affairs of Hungary, 1849-1850* (Correspondence with A. Dudley Mann), pp. 1-38. For the first official contacts between U. S. diplomats and Kossuth, see William Henry Stiles, *Austria in 1848-49* (New York: 1852), II, 402-406.

Other documents relevant to the problems of Austria-Hungary in the mid-nineteenth century, and indicating the United States' and England's special interests in this part of the world, were published in *Doc. No. 246, 27th Cong., 2d Sess., 1841-42. Sen. Docs.,* "Papers accompanying the President's message of April 13, 1842 "(Austria, in relation to the commercial interests of the United States. Correspondence of the agent and minister of the United States at the court of Austria), pp. 1-77; *British Sessional Papers, House of Commons, State Papers, Hungary.* Session 4 February-8 August 1851 (Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Hungary, 1847-1849), LVIII (London: 1851), 1,406; "Anglo-Hungarian Documents 1841-1850" (Reports of A. J. Blackwell), *South Eastern Affairs, I* (1931), 42-61; 135-51; 183-230; II (1932), 28-54; III (1933). 91-132; IV (1934), 191-218. Cf. Dénes Jánossy, *Great Britain and Kossuth* (Budapest: 1937), No. 9 of *Archivum Europae Centro-Orientalis,* ed. E. Lukinich; Dénes Jánossy, *A Kossuth-emigráció Angliában és Amerikában, 1851-1852* (The Kossuth Emigration in England and America, 1851-1852), 2 vols. (Budapest: 1940-48). Published in *Fontes Historiae Hungaricae Aevi Recentioris* (Magyarország Ujabbkori Történetének Forrásai—cited hereafter as *Fontes*). Also: Jenö Horváth, "Amerika és a Magyar Szabadságharc" (America and the Hungarian Freedom Fight), *Századok,* LXI-LXII (1927-28), 231-42.

During the same period of time, however, no article or book has been published in the United States about Count Stephen Széchenyi,[2] forerunner and later political opponent of Louis Kossuth; yet, the latter repeatedly called Széchenyi "the Greatest among the Magyars."[3]

In a recently published book,[4] Arnold Whitridge seems to have realized the significance of Széchenyi, going so far as to state that "If Széchenyi could have had his way there would have been no revolution."[5] The conclusions of Whitridge, however remarkable, are summary statements and cannot substitute for a thorough analysis of Széchenyi's life work.[6] Without a close investigation of Széchenyi's personality and public activity, neither the career of Kossuth, nor the Hungarian reform movement in the first half of the nineteenth century can be understood correctly.[7] Széchenyi's impact upon the cultural and national renaissance of the different parts of the Habsburg Monarchy has also received insufficient attention. Count Kolowrat, with whom Széchenyi was on good terms, reproached the latter as early as March, 1843, as "being one of the causes of the awakening of Slavism in Bohemia."[8] Metternich, well aware of the rather important change in

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[2] One reason for this may be that "Széchenyi's main works have not been translated from the Magyar." Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire* (New York: 1950), I, 381. There may have been, however, an interest in Széchenyi in the Anglo-Saxon world in the second part of the nineteenth century, as shown by the four articles published anonymously under the title "The Great Magyar" in Charles Dickens' journal *All the Year Round* in 1870 (New Series, III, 450-56; 476-80; 498-504; 522-28). This series of articles was based on René Saint Taillandier's study about Széchenyi published in the *Revue des deux mondes* in 1867 (Aug. 1 and Oct. 15, pp. 628-61 and 864-903 resp.) The only article published in an American periodical on Széchenyi was written one hundred and ten years ago by Thomas Dunn English ("Szechényi [sic] and Wesselényi." *Sartain's Union Magazine*, VII, Sept. 1850, pp. 174-77). About the same time Francis Bowen, while attacking Louis Kossuth in *The North American Review* ("The War of Races in Hungary," *No. Amer. Rev.*, LXX, Jan. 1850, pp. 78-136), used rather eloquent language in describing (pp. 90; 105-110) "the grand reforms effected by Count Széchény" [sic], comparing the latter "even to our sainted Washington" ("Hungary. The Rebellion of the Slavonic, Wallachian, and German Hungarians against the Magyars." *No. Amer. Rev.*, LXXII, Jan. 1851, p. 246).

[3] This happened first at a county meeting of Pest, in November, 1840. On Nov. 19, 1840, Széchenyi wrote in his Diary: . . . "Congregation. Kossuth ergreift eine Gelegenheit, mich den grössten Ungarn zu nennen. Donnernder langer Beifall. Ich rühre mich nicht. Später: an Kossuth, 'miért emel olly magasra, hol nem tarthatom fel magamat' ('Why do you exalt me to heights where I shall be unable to maintain myself'). *Gróf Széchenyi István Napói* (The Diaries of Count Stephen Széchenyi), ed. Gyula Viszota, V (Budapest: 1937), 422. The modern critical edition of Széchenyi's voluminous diaries was published in the *Fontes* series as vols. 10-15 of *Gróf Széchenyi István összes munkái* (Collected Works of Count Stephen Széchenyi) in the years 1925-39. This important source material will be cited hereafter as *Diaries.* In 1841, Kossuth himself, in a leading article of *Pesti Hirlap* (No. 51, June 26), referred to this event in the following terms: ". . . I declared Count Stephen *Széchenyi* last November (as he himself mentioned) the greatest of all Hungarians at the crowded assembly of Pest county, and the multitude resounded with unceasing acclamations; and I also repeated this word in the *Pesti Hirlap.* This word belongs to the *Credo* of my soul . . . I would blush in shame before myself if I should forget even for a moment about the respect that every Hungarian owes to the immortal merits of Count Stephen Széchenyi, and no one feels this more deeply than I, who have called him and sincerely call him now, at this moment, too, with these lips which have never been and never will be contaminated by cowardly flattering and deceiving politics, the greatest Magyar." Quoted in Széchenyi, *A kelet népe* (People of the Orient), ed. Zoltán Ferenczi, *Fontes, Coll. Works,* V (Budapest: 1925), 62. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 360; also: *Felelet Gróf Széchenyi Istvánnak Kossuth Lajostól (*Reply to Count Stephen Széchenyi from Louis Kossuth), *ibid.*, p. 421. In 1860, when the news of Széchenyi's death reached him in his exile, Kossuth again used the same expression. See Elemér Czakó, *Széchenyi a legnagyobb és leghivebb magyar* (Széchenyi the Greatest and Truest Magyar; Budapest: 1941), p. 243, and László Bártfai-Szabó, *Adatok gróf Széchenyi István és kora történetéhez, 1808-1860* (Contributions to the History of Count Stephen Széchenyi and of His Era, 1808-160—cited hereafter as B. Szabó, *Contributions),* II (Budapest: 1943), 881 (Kossuth's letter to Ladislas Teleky, May 8, 1860).

Strictly speaking, however, even before the date mentioned by both Széchenyi and Kossuth (*i.e.*, November, 1840), the latter referred to Széchenyi already in June, 1840, as to "the man whose equal I do not know in my nation's annals." Gyula Viszota, ed., *Gróf Széchenyi István irói és hirlapirói vitája Kossuth Lajossal* (Count Stephen Széchenyi's Literary and Journalistic Debate with Louis Kossuth—cited hereafter as *Széchenyi-Kossuth Debate),* I (Budapest: 1927), 788-89 (Vol. VI. of the *Collected Works* in *Fontes*).

[4] Arnold Whitridge, *Men in Crisis. The Revolutions of 1848* (New York: 1949), Ch. IV: "The Revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy. Metternich, Széchenyi, and Kossuth," pp. 238-82, esp. 240-43; 254-55; 257; 262-67.

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[5] P. 262. In the opinion of Whitridge,

> Széchenyi was . . . one of the most farseeing practical reformers of his age . . . In another age or in another country he would have been a great empire builder, but there was nothing of the ruthlessness about him that empire-building sometimes suggests. His energy was inexhaustible, but at the same time he walked delicately and never trampled on other people's rights (pp. 241-42).
>
> Széchenyi stood midway between the two extremes of reaction and revolution represented by Metternich and Kossuth [?!]. If either of them had been willing to listen to him the Austrian Empire might well have been spared the storm that was uprooting governments all over Europe, but one was convinced that Széchenyi harbored designs against the Empire, while the other, though he called him the greatest of Hungarians, always suspected him of being more of an aristocrat than a patriot (p. 243).

[6] "Le nom de Széchény [sic!] est célèbre en Europe depuis que l'on s'y occupe de la Hongrie, mais on a peu de détails sur les commencements de sa carrière; le bruit lointain de son éloquence a retenti à nos oreilles sans laisser rien de précis à notre souvenir." These remarkable words written in 1848 by Baron Émile Langsdorff, excellent connoisseur of Central European affairs ("La Hongrie.—III.—Les Réformateurs et les Révolutionnaires," *Revue des deux mondes,* XXIV [December 1, 1848], 681) have not lost their validity yet.

[7] Support for this statement can be found, *e.g.*, in Otto Zarek's Kossuth interpretation (Otto Zarek, *Kossuth,* Translated from the German by Lynton Hudson [London: 1937], pp. 82; 91; 159). Also: Jánossy, *Great Britain and Kossuth,* pp. 1; 4; 6.

[8] "Bei Kollowrath. Mich recht ausdiscourirt. Er—'ich [*i.e.,* Széchenyi] bin mitunter Ursache, dass in Böhmen Slavismus erwacht.'" *Diaries,* V, 698. In 1840 Kolowrat, who was president of the Czech Academy, suggested to a delegation of that institute (Palacký, Jungmann, and Kalina) that they follow the Hungarian example. Cf. Oszkár Sárkány, "Magyar kulturális hatások Csehországban (Hungarian Cultural Influence in Bohemia), 1790-1848." *A Gróf Klebelsberg Kunó Magyar Történetkutató Intézet Évkönyve* (Yearbook of the Count Kuno Klebelsberg Hungarian Historical Institute), vol. VII, ed. Gyula Miskolczy (Budapest: 1937), p. 310-11.

At this point, let us recall an article of René Saint Taillandier, published in the *Revue des deux mondes* in 1867. ("Hommes d'Etat de la Hongrie. Le comte Stéphan Széchenyi." Aug. 1 and Oct. 15, 1867, 2d Period, vols. 70 and 71, 628-61 and 864-903.) The French author, writing immediately after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 had been accomplished, stressed the vital importance of finding a solution to the nationality problem in the Dual Monarchy. As an illustration of his thesis, he made the following statement:

> Un des plus dignes représentants de la race slave en Bohême, le vénérable M. Franz Palacky, me disait il y a quelques semaines, au moment de partir pour le congrès slave de Moscou: "Vous vous occupez du comte Széchenyi. C'est une grande figure. Széchenyi est le seul Magyar qui est en respect des autres races. Si le gouvernement autrichien s'inspirait de ses principes, si tous les Magyars lui ressemblaient, nous ne serions pas réduits à accepter l'invitation des Russes." Ces paroles, dans la bouche d'un homme aussi loyalement attaché à l'Autriche,—il l'a prouvé en des circonstances décisives,—éclairent toute une situation. (*Revue des deux mondes,* Aug. 1, 1867, pp. 653-54.)

Széchenyi's political attitude during the 1830's,[9] supported to a certain extent Széchenyi's projects in the '40's; yet he never completely trusted him, always recalling that it was Széchenyi who had first spread the seeds of revolutionary ferment in the Austrian Empire after the Congress of Vienna. An interesting example of this is a letter written to Disraeli by "Professor Metternich"[10] during his exile at Brighton, England. The seventy-five-year-old ex-chancellor chose the example of Széchenyi as an object lesson to illustrate and justify his own political philosophy to Disraeli who was about to take over the leadership of the English conservatives. The letter, dated October 2, 1848, *i.e.*, at a time when the reaction to the revolutionary events of Spring, 1848, had already gained momentum all over the continent, put a rather strong emphasis on the principle of order and on the importance of military strength, only to continue with a characterization of Széchenyi as follows:

> . . . Il me reste de vous faire part d'un fait charactéristique. Vous connaissez peut-être personnelement le Comte Etienne Szécheny [sic!]—il a été souvent en Angleterre—ou, si tel n'est pas le cas, son nom vous sera présent, parce qu'il parait dans les feuilles du jour. Le Comte S. est l'un des fauteurs les plus marquant des changements que dans son organisation intérieure a éprouvé la Hongrie dans le cours des dernières 25 années. Idéologue et à la fois homme d'action; patriote chaud mais exalté; ambitieux dans la double direction du bien général et de sa personnalité, c'est lui qui a introduit dans son pays les produits de la vapeur; les courses de chevaux; les clubs, appelés en Hongrie casinos, et l'idée de la nationalité Hongroise, servie par la diffusion de la langue Magyar que le bas peuple parlait *seul* jusque'à l'année 1825. Toutes les affaires se sont jusqu'en 1830 traitées *en latin* . . . .
>
> Le Comte S. arrivé au point où la raison s'est montrée à nu devant lui, c'est elle qui lui a fait défaut. La tête lui a tourné et il se trouve aujourd'hui dans une maison de santé près de Vienne. La faculté ne renonce pas à l'espoir de le guérir et je partage cet espoir, vu la circonstance suivante. Il a des moments lucides et dans ces moments il rentre dans les faits historiques. "Le P. de M. m'a toujours averti du mal que je

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Bartholomew Szemere, Prime Minister of Hungary after the dethronement of the Habsburg dynasty in April, 1849, wrote in his diary after Széchenyi's suicide:

> Indeed, it is a great disaster for the fatherland, especially if one supposes that in the case of a movement he [Széchenyi] would have left his hidden place. On him alone the trust of the non-Hungarian races had been focused, while it was chiefly Kossuth whom they hated the most (B. Szabó, *Contributions*, II, 877).

[9] In March, 1846, Princess Melanie, the Chancellor's third wife, introduced Széchenyi —to the latter's great annoyance—with these words to the Papal Nuncio in Vienna: "C'est le plus grand radical,—de jadis, à présent il est sage." *Diaries*, VI, 344. Princess Melanie, a former Zichy-Ferraris Countess, was a sister-in-law of Széchenyi's elder brother, Paul. In earlier years, she was in love with Count Stephen. After her marriage to Metternich in January, 1831, Széchenyi became in a sense a member of the Chancellor's family; he often had dinner with the Metternichs when in Vienna, and more than once used Princess Melanie's influence with her husband to promote the realization of his plans for the "regeneration" of Hungary.—For the intimate relationship of the Metternich-Zichy-Széchenyi families, cf., Jules Gesztesi, *Pauline de Metternich* (Paris: 1947), pp. 33; 43-45.

[10] Epithet used by Disraeli in his letter to Mrs. Disraeli, January 7, 1849. William Flavelle Monypenny and George Earle Buckle, *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli*, III (New York: 1914), 130.

> faisais. Il m'a dit: Ne touchez pas aux fondements de l'édifice sans quoi il croulera en entier. Je n'ai point su profiter de cet avertissement; j'ai tué mon pays!" Alors il rentre en fureur.
>
> Bien des amitiés, mon cher Disraeli. Ma lettre renferme de l'étoffe pour l'orateur au Parlement et pour le romancier. Vous ne m'en voudrez pas.[11]

In his answer of October 12, 1848, Disraeli replied to his "dear master,"

> . . . You were quite right in saying that there was stuff in it both for the statesman and the poet, for the principles indicated may guide a troubled Cabinet, and the fate of Széchenv [sic!], whom I knew only by reputation, is dramatic and fulfils the laws of poetic justice.[12]

Be this as it may, the expressions used by the two conservative "philosophical statesmen" concerning Széchenyi clearly point out one of the basic questions of all Széchenyi research: how is it possible that Széchenyi, considered a loyal supporter of the Habsburg dynasty, a staunch defender of the Austrian Empire's unity against Kossuth, was also thought of as *the* initiator of the "subversive activities" resulting in the revolutionary explosion of 1848 in Central Europe?[13]

The above-mentioned letters of Metternich and Disraeli also referred to the human side of the Széchenyi problem. Indeed, the dramatic activity of the "Greatest Magyar" caught the imagination of poets and writers in and out of Hungary at an early stage of Széchenyi's public career.

Hans Christian Andersen, the famous Danish poet and story-teller, visited Hungary in 1840. On his journey along the lower Danube, at the "Iron Gates," he admired the "excellent carriage-road . . . now completed here under the direction of Count Schechenyi [sic!]." And when, a few days later, in Pest,

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[11] Monypenny-Buckle, *op. cit.*, III, 189-90. Cf. Richard Metternich-Winneburg, ed. *Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren.* Geordnet und zusammengestelt von Alfons v. Klinkowström . VIII (Wien: 1884), *Docs. no 1701 and 1734,* pp. 34 and 185; Le comte de Hübner, *Une année de ma vie, 1848-1849* (Paris: 1891), pp. 295-97. See also Széchenyi's diary entry of Aug. 11, 1848 in Árpád Károlyi and Vilmos Tolnai, eds., *Gróf Széchenyi István döblingi irodalmi hagyatéka* (Count Stephen Széchenyi's Posthumous Döbling Papers, cited hereafter as *Döbling Papers),* I (Budapest: 1921), 371 and his letter to Anton Tasner, written on Sept. 8, 1850, in Béla Majláth, ed., *Gróf Széchenyi István levelei* (Letters of Count Stephen Széchenyi, referred to henceforth as *Letters),* III (Budapest: 1891), 637.

[12] Monypenny-Buckle, *op. cit.*, III, 190. Széchenyi's life presented a challenge not only to politicians, writers, and historians, as suggested by Metternich and Disraeli, but also to medical and psychiatric research. Lombroso, *e.g.*, tried to support his ideas that "genius was a special morbid condition" and that there was a "resemblance between genius and insanity" among others also by citing the example of Széchenyi. Cesare Lombroso, *The Man of Genius* (London: 1896), pp. 87-90.

[13] As a supplementary footnote to the opinion of leading contemporary statesmen of the Austrian Empire, it is rather interesting to cite the opinion of the revolutionary Viennese daily *Die Constitution* about Széchenyi—in the spring of 1848. In a series of articles, aimed at the popularization of revolutionary Hungary among the "dear Austrian brethren" ("liebe Brüder Österreicher"), the author, M. Töltényi, presents Széchenyi as father and prime mover of the Hungarian opposition to the "hated Metternich" ("Ungarn." *Die Constitution,* No. 16, Apr. 8, 1848, pp. 211-12) and calls Kossuth the "disciple" of Széchenyi despite the fact that he was aware of the Széchenyi-Kossuth controversy since the publication of *People of the Orient* in 1841 ("Ungarn." *Die Constitution,* No. 17, Apr. 10, 1948, p. 224), where Széchenyi himself sharply rejected all such generalizations,

> The question was put to me,—if any Hungarian work had been translated into Danish? and I could only answer that I knew but one: — "Széchenyi on Horseracing;" and added, that had been just translated by one of my dearest Danish friends. The Hungarians spoke with great enthusiasm of Széchenyi and his many services to Hungary. As the most interesting of his works, they named "Der Credit."
>
> Széchenyi's portrait was to be seen in all the booksellers' shops, and it ornamented our cabin in the steamer, which carried us higher up the Danube. . . .[14]

Andersen never met Széchenyi in person, but Julia Pardoe, an English writer, who had the opportunity of visiting Széchenyi in his home[15] and of observing him at the Diet of Pressburg in the autumn of 1839, has left us her personal impressions in her book about Hungary:[16]

> But I must no longer delay mention of Count Stephen Széchenyi, who has won an European reputation which has made his name a watchword with the high-minded; and whose appearance greatly tends to deepen the feeling of admiration which his extraordinary career must naturally command. He has a dark, keen, eagle eye, softening, however, at intervals almost into sadness; heavy eyebrows, finely arched, and in perpetual motion, giving a character of extraordinary energy to his countenance; and one of those full, deep-toned, sonorous voices to which you cannot choose but listen. In common conversation he is fluent and demonstrative rather than logical; with a play of fancy, and a choice of words, which rivet the attention of his hearers. Being an Hungarian it were needless to add that he is an accomplished linguist; but the tact with which he avails himself of the forcible expressions or appropriate idioms of the different European languages, in order the more readily to work out his subject, is not the least charm of his conversation.
>
> In the House he is earnest, rapid, and impassioned; and very graceful in his attitudes and movements; while such is the attention with which he is heard, that the accidental clanging of a sabre against the floor actually makes you start even in the midst of a dense crowd. Murmurs of applause universally drown his first words, and form an echo to his last; and it is not his least triumph that no member of the chamber ever ven-

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[14] Hans Christian Andersen, *A Poet's Bazaar,* Translated by Ch. Beckwith, III (London: 1846), 243-44.—*On Horses,* Széchenyi's first significant work referred to by Andersen, written in 1827, was first published in Hungarian in 1828. In 1830 it was translated into German, and three years later, the Danish version was published in Copenhagen. *Diaries,* III, pp. LXXVI-LXXVIII.

[15] Széchenyi mentions having seen her in *Diaries,* V, 303; 305-306; 312-15; 319-20; 322.

[16] Julia Pardoe, *The City of the Magyar, or Hungary and Her Institutions in 1839-40,* I (London: 1840), 263-64. Cf. also John Paget, *Hungary and Transylvania,* I (London: 1850), 202-28. [First ed. in 1839.]—For other descriptions of and opinions about Széchenyi, see Stephen Gál, "Széchenyi as seen by his Foreign Friends." *The Hungarian Quarterly,* VII (Winter 1941-42, No. 3/4), 501-515; also Sándor Fest, *Angolok Magyarországon a reformkorszakban* (Englishmen in Hungary during the Reform Era) *1825-48* (Budapest: n. d.) No. 1957-1966 of *Olcsó Könyvtár* series, and István Gál, "A Fiatal Széchenyi Angliában" (Young Széchenyi in England), *Magyarország, Anglia és Amerika* (Hungary, England, and America; Budapest: n. d.), pp. 65-72.

tures to reply to one of his speeches, save the Judex Curiae, and the Palatine himself.

Miss Julia Pardoe's vivid description of Széchenyi, then at the zenith of his popularity, is but slightly less romantic than that of the Austrian historian Freiherr von Helfert who tried to catch the moment when on the eve of the Allied Powers' decisive attack on Napoleon at Leipzig young Széchenyi first rode into the annals of European history.[17] According to Helfert, Prince Charles Schwarzenberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Allies, held a conference with his staff officers on October 17, 1813, and approved the plans of attack for the following day.

> Es kam jetzt nur darauf an, Blücher zu benachrichtigen, und das war keine leichte Sache: auf Umwegen konnte die Botschaft unmöglich zur rechten Zeit ankommen, der gerade Weg aber führte über feindlich besetztes Land. Ein junger Rittmeister von Merveldt-Uhlanen, Graf *Stephan Széchenyi*, der nachmalige "grösste Ungar," erbot sich zu dem Wegstück. Glücklich durchflog er, von seinem trefflichen Pferde getragen, mehr als einmal französische Reihen und erreichte gegen Abend Blücher. Der wollte auch den Kronprinzen von Schweden benachrichtigt wissen. Mit einem frischen Pferde vollführte der feurige Magyar auch diesen Auftrag, durchritt dann bei anbrechendem Morgen noch einmal die französische Aufstellung und meldete am Morgen des 18. dem Oberfeldherrn Schwarzenberg den Erfolg seiner Sendung.

Twelve years after the Battle of Leipzig, the daring officer became the founder of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences at the Diet of 1825 in Pressburg; in the following decade, he was considered the leader of Hungary's national rebirth; from the early 'forties on, members of the liberal opposition began to look upon him as a traitor to the cause of reform; in the mid-forties, he took a government position to modernize the Hungarian communication system; being thus a member of the last administration of pre-revolutionary Hungary, he also became, in the spring of 1848, with Kossuth, a member of the first independent and responsible Hungarian cabinet of Louis Batthyány. In September of the same year, however, he suffered a nervous breakdown which drove him into an asylum at Döbling, near Vienna, thus bringing his public career to an abrupt end. He spent the last twelve years of his life at Döbling where he committed suicide the night before Easter Sunday, 1860.

Even from these few dramatic highlights of Széchenyi's career, one must conclude that there were extraordinary circumstances and conflicts dominating his inner as well as his public life. The personal and psychological side of Széchenyi's life is a significant field for research in its own right; to it have been devoted the efforts of several generations of Hungarian historians, writers, and psychologists.

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[17] Freiherr Joseph Alexander von Helfert, *Kaiser Franz und die europäischen befreiungskriege* (Wien: 1867), p. 153. Cf. Emil Woinowich, *Kulm, Leipzig, Hanau 1813* (Wien-Leipzig: 1911), p. 94. Vol. III of *Österreich in den Befreiungskriegen*, ed. Alois Veltzé.

Yet even Hungarian historiography is far from solving the many questions raised by the study of Széchenyi. As to non-Hungarian historians of more recent time, their neglect of Széchenyi is rather surprising, if one takes into account the fact that the publication of the Széchenyi diaries (mostly in German) during the interwar period has opened a wide field of research for those interested in the history of the first half of nineteenth-century Europe.[18]

One of the few modern (non-Hungarian) historians who realized Széchenyi's importance was Heinrich von Srbik. In his Metternich biography, he paid specific attention to the relationship between Metternich and Széchenyi.[19] Besides trying to look at the Metternich-Széchenyi controversy from both the Austrian and Hungarian standpoints,[20] Srbik also emphasized that there had been an essential identity of views between the Chancellor and Széchenyi on many important questions of the day,[21] and that from the early 'forties on, their relationship became one of confidence ("Vertrauensverhältnis").[22]

The most interesting part of Srbik's interpretation, however, is the conclusion drawn from the comparison of Bismarck and Metternich in the final chapter of the book.[23] In the opinion of Srbik, the basic similarity between Metternich and Bismarck lay in the fact that they both had a similar attitude toward the problem of "opposition"; both Bismarck and Metternich neglected the problem of educating political parties for responsibility. And at this point, Srbik cited a conversation of Metternich with Széchenyi in November, 1825. In this conversation, or rather political discussion, Metternich declared to Széchenyi that he used to look at things from above, and not from below, for

> ich hasse die Opposition und bin nicht darnach angetan zu ihr zu gehören; die Opposition bedeutet soviel wie die unterliegene Partei; ich bin lieber ein Autor als ein Kritiker.

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[18] In an article published in 1939 ("Die neue Széchenyi-Forschung und ihre Probleme," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Osteuropas,* IV [1939], 90-110), Fritz Valjavec ably stressed the significance of the treasures hidden in Széchenyi's diaries from the point of view of European historiography.

[19] Ritter Heinrich von Srbik, *Metternich. Der Staatsmann und der Mensch,* 2 vols. (München: 1925). A similar effort has been made by Hanns Schlitter, *Aus Österreichs Vormärz,* Vol. III, *Ungarn* (Zürich-Leipzig-Wien: 1920), pp. 5, 22, 69-70.

[20] *E.g.,* Vol. I, pp. 470-71; Vol. II, p. 32.

[21] Vol. I, p. 469.—This, of course, had been pointed out by Hungarian historians, too, well before Srbik. See *e.g.,* Dávid Angyal, "Les idées historiques du comte Etienne Széchenyi," *Revue de Hongrie,* III (1909), 686-87.

[22] Vol. II, p. 193.

[23] Vol. II, p. 554.

[24] Cf. *Diaries,* II, 691-711, particularly pp. 697 and 706; also Menyhért Lónyay, *Gróf Széchenyi István és hátrahagyott iratai* (Count Stephen Széchenyi and his Posthumous Papers; Budapest: 1875), pp. 43 and 53. Srbik used the German edition of Lónyay's work; actually, the political discussion referred to consisted not of one but of several exchanges of ideas and letters. See *Doc. No. 784* in vol. IV of the *Memoirs of Prince Metternich,* ed. by Richard Metternich (London: 1881), pp. 249-52. However, only one of the two memoranda written by Széchenyi to Metternich at the end of 1825 has been published in the Chancellor's memoirs.

Whereupon Széchenyi remarked:

> Es kann keine politische Ökonomie, ebenso wie keine Maschine ohne Opposition oder Gegendruck bestehen; die Räder würden wanken, die Federn aus ihren Heften springen.[24]

A careful study of the documents relative to the first great political debate between Metternich and Széchenyi essentially supports Srbik's interpretation, suggesting that while the possibilities and advantages of parliamentary democracy failed to impress the political genius of both Metternich and Bismarck, Széchenyi, at a relatively early stage of his public career, seems to have had a deep understanding of the conditions under which modern constitutional government works.[24a]

However, this theoretical insight into the essence of western political methods cannot be used exclusively in evaluating Széchenyi as a statesman. Széchenyi's statesmanship was questioned not only by Metternich but by some historians as well. In the opinion of Gervinus, the greatness of Széchenyi was grossly overestimated in his fatherland.[25] In Hungary proper, contemporary opponents did not fail to point out the "inconsistencies" of Széchenyi's policy.[26] At the turn of the century, one noted Hungarian scholar even went so far as to refuse to see any "statesmanship" in Széchenyi's activities; in the opinion of Ákos Beöthy, Széchenyi had no political program or consistent system at all; he was completely unprepared for the role of a national leader; all his works and actions were but rhapsodic improvisations of a genius.[27]

In addition to this, one cannot overlook the fact that Széchenyi, besides being mistrusted, ridiculed, and duped by Metternich and other high-ranking officials of the Austrian Empire, was hardly understood by any of his Hungarian contemporaries; refusing to join any party, he became more and more isolated and, from the 1840's on, gradually lost his popularity. There can be no doubt that in the years preceding the revolution of 1848, Hungarian public opinion and the nation at large chose the way of Kossuth. This meant that somewhere between the official course of the imperial government and the fermentation of Hungarian political life, Széchenyi's ideas got lost and the "greatest Hungarian" failed as a practical politician.

[24a] At the end of his study *Conservatism Revisited. The Revolt Against Revolt, 1815-1949* (New York—London: 1949, p. 136), Peter Viereck also referred to the Metternich-Széchenyi problem without, however, trying to analyze the position taken by Széchenyi in the controversy. More recently, an article was devoted to the relationship of Metternich and Széchenyi by Béla Menczer ""Metternich und Széchenyi." *Der Donauraum*, V (1960), 78-86). In my opinion, the author of the article overemphasized the positive aspects of the co-operation between Széchenyi and Metternich with regard to the period 1825-40 and ignored some rather important results of Hungarian historiography (*e.g.*, Viszota's introductions and annexes to the Széchenyi diaries) in order to justify the Chancellor's highhanded and shortsighted attitude both toward Hungary and Széchenyi. But I agree with Mr. Menczer that the understanding of the Széchenyi-Metternich problem is one of the keys to a correct interpretation of Austro-Hungarian history in the first half of the nineteenth century.

[25] G. Gervinus, *Geschichte des XIX. Jahrhunderts seit den Wiener Verträgen*, VII (Leipzig: 1865), 115.—Gervinus seems to have read only two of Széchenyi's works in bad German translation, *Hitel* (Credit) and *Világ* (Light), the first of which was rejected by Széchenyi himself on account of the translator's distortions. (Cf. *Light*, pp. 353-56 in vol. I of the Szily-edition referred to in the next footnote.) Besides, in forming a historically sound judgment about Széchenyi, one has to integrate his writings and his public activities.

[26] Cf. *e.g.*, Gyula Kautz, "A 'Hitel' méltatása," (Appraisal of 'Credit'), Introduction to *Gróf Széchenyi István Munkái, II. Sorozat* (Count Stephen Széchenyi's Works, II Series), ed. by Kálmán Szily, I (Budapest: 1904), pp. XVIII-XXXVII. (Quoted hereafter as *Szily*.)

[27] Ákos Beöthy. *A Magyar Államiság fejlödése, küzdelmei* (Development and Struggles of Hungarian Statehood), II (Budapest: 1903), 139-91. Beöthy's principal arguments are summed up by Kautz in *Szily*, I, esp. pp. XXXV-XXXVI.

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Why is it that a nation assigned the epithet "greatest" to a man who seemed to have failed as a practical politician? Is there any more important test of statesmanship and greatness than success in politics? Was Kossuth's Széchenyi apotheosis sincere, or was it just one of his skilful political manoeuvres to raise his potential opponent above all human standards and thus to declare him a *quantité négligeable* for all practical purposes, as Antal Szerb, the able literary historian suggested?[28] But even if Kossuth really meant what he said, he might have been wrong: did Hungarian public opinion ever reverse his judgment concerning Széchenyi? Or was Széchenyi, as Julius Szekfü thought,[29] a unique phenomenon," "a miracle never to be repeated" in Hungarian history, who had a message for Hungarian posterity which his own contemporaries, in a mysterious way, were blind enough to overlook? In the latter case, were there any "objective" historical factors which prevented his fellow-countrymen from "understanding" him and which influenced the leaders of Austria to ignore his suggestions,[30] or was his personality too enigmatic and unstable for political leadership?

To be sure, one key to the solution of the Széchenyi "mystery" must be found in his personality, although this approach raises new difficulties. As a captain of the hussars, previously unknown in his country's public life, he became the founder of the Academy of Sciences at the age of thirty-four. As a member of one of the leading Hungarian magnate families, intermarried with the Austrian, Bohemian, Croatian, and Italian nobilities, he started a radical reform movement in the fatherland which he hardly knew as a youth. He was one of the greatest landowners in Hungary, yet he raised his voice in the interest of the serfs and advocated the gradual elimination of all privileges. A citizen of the world, he had spent most of his life abroad before he reached his thirties and kept his private diaries in German, sometimes in Italian, French, and English, only occasionally inserting a few Hungarian words; nevertheless, he was the first to utter a speech in the Magyar tongue in the upper Chamber of the Hungarian Diet, and his writings marked the beginning of Hungarian political prose. A man with strong sensual impulses, a dandy of the Congress of Vienna, he turned out to be the most ethical thinker of his nation. An ardent patriot, he preferred in his romantic and somewhat mystical national feeling the most ignorant and poorest Hungarian peasant to any other national, be he German, Jew, Rumanian, or Slav, but he was the first and practically alone among his countrymen to raise his voice against any discrimination against other peoples at a time when Hungarian chauvinism seemed to have overpowered all minds. As a Christian humanist, he preached and practiced tolerance toward Protestants, Jews, and Mohammedans as well; but he could become rigid and intolerant wherever he saw dishonesty, dirt, and ignorance in his beloved fatherland, or whenever he found himself failing in his duties toward God or his fellow men.

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[28] Antal Szerb, *Magyar Irodalomtörténet* (Hungarian Literary History; Budapest: 1947), pp. 280, 286. [First edition: Kolozsvár-Cluj, 1934.]

[29] Gyula Szekfü, *A mai Széchenyi* (Present-day Széchenyi; Budapest: 1935), pp. 24-25.

[30] For the former, see Elemér Mályusz, "A reformkor nemzedéke" ("Generation of the Reform Era"), *Századok,* LVII (1923), pp. 32-60; for the latter, Louis Eisenman, *Le compromis austro-hongrois de 1867* (Paris: 1904), pp. 652-653.

He was an adherent of the Habsburg dynasty and of the Austrian Empire, realizing the mutual interdependence of Hungary's regeneration and of the strengthening of the Monarchy; but he wrote hundreds of pages of the most violent and sarcastic criticism of Francis Joseph and Austrian absolutism in the 1850's. An impatient agitator advocating the modernization of Hungarian society and the emancipation of all underprivileged classes, he attacked vigorously what he believed to be false glorification of the Hungarian past so cherished by the nobility; yet, while scourging the "national" vices and ridiculing the feudal practices and outmoded customs, he strove to prepare a firm ground for the country's future by preserving the organic continuity of the nation's constitutional life and by "ennobling" the moral forces of its traditional ruling classes. He was a champion of liberty and progress, giving these concepts a special moral aspect by demanding both from the nation and from the individual citizen a high degree of soberness and discipline; always more admired and respected than loved, he despised all demagoguery, mistrusted popular enthusiasm, and remained in the strict sense of the word an "aristocrat" at the bottom of his heart until the very end of his life. His views were enlightened and liberal concerning all important religious, social, and economic questions of the day, but he advocated the "golden mean" and was in favor of moderation in all walks of life; still, he did not hesitate a moment to sacrifice his remaining popularity by attacking Kossuth with crusading zeal and bitterness when, in his opinion, the latter's policy threatened the country with deadly danger. By his economic reforms, he laid the foundations of modern Hungary, where he was the first to realize the primary significance of economic matters in modern societies; yet, he rejected any kind of materialistic philosophy, did not refrain from dreaming for his people, and always kept his eyes directed toward the lofty ideals of Eternal Truth, Justice, Equity, and Virtue—ideals which could be reached in his opinion both by nations and individuals only through Christian perfectionism.

In political affairs, however, Széchenyi held rather realistic views, warning that in politics one must never yield to passions and emotions; at the same time, he agitated for his reform program in the most poetic terms to catch the fantasy of his countrymen, and his whole "system" and philosophy of life was highly idealistic. A pioneer of Western ideas in Hungary and an admirer of the achievements of the Anglo-Saxon world, he endeavored to discover and understand the secret of the Hungarian nation's peculiar vitality. Regarded by many as a "cold calculator," he became the "martyr of the heart," for he was driven insane by his excited imagination which compelled him to foresee political trends and consequences which no one else but he could recognize in time. Having first died a spiritual death, he later recovered and again began to work for his fatherland, only to commit the most controversial act of his life: a devout Catholic, who throughout his whole life went to confession and received Holy Communion, he was finally forced into suicide by the Austrian police in a fit of utter despair.[31]

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[31] The most important biographical works on Széchenyi are the following: Miksa Falk, *Gróf Széchenyi István és kora* (Pest: 1868.) German ed., Max Falk, *Graf Stephen Széchenyi und seine Zeit* (Wien: 1866); Antal Zichy, *Gr. Széchenyi István Életrajza* (Biography of Count Stephen Széchenyi), 2 parts (Budapest: 1896-1897). Published in *Magyar történeti életrajzok* (Hungarian Historical Biographies), ed. Sándor Szilágyi, XII (1-628) and XIII (1-380); István Friedreich, *Gróf Széchenyi István élete* (Life of Count Stephen Széchenyi), 2 vols. (Budapest: 1914-1915); László Bártfai-Szabó, *A Sárvár-felsövidéki Gr. Széchenyi-család története* (History of the Count Széchenyi family de Sárvár-Felsövidék), 3 vols. (Budapest: 1911-26)—Vol. III deals with Stephen Széchenyi; Lóránt Hegedüs, *Gróf Széchenyi István regénye és éjszakája* (Count Stephen Széchenyi's Romance and Night), 2d ed., (Budapest: 1941).

The works above should be supplemented, besides Széchenyi's own writings, with the detailed introductory studies to the Széchenyi *Diaries* published in *Fontes* and written by Gyula Viszota, as well as by the introductions of Árpád Károlyi to *Széchenyi's Posthumous Döbling Papers (Gróf Széchenyi István döblingi irodalmi hagyatéka,* eds. Árpád Károlyi and Vilmos Tolnai, 3 vols., Budapest: 1921-1925, published as vols. VII-IX of the *Collected Works*). For the last twelve years of Széchenyi's life spent at Döbling, the most comprehensive modern study is József Östör, *A döblingi Széchenyi* (Széchenyi at Döbling), *1848-1860* (Budapest: 1944). In addition, see also B. Szabó, *Contributions.*

Concerning Széchenyi's personality, see the essays of Zsigmond Kemény: *Emlékirat 1849-böl* (Memorial from 1849) and *Gróf Széchenyi István* (Count Stephen Széchenyi). Kemény's first essay was written in 1849, the second—in 1851; they were published in Antal Csengery, ed., *Magyar szónokok és státusférfiak* (Hungarian Orators and Statesmen), II (Pest: 1851) 1-274. German ed.: *Ungarns Redner und Staatsmänner,* II (Wien-Leipzig: 1852), 332-513. The two essays were republished in Zsigmond Kemény, *Történelmi és irodalmi tanulmányok* (Historical and Literary Studies), Kemény's *Collected Works,* ed. Pál Gyulai, vol. IX (Budapest: 1907), 47-141; 142-343, resp. Other important works on Széchenyi's personality: Pál Gyulai, "Gróf Széchenyi István mint iró," ("Count Stephen Széchenyi as a Writer")—address given at the annual meeting of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1892. *Szily,* I, pp. V-XXIII; Dávid Angyal, *Történeti tanulmányok* (Historical Essays; Budapest: 1937), pp. 1-147; and the same author's "Les idées historiques du comte Etienne Széchenyi," *Revue de Hongrie,* 1909, vols. III-IV, 406-417; 531-551; 671-693; and 14-30, resp.

For a general background of "Széchenyi's era" see Mihály Horváth, *Huszonöt év Magyarország történelméböl* (Twenty-Five Years of Hungary's History), *1823-1848,* 3d ed., 3 vols. (Budapest: 1866; cited hereafter *Twenty-Five Years).* Germ. ed. of Horváth's work: *Fünfundzwanzig Jahre aus der Geschichte Ungarns von 1823-1848.* 2 vols. (Leipzig: 1867.) This contemporary account, not yet surpassed, has to be supplemented with the corresponding chapters written by Szekfü in Vol. V of Bálint Hóman and Gyula Szekfü, *Magyar Történet* (Hungarian History), 2d ed. (Budapest: 1936.) No Széchenyi research

This rather dramatized characterization of Széchenyi could be continued and supplemented by many other of his traits, revealing both the tensions within and the tremendous drive of his personality. All this, of course, is fascinating from the point of view of the writer or psychologist, yet it does not make any easier the task of the historian bound to face still another problem.

It has been said that each generation should try to make a new approach to any great man.[32] Due to special political and social conditions, this otherwise healthy principle has been somewhat overdone in Hungary with regard to Széchenyi. Although no responsible Hungarian politician would pay any attention to his warnings in the years preceding 1848, he was credited with almost prophetic clairvoyance during the years of Austrian oppression after the revolution and Kossuth had failed. The classic examples of this reinterpretation of Széchenyi are Kemény's brilliant Széchenyi essays.[33]

Following this period of soul-searching, the "liberal" era between the Compromise of 1867 and World War I tried to incorporate both Széchenyi and Kossuth into the national Pantheon. But somehow the balance usually turned out to be in favor of Kossuth, for due to an unconscious attitude noticed already by Kemény, "the justification of one's career necessarily predetermined the other's condemnation."[34] During this period many important works on Széchenyi were contributed, including the publishing of his own writings[35] and interpretations of his life work.[36] Despite some important exceptions, as *e.g.*, Angyal and Gaál, writers of this period frequently thought of Széchenyi only as the great initiator of the Hungarian Reform Era (which he actually was) whose principles were taken over and brought to a new phase by Louis Kossuth. Kossuth's name still had an unparalleled appeal to Hungarian hearts. Széchenyi was, at best, considered a national monument, to be respected but not studied, as an aristocratic and imperfect Kossuth, who got cold feet from the ideas

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must ignore Szekfü's Széchenyi interpretation in *Három nemzedék* (Three Generations), 2d ed. (Budapest: 1922), despite its shortcomings and exaggerations.

The most comprehensive bibliography covering the Hungarian and foreign works dealing with the period of Széchenyi's public career is Zoltán I. Tóth *et al.*, *Magyar történeti bibliográfia* (Hungarian Historical Bibliography), *1825-1867*. Vol. I, (Budapest: 1950).—This work is planned for four volumes the first being the "General Part." Recently, Vol. III has been published, too.

[32] "Every new era asks a new question from Széchenyi." Szekfü, *Present-day Széchenyi*, p. 25.

[33] See fn. 31.

[34] *Memorial from 1849.* Csengery, *op. cit.*, II, 6. (Germ. ed.)

[35] *E.g.*, *Gróf Széchenyi István munkái* (Count Stephen Széchenyi's Works), ed. Antal Zichy, 9 vols. (Budapest: 1884-1896) and the already mentioned two-volume set edited by Szily, both published by the Hungarian Academy.

[36] In addition to the cited works of Gyulai, Friedreich, Angyal, see, *e.g.*, the monograph by Jenö Gaál, *Gróf Széchenyi István nemzeti politikája* (Count Stephen Széchenyi's National Policy), 3 vols. (Budapest: 1902-1903.) The title of vol. III is *Gróf Széchenyi István nemzeti politikája és jövönk* (Count Stephen Széchenyi's National Policy and Our Future). See also the essays published in *Széchenyi eszmevilága* (Széchenyi's World of Ideas), 3 vols. (Budapest: 1912-14.)

of his younger self; but more often his ability as a political leader was questioned and regarded as inferior to that of his great opponent.[37]

In the period between the two world wars, during the era of conservative reaction and right-wing nationalism in Hungary, Széchenyi's fear of the revolution and the conservative aspects of his life work received particular attention. The nationalistic side of his patriotism was overemphasized and re-evaluated as the forerunner of Hungarian racial thinking, the more so, because this tendency had already been present in Kemény's interpretation and seemed especially useful both for criticizing the achievements of the foregoing liberal era and for justifying Hungarian claims to intellectual supremacy in the Danube basin. The most outstanding representative of this trend in Hungarian historiography was Julius Szekfü, in whose opinion Széchenyi's real claim to immortality lay in his ability to realize in time the extraordinary significance of the nationality problem within the Austrian Empire.[38] The great achievement of this period with regard to Széchenyi research was the monumental and complete re-publication of Széchenyi's *Diaries* (ed. Gyula Viszota)[39] and the publication of the literary legacy of the Döbling period, made possible by the opening of the former secret imperial Archives in Vienna. Both publications appeared in the series *Fontes Historiae Hungaricae Aevi Recentioris* published by the Hungarian Historical Association, which also began the re-publication of Széchenyi's other writings in the form of a modern critical edition of his *Collected Works.*[40]

The era following World War II has seen no really significant contribution to the Széchenyi literature as yet. The régime being anxious to justify its "historical mission" by "accomplishing the work of Kossuth," first banned the name of Széchenyi from the textbooks and schools, presumably because the "Greatest Hungarian" also happened to be a great landowner and magnate, *i.e.*, a member of the ruling and exploiting class—in a word, he was considered "reactionary." Although a Resolution of the Party's Central Committee in 1954 decided to "restore" the reputation of certain great Hungarians such as Széchenyi, Zrinyi, Madách, etc. in the schools in order to stimulate "patriotic education," the Széchenyi problem is too complicated and touchy to fit into the restricted limits of orthodox Marxian historical theory.[41] Whether the centennial of Széchenyi's death will bring any changes in this respect remains to be seen.[42]

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[37] In addition to A. Beöthy's already quoted interpretation, cf. also Béla Grünwald, *Az uj Magyarország. Gróf Széchenyi István* (New Hungary. Count Stephen Széchenyi; Budapest: 1890) esp. pp. 524-28; Imre Halász, "Gróf Széchenyi István," *Egy letünt nemzedék* ("Count Stephen Széchenyi," *A Generation Which Disappeared;* Budapest: 1911), pp. 30-53. Also Antal Zichy's "Introduction" to *Gróf Széchenyi István Hirlapi Cikkei* (Count Stephen Széchenyi's Newspaper Articles), I (Budapest: 1893), pp. XXI-XXII; XXXIII.

[38] *Hung. History,* V, 373-74.

[39] Excerpts of Széchenyi's *Diaries,* in Hungarian translation, were first published as Vol. I. of the nine-volume edition of Széchenyi's Works, published by the Academy (cf. fn. 9); *Gróf Széchenyi István Naplói* (kivonatosan). Összeállitotta Zichy Antal. (The Diaries of Count Stephen Széchenyi. Excerpts. Compiled by Antal Zichy; Budapest: 1884). This edition, however, was far from modern standards. Characteristically enough, Béla Majláth, editor of Széchenyi's letters held the opinion in 1889, that "the original text of the [Széchenyi] diaries cannot be published either at the present or in the future; they, however, have been made available to the public in an excellent adaptation compiled by Antal Zichy, outstanding connoisseur of all the circumstances . . ." Béla Majláth, ed. *Gróf Széchenyi István Levelei,* I (Budapest: 1889), p. VII.

[40] In addition to the *Diaries* and *Döbling Papers,* the following Széchenyi works have been published in the *Fontes* series: Béla Iványi-Grünwald, Jr., ed. *Hitel* (Credit; Budapest: 1930), *Coll. Works,* II; *People of the Orient* and *Széchenyi-Kossuth Debate, Coll. Works,* V and VI as cited in fn. 3. An important contribution to the Széchenyi literature has been made by László Bártfai Szabó (*Contributions*) who published about 1,500 Széchenyi letters and documents in 1943. In the introduction to his work, however, B. Szabó reminded the reader that even this supplement to the former Széchenyi publications will have to be supplemented by further additions in the future.

This brief survey of Széchenyi's constant re-evaluation in Hungary serves to indicate that ever since the national rebirth of Hungary in the early nineteenth century, the Széchenyi problem and Széchenyi's problems have been deeply interwoven with the questions of Hungarian social and political development. Somehow the Széchenyi-Kossuth controversy has become and remained to our day a symbol of the clash between the ideas of revolution and peaceful evolution; between the principles of "complete" national independence at all costs and "coexistence" within the framework of one supranational monarchy; between conservative and liberal thought. Hence its importance from the point of view of Hungarian and European history as well.[43]

Whether or not this broadening and/or oversimplification of the Széchenyi-Kossuth problem can be justified, is but one of those challenging questions of which there are numerous examples in the hundred-and-thirty-year-old Széchenyi literature. It is to be regretted that so little has been done to bring these problems closer to the English-speaking public.[44]

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[41] Cf. Ferenc Wagner, *A magyar történetirás új útjai* (New Ways of Hungarian Historiography), *1945-1955* (Washington: 1956), p. 13.

[42] Antal Mátyás, "Széchenyi közgazdasági nézetei" (Széchenyi's Economic Views), *Társadalmi Szemle* (Social Review, theoretical organ of the Communist Party), IX (1954), No. 10, pp. 91-110, was an indication of the rather limited possibilities in this respect. Since the writing of these lines, however, a number of publications appeared in Hungary in connection with the centennial of Széchenyi's death. These publications made the shift in the official attitude toward Széchenyi more emphatic; at the same time, they continued to reflect the shortcomings of the preconceived principles of a rigidly applied historical determinism. Cf., *e.g.*, "Széchenyi István." A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történeti Föbizottsága és Történettudományi Intézete tézisei Széchenyi halálának (1860. április 8.) 100. évfordulójára (Stephen Széchenyi. Theses of the General Committee on History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and its Historical Institute on the Occasion of the Centennial of Széchenyi's Death), *Társadalmi Szemle, XV* (Feb. 1860), pp. 30-55; and Stephen Barta's introductory study to *Széchenyi István válogatott irásai* (Stephen Széchenyi's Select Writings), ed. István Barta (Budapest: 1959), which is perhaps the most valuable contribution to the Széchenyi literature since World War II.

[43] The present author's interest in Széchenyi, however, does not mean that he shares the opinion of some recent writers concerning the Széchenyi-Kossuth problem. To his great regret, he cannot concur with the summary judgment expressed by A. J. P. Taylor (*The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918*, London: 1948, p. 52) and by Arnold Whitridge (*op. cit.*, p. 255) concerning the necessity of a radical "revaluation" of Kossuth. To proclaim Kossuth a modern dictator of the type of Hitler or Mussolini, and to see in him only the protagonist of a Hungarian "Herrenvolk"—ideology seems to go too far. Such exaggerated statements, albeit containing an element of truth, are similar to the unfortunate efforts of some politicians of the extreme right in Hungary, who in order to justify "historically" their violent anti-semitism and racial concepts, chose a Széchenyi "slogan" as title of their newspaper. (The disreputable organ of Ferenc Rajniss: *Egyedül vagyunk* [We Are Alone].)

Széchenyi's life can be divided into four rather distinct periods, each capable of further subdivisions. The first period, ending around 1824-25, includes his youth and education. Besides the influence of the parents, these formative years also comprise the military experience of the Napoleonic wars, the splendor of court life at Vienna and Naples, and long leisurely journeys abroad. It is a period of emotional and intellectual experimenattion, interspersed with love affairs and the first signs of creative activity. The year of the Allied Powers' victory over Napoleon, 1814, is an important landmark within the period. The first entries in his *Diaries* date from this year; these diaries accompanied him to the end of his life. In 1815, Széchenyi visited England for the first time; his experience played a decisive role in forming his future career. Around 1819-20, another line can be drawn: he suffered a severe emotional shock the influence of which lasted throughout his life. About that time, another personality trend manifested itself: he became deeply interested in his fatherland.

At the beginning of the second great period, Széchenyi fell in love with Countess Crescentia Zichy, née Seilern, his future wife. Inspired, at least partly, by this love, he entered his public career at the Diet of 1825. The end of this period is marked by another Diet, that of 1839-40, bringing a temporary appeasement in the relationship of Budapest and Vienna, and suggesting for a short time the illusion of the victory of Széchenyi's political ideas. This period shows Széchenyi at the zenith of his popularity; in the history of Hungary, this is "his age." Between 1830-1833, he published his three major works, *Hitel, Világ, Stádium* (Credit, Light, Stage), containing the basic ideas of his "system," aimed at the transformation of contemporary Hungary. The concepts and ideas summed up in his first major works were bound to remain in the forefront of the political fights in the next decades, hence their importance. Yet the shift in Széchenyi's attitude, which in the following period of his career brought him into close association with the conservatives supporting the Viennese government, can be traced back to the early 'thirties. Although he always emphasized his "independent" position with regard to both government and opposition, he insisted that Hungary's "regeneration," *i.e.*, modernization, had to be achieved through peaceful means, in co-operation with and not against the Austrian half of the Monarchy, and with the help of the government.

The third period of Széchenyi's life, comprising the years between 1841-48, centers around his fight against the increasing impact of Kossuth upon Hungarian political life. At the beginning of this period stand his *Kelet Népe* (People of the Orient) and his *Academic Address* of 1842, both reflecting his deep anxiety over the revolutionary fermentation in the country. Within this period, the political struggles and maneuvers before and during the diets of 1843-44 and 1847-48 deserve special attention. Also, Széchenyi's economic activities, so important already in the second period, came to a new phase with his appointment as President of the Department of Communication and Public Works within the Lieutenancy. The climax of this whole period is marked by the events of the spring of 1848.[45]

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[44] A valuable effort in this direction was the special Széchenyi issue of *The Hungarian Quarterly* during the winter of 1941-42 (Vol. VII, No. 3/4, pp. 415-512; 572-77).

The years spent in the asylum at Döbling, 1848-1860, involve two major problems. The first is the question of Széchenyi's insanity—the origins, category, and duration of his sickness. The second centers around the resumption of his political activity behind the walls of the asylum, and the significance thereof. While there is a vast number of works dealing with this period, there is still much research to be done, in particular with regard to Széchenyi's political role during the Döbling years.[46]

In the midst of the different and sometimes passionately clashing Széchenyi interpretations[47] I should like to recall the sound judgment of Count Julius Andrássy, Jr. According to Andrássy, "*Széchenyi's* political career was not a victorious one. He never was the political leader of the nation. First the influence of *Wesselényi,* then that of *Deák, Kossuth,* and later again that of *Deák* became decisive, and never Széchenyi's."[48] And yet, said Andrássy, Széchenyi's career, "unsuccessful from his own point of view," belonged among the most useful ones of Hungary, for Széchenyi envisaged great and significant aims for Hungary as a nation. "Széchenyi held no office, was no leader of a party and was an average speaker; still, he transformed the thinking of the nation and gave a new direction to its endeavors."[49]

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[45] Beside literature already cited, cf. Lajos Kovács, *Gróf Széchenyi István közéltének három utolsó éve* (The Three Last Years of Count Stephen Széchenyi's Public Career). *1846-1848,* 2 vols. Budapest: 1889). The volumes of *Kossuth Lajos Összes Munkái* (Complete Works of Louis Kossuth), which are being published by the Hungarian Historical Association in the *Fontes*-series during recent years, supplement much information to the previous source editions of Viszota (*Diaries* and *Széchenyi-Kossuth Debate*) and B. Szabó (*Contributions*) in regard to the period in question.

[46] In addition to the works referred to above, see Rudolph Gussmann, *Graf Stephan Széchenyi im Privat-Irrenhause zu Döbling* (Pesth: 1860). Hung. ed.: *Gróf Széchenyi István a döblingi magántébolydában. Németböl* B. J. (Pest: 1860); Aurél Kecskeméthy, *Gróf Széchenyi István utolsó évei és halála (1848-1860),* 2d ed., (Pest: 1866). Germ. ed.: *Graf Stefan Széchenyi's staatsmännische Laufbahn. Seine letzte Lebensjahre in der Döblinger Irrenanstalt und sein Tod* (Pest: 1866); K. M. Kertbeny, *Erinnerungen an Graf Stephan Szécheny* [sic] (Genf: 1860); Menyhért Lónyai, *Gróf Széchenyi István és hátrahagyott iratai* (Budapest: 1875). Germ. ed.: *Graf Stefan Széchenyi und seine hinterlassenen Schriften.* Übersetzt von Adolf Dux, (Budapest: 1875).

Whereas the Viennese secret police endeavored to exaggerate Széchenyi's political role during his last years in the asylum, most non-Hungarian historians tend to ignore Széchenyi's activities during the Döbling-period. Széchenyi's direct and indirect influence on the public, however, should not be underestimated in the last phase of his life. An interesting example supporting this suggestion can be found, *e.g.,* in the contemporary description of the effect of the *Offenes Promemoria an S. M. den Kaiser von Oesterreich* ("Aus Oesterreich." *Preussische Jahrbücher,* V (1860), 414. The date of the report is March 28,—that of Széchenyi's suicide April 8, 1860). The pamphlet just mentioned, was written by Széchenyi (republished in *Döbling Papers,* III, 215-16).

[47] Concerning this constantly changing aspect of Hungarian Széchenyi research, referred to above, cf. Szekfü, *Three Generations,* pp. 51-57 and Sándor Karácsony's booklet *Széchenyi,* 2d ed. (Budapest: 1941), pp. 12-20; also, fn. 32 of the present study.

[48] Gyula Andrássy, "Széchenyi politikája" (Széchenyi's Policy), in *Széchenyi's World of Ideas,* I, 120.

This "new direction," in Széchenyi's mind, amounted to a gradual and peaceful, but complete ethical "regeneration" of his fatherland. There can be no question but that it also implied the victory of liberalism and nationalism and the introduction of capitalism into underdeveloped feudal Hungary. Hence the measure of Széchenyi's statesmanship can be taken by moral standards as well as by his ability to appreciate the working of historical forces.

But not even in his "radical" period of the 1820's did Széchenyi forget that under the given international circumstances the Habsburg Monarchy was a European necessity, the abolition of which would have meant a power vacuum in Central Europe, and consequently a dangerous situation for all small nations of the area. In the interest of maintaining the balance of power, which in his eyes was equivalent to the survival of Hungary as a nation-to-be, Széchenyi stood always for stability and order throughout his entire public career. Yet even during the years of his alliance with the Hungarian conservatives in the 'forties, he was well aware of the fact that, to use a classic definition of Andrássy's, "one can conserve only through reform."[50] Thus in his public activities as a reformer, Széchenyi adapted his enlightened liberal ideas to the principle of progressive conservatism.

In a more advanced, Western-type society and under a more capable ruler than Francis I or Ferdinand V, Széchenyi's ideas might have prevailed. Even so, many initiatives of his were put into practice, chiefly in the economic and social fields. He was rightly considered, as a great historian put it, "the father of Hungarian reform,"[51] whose ideas inspired generations to come and influenced the thinking of his opponents. Despite his shortcomings as a politician and many adverse circumstances of which he himself was more aware than anybody else, Széchenyi had vision and a deep insight into human affairs. He preached unlimited devotion to one's own people without ever hurting the rights or sensitivity of other nations. He believed in human dignity and progress, appreciating quality and honest work in whatever quarter he found them. He put clear conscience and moral mandates above everything else, even in international relations. He thought that men and nations do have a divine purpose to fulfill. Throughout his entire life, he heroically tried to rise above his own mental conflicts and human fallibilities. He also tried to improve his nation by fighting against prejudices and all sorts of outmoded customs. Second to none in readiness to sacrifice for the public good, Széchenyi educated his people through the example of his own life.

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[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 122-24.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 136.
[51] Horváth, *Twenty-Five Years*, II, 249.

Taking together Széchenyi's achievements as a practical reformer and the rather remarkable features characterizing him as a man, the student of history cannot but agree with Kossuth's eloquent judgment confirmed long since by the Hungarian popular mind: Stephen Széchenyi certainly is one of the noblest minds brought forth by Hungary.

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FROM FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM: THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND TO SZÉCHENYI'S REFORM IN HUNGARY

by B. G. Ivanyi

DURING the greater part of the eighteenth century the feudal landowners of Hungary did not restrict their traditionalism to the field of politics. Traditionalism played a decisive part in their approach to all economic questions. Plans for substantial reforms were repudiated, whether they referred to the existing relationship between peasant and landholder, or whether they aimed at modifying the nobility's ancient exemption from taxation. Characteristic of this feudal attitude is a poem by a popular eighteenth-century Hungarian aristocrat, which expresses "with an almost naive self-consciousness"[1] the satisfaction of the ruling classes with the existing conditions and their fear that economic changes might upset these conditions as a result of closer contact with capitalist countries. This—they feared—might have a serious effect on the privileged position of the landed gentry. It was one of the economic characteristics of feudalism that agrarian production aimed at simply satisfying the needs of the households of landowners and no more. The poem says:[2]

> In the counties of Zemplén, Bereg, Ungvár, Szabolcs there is money, food, and wine in the cellars: What more is needed? Why should the Hungarians live a life of uncertainty to make their purses bulge? Good God, of what use is all this labor, which involves the fatigue of thousands of peasants? Maybe venturesome navigation will produce much wealth: but methinks true happiness is of another sort. Maybe John Bull will sail to Tokaj and fill his galleys with nectar sweet, but he will give us lace for our women-folk and set a heavy price on his gaudy wares. From us he will take all that's worth having, alluring spendthrifts to buy showy trinkets, and in the end our serfs will despise the sickle, turn sailors and neglect the stubble."

With the passing of time this economic rigidity gave way to a more elastic attitude and in the Hungarian Diet many voices stressed the importance of establishing commercial connections with foreign countries. Speeches and decisions in Parliament urged the supreme Austrian authorities to improve communications inside Hungary and also those with the Adriatic Coast. But these demands, although designed to serve the country's agricultural exports, were only intended to improve the existing feudal system, not change it. The idea, for instance, that the standing of the family took precedence over all things economic and financial, and that the family had a mystique, while the individual had none, was clearly expressed by the father of Széchenyi, himself a spokesman of traditionalism. Writing to another member of the aristocracy who found himself in grave financial difficulty, Count Ferenc Széchenyi said:

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[1] Henry Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1910) p. 86.

[2] *Ibid.* pp. 86-87; this is a prose-translation of a poem by Baron Lörinc Orczy (1718-1789), published in 1787.

> I am not rich enough to present you with the sum which should enable you to save your estates from the threatening danger of coming under the hammer. But I can lend you the necessary money and I am going to do so without asking for any interest. We do not know what fortune has in store for us: your children may go up in the social scale and mine may become poor. In this case your descendents shall repay the money to my impoverished family. . . .[3]

Of course to lend money without interest to an acquaintance—just to help the "family"—shows how little Széchenyi was touched by the spirit of commercial gain. In contrast to this, his son, Count Stephen Széchenyi, expressed the opinion that "the profit of the individual is the best incentive" in economic life. And a few years later he began to think of making quick profits on a cocoonery of silkworms he was planning to set up on his estate on a capitalist basis.

How his economic ideas were determined by certain economic changes that had already taken place in Hungary, how these changes convinced him that only a complete departure from the ways of old fashioned feudalism could help the country, and how these changes influenced the landed gentry,—these are questions which can only be answered if we first examine the economic changes themselves.

I.

Hungarian economic historiography has already established why feudalism did not begin to take root in Hungary in the middle of the eighteenth century, i.e. concurrently with the changes that began to take place in other parts of the Austrian Empire. Ferenc Eckhart[4] has shown that this was due to the selfishness of the Hungarian historical classes and to their aloofness vis-à-vis economic questions. Capitalism was the product of industrialism and this could only be established by the direct or indirect help of the State. Maria Theresa, the first promoter of industrialism in Austria, put the choice squarely before the Hungarian nobility: would they like to maintain their class privileges (i.e. the non-taxation of the nobility), or would they rather have industries imported to Hungary with the assistance of the Court and with the participation of the old aristocracy. The historical classes insisted that the nobility should continue to be exempt from the payment of taxes, although the Austrian nobility contributed considerably to the growing expenses of the modern state. As a consequence of this attitude industries were not introduced and the Queen decided that Hungarian agrarian products should supply the industrial population of Austria without jeopardizing the economic interests of Austrian agriculture. The result was the creation of a system of tariffs according to which Hungarian agrarian products were allowed to be imported to Austria only if there was a bad harvest in Austria, and the price of agrarian products was high. Thus Hungary became a cheap granary for Austria—a colony in the eighteenth century sense of the word.

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[3] *Kazinczy Levelezése* [quoted *infra Kaz.Lev.*] (The Correspondence of Ferenc Kazinczy, published by the Hungarian Academy in 21 volumes) vol. XX. p. 55.

[4] Ferenc Eckhart, *A bécsi udvar gazdaságpolitikája Magyarországon Mária Terézia korában* (The economic policy of the Vienna Court in Hungary during the reign of Queen Maria Theresa.) (Budapest, 1922).

Thus Austria had set out on the road of industrialization, but in Hungary agricultural production was restricted to the satisfaction of internal needs. Under such conditions it was impossible to think of capital accumulation, of a market economy or of the growth of industry. Nor was it possible to think of the growth of a requisite middle class.

After the reign of Maria Theresa these general principles were reaffirmed and Joseph II emphasized that Hungary could not hope to get support for her industrialization from Vienna unless there was a radical change in the privileged position of the Hungarian ruling class. During his reign and during the early period of the French Revolution Hungarian radicalism was pregnant with many progressive ideas in the field of economics. These demands were mostly of a purely ideological character; they hardly appealed to the landlords who went on cultivating their farms as their ancestors had done and saw no reason for change in the system of production.[5]

Things took a somewhat different turn during the long period of the French Wars. Between 1793 and 1815 the Austrian Empire participated in the wars against revolutionary France and (with a short interval) against Napoleon. The needs of the army and many other factors connected with the war were responsible for a modest progress in industrialization and for a marked improvement of commerce in Hungary. It was partly due to the effects of this industrialization (such as for instance increase in town population), but much more to the increasing demands for cereals for the army that Hungarian agricultural products found, for a considerable number of years, a permanent and substantial market. It was of great importance that at the same time the prices of agricultural products, mostly of the cereals, became higher and higher and finally, in a period of growing inflation, they rocketed.[6]

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[5] As a result of the great national movement which followed the French revolution in Hungary, many important books were published in the field of economy. But during the underdeveloped economic state of Hungary, these were less far reaching than the works of Adam Smith and of the physiocrats—according to Antal Mátyás in his article "A közgazdasági gondolat kibontakozása Magyarországon 1790-1848" (The Development of Economic Thought in Hungary 1790-1848), *Közgazdasági Szemle* (Budapest, August-September, 1959).

[6] My Historical Introduction to the centenary edition of Count Széchenyi's *Hitel* (in Hungarian in *Fontes Historiae Hungaricae Aevi Recentioris* (Budapest, 1930) quoted *infra* as *Historical Introduction to the Hitel,* describes the historic aspects of this agrarian boom, pp. 9-19. See also László Ungár's review in *Századok* (Budapest, 1933) pp. 455-460. Ungár gives a thorough analysis of the movement of agrarian prices and raises a number of relevant questions. Gyula Mérei's book *Mezögazdaság és agrártársadalom Magyarorszagon 1790-1848* (Agriculture and Agrarian Society in Hungary, 1790-1848, Budapest, 1948) is, so far as I am aware, the first study to point out that the agricultural boom shifted the focus of production from self supply to that of a market economy.

Contemporary price lists, imperfect as they are, make it possible to draw up certain statistics. Far from being exact in a modern sense, they give a general idea of the agrarian boom of the period. After the end of the eighteenth century the price of corn improved but the real boom began in the early part of the nineteenth century. Despite deterioration in the value of money, prices show a substantial increase. To illustrate this trend we give the following statistics[7] which may be useful as a guide:

According to the market prices between 1800 and 1819 the annual averag eprice of wheat in Pest changed as follows:

Year	Price of one "Pozsony Measure" (i.e. 62.5 liters) in paper forints	100 "conventional" ("silver") forints= paper forints	Year	Price of one "Pozsony Measure" (i.e. 62.5 liters) in paper forints	100 "conventional" ("silver") forints= paper forints
1800	2.22	116	1810	8.50	646
1801	2.30	116	1811	23.40	525
1802	4.33	123	1812	24.32	198
1803	4.33	131	1813	1.48	116
1804	4.10	133	1814	3.12	224
1805	6.25	139	1815	5.44	356
1806	6.50	165	1816	10.32	323
1807	5.35	199	1817	8.32	336
1808	7.30	223	1818	2.48	262
1809	8.50	314			

One of the main influences of the Napoleonic wars on Hungarian economy was the arrival of market economy. As this development coincided with the rising prices of cereals the two trends should have made it possible for the Hungarian farming nobility to adopt a more capitalistic outlook, to improve the methods of cultivation and to start accumulating capital for future investment. In reality the lingering atmosphere of feudalism and, in particular, two factors prevented any really progressive change towards a capitalist economy. They were: the system of "aviticity" and the established economic relationship between landlords and peasants.

The Latin term "aviticity" (well known to foreign visitors to Hungary) can be translated as a kind of "entailment." Most of the estates of the nobility belonged in the last analysis to the Crown but they were entrusted to the noble families[8] until the latter's extinction. In a strictly legal sense the family was the possessor and the individual was only a temporary tenant. Under this system land could not be legally sold, only mortgaged for a limited period. A complicated legal system made it possible (and made it comparatively easy) to pay off the mortgages and regain possession of old estates. In the eighteenth century much energy which could otherwise have been devoted to more useful work in the economy was wasted in interminable litigation. Members of noble families would time and again try to augment their possessions by asserting "latent" rights. Good connections, and corruption in the judiciary, often brought these suits to a successful end. During the inflation it was easy to get credit and thus, through the repayment of mortgages, to enlarge the family estates. Thus the existing system lent itself to a practice whereby the money made on the good sales of cereals went into a kind of "feudal land-speculation," characteristic of this period. This, rather than any attempt to improve agricultural production, is the true hallmark of this period.

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[7] Quoted from the *Adalékok Magyarország nyerstermékeinek ártörténetéhez a tizenkilencedik században* (Data on the history of prices of Hungarian raw-materials in the 19th century, Budapest, 1873) p. xlix.

[8] "The Hungarian gentleman is not . . . absolute proprietor of his possessions; in some respects, he has only the usufruct, for on the extinction of male issue, the property reverts to the state, which may dispose of it in favor of another family. Seignorial lands cannot be sold; they may be mortgaged, and the original proprietor, or his children, may reclaim, on reimbursing the sums advanced. This is attended with an advantage to

Contemporaries report how they felt tempted to buy more estates, and "buying" very often meant acquiring land on mortgage. The temptation is understandable in a period when an estate would sometimes pay off its purchase price in a year or so. The great Hungarian critic and writer, Franz Kazinczy, relates in one of his letters: "In 1806 I was given a loan to acquire a vineyard, and *in one year* I made so much profit on its products that it brought in all the money I had borrowed to buy it. In 1811 I bought another vineyard: the same thing happened and I now possess it for nothing as the loan has been repaid (from one year's profit)."[9] No wonder that in such circumstances only a little money was invested in production or the accumulation of capital, and much more in the purchase of more land.

Another factor which hampered change in agriculture was the fact that in Hungary agrarian production was based on the work-service of the peasant for his landlord. With but few exceptions, only the nobles were allowed to possess land, the peasant being a sort of tenant on the land. The landlord had no market for his products—hence he needed unpaid labor, and the peasant needed a house to live in and land to grow food for himself and his family. Consequently the so-called "urbarial" part of the landlord's estate was leased to the peasant in exchange for agrarian produce and service on another part, the "allodial," of the feudal estate which was not given out to the peasants. The peasant-landlord relationship is a complex one and foreign visitors to Hungary, who often described it[10] and its implications in

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decayed families, and there are many examples to attest it"—F. S. Beudant, *Travels in Hungary in 1818*. Translated from the French. (London, 1823) p. 26.

[9] *Kaz. Lev.* vol. XVII, pp. 460 and 468.

[10] Foreign visitors to Hungary at the end of the eighteenth century and during the first half of the next give us a vivid account of the relationship that existed between the landowners and the peasants at this time. The economic aspects of this relationship emerge from these accounts particularly clearly. "It appears that the Hungarian peasant pays to his lord, for twenty-five acres of arable land (each acre containing about twelve hundred square fathoms), and twelve days mowing of meadow land, a ninth of the produce of the soil, of the lambs, kids and bees, and about one hundred and eleven days labor, two shillings for rent and three shillings for fowls, butter etc." Robert Townson,

great detail, expressed widely divergent views on it.[11] By the end of the eighteenth century (and of course even more during the hectic decades of the following one) it was apparent that the old system of labor-service for a number of specified days was no longer satisfactory. Robert Townson wrote in 1797:

> I have been informed by several great landed proprietors, that they did not receive upon an average, taking all dues together, more than equal to a gulden, or about two English shillings for an acre. The hardship lies chiefly in the nature of the contrast: this is a reciprocal hardship, as inconvenient for the landlord as for the peasant. It chiefly arises from receiving labour for payment; yet this kind of payment as always used in similar cases, is in the first stages of improvement.[12]

The Hungarian peasants were of two kinds: those who had full tenure of land, and those who had not. According to a French visitor "the peasant who has no lands to cultivate, suffers no disparagement on that account. If he dwells in a cottage, the seigneur erects it, and supplies materials for its repairs."[13] This description comes from the period of the agrarian boom when the Hungarian feudals tried to cultivate as much arable land as possible. In such circumstances they often endeavored to take the urbarial fields into their own care. The procedure of "Bauernlegen," so characteristic of the whole East European agrarian development, was in evidence in Hungary too. The rise in the number of the *landless peasants*, and the decrease in the number of those who had the whole of their urbarial land,

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Travels in Hungary with a short account of Vienna in the year 1793 (London, 1797), p. 131. The book also contains an English translation (pp. 109-131) of the famous *Urbarium,* introduced by Maria Theresa in 1764 to regulate the relationship between the Hungarian landlord and peasant. Another traveller mentions that "the service of the peasant consists of fifty-two days labor with his own cart and oxen . . . No peasant can purchase or possess land. He enjoys no political rights, and, in all but the name, he is a slave . . . Is a bridge to be constructed? an order is issued for the serfs to build it without remuneration. Are the roads to be constructed? the serfs' labor is demanded. Are troops passing through the country? the serfs must house and feed them . . ." C. B. Elliot, *Travels in the three great empires of Austria, Russia and Turkey,* 2 vols. (London, 1838) vol. I, pp. 39-40. The serfs have to give away "as the sum of his bondage, one-third of his time, and rather more than one-fifth of what his industry produces" summarizes the situation (including the tithe of the soil rendered to the Church), *Austria and the Austrians,* 2 vols. (London, 1837) vol. I, p. 317.

[11] For social history parallels drawn between the situation of the Hungarian peasantry and that in other countries are of importance. Thus according to Robert Townson: "the peasantry of Hungary are farther advanced than their northern neighbors, the Poles and the Russians." *ibid.*, p. 108. "On the whole, the condition of the peasant (in Hungary) is not inferior to that of many farmers in France." F. S. Beudant, *op. cit.*, p. 27. "Comparing the condition of the *Hungarian serf* with that of the *Irish peasant,* I regret having to admit that the former is in a far more enviable *material* position than the latter, having about one-half what his labor yields to subsist upon, and having usually bread, and some animal food to eat, while the Irish cotter having to pay the highest possible rent in *cash,* not in kind, that the middleman of an absentee landlord can get out of him, is compelled to make up that rent, be his crop good or bad, or whether anything be left for himself or his wife and little ones to live upon . . . In Hungary . . . the servi are . . . not separated from their families; and in this respect it is that they are in a condition so infinitely more enviable than that of four millions of the population of the United States of America." *Austria and the Austrians* (London, 1837) vol. I, pp. 317-19.

[12] Robert Townson *op. cit.*, p. 131.

[13] F. S. Beudant *op. cit.*, p. 27.

became, it is reported by many agrarian historians, more marked at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Various sources, however, mention another procedure. A report from 1843 says:

> The Hungarian farmers were inclined (during the Napoleonic wars) to distribute a substantial part of their allodial fields amongst the peasants in order to acquire as much help as possible from their new peasant tenants, in order to get gratis their corn contribution and in order to get help from them in production and in the gathering in of corn from the remaining part of their own, feudal estates, without paying a farthing for the work . . .[14]

Thus financial gain became the acknowledged aim of farming. A wave of speculation began. "It is due to tremendous profits from agriculture that everybody wants to speculate, to earn more money"[15] writes one contemporary and another confesses that "the drive to be rich took me in spite of the fact that I am no more a young man."[16] Such statements indicate that the outlook of the Hungarian nobility underwent a great change during the period of the agrarian boom. The drive for financial gain was not characteristic of feudalism, or at least not to the extent to which it now dominated agricultural thinking. True, the profits made were still utilized in the old feudal ways, i.e. for the purchase of more land, or for the re-acquisition of land lost. Under the influence of inflation a new factor now appears on the social stage, that of luxury.[17] The nobility's way of life changed out of all recognition in these years. But the new attitude involved was not identical with the spirit of capitalism. The general attitude of the Hungarian nobility had very little in common with the ethos of the Western middle classes. At the same time it had also moved a long way from the spirit of feudalism. It was the individual who came to occupy a more important rung on the ladder of social values, replacing to some extent that occupied by the family. Both at work and in private life it was the welfare of the individual that mattered. In short: the boom in agriculture did not produce a capitalist economy in Hungary, but in its general outlook the landed gentry made a definite move away from the spirit of feudalism, while retaining its methods of production.

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[14] Quoted by Gyula Mérei, *Mezögazdaság és agrártársadalom Magyarországon 1790-1848,* p. 26. Hungarian economic history emphasizes that the boom in agriculture was instrumental in the expulsion of the peasant. Pál P. Zsigmond for instance is convinced that "the agricultural boom gave a special stimulus to the 'allodisation' of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This was the first golden age of the take-over of serf-holdings." *A tökés termelés feltételei a magyar mezögazdaságban 1848-ban.* (The pre-conditions of capitalistic production in Hungarian agriculture before 1848.) *Társadalmi Szemle,* (Budapest) 1928, p. 118. Gyula Mérei arrives at a similar conclusion but he also quotes the above note where a different conclusion is suggested, namely, that the boom helped the serfs to obtain more land. The truth is probably that, while the agricultural boom produced many examples of both processes, in the years following this boom, the expulsion of the serfs was the principal characteristic of the age.

[15] Márton Schwartner, *Statistic d. Königreichs Ungern,* 2nd edition. (1809) p. 342.

[16] *Kaz. Lev.* vol. XVII, p. 541.

[17] "Everybody is accustomed to luxury in Hungary" states a member of the 1825/27 Diet and a contemporary complains as late as 1829: "Anybody witnessing the extreme luxury . . . in Pest would find it hard to imagine the great poverty which exists in the rest of Hungary." *Historical Introduction to the Hitel,* pp. 27, 64.

II.

Széchenyi's first important work was written in 1828-29 and published in 1830 under the title *Hitel*, i.e. *Credit*. The titles of the chapters of this book indicate the kind of economic conditions that existed in Hungary during the 15 years that followed the agrarian boom. "The Hungarian landlord is poorer, considering the value of his estates, then he should be"—says the title of one of the principal chapters. "The Hungarian does not enjoy that economic well-being to which, according to his circumstances, he should be entitled" says another. And again: "The Hungarian farmer cannot bring his farms up to a higher standard." And the sad diagnosis ends with the chapter: "Hungary has no commerce." In the latter the author identifies "commerce" with the export of Hungarian products, or rather the conversion into money of Hungarian agrarian goods, such as cereals, cattle and wool, etc. Nearly everywhere *Hitel* speaks of Hungary's backward condition. "In spite of the fact that he possesses many herds of cattle and granaries are bulging, the Hungarian landlord lives on the verge of starvation." "He is," states the book in another passage, "very often impoverished to such an extent that, as a consequence of his debts, he simply has less than no possessions.

Thus the author describes the Hungarian symptoms of the general agrarian crisis of the period, one brought about by the peaceful aftermath of the wartime agricultural boom. Thus, agricultural Hungary, too, entered a period which was described by a French economic historian as "une crise de surabondance."[18] The Hungarian farmers were unable to sell their products at a reasonable price; the prices of cereals were low, except (and this may be considered important) for a few years just around the time when Széchenyi finished *Hitel*.

The analysis of corn prices shows that this was the period of the lowest known prices in Hungarian agrarian history during the nineteenth century.[19] The average price of wheat for 1818 was 148 "garas" per quintal, in 1819 it was 80, in 1820 115, in 1821 130 "garas." The big decline began between 1822 and 1826 when the average prices were 85 in 1822, 93 in 1823, 75 in 1824, 63 in 1825 and 60 "garas" in 1826. There was a small improvement in the years that followed, mostly due to local conflicts and to the growing atmosphere of war. The prices went up to 112 "garas" in 1827, to 149 in 1828 and to 159 in 1829. Count Széchenyi may have assumed that conditions were improving,[20] but the price fell again to 119 in the year of the publication of *Hitel.* While depicting the symptoms of agrarian crisis, this book still aimed at spreading economic optimism among the Hungarian feudals.

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[18] M. Louis de Romeuf *La crise agricole sous la Restauration* (Paris, 1902), p. 184.

[19] For further details see *Historical Introduction to the Hitel*, pp. 18-20.

[20] "The war in the neighboring countries is having a beneficial effect on the whole land. Already there has been a 10-20 per cent rise in the price (of the products for the estates) and it is reasonable to expect that all will turn out for the best"—Count Stephen Széchenyi wrote to his friend on 11th November, 1828. Imre Lukinich's article "Gróf Széchenyi István kiadatlan levelei gróf Sándor Móriczhoz" (The unpublished letters of

The fall in the price of wheat (and generally of cereals) is important from many points of view. First it followed a period of extreme agricultural prosperity. There was a feeling abroad that everyone in Europe had taken up farming while the boom was on, and that consequently there was no hope for the Hungarian farmer to conquer or re-conquer foreign markets. One member of the 1825-27 Hungarian Diet expressed the view of many Hungarians when he stated: "A great difference has taken place between the turn of the century and our present time. Due to high prices, people abroad have switched over to agriculture; consequently there is no market for Hungarian agricultural products. In the past we exported Hungarian wheat, but now Russian corn from Odessa conquers the world markets. The prices of agrarian products are so low that they do not cover the expenses of the cultivation of the land . . ."[21] The situation was serious indeed. During the period of boom a considerable number of Hungarian farmers had borrowed money to acquire more land in the hope of augmenting their incomes. It became difficult for them to pay the interest and a high return was demanded for new credit.[22] To these circumstances many Hungarian farmers reacted with great pessimism.

> What useless work it is to farm in a country where peace is more harmful for the farmer than war, where we farmers must wish for a blood bath in order to secure better circulation in our economic system. We live in a country where every day of the present and every day of the future is absolutely uncertain, where the Government (i.e. the Vienna Court) does not work for the interests of the country, where there is no capital whatsoever to stimulate the economic activities of the farmers, where usury is an organized form of economic life and where there is no protection for the farmers.

This complaint comes from a letter written in 1821. As so many other documents of the period, it shows a distinctive resemblance to the complaints of farmers in other lands.[23] As Hungary's agricultural products slumped in the West, the country was more and more involved in the general crisis of the post-war period. The main characteristics of this international crisis may be summarized as follows: For about 10 years after 1818 there was a marked fall in the price of corn and often a definite slump. At

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Count Stephen Széchenyi to Count M. Sándor), *Akadémiai Értesitö* (Budapest), June-December, 1938, p. 147.

[21] *1825-27 Országgyülés Naplója* (The Records of the Diet of 1825/27), II, 452.

[22] According to contemporary sources 10 or 12 per cent interest per annum was considered to be an average and it even went up as high as 25 per cent. See *Historical Introduction to the Hitel*, pp. 10, 15, 60 and 63.

[23] For the history of the continental agrarian crisis during the last Century see M. Louis de Romeuf, *La crise agricole sous la Restauration* (Paris, 1902), A. Ucke, *Die Agrarkrise in Preussen während der zwanziger Jahre dieses Jahrhunderts* (Halle, 1888), Th. von der Goltz: *Geschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft* (Stuttgart, 1902), Joseph Kulischer, *Allgemeine Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (München & Berlin, 1929) vol. II.

the beginning of this period the rise in the prices of wool compensated some farmers for the decline in prices of nearly all other agricultural goods. Except for a short period the economy sufferéd from a shortage of credit facilities.

The economic impact of the post-war period made a deeper impression on Hungarian feudal society than that of the previous boom. Changes in the methods of production became of paramount urgency. The time when the farmers could singly enjoy the higher income in the new spirit of luxury or acquire new estates in the old spirit of feudalism, was over. The catastrophic fall in the prices of cereals made it imperative for the feudals to make substantial changes in at least one branch of agriculture if they were not to succumb to complete economic pessimism. This branch was sheep farming with its high profits. There was a growing demand in industrialized England for raw materials for the textile industry. The center of the new trade was in Germany, especially the Saxon Electorate where a local breed of Merino sheep had for some time already been successfully cultivated and after the return of peace also exported to England. According to English official documents German wool-exports to England were

3,595,146 lbs.	In 1814
4,557,938 lbs.	In 1819
15,432,657 lbs.	In 1824
23,110,822 lbs.	In 1828[24]

"Electoral Sheep" became a magic word on the lips of the farmers and soon it was generally believed that sheep could compensate the Danubian farmers for the losses they had suffered in cereals. "This prodigious increase in the demand for German wool naturally excited the emulation of the states lying contiguous to Saxony; and the flock masters of that kingdom carried on for a considerable period a very prosperous trade in their rams and ewes with the landlords of Silesia, Bohemia, Austria and other parts, who were desirous of changing the nature of their flocks to this more profitable breed"—said an article in an English paper in 1830.[25] Indeed many Hungarian farmers tried to get a footing in this new and profitable trade. At the beginning they received comparatively good prices for their wool, but after a few years of wool-boom the Hungarian farmers had to realize that their wool was too mediocre in quality, insufficiently cleaned and prepared for a market which was becoming highly selective. It was then that the Hungarian feudals realized that to improve quality and quantity, serious reforms were needed.[26]

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[24] "State and Prospects of the Wool-Growers," *The Foreign Quarterly Review* (London, June 1830), pp. 181-194.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

[26] Gyula Mérei gives us a list of the causes that produced the deterioration in the quality of Hungarian wool (*Mezögazdaság és agrártársadalom Magyarországon 1790-1848* (Budapest, 1948), pp. 24-25. He also quotes from an official report showing that sheep farming had become a decisively important branch of agriculture in Hungary by this time. According to this report in 1846/47 Hungary's agricultural exports to Austria amounted to 2,400,000 quintals in cereals representing a value of 9,100,000 forints. In the same

The solution was investment, but for this cash and agricultural credits were badly needed. Also the problem of suitable pastures remained an important one. During the agrarian boom it was often in the landlord's interest to distribute as much land as possible among the peasants. In this way he could hope to augment unpaid peasant labor and increase his production. But the agrarian crisis changed all this. The peasant's work, whether it was the production of cereals or the gathering in of corn, was of decreasing interest to the feudal. The peasants' fields on his own estate on the other hand, and especially the common pastures, were serious handicaps to the extension of the seigneur's own pastures which he now needed for sheep farming. Under such circumstances the landlords did everything, and often much more than they were legally allowed, to expropriate the common pastures and to eject the peasants from their small plots of land. This "allodization" was a general tendency of this period. Thus the interests of the Hungarian landlords were in direct conflict with those of the peasants. Once he had been ejected it became very difficult for the peasant to find a new home. Soon there was a sharp increase in the number of landless agricultural hands. Of course the primary interests of the State were opposed to this expropriation. Documents from the Austrian Staatsrat testify[27] that the news of the ejections in Hungary caused serious alarm at the Court, since the bills of the State and the military service were being footed in large measure by Hungary's comparatively prosperous peasantry.

The Vienna Court and the Hungarian authorities issued many serious warnings to the landlords reiterating their view that these ejections were against the spirit and letter of Hungarian law. But there was feudal solidarity, if not conspiracy among the landlords. Their hunger for the peasants' land and common pasture was desperate and they got assistance from the lower courts and the county authorities. These courts and authorities supported the landlords and made it possible for them to continue their practices. Thus the ejections went on,[28] the economic foundation

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period the export of wool amounted to 200,000 quintals but brought in a total of 17,000,000 forints. *Ibid.*, p. 25. Hungarian statistics estimated the number of sheep in Hungary to be 4 million at the beginning of the nineteenth century and in 1840 to be 8 million. The usual number of sheep on the estates of the great landlords seems to have been between 30,000-60,000. Count Stephen Széchenyi himself possessed about 50,000.

[27] The relevant *Staatsrat Akten* from the Vienna Staatsarchiv quoted in *Historical Introduction to the Hitel,* p. 45.

[28] Pál Pach Zsigmond gives interesting statistical evidence of the division of land in Hungary in the first half of the nineteenth century. At that time 65.5 per cent of the country's land capable of cultivation was in the hands of the landowners and only 28 per cent in those of the serfs. The serfs fell into two classes: some 'possessed' no land at all, others 'possessed' a so-called 'serf's site', (*essio*) but already ⅛th of such land entitled them to membership of this second category. In 1846 in Hungary proper (excluding Croatia) there were 549,846 peasant families *with* and 825,770 families *without* the 'possession' of land. "A tökés termelés feltételei a magyar mezögazdaságban 1848-ban." *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest) February, 1948). Of course in a real feudal society the peasants keep their land under their own cultivation, while in pre-revolutionary Hungary the great majority of the underprivileged class had no possession of land even in the then contemporary sense of the word. A point rightly emphasized by recent Hungarian economic historians.

of feudalism being jeopardized by the feudals themselves. The feudals changed the situation against the principles of their system when this best served their interests. They adopted more capitalistic methods and incorporated the peasants' lands into their own. At the same time they were full beneficiaries of feudalism as a source of power, and retained that part of feudalism which was to their advantage, insisting that the existing legal provisions should continue to give them the greatest possible control over the peasants.

There was a somewhat similar situation as far as agrarian credit was concerned. During the crisis money was badly needed and the old, traditional sources of credit had practically disappeared. During the inflation the great church foundations and family legacies had lost much of their value and their trustees became very cautious in granting new loans to the landowners. In this new situation a class of creditors arose, equivalent to capitalists in the modern sense; merchants, middle men between the Vienna banks and the landowners (and others who wanted to keep in touch with the aristocrats to buy their wool) now turned into money lenders. Of course they did not follow the same line in lending money as had the landowners' personal friends in earlier days. They demanded higher interest rates, and often borrowed for speculation. They mortgaged the property of the landowner in case he failed to repay the money or the interest. For a creditor to obtain repayment of an unsecured loan was always very difficult in Hungary, and for merchants practically impossible. This was mainly due to the Hungarian feudal features written into Hungarian civil law.[29] The retention of land in family hands was the main aim of feudalism. Feudalism hated change of any sort and thus gave all protection to the debtor of noble birth. Some of these measures were archaic in the extreme. For instance a noble could legally "resist" any kind of forced sale of his feudal estate by waving a large stick at the bailiff. From the point of view of the creditor the greatest danger was that the debtor would want to acquire a so-called "special mandate" which was simply an official step to help him in the last phase of the procedure. This mandate served to appoint a kind of inspector to keep the estate in good order before a final settlement was reached. The position of supervisor was an extremely lucrative job; landowners opposed to the Court in Vienna were often brought over to the Government's side by the offer of such privileged posts. It was in the interest both of the inspector and of the debtor to prolong this special mandate. The inspector was empowered to completely "reorganize" the estate. His expenses and salary were to be paid first and then the debtor and his family were to be supported from the income of the estate. Often it took 10 to 12 and sometimes 20 years for the creditor to get possession of the estate of a nobleman and if the creditor was not of noble birth new complications had to be faced. At the end of the eighteenth century some of the nobility, especially of the lower ranks, were crying out for credits, when involved in commercial contacts with merchant houses. A law was introduced to help these people.[30] It made it possible for people of noble origin to go to Austrian courts and litigate their debts away from their own legal authorities. Hungarian authorities were only to put into effect the decision of the Austrian courts.

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[29] For a detailed description of existing legal procedure in credit cases see *Historical Introduction to the Hitel,* pp. 66-70.

In the middle of the 1820's certain East European capitalists started raising money for the old Hungarian families either to repay their debts or to help them make changes on their estates. These financiers became middle men between the aristocrats and Vienna bank houses. They worked out a scheme based on the principle that the money Hungarian landowners wanted was to be borrowed from small investors, and the bank houses would simply mediate between these Austrian investors and the debtors. A propaganda campaign was started in Vienna, the press began to publish articles about the great wealth of these landholders and the security of the investment. The debtors, they said, renounced the legal protection of the Hungarian feudal laws and were ready to abide by the decisions of Austrian jurisdiction. These were the first steps taken on the way to credit manipulation.[31]

In 1825 Prince Anthony Grassalkovich, one of the wealthiest Hungarian aristocrats, wanted to borrow two million forints from small investors. Everything was done to give confidence to the prospective creditors. Bearers of great historical names were witnesses of the contracts which were placed at the famous Vienna National Bank, and the Prince undertook to forego the authority of any Hungarian court of law in case of legal argument over these issues; in fact he made himself liable only to the Austrian court and not to Hungarian feudal law. The Vienna press emphasized that the Prince had estates of tremendous value in Hungary. 2000 "partial obligations" were issued to the value of 1000 forints each at 6 per cent interest per annum. These shares promised repayment over a period of 15 years. As early as 1827 the Prince did not, or was unable to pay the promised interest and the desperate investors hurried to Stametz & Co., the Vienna Bank, which had been instrumental in arranging the loan. They flatly refused to pay, arguing that they were only the middle men between the investors and the Prince, and that the small investors and possessors of "partial obligations" should enforce their demands by legal actions.

Let us follow the Odyssey of a capitalist possessor of shares trying to regain his money from a Hungarian aristocrat.[32] He possessed 28 "partial obligations" and initiated a case at the Austrian court of law which he quickly won. The relevant law stated very clearly that in such cases the only duty of the Hungarian authorities was to execute the decision of the Austrian court against the Hungarian nobleman. Thus the court sent the case to Pest county, where the estates of the Prince were actually situated.

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[30] Act of Diet No. XVII of 1792.

[31] See *Die Kehrseite der modernen Finanz-Operationen: mit besonderem Bezug auf die Ungarischen Privatanleihen mittelst Partialobligationen* (Heidelberg, 1832). This is a detailed book written against the Hungarian noble debtors. On the other hand Count Carl Andrássy's *Umrisse einer möglichen Reform in Ungarn* (Altenburg, 1833), 2nd edition, p. 31, tries to give the other side of the picture and deals with the fraudulent practices made in connection with these credit manipulations by certain middlemen, between the Hungarian aristocrats and foreign small investors.

[32] The relevant archival material from the archive of Pest county quoted in *Historical Introduction to the Hitel,* p. 73.

A Hungarian nobleman was despatched by the County committee to enforce the decision of the court, i.e. to put the estate under the hammer in order to satisfy the creditor. He did not carry out his mission and enclosed in his report a statement made by the supreme bailiff of the estates of the Prince. The bailiff said that the "partial obligations" were not valid documents in a legal sense as they did not contain the name of the creditor, and in any case the very fact that they were circulating on the Vienna market at a much lower price than 1000 forints showed that no enforcement was justifiable.

Before going further let us say here that in this case the bailiff was right in stating that the price of the Grassalkovich "partial obligations" possessed a lower face value than 1000 forints. In fact the so-called "Hungarian papers" or "Hungarian shares" show the following catastrophic drop[33] around 1829 when Széchenyi's *Hitel* was written:

Name of the Hungarian debtor:	The sum of the whole issue and its date in forints	The face value of one "obligation" in forints	The real value of one "obligation" in forints
Prince Antal Grassalkovich	2,000,000 (1825)	1000	150-200
Count Festetich	2,000,000 (1828)	1000	2
Count Festetich	600,000 (1828)	1000	2
Count Festetich	900,000 (1828)	1000	2
Count Ádám József Hadik	1,000,000 (1827)	1000	5
Count Ádám József Hadik	500,000 (1828)	1000	20

The result of the first serious clashes between foreign capital and Hungarian feudalism can be seen from these statistics. The main reason for this fall will be clear if we follow the fate of the unfortunate creditor who was facing Hungarian county authorities, the co-feudals of the debtor. The County not only refused the enforcement of the decision of the Austrian court but condemned these issues and stigmatized them as improper financial manipulations intended to do harm to the innocent Hungarian debtor. The text of this characteristic resolution reads as follows:

> Justice demands that those who, having got themselves into financial difficulties, were forced to borrow money on interest, should be protected against the sly ways of their creditors. It also demands that should such debtors be delivered into the hands of their creditors, the former should find protectors and friends in the judges and other servants of the law. Otherwise the good that accrued to them by virtue of the financial help

given, might be many time outdone by the harm they would finally suffer.[34]

Higher Hungarian Government authorities and the County Court argued back and forth but no help was forthcoming for the creditors. The reputation of the whole country was seriously jeopardized and there was little hope that further capital would be invested in Hungary. Many of the Hungarian landowners, it seemed, preferred feudalism to foreign credit, in a period when credit was essential and all the nobility were deeply in debt.[35]

III.

Describing the general trends in the economic policy of Count Széchenyi's *Hitel,* the historical introduction to the centenary (1930) edition summarizes this policy as follows: "The economic system of the *Hitel* definitely contains certain elements of capitalistic thinking. In many parts of his work Count Széchenyi emphasizes the importance of the economic possibilities created by the new epoch. These provided opportunities for the farmers to increase their capital in a novel manner. Count Széchenyi was definitely opposed to the old fashioned method through which the landowner tried to achieve a more favorable position for himself by endless litigation . . . He expressed the idea that in agriculture (as in other fields of economics) the hope of profit is the most important factor. He urges the Hungarian farmer to show initiative in his farming and not oppose new methods of production. Széchenyi emphasizes the importance of order and punctuality in economic life. He says that strict economy is needed in all spending and he urges the Hungarian nobility to build up capital." To this should be added that he also suggests that economic changes in production should be carried out without doing harm to the peasantry. In his other books, published after the *Hitel,* he not only condemns the maltreatment of the peasants by the landlords but also expresses the view that the Hungarian peasantry should have the right (and thus the opportunity) to buy land freely. He states that the free possession of land by the peasantry would be in the interest of the whole country and especially of the landowners, as the more productive farmers would create a market for industrial products and thus indirectly for agrarian products as well.

Széchenyi's point of view is not the feudal one. For him society is not a class hierarchy, homogeneous and connected in its component parts by mutual interest. There is another great difference between his attitude and that of the contemporary landowners. He does not share their opposition to

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[33] This statistical summary is based on the particulars given by *Die Kehrseite der modernen Finanz-Operationen* (Heidelberg, 1832).

[34] *Historical Introduction to the Hitel,* p. 37.

[35] All sources in Hungarian economic history agree that one of Hungary's greatest statesmen, Ferenc Deák, was right when he stated in 1845: "The impoverishment of our country is shown by the fact that there are very few families among the Hungarian nobility who are not in debt, although half a century ago these families were well off." (Quoted by Pál P. Zsigmond: "A tőkés termelés feltételei etc.") *Társadalmi Szemle,* (Budapest, February, 1948). During his examination of the land register of County Pest

the economic policy of the Vienna Court.[36] Just as he was aware of the common interest of various strata of Hungarian society, so also he tried to make his contemporaries understand that the two parts of the Empire were also economically interdependent.

Such ideas were completely different from those of feudalism, against which he openly started a theoretical and moral battle. Once implemented[37] they led the Hungarian landed aristocracy away from feudalism and created an economic system still within the feudal setting but in many respects resembling capitalism. Whatever dynamic effects his economic policy would have upon the agricultural strata of society, the economic policy of the Vienna Court and the difficulties of industrialization would have made a fully capitalistic economy at that time impossible. Nevertheless it is still true that Széchenyi's ideas provided the strongest opposition to feudalism on the part of the Hungarian power elite. How, then, did these ideas take shape and grow in the mind of one of Hungary's richest landowners?

IV.

In speaking of the anti-feudal attitude of Széchenyi it must never be forgotten that his youth was not spent in the usual milieu of the Hungarian landed classes. He was only 17 when he joined the Emperor's forces and as a lieutenant he saw service during the war against the French. He was a brave soldier and some of his most famous exploits were carried out as a liaison officer. It was he, for instance, who established contact between the supreme war command and the peasants in the surroundings of Györ who were busy digging defenses for the city. Széchenyi, who controlled the operation, was surprised at their industry. Later, just before the battle of Leipzig, Széchenyi carried out a daring exploit, succeeding in linking three national high commands. He was singularly suited for such liaison work and throughout his life "liaison" (in a non-military sense) and compromise were the ideas underlying all his activities. But his main motives were his religious faith and his humanitarianism;[38] it was these that made him turn

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between 1780-1839 László Ungár found that the value of mortgages increased as follows: 1780-89: 964,229; 1790-99: 2,070,880; 1800-1809: 2,198,743; 1810-19: 4,784,658; 1820-29: 5,314,939; 1830-39: 2,282,386 forints. "A magyar nemesi birtok eladósodása 1948 elött" (The 'indebtedness' of the estates of the Hungarian nobility before 1848), *Századok* (Budapest), 1936.

[36] *Historical Introduction to Hitel,* p. 80.

[37] In his most radical book, *Stadium,* published in 1833, he expresses the view that the main fault is in the existing (social) 'system'. In the same work he demanded the introduction of 12 new Bills in Hungarian legislature. The very first intended to put an end to the feudal abuses in credit operations. It demanded the introduction of a new commercial Court in Hungary against the decisions of which no appeal would be possible. It envisaged legal equality between members of the nobility and others as far as credit affairs were concerned. The second and third Bills demanded the complete abolishment of aviticity both in private and public law. The fourth Bill stated that "in Hungary everybody shall be able to possess goods and estates of his own." The implementation of these four Bills would have meant the cessation of the feudal system in Hungarian civil and public law.

[38] See Gyula Szekfü's classic analysis of Széchenyi's personality in his *Három Nemzedék* (Three Generations) (Budapest, 2nd edition), pp. 104-5.

against feudal society, particularly against the autocratic and inhuman way in which the peasants were treated. His sympathies were firmly on the side of the oppressed. He believed that the rigid class structure of feudal Hungary and the virtual exclusion of the peasants from the productive processes was both unchristian and harmful to the real interests of the landowners.

Széchenyi, it will be seen, was aware of the importance of the profit-motive. His solidarity with the oppressed was clear and articulate but he was by no means representative of nineteenth-century early socialist criticism. His political philosophy was anchored in the idea that people, individual people, were out to make money. He also believed in such capitalist virtues as efficiency and order. That in his writings so many features of capitalism are clearly expressed, is due to many factors. His first tutor, later his bailiff, one Liebenberg, later known as János Lunkányi, was a typical nineteenth-century rationalist. A guardian of the interests of the landowner, it was he who instilled the love of economic efficiency in the young Széchenyi. "System, System, wenn auch fehlerhaft"—he once said, probably under his tutor's influence. His readings also reveal some of the influences that were at work in his education. He read Benjamin Franklin, imbibing a lasting respect for capitalist virtues. He was familiar with the writings of Bentham and of Albert Thaer, the father of the German agricultural school of writing; he also knew a great deal of English economic theory.[39] He was an admirer of Adam Smith and Arthur Young.

But all these influences were dwarfed by his grand tours to Western Europe. During his first visit to England his reactions were mixed. He was awed and somewhat taken aback by the cold and impersonal face of capitalism. Yet he soon learned a lasting lesson. He realized for instance that in England even horse breeding was a purely business undertaking. In his first economic memorandum,[40] submitted to the Government about two years after he returned from his first visit to England (1817), this lesson is clearly applied. It returns in his book *Of Horses* in 1828 and is a recurrent feature in his economic thinking. In this context it is interesting to watch the development of his own attitude toward the idea that business profits ought to be encouraged. In 1825 he made certain calculations trying to estimate how much money he could make if he started producing silk on a capitalist basis.[41] His calculations were somewhat faulty and he was the first to realize this. But this was a minor matter. What is important in this respect is that Széchenyi was now entirely under the influence of capitalistic thinking and that, whether horse breedng or sheep farming was the focus of his interest, he was unwilling to think in terms other than those of capitalism.

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[39] For the influence of Albert Thaer on Széchenyi see *Historical Introduction to the Hitel,* p. 39; about Benjamin Franklin and Széchenyi *ibid.,* pp. 122, 132, 135, 188-189; Arthur Young and Széchenyi *ibid.,* pp. 28, 54, 119.

[40] László Bártfai Szabó, *Adatok Széchenyi István és kora történetéhez* (Documents relating to the history of Count Stephen Széchenyi and his era.) (Budapest, 1943, 2 vols. vol. I, p. 9.)

[41] See *Historical Introduction to the Hitel,* p. 36.

In 1827, after a two years' session, the Hungarian Diet went into recess. Széchenyi had been an attentive and observant participant. Part of the nobility was critical of the economic policies of Vienna but this seems to have left little mark on Széchenyi. The reason for this indifference was probably that Széchenyi had, by then, become immune to feudal arguments of any kind. On his foreign journeys he familiarized himself not only with the theoretical aspects of capitalism but also with the civilization which capitalism had produced in Western Europe. Having compared his own country's backward condition with that of the capitalist West, he decided that the introduction of a capitalist economy was a vital Hungarian interest. He saw this and spoke up for such a change without, however, demanding a complete revolution in the Monarchy's economic policies. He was a cool-headed man who dreaded upheavals. Compromise and striking a balance of interests were his guides for action. Széchenyi could see only too clearly that the feudal methods of production were gravely limited. His experiences on his own estates taught him that. In 1827 word reached him that the peasants on his lands were deeply discontented. Writing to a friend, Count Pongrácz Somsich, Lord Lieuenant of Baranya, Széchenyi said:

> You know me sufficiently well to appreciate how much I was taken aback by this news . . . Time and again I told Liebenberg: You know that I can live on very little—I am not married and have no children. You know my liberal ideas, so please look after my employees. Please improve the state of my business, but not in any way that might harm them—this, surely, would be the most miserable miscalculation. See to it that all prejudices and unsavory practices are uprooted. Make your appeal to the peasants' love of industry and order. On the other hand I do not want to weaken or split their productive power because I believe it to be my duty to extract the highest profit from the land that has been given into my care. So please have both these points in mind.
>
> Such were my instructions and of the subsequent developments I received regular reports. . . . *But from this distance, how can one form a reliable opinion?* . . . Now that I have left the army I shall take things into my own hands. In the meantime could you please give me some assistance? I know that the peasants are reluctant to change their ancient ways of doing things. Don't you think that the peasants' compulsory labor and all their other efforts are inefficiently used? Of course, many will not like it if we pay more attention to their labors. They don't like our new ideas on pasturing and the other improvements. On the other hand it is true that in this country the landlords have only been able to grow in wealth and stature at the expense of their peasants.[42]

In conclusion Széchenyi begs his friend once again to find out whether the peasants really had a good reason for being dissatisfied.

The final and decisive influence that made Széchenyi turn against the whole structure of feudalism came from the results of the credit-manipulations of Grassalkovich and his associates. In the 1820's a wave of indignation swept over Hungary and the neighboring countries. The credits secured by a handful of Hungarian noblemen had ruined large numbers of Western small investors. This was bad enough. It was worse that these landowners enjoyed various feudal privileges. The whole procedure was marked by dishonesty and chaos. The men who were party to it had not learned to deal with the economic realities of the modern world. Széchenyi was one of the suffering witnesses. He could see the consequences he must face if he wished to change over from feudalism to a more rewarding type of economy. He approached a Vienna bank for an increased credit allowance—but the money was refused.

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[42] László Bártfai Szabó, *Adatok Széchenyi István és kora történetéhez* (Budapest, 1943) vol. I, pp. 71-72.

Széchenyi's notes show his reactions to these credit manipulations. In one of these he says:[43] "Some of the great gentlemen of our country have caused the nation more harm by their disorderly ways than the worst highway robber. It is less serious for one's finances to have one's purse stolen than to lose both the money lent and the interest. The lesson is this: the first thing is good order."

* * *

Even this cursory examination of Hungarian economic changes at the beginning of the nineteenth century shows two tendencies—both hostile to the survival of feudalism. The first was the boom in cereals, the sudden wealth of primary producers and the luxury subsequent to the latter. It is true that the Hungarian producers did not change their ways with this change in their fortunes. The litigations continued, and nothing altered in their methods of production. But slowly there was also a change in the kind of thing the landlords believed in and in the kind of values they cherished. Feudalism as a way of life woven into the whole fabric of society was beginning to lose ground.

Next there was a structural change in production itself, mainly due to the fact that the slump in cereals demanded a complete reorganization of the agrarian economy. It now became obvious that feudal methods of production were a serious handicap to the nobility. But, paradoxically, although a move away from the feudal economy was imperative, it was precisely under the political and legal cover of the feudal system that the landowners hoped to secure for themselves a new lease on life. A period of transition followed. The situation was now ripe for radical action. It was Széchenyi who made the pendulum swing decisively in the opposite direction, showing his compatriots that feudalism was harmful and dying, and preparing Hungary's way both toward the methods and theory of capitalist economy.

London, England

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[43] *Historical Introduction to the Hitel,* p. 59.

SZÉCHENYI AND THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM IN THE HABSBURG EMPIRE

by Francis S. Wagner

I

The Crisis of Feudal Patriotism

THE territory of the Habsburg Empire was never ethnographically uniform. However, due to its feudal socio-economic structure, which naturally prevented mass movements of a nationalistic character, this conglomerate state through several centuries witnessed only local nationality conflicts.

The colonial policy of the Habsburgs also more or less affected all these subjugated nations. For instance, in the Rákóczy's Fight for Liberty (1703-1711) Magyars, Slovaks, Germans, Rumanians, and Ruthenians participated. But this was the last historic event in which the peoples of historical Hungary stood on a common platform. From the middle of the eighteenth century, possibilities of forming similar anti-Habsburg movements almost disappeared. Henceforth, economic and cultural development, in accordance with the gradual growth of the forces of production, took place in specific and quite differing forms within certain provinces of the Monarchy.[1]

The social conditions of changing feudalism thereby helped to reduce the so-called "Gens Hungarica," which heretofore politically comprised all existing nations within historical Hungary, to its natural and individual elements—the Magyar and numerous non-Magyar nations. This rapid process of disintegration[2] was greatly stimulated by the French theory of nationality. This "one language-one nation-one state" concept in general corresponded with the interests of the great homogeneous national states of Western Europe. But the French concept and its German practice tragically destroyed the very foundations of any future interracial collaborations in the multinational states of the Danube Valley.

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[1] At the end of the eighteenth century the once rather uniform economic conditions showed basic dissimilarities in the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the Monarchy. In 1797 Gergely Berzeviczy, a noted economist, said: "The situation of Austria's industry and commerce cannot be compared with that of Hungary. The Austrian peasantry lives under much better conditions than the common nobility in Hungary." See G. Berzeviczy, *De commercio et industria Hungariae* (Löcse, 1797), 64. For a full account of the economic policy of the Court of Vienna see Ferenc Eckhart, *A bécsi udvar gazdaságpolitikája Magyarországon*, 1780-1815 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1958), 492, and his earlier work, *A bécsi udvar gazdaságpolitikája Mária Terézia korában* (Budapest, 1922).

Differences in the standard of living of the nobility and serfdom within Hungary were also enormous. Since about 90 per cent of the nobility was of Magyar descent, the differences of employment and socal position contributed to the perpetuation of racial distinctions.

[2] Simultaneously, such concepts as "Deutschungar," and the short-lived "böhmischer Landespatriotismus" also lost their historical role. This is summarized in F. Wagner's *A szlovák nacionalizmus elsö korszaka* (Budapest, 1940), 15-22. In the Danubian Basin, awakening nationalism followed the teachings of J. G. Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Menschheit*, etc. T. G. Masaryk in his historical-minded critique, *Česká otázka.Snahy a túžby národního obrození* (Praha: Pokrok, 1908) states: "Herder's concept of state is artificial" (21), and Herder held "incorrect views on the character of the ancient Slavs" (58).

First of all, Emperor Joseph II was captivated by the ideas of the French Enlightenment. In this spirit, in 1784, he issued his infamous decree on forceful Germanization by means of language, stating that Latin, heretofore used in Hungary, was no longer suitable for official transactions and must be supplanted by German.[3]

The 1784 Germanization order and the later centralization policy of the Imperial Court were primarily directed against the Magyar nation, because the Magyars were politically more independent than any other non-German nation and, therefore, represented a greater menace to the realization of the idea of *Gesamtmonarchie.*

Chancellor Prince Kaunitz of Austria as early as 1791 formulated the guiding principle of how to administer a multinational state: "The more apparent and well considered the attempts at securing the unity of Hungary, Transylvania and the Illyrian nation, the more recommended and necessary is the principle of *divide et impera.*"[4]

The language problem itself has remained a highly controversial issue of Central Europe up to the present. Széchenyi was also overwhelmingly occupied with this issue, and the farsightedness of his views cannot be properly analyzed without a portraying of the historical background of the political cult of native tongues.

II

POLITICAL RENAISSANCE OF MOTHER TONGUES

1.

A Glimpse of Czech and Slovak Developments

Parallelism between the Magyar (i.e. the 1790/91 Diet), the contemporary Czech, and other developments demonstrated clearly enough that the time was already ripe for a politically-minded nationalist awakening. Josef Dobrovský at the solemn session of the Czech Society of Sciences in Prague, on September 25, 1791, in the presence of Emperor Leopold II himself, delivered a resounding address[5] in which Dobrovský enthusiastically emphasized the right of the usage of the Czech language, and took a cautious but firm stand against any form of forceful Germanization.

Dobrovský's stand, a mixture of loyalty towards the Habsburg dynasty,

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[3] At first all the nations of Hungary reacted vehemently against the Germanization decree, defending the constitutional rights of *lingua patria* (Latin) against *lingua monarchica (German).* But a few years later, all these nations started promoting their own national language. These changing conditions are masterfully depicted in certain contemporary sources. See *Magyarország polgári és egyházi közéletéből a XVIII. század végén; Keresztesi József egykorú eredeti naplója.* New ed. (Budapest, 1882), 83, 184, and F. Kazinczy *Levelezése,* I, 396, 399, XIII, 109ff.

[4] Walter Friedrich, *Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung,* II Abteilung, Bd. I, Halbband 2, Teil 1. "Die Zeit Joseph II und Leopolds II." Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs, 35. (Wien: 1950), p. 82.

[5] *Ueber die Ergebenheit und Anhänglichkeit der Slawischen Völker an das Erzhaus Oesterreich* (Prag, 1791). The solemn speech received a favorable reaction from contemporary Czechs and affirmative comments in the October 1, 1791 issue of *Vlastenské noviny.*

Slavophilism and well-hidden Germanophobia, impressed also Juraj Fándly, a Slovak historian who incorporated the historic speech into his book. Though Dobrovský spoke exclusively about the Czechs, J. Fándly used consistently the name Czechoslovak.[6] Due to the fact that the Slovak people lived at that time without its own statehood, its language movement was the most dynamic and politically colored of all. Anton Bernolák, an otherwise thoroughly linguistically-minded scholar, dealt much with topical problems of his age when he himself firmly believed in the theory of a uniform Slav nation—the Slovaks of which were only a tribe. This was a common belief of this generation in all Slavic-speaking countries. Naturally, historians went much farther than linguists. Juraj Papánek,[7] another Catholic priest who was the pastor of Olaszi in the Diocese of Pécs, Hungary, drew a picture of the Slav (and partly Slovak) past as being the first to idolize the Great Moravian Empire and its King Svatopluk, and created a solid basis for the later cult of Pribina, Mojmír, etc. Indubitably, Juraj Papánek thereby became the earliest forerunner of the later glorifiers of the period.

The philological orientation of the Czech Josef Jungmann's school ("there are as many nations as languages; there are as many countries as languages")[8] deeply affected Slovak Lutheran scholars in Upper Hungary, such as Jozef Pavol Šafárik. After such antecedents, quite early in 1817 a noticeable Magyar-Slovak dispute started between *Tudományos Gyüjtemény* and Palkovič's *Týdennik*. The Magyar author stated that only the Magyars as a nation existed in Hungary, and the national individuality of the Slovaks should be rejected. So, prior to Széchenyi's appearance, all chief characteristics of the later heated debates on national existence and attributes were already latent at the dawn of the nineteenth century.

2.

The Rumanian Question

The Rumanians in Hungary did not cause much trouble to the political leadership of the Magyars until about 1848/49. The *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* (1791), the first document of the awakening Rumanian patriotism, theorized that the original inhabitants of Transylvania were the Rumanians as descendants of Trajan's Roman settlers and the Latinized offspring of the Dacians. The *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* asked for the acknowledgment of the Rumanians as the fourth "nation" by the 1790/91 Diet. This early claim to a Rumanian national consciousness was rejected.

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[6] Československá akademie věd. Historický ústav, *Přehled československých dějin. I. Do roku 1848* (Praha, 1958), 624.

[7] G. Papanek, *Historia gentis slavae* (Pécs, 1780), 355. See especially its Caput XIII "De Svatoplugo Slavorum Rege," 296-325, and Supplement *Schema Orationis Dominicae* which is a linguistic comparison of the Lord's Prayer in Latin and in individual Slavic languages.

[8] "Kolik jazyků, tolik národů, kolik jazyků, tolik vlastí"—quotation from *Přehled československých dějin.I.Do roku 1848* (Praha, 1958), 748.

The Rumanian national movement appeared again at the 1834 Transylvanian Diet in the political arena.[9]

Until the early 1830's, which marks the beginning of a more or less organized Magyarization, the Rumanians rather felt that the Slavs were their chief enemies.[10] This was so because their eastern Orthodox Church was administered by the Serbian hierarchy using the Cyrillic alphabet which had no respect for the formation of the Rumanian literary language and culture based upon folk traditions. These Serbo-Rumanian-Magyar relations contributed to some extent to the enthusiastic reception of the reform achievements of Stephen Széchenyi among the Rumanians in Hungary and Transylvania. And the Magyarization campaign as well as Louis Kossuth's quite chauvinistic articles in *Pesti Hirlap* were also favorably greeted by the Rumanians,[11] for they were primarily directed against the Slavs of Hungary.

3.

Illyrism

The Croatian-Magyar collaboration seemed to be a continuation of their tranquil life so characteristic of the Middle Ages. Josephinism, the common enemy of both nobilities, brought the leading figures of the two nations so close together that Nicholas Skerlecz, a Croat leader en route to the 1790/91 Diet, asserted publicly that "unbreakable ties joined Croatia to Hungary."[12]

Somewhat later during the sessions of the Diet delegates of the two countries clashed on two main points. The Croats refused to accept a Magyar proposal to establish free practice of religion for the Protestant churches. Furthermore, the Croats were opposed to the substitution of Magyar and Croatian for Latin. The Croatian nobility reacted strongly against the relevant legislation (Law No. XVI of 1791, and Law No. VII of 1792) and thus delayed for decades the formal legalization of Magyar as the official language of the state (Law No. II of 1844). The struggle for Latin and against the native languages was led by the same Nicholas Skerlecz. His *Declaratio*, for the first time in history, referred to the rationalistic theory of *pacta conventa.*[13] That is, there are no grounds for any non-bilateral change in the ancient constitutional link between the two nations, and declared all efforts to substitute Magyar for Latin unconstitutional.

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[9] Zoltán I. Tóth, *Az erdélyi és magyarországi román nemzeti mozgalom (1790-1848)*, (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1959), 65.

[10] When the Serb D. C. Nestorović, General Director of Schools, tried to introduce the Serb language into the Arad Teachers Training School, the deans and priests of the Arad Diocese of the Rumanian Orthodox Church made a strong protest on April 16, 1816: "There would be a great profit for our faithful sons, if the Magyar, the language of our beloved country were introduced into our teachers training school instead of the Serb language." See Z. I. Tóth, *op. cit.*, 103. Also the Rumanian laity of the same city, on July 17, 1816, complained of the use of the Serb language: "It can be proved, that . . . even in purely Rumanian communities the Rumanian youth have Serbian teachers, and are compelled to learn the Serbian language. It is evident that the domestic language, the Magyar tongue, is more useful and necessary to introduce into the Arad Institute than the Serb language. This is acknowledged and desired by everyone, even by the Rumanian youth." *Ibid.* 103.

[11] *Ibid.*, 106-108.

[12] Hóman-Szekfü, *Magyar történet*. V. (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1936), 106.

Although the 1790/91 Diet did not change the status of Latin and the Catholic Church in Croatia, this was the period when the first signs of Croatian separatism appeared. Essentially, no new movements occurred until about 1832, when Count J. Draskovich drafted a new program for the Croatian patriotism Stephen Széchenyi was dealing with. According to the Magyar interpretation only they, and to a certain extent the Croats, had historical rights to an independent statehood within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. It was also a prevalent element in the thinking of a later generation which, under the leadership of Louis Kossuth, Francis Pulszky, and some others, made efforts to reconcile liberalism and national chauvinism in the midst of Széchenyi's growing protests.

III

Struggles Over the Magyar State Language

On the eve of Széchenyi's appearance on the political stage in 1825, the antagonism between the ruling circles of Austria and Hungary, as well as that between the nobility and serfdom, reached an acute stage. In addition, the controversy between the Magyar nation and the national minorities became quite grave. In this regard, all efforts were centered on the Magyar language.[14]

Viewing the relations between the Magyar and non-Magyar nations, Széchenyi's attitude from the very beginning was rather pessimistic. The actual situation led him to believe that the sun of the Magyars had set, the vitality of national minorities was much higher, and the Magyar nobility, the real bearer of national characteristics in Széchenyi's concept, was "morally and physically sick."[15]

The 1812-1825 recess of legislation shifted the language question to the press which produced, on both sides, biased opinions. Széchenyi was aware of future complications and tried to solve this burning question on a high moral level by scholarly means far removed from everyday politics. His proposal for the establishment of *Magyar Tudós Társaság* (Hungarian Academy of Sciences) was enacted into law (No. 11 of 1827). Széchenyi, in founding the Academy, tried to weaken extreme political trends of the so-called "linguistic" Magyarization. Thus the Academy's chief goal as inspired by him was: "to promote sciences and arts in the language of the country; thereby the language becomes more magnificent and expressive, and, thus, the national spirit strengthened by noble and useful knowledge will live in its brightness for ever."[16]

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[13] Foundations of *pacta conventa* are best analyzed by József Deér, *A magyarhorvát államközösség kezdetei* (Jancsó Benedekemlékkönyv, 1931), 97.

[14] Relevant legislation and its political consequences are well summarized partly on the basis of unpublished material by Gyula Szekfü, *Iratok a magyar államnyelv kérdésének történetéhez 1790-1848,* I-II (Budapest, 1926). The de facto situation of the language question was so complicated in multinational Hungary that there was no possibility of an easy solution. Pulszky, who for a while seemed to belong to the inner circle around Széchenyi, described it thus: "At our home in Eperjes we spoke German exclusively. . . . The Slovak tongue was regarded by my father as the language of peasants and maids. Therefore, my father did not want me to learn it. I had a Magyar nurse which was customary throughout Upper Hungary. German was the language of the cultured strata." See F. Pulszky, *Életem és korom,* I, (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1958), 47.

[15] "Der Adel ist moralisch und physisch krank"—quotation from 1821 in Gy. Viszota, *ed. Naplók,* II, 156. Cf. Gy. Szekfü, *A mai Széchenyi* (Budapest, 1935), 37.

The Concept of Nationality

The third decade of the nineteenth century was a transition period during which a mixture of old and new elements appeared on the scene. Széchenyi accomplished a pioneer work by compiling a catena of thoughts on the patriotisms of his age. First of all, he criticized superficial patriotism which relied rigidly and solely upon its outward forms. This sort of patriotism was designed to assimilate as quickly as possible great masses of other nations. The liberal wing of the Diet led by Kossuth tried to apply this method to replace catastrophic human losses suffered primarily by the Magyars under the Turkish yoke and the following Era of Reconstruction.[17] The Count in his first major publication in *Hitel* (1830) took a firm stand against this popular trend which overestimated the role of the outward appearances of patriotism:: "As the outward signs of nationality I do not condemn them . . . but we do not regard it as the foundation of the building and do not forget, besides the outside color, the interior of the thing."[18] Unlike his contemporaries, he reduced the importance of outward forms (language, folk costumes, dances, etc.) to a normal acceptable level: "The word is only a superficial interpreter of our sentiments"[19]

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[16] *A Magyar Tudós Társaság Évkönyvei,* I, 1831-1832 (Pesten: Trattner-Károlyi nyomt., 1833), 101-103.

The Hungarian Academy's first foreign contact was with the *American Philosophical Society* of Philadelphia. On December 25, 1832, Károly Nagy, member of the Academy, visiting the United States, sent a letter to Peter Duponceau, President of the Philadelphia institution, asking for mutual exchange of cultural goods. In this letter, Mr. Nagy also stated the main purpose of the Academy in these words: "for promoting the sciences in general and especially for the culture and diffusion of the Hungarian language and Literature." See Charles Nagy's letter to Peter Duponceau in the Archives of the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, Pa. But see "Document" first, this Journal, p. 310f.

Later, on November 11, 1833, when the Hungarian Academy of Sciences sent its first *Évkönyv* (Yearbook) to Philadelphia, the accompanying letter emphasized: "The Hungarian Academy of Sciences is sending you its first Yearbook and desires that by the love of sciences and arts all mankind may be spiritually united in the great society of kinship." This and other unpublished documents relating to the first foreign contacts of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences are housed in the Archives of the Library, American Philosophical Society. The building of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences was so badly damaged at the end of World War II that its relevant sources were almost completely destroyed (communication of the MTA Könyvtára under No. 7058/59, June 3, 1959).

This spirit was highly characteristic of the thinking of its great founder, Count Stephen Széchenyi, who personally directed the Academy's foreign contacts during the first decade of its existence.

[17] The 150 years of Turkish occupation brought about a disastrous change in ethnic conditions, and the consequences have been regarded as one of the primary causes for advocating the policy of Magyarization. Accordingly, the population of historical Hungary at the turn of the fifteenth century was 4 million, of which roughly 80 per cent were Magyars (D. Kosáry, *A History of Hungary*, New York-Cleveland, 1941, p. 145), while after the Turkish oppression, at the end of the eighteenth century, only 40 per cent of the total population were Magyars (E. H. Balázs, ed. *Magyarország története,* I/2, Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1957, 445). For relevant source material see József Kovacsics, *A történeti statisztika forrásai* (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1957), 460.

The positive side of his nationality concept is composed of several ingredients which are deeply embedded in Christian ethics: "We shall see clearly that the sole cause of the gigantic rise of some nations is Virtue . . . and finally we shall be convinced that the moral good being purified through the undisturbed spring of the Christian faith is at the root of nationality promising the most durable lifetime for it."[20] This moral idea penetrates all of his teachings on patriotism. Consequently, to avoid the gloomy future is up to the Magyars if "the Magyardom is perfected by intelligence . . . because if anything can raise the country's happiness to its proper height for the eternal glory of God, it cannot be anything else than *Nationality* and *Public Intelligence*."[21] Széchenyi continued: "To elevate nationality, it was unceasingly recollected that we were Magyars. And we also did not want to let it escape our minds that at the same time we were human."[22]

After these preliminary observations, it is needless to say that all social strata belong to the indivisible nation. But the chief supports are: the nobility for the present and the peasantry as the guarantors of the future. His comparative analysis of the peasantry reveals one of his most admired attributes–objectivity in emotional matters: "The peasantry of our country is divided into many nationalities. The industriousness of the Germans, the limitless fecundity of the Slovaks, the stubborn affection of the Rumanians for their customs, and the commercial art of the Serbs are pushing the Magyar peasants to tighter boundaries . . . who in their independent self-consciousness and with proud wildness in their oriental seriousness avoid labor and neglect the most necessary means of spiritual progress and self-realization."[23] The fashionable romantic views of the past are rejected because "We could not find such a national greatness in our past which we could not now surpass" and "quite apart from good luck, we should be indebted to the nobility for maintaining our national existence, but, at the same time, the nobility was the chief cause why the Magyar people were almost the most backward nation in the Christian community."[24]

Evidently, forced assimilation had no place in this train of thought. Széchenyi in one instance only set a date categorically, the first day of 1835, to introduce Magyar as the official language of the state. But it was merely a tactical response to the most recent wave of systematic Germanization which endangered the achievements of Magyar cultural efforts, especially literary and linguistic movements.[25] Otherwise he cautiously avoided any clash between the conflicting interests partly on the grounds that the Magyar as "the weaker should abstain from collision with the stronger because the Magyar will be the loser alone."[26] The modern idea of peaceful coexistence of nations in quite clearly expressed on several occasions in the midst of a stormy atmosphere when hatred became the chief adviser for competing nationalities. Especially in *Hunnia* (1834-1835) can one find a comprehensive system of principles on this issue. At that time, in the middle of the '30's, it was an ultramodern cry in the wilderness: "Each nation is called, though in different ways, to present heretofore unknown inventions, some new truths, and virtues to mankind, thereby promoting the ultimate goal of creation. There is no nation whose liquidation did not mean a loss for the whole of mankind, and for all of creation."[27] Then Széchenyi argues that although the non-Magyar population of Hungary stand closer to the well of civilization than the Magyars, due to the huge foreign kinship of minorities, nevertheless, only the Magyars can form a crystallization point around which all nations can be united politically.

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[18] I. Széchenyi, *Hitel,* 4th ed. (Pest: Petrózai Trattner J. M. és Károlyi István Könyvnyomtató-Intézetében, 1832), 165.

[19] I. Széchenyi, *Világ* (Pesten: Füskuti Landerer Nyomtató Intézetében, 1831) 243.

[20] I. Széchenyi, *Hitel, 169.*

[21] I. Széchenyi, *Világ, 169.*

[22] *Ibid.*, 96.

[23] *Ibid.*, 68.

[24] *Ibid.*, 77, 65.

In summing up this subject, he went so far as to declare that the preservation of national individualities was an inalienable right of nations: "The united Magyar nation does not want anything unnatural . . . but wants to respect and esteem the national character of other nations, and its heartfelt desire is only to substitute Magyar for Latin . . ."[28] Széchenyi's argument does not insult the national pride of any minority when proposing that living Magyar replace dead Latin:

> Magyar is not a general language of the country. But is Latin? It is less so than Magyar. I think it is more advisable in our complicated conditions to reduce the number of languages than to increase them without proper cause. Latin is not the native tongue of any one. It is known among scholars only, and is a sour medicine for our youth. I think, if the languages and customs of our non-Magyar population will not be bothered, thereby their excitement will decrease and they will be more pleased to learn Magyar than Latin—chiefly if our liberal treatment awakens . . . more sympathy towards life than towards death . . . By learning Magyar instead of Latin no one's natural or civil liberties will be hurt, . . . and finally a living language will be taught instead of a dead one . . . You, non-Magyar inhabitants of our country, remain loyal to your origin and language . . . use your own language among yourselves. Do not bother to learn a strange language . . .[29]

Now we have arrived at the essential point of Széchenyi's opinion on the complexity of intergroup collaboration: "Yes, to Magyarize! But how and by which means? It is an exact scientific law that everything in the world yields to *superiority* only. But the Magyar can be almost in every respect a disciple only, and preceptor perhaps in a few cases. Therefore, first of all, all impurities should be eliminated to make the Magyars worthy of being followed . . ."[30] Furthermore, it is stated that the supreme good is liberty, a virtue which cannot be possessed by "wild, uneducated, lazy, and tyrannical men," but only by those who, guided by their intelligence, can esteem highly the qualities of other people, and who have "in their heart the immortal standard of the Christian faith carved indelibly: Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do also to them."[31]

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[25] I. Széchenyi, *Stádium, 1833* (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1958), 66.

[26] I. Széchenyi, *Magyar Játékszinrül* (Pesten: Nyomtatta Füskuti Landerer, 1832), 73f.

[27-29] For purposes of comparison, see the interpretation of *Hunnia*-quotations in Dr. Imre Bédi's essay "Széchenyi és a nemzetiségi kérdés," *Kisebbségi Körlevél*, Pécs, V (No. 4, July, 1941), 331-337, and Gy. Szekfü, *A mai Széchenyi*, 267-270.

This biblical teaching (Matt. 7:12) is the very foundation of Széchenyi's nationality policies regardless of the changing historical circumstances. These rare ideas on coexistence advocated by a practicing politician naturally got a warm reception from all sides except Magyar extremists. G. Sinkai, an outstanding Rumanian historian, and Ch. Fletchtenmacher, a noted Moldavian jurist, praised Széchenyi highly for this attitude;[32] Fr. Škorpjk, a Moravian, called him "the adornment of mankind."[33]

In this transition period before open hostilities, some data on the quantity of publishing activities attracted more attention from the minority politicians than Széchenyi's idealistic views. According to relatively dependable contemporary statistics,[34] in 1832 the following monographs were published by the nationality groups of Hungary:

Magyar	Latin	German	Ital.	Slovak	Croat	Serb	Illyrian	Russian	Rumanian	Jewish	Total
172	71	49	1	5	2	12	1	1	3	2	319

The Croat Count Draskovich, in 1832, amended the ancient legal concept of Magyar-Croat relations. Draskovich, among others, stated that Croatia was an allied and not a conquered state and its privileges could not be discussed by the Hungarian Diet. Croatia should be put under the jurisdiction of central Viennese authorities which were using Latin instead of Magyar as their official language.[35]

The 1832-1836 Diet did not pay much attention to the revival of Croatian patriotism. The Diet went on its way in building up the Magyar nationality. On January 11, 1833, at its fifth session the Lower House requested the Upper House to draft its messages in Magyar, and accepted a proposal according to which Magyar instead of Latin should be the official language in all branches of public administration, and the decisions made by the King of Hungary should use Magyar as the official language. Széchenyi himself backed the above-mentioned proposals and was their mouthpiece in the Upper House, supporting the proposals with moral arguments.[36]

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[30] I. Széchenyi, *Világ*, 80f.

[31] *Ibid.*, 384.

[32] *Magyar Kisebbség (Lugos)*, III, 1924, 182.

[33] "Hrabě Stěpán Széchényi," *Hronka*, II, 1837, 46-50. In spite of this favorable reception, no direct negotiations of the parties involved could be expected, for in these relations there were not yet any bilateral agreements. The highest forum of appeal for the peoples of the Monarchy was the double-faced Court of Vienna which, after the death of Emperor Francis I (March 2, 1835) applied the method of divide and rule with even more success than Prince Kaunitz, one of the architects of this policy. It was a tragedy for the multinational Monarchy that during this dangerous period of antagonism, under the imbecile Ferdinand (1835-December 2, 1848), the old reactionaries continued to rule. Unfortunately, Prince Metternich, a political friend of Count Széchenyi, turned most of his attention to foreign affairs; domestic issues were conducted by the State Conference, composed of Habsburg princes and Kolowrat, the avowed enemy of the Magyars.

[34] *Tudománytár*, III, 1834, 207.

[35] Gyula Miskolczy, *A horvát kérdés története és irományai a rendi állam korában*, I. (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1927), 123-124.

[36] *Ibid.*, 125.

Széchenyi studiously avoided insulting the delicate sensitivities of non-Magyar groups. At that time leading figures of the minorities, except the Rumanians, had already passed the Rubicon, and separatism rather than reconciliation reigned in their minds. But it is also true that Széchenyi-like politicians were not in great abundance in the Magyar political arena.

In the '30's the prevailing ideas were derived from Herder's historically rigid and false philosophical notions, from Ján Kollár's stubborn Pan-Slavism and from dynamic Illyrism as represented by Ljudevit Gaj. All these main trends were at one in the dislike of the Magyar character of the state. They unanimously refused to recognize Hungary as a main product of the Magyar nation, rather they viewed her as a collective work of all nationalities which participated equally in the formation of the state. Their campaign, including their German-language political pamphlets, was primarily concentrated on Magyarization. Some of them offended those loyal to the country and thus became forerunners of revolutionary thinking which somewhat later helped destroy the unity of the state. Many of them were usually published outside of Hungary in Germany[37] as a symbol of German-Slavic collaboration against the rebellious Magyars. A Leipzig pamphlet which deviated from the moral principles of Széchenyi distinctly tried to undermine the state's foundations by proclaiming that the voice of patriotism is compulsory only in a state which reflects truth and law.[38] Minority leaders refused to grant official status to Magyar as the state language under the pretext that the constitutional rights of the ancient Latin should be respected in order to preserve the historical unity of the state and of the nation:

> "Now we are all the Hungarian [not Magyar] nation and one nation,
> As long as the common Latin language remains."[39]

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[37] The most famous was prepared by the Slovak Samuel Hojč in 1833 under the title *Sollen wir Magyaren werden?* Széchenyi's remark of May 25, 1833, is rather interesting: Gelesen "Sollen wir Magyaren werden? Bitter, aber das meiste wahr!" Diaries edition of Viszota, vol. IV, p. 380.

[38] S. M. Sch., *Der Magyarismus in Ungarn* (Leipzig, 1834). See Gy. Miskolczy, *op. cit.*, 169f.

[39] "Nunc genus Hungaricum sumus omnes et genus unum, Donec communis lingua Latina manet." See S. M. Sch., *op. cit.* (Appendix). Cf. Gy. Miskolczy, *op cit.*, 170. For contrasting views see contemporary Magyar sources on the political aspects of the Magyar language movement. Among these sources, István Kultsár, a well known writer, helped lay the foundations for the policy of assimilation by means of language: "Only that country can be happy and powerful whose population has national character. The Magyar nation is first in this country as to its historical rights, first in number, first in the culture of its native language . . . the name Magyar is so glorious, so ancient and famous, and

In the second half of the '30's almost no one concerned himself with the historical necessity of Széchenyi's guiding principles. Since each nation considered itself more or less self-centered, the vision of *Hungaria,* the inherited myth of the common country for many generations, vanished beyond the horizon and a new ideal emerged from the relics of the past—the fatherland of kindred peoples. The opposition to Széchenyi's reform ideas did not see the gathering clouds and struggled fiercely with minorities. In the meantime, the once backward Slovak literature also advanced as a result of well-organized Slavic collaboration. Thus, in January 1833, almost unexpectedly, the Slovak Medical Society was founded in Pest, the heart of Hungary, and the organization of Slovak reading circles and lending libraries throughout Hungary was urged.[40]

Despite rapid political progress, the publishing activity of minorities was still quantitatively low in proportion to the degree of their national consciousness, especially compared with figures on the publications of the Magyars. In 1838, the number of monographs published by the nationality groups of Hungary was as follows:[41]

Magyar	Latin	German	Slovak	Croat	Serb	Rumanian	Jewish	Total
216	82	58	7	1	6	1	5	376

In this phase of development, competing nations started to argue passionately over an imagined cultural supremacy,[42] discussion of which had been so carefully avoided in Széchenyi's writings.

Both participants, Magyars and Slovaks alike, represented extreme, inflexible standpoints. This time Széchenyi did not take part in the quarrel. The Magyar intellectual élite under the leadership of Kossuth had much faith in the prophecies made by its organ *Társalkodó:*

> The cause of Magyarization is, simultaneously, the cause of unification in our country. Our country, from the point of view of language, is a true Babel. If we cannot change the course of things, and the country cannot be united through Magyarization, sooner or later the German or Slav elements will assimilate our nation and even our name will be forgotten. Every action has a reaction. So the growing Magyar nationality has awakened Illyrism in the provinces, and the Slovaks within the

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its reign on this blessed soil has been so glorious during a thousand years' period, that every nation holds its special glory to become a Magyar patriot." See I. Kultsár, "A magyar theátrom," *Nemzeti Ujság vagy Hazai s' Külföldi Tudósitások,* II, 1809, 47.

[40] Jonáš Bohumil Gwoth, "Slovo o čjtacjch knihownách Slowenských w Uhrách," *Hronka,* I, 1836, 60-64.

[41] *Tudománytár.* New series. II, Pt. 2, December 1838, 413.

[42] P. M. W. . . . y, "Čemu přiučili se Slowáci od Madărů, a Madăři od Slowáků?," *Květy,* VIII, 1841, 191f., 198f. This is an angry dispute over cultural interaction with the anti-Széchenyi periodicals, *Társalkodó, Századunk* and *Tudományos Gyüjtemény.* In this debate, Jar. Lýsek established himself as a defender of the Slavs. After drawing a parallel between Slavic-German-Magyar cultural relations, he concluded that: "The Slavs have much more right to be proud of their language and literature than the Germans . . . and the Magyar language should be spoken by the Magyars alone . . ." See Jar. Lýsek, "Dobrá rada a wýstraha Madăromanům," *Květy,* VIII, 1841, 231f.

boundaries, and all other phenomena of Pan-Slavism which from now on will trouble us as much as the Turkish empire once did.[43]

IV

SZECHENYI VERSUS KOSSUTH

The sharp struggle of the contending nationalities was accompanied by an inevitable clash between the two Magyar leaders. At this time, Kossuth was more powerful than Széchenyi, whose popularity had suffered much because of his moderate views on coexistence which were highly praised by minority leaders, but abhorred by the majority of the Magyars. At the beginning of 1841, Kossuth became the editor of *Pesti Hirlap,* a newly founded Magyar newspaper, which was believed by contemporaries to be the chief instrument of Magyarization. Széchenyi remained silent and merely watched the development of affairs. But after a while, unfavorably impressed by its militantly aggressive attitude towards national minorities, he decided to counteract its policies by publishing a polemic book[44] highly critical of Kossuth and his *Pesti Hirlap* drive in general, and particularly in regard to the nationality issues. Obviously, only Széchenyi and some of his disciples had the political insight to realize the significance of the fact that national minorities outnumbered the Magyars. Consequently, not for moral reasons alone, but also for political ones, they disapproved of any attempt at forceful assimilation:

> Is it sober tactics if we, the lesser weight, ceaselessly collide with the boundlessly greater weight? . . . It is unbelievable, I cannot see any success . . . but certain people do not want to see that these experiments are against the scientific law of mixing and of philosophy because 1 pound Magyar will be melted in 60 pound Slavs, and 40 pound Germans, etc. and not vice versa. . . . The status of the Magyar language was already legalized, and there was no justifiable cause to fight for its larger expansion . . . do not force the Magyar language by flame and sword . . . otherwise you cannot prevent your own destruction by fire and the sword . . .[45]

Like most of his contemporaries, including many minority leaders, Széchenyi had an ardent faith in the Hungarian Constitution. They went so far that the Constitution itself came to be regarded as something magical which could dissolve even international differences. This was also, in Széchenyi's concept, the main road towards concord between the Magyars and other nationalities: "You have another country outside our boundaries. But we have nowhere but here. But you do not possess a Constitution; we do possess it. Therefore we should conclude a treaty of peace; the main features of which should be these: we let you speak Slovak, German, Rumanian, Greek, Latin, French, even Sanscrit in family circles . . . but Magyar should be exclusively the language of public affairs . . ."[46]

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[43] Sz.g.-G.v., "Nemzetiségünk' ügye 's a' panslavismus jelenségei ágost, hitv felsöbb iskoláinkban," *Társalkodó,* X, 1841, 19f.

[44] I. Széchenyi, *A' kelet népe* (Pesten: Nyomt.Trattner-Károlyi betüivel, 1841), 387.

[45] I. Széchenyi, *op. cit.,* 73-76.

[46] *Ibid.*

The mockery of minorities by the Magyars, although the phraseology mostly was of late medieval origin, did not contribute positively to the common cause of peace. Széchenyi also complained that through several generations the Slovak had been mocked in the traditional expression "Tót nem ember" (The Slovak is not a human being). Germans and others were ridiculed differently but none the less disparagingly. These terms of contempt had to be weeded out, and: "To insure our future, above all, by a thoroughgoing improvement of our Constitution . . . and each and every one of us should share in the bountiful fruits and benefits of the Constitution . . ."[47] Referring constantly to the combative items of *Pesti Hirlap,* he consistently rejected tendencies to regard things emotionally, preferring Anglo-American dispassionateness: "Great, happy and glorious will a nation be if it is exclusively governed by the intellect . . . The American people, similar to the English, do not have adventures on the false tracks of the outbursts of the heart, nor do they wander on imaginary puppet's paths, but for the most part the North American people govern themselves by the intellect . . ."[48]

Needless to say, these recommended ideas could not govern public philosophy at a time when mutual and deeply rooted hate frustrated the possibilities of rapprochement. Even such a great liberal thinker as József Eötvös could not comprehend Széchenyi's effort to neutralize the influence of the Kossuth-led wing of Magyar public life. On March 1, 1841 Eötvös sent the following letter to his friend Széchenyi: "Your attack against *Pesti Hirlap,* in my judgment, is the most embarrassing question of our day . . . During the last meeting you called my attention to the inflammatory articles of *Pesti Hirlap.* Arriving at home, reading all its main articles from the first to the last, and taking everything into consideration, I do not regard them as inflammatory. After having read these articles I have concluded that your attack against *Pesti Hirlap* will reduce public confidence not in the Editor of the paper but in you."[49] The Eötvös letter clearly reflected the opinion of the general public which became more hostile towards Széchenyi as a result of Kossuth's reply.[50] In his reply, as was to be expected, Kossuth rejected all criticisms made by Széchenyi and reaffirmed all the basic statements on national minorities ever made in *Pesti Hirlap.* The core of his lengthy answer was Stephen Gorove's opinion expressed in the first issue of *Pesti Hirlap* (Vol. I, no. 1, 1841):"On the one hand, we should demand the acceptance of our nationality, and, on the other hand, let us give them (i.e. non-Magyars) the benefits of our Constitution. . . .

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[47] *Ibid.,* and 77f.

[48] I. Széchenyi, *op. cit.,* 181f.

[49] Quotation from Zoltán Ferenczy's *Báró Eötvös József élete és munkái.*Cf. S. Kardos, *Báró Wesselényi Miklós élete és munkái,* II. (Budapest: Légrády Testvérek könyvnyomdája, 1905), 46ff.

[50] *Felelet gróf Széchenyi Istvánnak Kossuth Lajostól* (Pest: Kiadta és nyomatta Landerer és Heckenast, 1841), p. 244.

All non-Magyar elements should be welded together with us by the flame which is ignited and kept alive by the Hungarian Constitution."[51]

Unlike Széchenyi, Kossuth did not treat equally all strata of a national minority. He grouped them into several categories from the point of view of Magyar statehood. Thus, from Kossuth's standpoint, to be patient with Pan-Slavism was considered suicide[52] for the Magyars. Széchenyi, on the contrary, at this stage of the development of his thought was inclined to rate the menace of Germanization above that of Pan-Slavism.

V

THE ACADEMIC ADDRESS AND ITS ECHO

Not many Magyars shared the opinion of Széchenyi that national minorities were reacting against Magyarization. Louis Kuthy[53] and a few others belonged to this group. The overwhelming majority of the Magyar nation, and its intellectual élite openly sided with Kossuth and advocated a rapid assimilation of non-Magyar minorities as a preventive measure to be taken in time against both Pan-Slavism and Germanization. Francis Deák, the great Magyar statesman of decades to come, at that time could not yet see clearly the essence of the nationality problem, though he was opposed to the spread of the Magyar tongue by official and educational means. Thus around the '40's the process of disintegration in Hungary was general and almost complete. The position of the Magyar nation deteriorated swiftly as foreseen in the prophecies of Széchenyi: "Let us prepare ourselves for the worst because the Magyar nation and Constitution have never been in such great danger."[54]

The dispute over the status of national minorities and their relationships to the Magyar state continued in an explosive atmosphere without any signs of compromise. Széchenyi in his capacity as the founder and Vice President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences made a last-ditch stand to halt the coming catastrophe. On November 24, 1842, at the 11th plenary session of the Academy, he delivered an historic speech[55]—a unique document of a morally well-founded policy relating to minorities. The lengthy dramatic speech gave a realistic account of the situation, summarized all important basic statements ever quoted by its author, and vigorously attacked chauvinistic tendencies while throwing new light on the assimilation policy as well as on the moral grounds of dealing with unrelated, strange peoples.

In the course of the speech, he took a firm stand several times against the Kossuth-Pulszky-led nationalistic groups for having forced a superficial "linguistic" assimilation by official and educational means. All these efforts, in Széchenyi's interpretation, were morally and practically in vain: "If any one knows or speaks Magyar is it necessary for him to be transformed into a Magyar? . . . national characteristics cannot be secured so easily . . . because speaking is by no means a sentiment, the sounding of a tongue is by no means the beating of the heart, and thus he who speaks Magyar even most eloquently is not yet a Magyar."[56]

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[51] L. Kossuth, *op. cit.*, 232-236. Kossuth's counterattack is based chiefly on the justification of Gorove's statement.

[52] *Ibid.*

[53] L. Kuthy, *Polgári szózat kelet népéhez* (Pesten: Kiadta Heckenast Gustáv 1841), 217.

[54] I. Széchenyi, *Garat, 1842* (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1912), 28.

[55] Beszéd, mellyel A' M.Academia XI. köz ülését, Nov. 24, 1842.megnyitotta a' másod elnök, G. Széchenyi István. *A' Magyar Tudós Társaság Évkönyvei*, VI, 1840-1842 (Budán: A' Magyar Királyi Egyetem betüivel, 1845), 55-89.

Subsequently Széchenyi approached the height of his teachings on nationality. This was a high-level synthesis of moral and national elements with emphasis on the former: "The word is not yet a Magyar sentiment, and simply because a man is a Magyar does not necessarily mean that he is an ethical being . . ."[57] Accordingly, morals are in indissoluble symbiosis with patriotism. But the supreme value of anything social should be weighed on the broader scale of Christian ethics. Consequently no nationalistic value exists in itself. On the contrary, it must be thoroughly interwoven with morally good intent. In other words, nationalistic values should correspond fully with the moral principles of Christianity, especially with its teachings on brotherly love. Otherwise nationalism does not represent the slightest value.

The controversial assimilation policy, and the treatment of subject nationalities by a ruling nation were evaluated on this moral basis. The philosophy of moral duty was strictly applied to all topical questions of those days, especially to the assimilation policy:

> Yes, assimilating supremacy ought to be possessed. But does any one possess it who, instead of propagating love and sympathy, like a magician, affects things only outwardly by teaching grammar, painting red-white-green colors everywhere, etc.? Or does any one possess really an assimilating supremacy who cannot esteem those things in others for which he himself demands esteem from others? . . . Do not do that to others which you would not accept wholeheartedly from others. . . . He who morally ranks even slightly superior [to minorities] is spreading nationality, but he who is only a hairsbreadth lower is destructive. And not only the Magyar blood exists under these circumstances, but all other inhabitants of our country regardless of race . . .[58]

The cultivation of native language and literature was highly esteemed by Széchenyi as well as by most of his contemporaries. He repeatedly stated that "our national existence depends upon the improvement of our language." By that we can appreciate even more his moral approach which remained free of extremes at all times and in all situations. It is noteworthy that during this revolutionary period only a few intellectuals could view this problem from many sides. But outside of Széchenyi, no one took foreign relations into consideration. Extreme nationalists were held by him to be bigoted on all matters of patriotism for they "worked on killing their country," and made true patriotism suspect. And, continued Széchenyi: "This is the main reason why Magyar patriotism is less respected on the stage of the world, why the purest Magyar civil virtue cannot excite sympathy and cannot form a favorable public opinion outside Hungary. This is due to our numerous pseudo-patriots . . . who are applauded and idolized here in Hungary . . ."[59]

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[56] I. Széchenyi, *op. cit.*, 67.
[57] I. Széchenyi, *op. cit.*, 84.
[58] I. Széchenyi, *op cit.*, 80.

Finally he dealt with the implementation of his policy guidance, recommending a proper Magyar phrase for the German *"Klugheit"* which, interpreted as a mixture of prudence and wisdom, is to be materialized in the country. And in this case policy makers should not be guided by uncontrollable passions, but by moderateness, caution, patience, and, above all, *Klugheit*—since only through such virtues can the Magyars rise above other nations.[60]

The academic lecture has had a tremendous reception for over a century. Széchenyi's voice echoed beyond the boundaries of the Habsburg Monarchy. Magyars and foreigners alike made declarations on this historic address. Nevertheless, at the beginning, many a compatriot of Széchenyi could not understand its main theme. As a reaction, a long, almost endless series of articles was first published in the Magyar press. Francis Pulszky, an enthusiastic Magyar of Slovak Lutheran descent,[61] opened fire on the academic lecture.[62] He criticized above all the academic address for wounding the national pride and honesty of the Magyars.

Miklós Wesselényi, a lifelong friend and travelling companion of Széchenyi, seized the opportunity to stage a return to public life. In his open letter of December 8, 1842, to Louis Kossuth, editor of *Pesti Hirlap*, he referred to the December 1 issue of that newspaper, which covered the academic lecture, and among other things noted that: "Széchenyi's statement indicating that the Slavic reaction was caused by the Magyar language

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[59-60] I. Széchenyi, *op. cit.*, 56, 88f.

[61] Reference to this origin of Pulszky, Kossuth and many others in the contemporary non-Magyar and foreign press, was general, from Ján Kollár to the American Francis Bowen (See *The North American Review*, LXX, January, 1850, 78-136, etc.). It is an historical fact that Pan-Slavic movements were led by Slovak Lutheran ministers and laymen while chiefly Lutheran Magyars of Slovak descent counteracted these movements for the first and only time in history. If this process of interaction is analyzed methodically and on the grounds of source material, it may possibly reveal some highly interesting motives necessary to elucidate the role of religion at the beginning of the modern nationality struggle. Undoubtedly Széchenyi's religion played a leading role in formulating his views on the coexistence of various nationalities. Széchenyi was aware not only of *nation-language* but also of *nation-religion* relations. It is noteworthy that the latter interaction was viewed by him within the framework of universal Christendom, not paying specific attention to its various denominations, although the opposite view was at that time fashionable: "We have seen that the priests trembled most on account of the introduction of the Magyar language, believing that the Magyar language would transform Papists into Calvinists" since it was generally felt that "the universal language for the Calvinists was Magyar, kitchen Latin for the Papists, and the Slovak and German languages were for the Lutherans . . ." See Ferenc Kazinczy, *Levelezése,* I, 399,396. Cf. F. Wagner, *A szlovák nacionalizmus elsö korszaka* (Budapest, 1940), 21ff.

[62] F. Pulszky, "Magyar tudós társaság XI.-ik nyilvános közgyülése Pesten novemb. 27-en." *Pesti Hirlap,* nos. 200-201, Dec. 1, 4, 1842; see also Gyula Viszota, ed. *Gróf Széchenyi István hirlapi vitája Kossuth Lajossal*, I, 196-205; "Magyarország és Erdély," *Pesti Hirlap*, Jan. 1, 1843; "Gróf Széchenyi István akadémiai beszéde körül, I-II," *Pesti Hirlap,* nos. 209-210, Jan. 1, 5, 1843. Cf. Gy. Viszota, *op. cit.,* I, 196-205, and "Die ungarische Akademie. Széchenyi," *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Augsburg), no. 347, 1842.

movement is without foundation . . . and this false accusation makes us hated at home and abroad . . . These views expressed at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences . . . should be regarded as Széchenyi's private opinion . . . ; I solemnly protest against them and . . . firmly declare that those . . . who are against the Magyar language and nationality and promote other [Slav] movements, knowingly or not, are the enemies of our most sacred interests."[63] This statement made by a longtime friend stamped Széchenyi as a traitor and started an avalanche of similar accusations. Kossuth readily and promptly gave space for such writings in *Pesti Hirlap.*[64]

The immediate reaction to the academic address is well depicted also by two contemporary politician-historians, Francis Pulszky and Bishop Mihály Horváth. Pulszky in his "Memoirs" said that the academic speech "created a real scandal because it seemed to concede that Gaj and the Lutheran Slovak ministers were right when they protested against the alleged Magyar atrocities which have never existed. Not only Wesselényi, Deák, and Kossuth, but even the pro-Government József Andrássy and Francis Császár, editors of *Hiradó,* protested this unreasonable demonstration . . ."[65] According to Mihály Horváth, the best chronicler of that time, Széchenyi, on account of his academic address, "came into antagonism not only with Kossuth's liberals, more correctly with the party of *Pesti Hirlap,* but with all Parties . . ."[66] Even the editor of *Világ,* a conservative pro-Government journal, was of the opinion that: "We have done no more in spreading the Magyar language than has been our right, and we have done no less than had to be done . . ."[67] Quite understandably after such attacks no one risked being a defender of Széchenyi who was in the center of a growing and stormy public scandal. Under such circumstances Gusztáv Szontágh's moderate tone was a courageous stand,[68] because of which Széchenyi was compelled to prepare some writings in self-defense.[69]

His articles in *Jelenkor* summarized the debate as it stood between December 1842 and February 1843, and complained that all accusations were based on roaring rumors which ran through the country. Széchenyi emphatically pointed out that his oral lecture was published eight days after the first accusations appeared in the press. In spite of the increasing turmoil surrounding the academic address, its author never revoked a single statement. On the contrary, his tone in self-defense became even sharper. His attacks were partly directed against Kossuth and his followers on the grounds that: "the Magyar language is already the language of the law, and it is not less than a new life, a new start and besides that, so many excellent laws have been enacted that those who can still see the Government as an exclusive organ for assimilating Magyars and denigrating their Constitution are incurable and cannot distinguish day from night . . ." Otherwise this series of articles completely neglected Kossuth and unsuccessfully tried to reestablish friendship with Miklós Wesselényi—whose cited open letter was the real prologue to the anti-Széchenyi literature—and in a few months Wesselényi became the chief spokesman for the Kossuth group in its anti-Slav campaign.

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[63] M. Wesselényi, "Nyilatkozat," *Pesti Hirlap,* no. 205, Dec. 18, 1842, with Kossuth's editorial comments. Cf. S. Kardos, *op. cit.,* II, 49f.

[64] Besides Pulszyk's articles see Dániel Vay, Gr., "Értekezö. Tůlhév miatt nem terjedt-e nemzetiségünk?" *Pesti Hirlap,* no. 218, Feb. 2, 1843; Alajos Záborszky, "Gróf Széchenyi István eddigi iratai, I-II," *Pesti Hirlap,* nos. 226,231, March 2, 19, 1843, and by L. Kossuth, "Nyilatkozat," *Pesti Hirlap,* no. 205, Dec. 18, 1842, 883; A novem.27-ei beszéd," *Pesti Hirlap,* no. 212, Jan. 12, 1843; "Igazolás és feletek" *Pesti Hirlap,* Jan. 29, 1843, etc.

[65] F. Pulszky, *Életem és korom,* I. Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1958), 190f.

[66] M. Horváth, *Huszonöt év Magyarország történelméből; 1823-tól 1848-ig,* II, 2nd rev., enl. ed. (Pest: Kiadja Ráth Mór, 1868), 323f.

[67] *Ibid.* Cf. "Szálljunk magunkba," *Világ,* Dec. 14, 1842.

[68] G. Szontágh, "Kelet népe. A magyar akadémia körül," *Jelenkor,* no. 27, 1843.

[69] I. Széchenyi, "Wesselényi és Kossuth," *Jelenkor,* nos. 6-14, Jan. 22-Feb. 19, 1843; *A magyar akadémia körül* (Pest, 1842), 56, also in German: *Über die ungarische Akademie. 1842.* Übers. v. Sincerus (Leipzig, 1843) 72. The academic address shortly after the beginning of the dispute was translated into German, entitled "Akademischer Vortrag." Übers. v. József Orosz (Pressburg, 1843), 72.

VI

PRELUDE TO THE WAR OF RACES

Miklós Wesselényi's work[70] was the most effective counterattack against Széchenyi's statements of November 24, 1842. Prior to its publication in a December 1842 issue of *Pesti Hirlap*, Kossuth published some excerpts from the book in which Miklós Wesselényi, a one-time close friend of the Count, denied any attempts at forceful Magyarization, and launched a well-timed accusation against the Slavs. The Slavic question was described by Wesselényi as the greatest present and future menace to the Magyars as well as to the whole of Europe. Therefore, to diminish this immediate danger, Wesselényi offered an exclusive Magyar-langauge schooling especially at kindergarten and elementary school levels for non-Magyar nations and thus became a pioneer in the historic anti-Slav campaign of the Magyars who at this time began thinking about a systematic policy of assimilating the Slavs by means of schooling. On the other hand, national minorities tried to take maximum advantage of the academic address.

Mihály Horváth relates that as an aftermath of the speech the Jozeffy group of Lutheran Slovak patriots, who in the previous year had strongly opposed Magyar domination, sent a letter of thanks to Széchenyi, as did the traditionally hostile Transylvanian Saxons. Also Ljudevit Gaj's *Hrvatske Novine* praised Széchenyi highly for his policy. All these tributes seriously damaged his waning popularity in the growing camp of Slavophobes who, because of the Kossuth-Wesselényi collaboration, had public life under their control. Széchenyi, as it was said in one of his letters, hoped that after he had uttered his "mea culpa," the Slavs would do the same.[71] It did not happen. although Ján Kollár himself, affected by the academic address, called on Széchenyi in Pest in March, 1843.[72] Kollár, in his letter to

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[70] M. Wesselényi, *Szózat a magyar és szláv nemzetiség ügyében* (Lipcsében: Wigand Ottónál, 1843).

[71] M. Horváth, *op. cit.*, II 322.

[72] Jozef Miloslav Hurban, *L'udovít Štúr; Rozpomienky* (Bratislava: Slovenské vydavatel'stvo krásnej literatúry, 1959), 250. Cf. J. M. Hurban, "L'udovít Štúr," *Slovenské pohl'ady*, II (1882), 129ff, and Ján V. Ormis, *Bibliografia Jána Kollára* (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 1954), 90, 138.

L'udovít Štúr, recalling this visit to Széchenyi, said that the Count was very gloomy when they discussed the grievances of the Slavs. Széchenyi, said Kollár, asked for forgiveness and patience toward his nation just beginning to live, only now emerging from oppression. Furthermore, according to Ján Kollár's reminiscences, Széchenyi said, in an unbelievably mild manner, that he was sorry for not belonging to the great Slav nation, but it was God's will that he was born a Magyar, and he tried to eliminate errors and avoid jeopardizing the path of his nation. Széchenyi's conservative friends often visited Ján Kollár, seeking a way of reconciliation. But all these meetings failed to produce anything fruitful.

Apparently Széchenyi's endeavors, including his greatest contribution, the academic lecture, failed to produce an acceptable basis for a rapprochement. On the contrary, the Magyars were greatly alarmed when they heard the warning voice of Széchenyi on the assimilation policy; and the Slavs, instead of making their own "mea culpa" as it was expected after Széchenyi's historic address, attacked Magyar domination with even greater vehemence, drawing upon only one side of Széchenyi's statements. This practice injected even greater passion into the antagonisms of rival nations. Thus the authorities of Zagreb County, Karlstadt and many other Croatian communities went so far as to return the circulars of the Magyar counties unread simply because they were written in Magyar.[73]

The Hungarian Diet was unable to discern the dynamic nature of the nationality problem and thereby to foresee the immediate political consequence of making Magyar the State language[74] without giving certain assurances to the awakened minorities concerning their political and cultural existence. After a series of increasingly bitter debates, Law No. II of 1844, which finally crowned the activities of nationalistic circles, declared that the Magyar language should be employed in all official (political) transactions (§.3) of the country; that it should become the medium of instruction in schools (§.8-9); that the Diet should deliberate in Magyar (§.3); the deputies of the annexed kingdoms (Croatia, Slavonia) were, however, permitted to use Latin for the next six years, etc. National minorities felt that under the prevailing circumstances these enactments were calculated to destroy the nationality of the non-Magyar populations, and thus violent opposition was aroused among the Slavs, who now more than ever turned their eyes to Vienna, demanding (chiefly the Croats) even a separate administration. This legislation helped unite the efforts of the Slovak clergy, Lutheran as well as Roman Catholic, toward the promotion of patriotic objectives.

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[73] M. Horváth, *op. cit.*, II, 322.

[74] (1844) II. Törvény-czikk. A Magyar nyelv és nemzetiségről. *Corpus Juris Hungarici* (Budapest, 1896), 198. The simple fact that the leading political circles paid attention only to promoting the Magyar language, and ignored minority languages, hastened the collaboration among individual Slav nations. See for details Karel Paul, *ed. Dopisy československých spisovatelů Stanku Vrazovi a Ljudevitu Gajovi* (Praha: Nákladem České akademie věd a umění, 1923), 148 (Sbírka pramenův, III/23), and V. A. Francev, ed. *Korespondence Pavla Josefa Šafaříka, I. Vzájemné dopisy P. J. Šafaříka s ruským učenci, 1825-1861,* I (V Praze: Nákladem České akademie věd a umění, 1927), 480 (Sbírka pramenův, III/25). These correspondences prove that since about 1830 Slavic solidarity was fed by events of forceful Magyarization attempts, and was not a simple literary movement. It was a Czecho-Slovak-Southern Slav-Russian, and to a much lesser extent Polish cooperation, to secure the political domination of Slavic-speaking peoples within the framework of the Habsburg Empire. The idea of Slavic solidarity in political practice during the fourth decade of the nineteenth century was rather combined with a strong anti-Magyar feeling, and the House of Habsburg was highly esteemed and praised as the defender of the Slavs against the Magyars in these sources.

Besides Széchenyi, there were several other statesmen (e.g. Francis Deák) who knew in advance that Law No. II of 1844 with its negative attitude towards national minorities would create an unfortunate siuation. Mihály Horváth also saw it quite clearly when decades later he recollected these events: "It should be confessed that the Magyar nation did not exert political wisdom when its language was righteously proclaimed the official state language, and, simultaneously, did not think about satisfying non-Magyar nations; therefore, it failed in time to eliminate nationality struggles from its course."[75]

On December 20, 1846, Széchenyi again raised his voice at the 15th plenary session of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. As Vice President, he gave an opening speech in which he again repeatedly warned Kossuth and his followers of the grave consequences of Magyarization through language: "Many of us believe in the methods of our ancestors who conquered the country and are disseminating nationality by fire and sword, not paying attention to the fact that material power has never won intellectual triumphs such as 'to have a liking for nationalities'. Intellectual superiority only can triumph in such matters."[76] Only a small powerless group heeded this advice. The nation itself was already engaged in an all-out press war with the non-Magyar nationalities. These eventful times seemed to justify Kossuth's struggle before the tribunal of the nation, since the sharp tone of the nationality press became an everyday phenomenon just on the eve of the 1848/49 Revolution. The nationality press, in order to neutralize assimilation attempts, introduced a heretofore rare element, the question of racial origin, into the dispute with *Pesti Hirlap,* thus foreshadowing the forthcoming ethnical war.[77] The Széchenyi-influenced small group tried again to localize the nationality strife by assuring the rebellious Croats that the emphasis in the Magyar political movements was put "not on nationality but on freedom for all."[78]

But it was too late to adopt this old idea of Széchenyi in these days of startling events when Széchenyi himself reemphasized it: "I idolize liberty —not only for myself, but for all of my fellowmen." At that time, public opinion on both sides could not get rid of some heritage of prejudice and the situation suddenly deteriorated. While minorities raised territorial claims, the leading Magyar circles misinterpreted the concept of "common liberty" and hoped that it would weld together Magyars and non-Magyars. These circumstances compelled Széchenyi again to take a stand against this new form of the old-time pattern: "It is generally said that common liberty will weld us together. But if the Slavs and Germans will say the same, and we number less than they do, who will finally assimilate whom? The 6 million Magyars will assimilate the 60 million Slavs, or vice versa ? . . ."[79]

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[75] M. Horváth, *op. cit.,* II, 327f .,461.

[76] Beszéd, mellyel a M. Akadémia XV. köz ülését dec. 20. 1846. megnyitotta a másod elnök, Gróf Széchenyi István. *A Magyar Tudom. Akadémia Evokönyei,* VIII, 1845-1847 (Budán: a Cs. Királyi Egyetemi nyomdában, 1860), 29.

[77] *Slovenské národné noviny,* Dec. 22, 1846, Jan. 8, 1847.

[78] *Pesti Hirlap,* April 2, 1848. This moderate tone just preceding the tragic September 1848 events was praised by several minority organs, among them a well-informed German-language newspaper whose article "Kroatien, die diplomatische Sprache und ein eigenes Ministerium" (*Pressfreie Flugblätter,* Pécs, Vol. I, no. 1, Apr. 5, 1848) called the attention of the Croats to the Vienna bureaucracy as the common enemy of all nationalities.

VII

EPILOGUE

The 1848/49 revolutionary events justified Széchenyi's anxiety about the numerical superiority of non-Magyar peoples and about their attitude towards the Government of Louis Batthyány. In the tense atmosphere of late August 1848, just before his complete nervous breakdown, he had a vision of the imminent danger: "Blood and blood everywhere. Brother will be slaughtered by brother, one race by another, irreconcilably and insanely. . . ."[80]

Unfortunately, the landed gentry already in power was not aware of the process by which the non-Magyar nationalities were being moulded into nations. Diametrically opposed to Széchenyi's views, it did not regard their national movements as symptoms of an organic development but took the biased view that they were merely the outcome of the machinations of the reactionary forces of Vienna. That the situation could develop to the point of armed conflict was at the root of the failure—according to Zoltán I. Tóth—of the Government and Kossuth to meet even the minimum of the nationalities' claims which could have converted them into their allies.[81]

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[79] *Pesti Hirlap,* April 10, 1848. The population statistics of the Austrian Monarchy were extremely disadvantageous to the Magyars. Besides the 5-6 million Magyars, the Slavs numbered 15,455,998, and the Germans 7,071,825 out of the total 36,110,272. For more convincing details see Joseph Vincenz Haeufler, *Sprachenkarte der Österreichischen Monarchie,* etc. (Pest, 1846), 9, and Elek Fényes, *A magyar elem s ellenesei* (Pest, 1860), 46.

[80] Széchenyi's words as reported by Sigismund Kemény. Quotation from Gy. Szekfü, *A mai Széchenyi* (Budapest, 1935), 407.

[81] Z. I. Tóth, *Koshut i natsional' nyi vopros v 1848-1849 gg.* (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akademia, 1954), 122. I. Tóth to a certain extent misjudged the situation. Undoubtedly the separatistic movements of the non-Magyar nationalities had been significant since the early 1830's and the reactionary forces in Vienna could only hasten those developments already in full swing towards an inevitable showdown. Cf. Ján Kollár, *Cestopis,* etc. (W Pešti, 1843), 363; Jiří Horák, *ed. Slovanská vzájemnost 1836-1936* (Praha: Orbis, 1938), 428; Zdeněk Tobolka, ed. *Slovanský sjezd v Praze 1848* (Praha, 1952), 520), etc. The most outstanding nationality leaders, among them Ján Kollár and Ljudevit Gaj, were in the service of the Vienna Government, and the latter even worked for Tsarist Russia's secret service. For details see Grgur Jakšić, "Izveštaj d-ra Ljudevita Gaja o Srbiji (1847)", *Srpski književni glasnik,* March 1, 1924, 368-377, and Ph. E. Mosely, "A Pan-Slavist Memorandum of Ljudevit Gaj in 1838," *The American Historical Review,* July 1935, 704-716.

Even the moderate L'udovít Štúr, a Széchenyi-like Slovak leader, rejected uncompromisingly the Magyar course of politics: "We do not need Western liberalism, and less do we need Magyar liberalism, an alter ego of it. . . . Slavdom is our star. "See *Slovenskje pohladi,* May 25, 1851, 147-152. This is why T. G. Masaryk said: "Croats and Slovaks because of the insincerity of Vienna let themselves be used as instruments of reaction in the name of the Slavic idea." (*Česká otázka,* etc., 80).

Excepting the short-lived Law No. VIII of 1849[82] on nationalities the Government policy was a sharp deviation from the line set up by Széchenyi.

From September 1848, the date of his mental collapse, until his death in 1860, Széchenyi took a passive interest in events except during the later years of his life when some fragments of his writings dealt again with the nationality problem, focusing his thoughts merely on condemning the Prussian policy of assimilation and the menace of German unification threatening the very foundations of the multinational Empire.[83]

During the past century, his theses on the nationality problem have withstood all the crucial tests of our changing times. It is interesting to note that Széchenyi's lifework on the nationality (racial) issues has always been favorably discussed by his critics regardless of their origin or political credo.[84]

But the most grandiose monument was erected by Charles Dickens who in his *Journal,* in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the death of Széchenyi said:

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[82] *Közlöny,* July 29, Aug. 10, 1849. Cf. János Beer, ed. *Az 1848/49. évi népképviseleti országgyülés* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1954), 868f.

[83] See Gy. Szekfü, *op. cit.,* 424ff.

[84] Štefan Marko Daxner, *V službe národa* (Bratislava: Slovenské vydavatel'stvo krásnej literatúry, 1958), 152; J. M. Hurban, *L'udovít Štur.Rorpomienky* (Bratislava, 1959), 250, 252, 478; Francis Bowen: "Count Széchenyi, one of the noblest and best reformers of whom any age or country can boast . . . comparing Széchenyi, their leader, even to our sainted Washington . . ." See *The North American Review,* LXX (January, 1850), 106f.; Francis Bowen, *Hungary. The Rebellion of the Slavonic, Wallachian, and German Hungarians against the Magyars* (Cambridge, 1851), 44; Emil Dessewffy, "A. M. Tudom. Akadémia XVII. köz ülését megnyitó beszéd; A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia 1858. dec. 20. "tartott ünnepélyes köz ülésének tárgyai," *Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Évkönyvei, 1848-59,* 4; *Srpski Letopis 1860,* 208ff.; Janos Vajda, "Nemzetisegek," *Csatár,* Oct. 3, 1861; "Ludwig von Mocsáry," *Romänische Revue,* 1887, 81-85; "Ein politischer Martyrer," *Siebenbürgisch-Deutsches Tageblatt,* No. 4024, 1887; Miloš Štefanovič's address in *Národnie noviny,* No. 72, 1899; Ödön Steinacker, "Eine magyarische Kassandra," *Preussische Jahrbücher,* CXV (1904), 495-502; Jozef Škultéty, "Madărismus od konca XVIII. stoletia." *Slovenské pohl'ady, XXIX* (1909), 655ff.; Miklós Asztalos, *Wesselényi Miklós, az elsö nemzetiségi politikus* (Pécs, 1927), 62; Josef Macůrek, *Dejiny Madărů a uherského státu* (Praha: Melantrich A. S., 1934), 253; Miklós Asztalos, *A nemzetiségek története Magyarországon* (Budapest, 1934), 50; Hóman-Szekfü, *Magyar történet,* V, 2nd enl. ed. (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1936), 260f., 262ff., 267-75, 324f., 363, 373f., 379; Imre Bédi, "Széchenyi és a nemzetiségikérdés," *Kisebbségi Körlevél,* V (no. 4, July 1941), 331-337; Révai József, *Marxizmus, népiesség, magyarság* (Budapest: Szikra, 1949), 120; Domokos Kosáry, "Küzdelem Széchenyivel" in *Kossuth Emlékkönyv* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1952), I, 41-47; G. Heckenast *et al. A magyar nép története,* 2nd rev. ed. (Budapest: Müvelt Nép Könyvkiadó, 1853), 239; Antal Mátyás, "Széchenyi közgazdasági nézetei," *Társadalmi Szemle,* IX (no. 10, Oct. 1954), 89-110; Antal Mátyás, "A Stádium föbb közgazdasági gondolatai" in István Széchenyi: *Stádium* (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1958), 28; Gyula Mérei, ed. Magyarország története II. *Magyarország újkori története 1790-1918, I. Magyarország története a feudalizmusról való átmenet korszakában 1790-1849* (Budapest: Tankönyvkiadó, 1957), 167-174; theses on Széchenyi prepared by the General Committee on History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and its Historical Institute. See *Társadalmi Szemle,* XV (February, 1960), and *Népszabadság,* March 5, 1960, 6. Endre Arató, *A nemzetiségi kérdés története Magyarországon,* 2 vols. (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1960); *Széchenyi István válogatott írásai,* edited, notes and introduction by István Barta (Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó, 1959; Gyula Ortutay, "Az élö Széchenyi," *Magyar Tudomány,* vol. 67 (5), no. 4, Apr. 1960, pp. 179-92; Szilárd Faludi, "Széchenyi emlékezete," *Pedagógiai Szemle,* vol. 10, no. 4, Apr. 1960, pp. 3233-327; Loránt Tilkovszky, "Virágzó életet a magyar parlagon," *Élet és Tudomány,* vol. 15, no. 13, March 27, 1960, pp. 387-390.

> One last and most important particular remains to be mentioned, in which Széchenyi's opinions remain to this day far in advance of those of those of his countrymen—far in advance, indeed of the opinions which still prevail in England respecting the treatment of alien races . . ."[85]

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Charles Dickens. Originally published in four parts, during April, 1870, 7-8. New Series, vol III, nos. 71-74 (Apr. 9-30, 1870), pp. 450-56, 476-80, 498-504, 522-528.

[85] "The Great Magyar," from *All The Year Round, a Weekly Journal Conducted by*

DOCUMENT

SZECHENYI AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE

A Letter to Pierre Du Ponceau

Besides promoting Hungarian cultural life through the foundation of the Academy, Széchenyi also realized the importance of cultural exchange with other countries. The Academy had hardly begun its work, when Széchenyi presented copies of its first Yearbook in person to the Académie Française and the Bavarian Academy in early 1834. At the same time, he asked the Russian Ambassador in London to send a copy to the Russian Academy and used other friends to transmit the book to the Royal Society in Edinburgh and the Asiatic Society in Calcutta.

An admirer of Benjamin Franklin and America, Széchenyi also sent a copy of the Academy's periodical *Tudománytár* (Depository of Science) through one of his friends in London to the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia. Along with the Royal Society in London, the American Philosophical Society was the first foreign cultural institute to which the Yearbooks of the Hungarian Academy were sent as early as 1833. The scope and purpose of broadening Hungary's cultural ties with the great world as conceived by Széchenyi can best be judged by his letter written to Pierre Du Ponceau, President of the American Philosophical Society, on June 10, 1833.

Széchenyi's letter was an answer to Pierre Du Ponceau's letter of Jan. 5, 1833, acknowledging the receipt of the Academy's first Yearbook and announcing that the Yearbooks of the Philosophical Society dating back to 1770 had been sent to the Hungarian Academy. Du Ponceau's letter, brought to Hungary by Charles Nagy, member of the Academy who visited America in 1832-33, was read at a session of the Academy presided over by Széchenyi on June 10, 1833. As my efforts to locate Széchenyi's English letter in the archives of the American Philosophical Society have so far failed, in the following we include a rough translation of this valuable document of Hungaro-American cultural relations, so indicative of Széchenyi's outlook and style and completely unknown in this country.

> Dear Sir!
>
> When I was entrusted by our society with the task of answering your letter of January 5, 1833, and of expressing our thanks for the books given to us through the mediation of our colleague [Mr.] Nagy, I was also instructed to send you in return samples [published] by our Academy hitherto. Discharging this [task] now, I pray to believe that I am only carrying out a most pleasant duty of mine. For what could be sweeter than to be at least in spiritual connection with people from whom location, distance, and especially the isolated situation of our country seem physically to separate us, if not forever yet perhaps for a long period of time, and for whom we nonetheless bear as much affection and such an inexplicable sympathy despite these hindrances, as for only very few people in other countries.

The qualities of the soul do not recognize time. Although the angel of Light has taken up quarters but a short time ago in the rugged wilderness of America, yet it has lent its radiance to those who, anguishing for centuries under more adverse circumstances like us, had hardly been able to extricate one leg from the disgusting feudal confusions debasing mankind and particularly our fatherland. Under more fortunate circumstances we ought to blush on account of such backwardness which, however, has not completely suppressed, thank heavens, all [vestiges] of our nationality. The national quality upon which our existence has been based is still alive; some time in the future, we shall be able to stand our ground among the ranks of advanced free generations.

At long last, even we woke up from our ancient lethargy on the tombs of our magnanimous forefathers. True, we are often split because of immature vainglory and hotheaded rivalry which further diminish and weaken our small number and feeble ranks, but we hope and believe, trusting the one living God, that the future generation will be united by that national spirit which, preferring honor and glory to all goods of life including life itself, is deeply rooted in our nation's soul and is increasingly developing day by day.

Our Academy whose Vice President I am, sends its greetings to the learned Societies of that Country where the divine residence of Sacred Liberty stands in hitherto unknown purity amidst the miracles of great nature. Fare you well in the halo of your true greatness.

I beg to remain your honor's faithful servant.[1]

GEORGE BARANY
University of Denver

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[1] The original Hungarian draft of Széchenyi's letter was published in Béla Majláth, ed., *Gróf Széchenyi István levelei* (Count Stephen Széchenyi's Letters), II (Budapest: 1891), 15-16. For the explanatory remarks, cf. Széchenyi's entries of Jan. 6, Feb. 17, March 9 and 18, 1834 in vol. IV of his *Diaries* (ed. Gyula Viszota), pp. 442-43; 453; 459 461. Also, Viszota's introduction, pp. XII-XXII; LX, and Dóra F. Csanak, "Az Akadémiai Könyvtár története a szabadságharcig" (History of the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1826-1840), *Magyar Könyvszemle,* LXXV/1 (1959), pp. 52-53.

NOTES

The American Slavic and East European Review, founded in 1941 by Professor Samuel H. Cross, has gone through several stages. Since 1948 it has been published by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has recently been decided to make the *Review* the organ of this Association, transformed into a member organization, supported by private and library subscriptions and subventions from interested universities. Memberships in the Association are of four sorts: Sustaining, $25, Regular, $10, Associate, $10, Student, $5. Fees may be sent to Professor Ralph T. Fisher of the University of Illinois, who is *pro tem* Secretary of the Association. Professor Donald Treadgold of the University of Washington is the new Editor of the *Review.*

* * *

In response to a wide demand for factual information concerning the organization of politics, industry, and culture in Yugoslavia, a new English language quarterly, *Yugoslav Survey,* has been established, published by an editorial committee in Belgrade. Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1960, consists of 138 pages of descriptive and documented articles on topics ranging from "Workers' Management" and "Investments in Post-War Economic Development" to foreign policy, "Yugoslavia and Disarmament," and a number of short notes on education. Much valuable information is packed into this first number. Editor-in-Chief is Božidar Đurović; address: Nemajina 34, Belgrade; subscription, $5 per annum.

* * *

The annual 1960 meeting of the Forschungsinstitut für den Donauraum took place in Innsbruck from October 8 to October 11. Lectures and discussions on historical, racial, and economic questions occupied most of the program of the meeting.

* * *

The latest Czechoslovak Statistical Handbook states that there are 410,000 Magyars still living in Czechoslovak territory. There are 600 primary and secondary schools that provide instruction in Hungarian, and the number of Magyars engaged in industry has grown sensibly in the past decade.

* * *

The annual meetings of the Expellee Germans seem to retain much enthusiasm. The June *Tagung* of Sudeten Germans that took place in Munich was attended by 360,000, while 80,000 Pomeranian Germans assembled at Bochum, and 40,000 Donauschwaben at Ulm. Prelates, members of the German Cabinet, heads of the Bavarian government, representatives of emigré groups brought greetings, and Chancellor Adenauer sent his best wishes.

* * *

The University of Minnesota was the scene of an institute "Poland Through a Thousand Years," August 3-5. Lectures on Polish history, science, literature, and music were given by various scholars from the East and from the West.

* * *

Numerous celebrations marking the centenary of the declaration of the Italian kingdom in March, 1861, are being organized for 1961. An Italian Centennial Office in New York, Palazzo d'Italia, 626 Fifth Avenue, has been created to function as a clearing house for these celebrations. Turin will be the center of these festivities in Italy, and 6,000,000 visitors are expected.

BOOK REVIEWS

Zernack, Klaus. *Studien zu den schwedisch-russischen Beziehungen in der 2 Hälfte des 17. Jahrunderts.* Teil I: *Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Schweden und Moskau von 1675 bis 1689* (Osteuropastudien der Hochschulen des Landes Hessen, Reihe I, *Giessener Abhandlungen zur Agrar- und Wirtschaftforschung des europäischen Ostens,* Band 7). Giessen: Wilhelm Schmitz Verlag, 1958. Pp. 185. DM 14.80.

That Sweden's period of eminence in the seventeenth century has much engaged the attention of her historians is understandable. But the attention has been somewhat unevenly concentrated on the militant years at the opening and close of the period, while the four decades between have had less sustained consideration. Meanwhile, the current generation of Swedish scholars is in the process of redressing this partial shortcoming with a growing list of studies (cf. Hoffstedt, Fahlborg, Landberg) on their country's foreign relations.

To this growing list a German scholar now brings a volume on Sweden's relations with Muscovy from 1675 to 1689. Zernack has probed into the archival resources in Stockholm and at Uppsala University. He has garnered his richest returns from the reports of Swedish envoys and negotiators and from the journals which they frequently kept. Sources published in Russian have likewise been consulted, though most of those available appeared before the turn of this century. The author is familiar also with a wide range of relevant secondary accounts—Scandinavian and Russian as well as German.

It is a major premise of the study that during these years Swedish-Russian relations were much affected by developments well beyond the Baltic region. For diplomats generally the larger issues of the day involved joint action against Louis XIV (even the royal family of Sweden was involved directly in some of the irregularities of the Chambers of Reunion) or against the efforts of the rejuvenated Turk. At intervals, Zernack turns aside to treat in some detail of diplomatic negotiations among the courts of western and central Europe, indicating how the maneuverings were readily projected into Moscow-Stockholm relations. He thus takes his reader into a wide setting; he is able to show, for instance, how Moscow for the first time came to participate in a general European coalition.

A long background survey takes up fully a third of the essay. The earlier half of this antecedent material seems more general and extended than is necessary, though this length may prove warranted in further related studies contemplated by the author. Three appendices enable him to expand on topics not easy to compress into the main discourse—Johan Gyllenstierna's alliance policy, the upkeep (or neglect) of Swedish fortifications on the eastern frontiers, and several ceremonial issues of diplomatic etiquette. One reader at least would welcome further discussion of the negotiations (p. 125) in which Swedish spokesmen pressed on the Czar the importance of a common front against the Turk.

Zernack's main concern is with the succession of efforts to implement the Treaty of Kardis (and the Agreement at Plüssemünde, 1666). Some tenacious issues lingered in the way of boundary tracings, exchange of prisoners, and trade relations. The reader's attention is focussed on this succession, now in Stockholm, now in Moscow, now in some intermediate locality. These negotiations are traced in much detail. Those in 1683-84 led to definite results, more or less confirming the 1661 Treaty. Throughout the succession, Swedish representatives often encountered delaying tactics and postponements. One conclusion seems safe—in the seventeenth century it evidently was no easier to deliberate with Russian envoys than it is to negotiate with their Soviet counterparts three centuries later.

This monograph is a solid installment. In 170 pages the documentation runs to well over 600 footnotes; many of these elaborate substantially on the text proper. In tone the study is uniformly temperate and objective. While the reader is at no time in doubt that the sources most consistently relied on are the Swedish, the presentation is kept in even focus. Here is a creditable addition to the accumulating spate of studies on Sweden's foreign relations in the days from Charles X to Charles XII.

New York University OSCAR J. FALNES

FOLBERTH, OTTO, *Der Prozess Stephan Ludwig Roth.* Graz-Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1959. Pp. xiv, 384. DM 26.

Stephan Ludwig Roth, the mid-nineteenth century hero of Professor Folberth's most recent book, was born into that German community in the eastern rimlands of the Habsburg empire which was the first "kind-conscious" ethnic minority, and which had the largest proportion of educated men and intellectuals among all the isolated German groups. He was a Transylvanian Saxon. His "Landsmänner," settled between the autochthonous Hungarians (Székelys) and the Rumanians as early as the late middle ages, had a long history in the precarious art of co-existence with other nations within a narrow space.

Young Roth was trained for the Lutheran ministry and, as was customary with the intellectually more ambitious Transylvanian Saxons, received his higher education and Ph.D. in Germany. This latter experience undoubtedly had a great impact on his very articulate Germanness at a time when such awareness was almost non-existent among the rest of the various ethnic Germans scattered around Central and Eastern Europe. Returning to his homeland he soon became not only a highly respected—though somewhat controversial—spiritual and intellectual leader of his local community, but also a spokesman for the people of his blood.

The storms of 1848 caught Roth in his native Transylvania (Erdély), which in the course of revolutionary events soon developed into one of the most disputed regions of the Monarchy, torn by the rising nationalistic ambitions of those who spoke (often unjustifiedly) in the name of the three local ethnic groups, the Székelys, the Saxons and the Rumanians. How Roth attempted to weather this storm in defense of his principles and people, trying to obtain aid from the (Austrian) imperial forces which, in alliance with the Russians, fought the Hungarian national uprising; and how he met his early and dramatic death before a firing squad, after being tried for high treason by a Hungarian (revolutionary) military tribunal, is masterfully described in Folberth's penetrating study. The author was fortunate in having access to new and hitherto unpublished documents on the matter in the Kossuth Archives in Budapest, which enabled him to support his statements with an abundance of primary materials, among them the entire records of Roth's trial. Otto Folberth, himself a Transylvanian Saxon and an authroity on the problems of his people, handles the trial, its setting and background, in a most skillful and captivating way. Though obviously championing his hero, he takes great pains to preserve his impartiality with regard to the motives and means of Roth's Hungarian antagonists, in which difficult task he succeeds to a great extent. Characteristic in this respect is his treatment of László Csányi, high commissioner and confidant of Louis Kossuth, an arch foe of Roth and a symbol of Kossuthian nationalism in the Hungary of the day. Severely critical as he is of the conduct of Csányi, the author gives, in all fairness, full credit to the high principles and sincere patriotism of this Hungarian who, after the crushing of the Hungarian War of Liberation, suffered at the hands of the Austrians the same fate that he had urged for Roth only a short time earlier.

Folberth's conclusions embody the classic message of the idealists: he profoundly believes in the possibility of a working multi-national state, if only the vested ethno-cultural claims of the various nationalities are respected and if the majority nation and the minorities act with more mutual understanding and tolerance. His book is not only an excellent biography of a fascinating man who lived through one of history's most interesting and dynamic periods, but because of its factual accuracy and massive documentation it is also a must for any student of the nationality problems in the Danube basin.

Le Moyne College
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G. C. Paikert

Walter, Friedrich and Harold Steinacker, *Die Nationalitätenfrage im alten Ungarn und die Südostpolitik Wiens* (Buchreihe der Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission, 3. Band). München: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1959. Pp. 167. DM 9.

This symposium comprises three treatises on the nationality problem in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Hungary as reflected primarily in the administrative policies of the Vienna Imperial Court.

Friedrich Walter's summary "Die Wiener Südostpolitik im Spiegel der Geschichte der zentralen Verwaltung" (pp. 7-28) is based on seven well-chosen monographs including his own. The correlations between the Habsburgs' Southeast policy and the changing trends in the central administration are well elaborated and the author properly concludes that: "After 1867, however, the Austrian governments did not have any further possibility of exerting their influence upon the fate of the nationality groups in Hungary" (p. 27). Unquestionably this is true, but Mr. Walter has failed to elucidate the historical background of this fact, above all the increasingly significant German-Hungarian collaboration against the Slavs of the Monarchy to prevent the trialism. Furthermore, the concluding passage which draws highly instructive lessons from the events (pp. 27-28) deserved much more space in order to make the readers realize the blunders committed on both sides. However, several aspects of the topic have already been treated by Hungarian experts (D. Edelényi Szabó, A. Némethy, J. Kovacsics, etc.) whose works are not utilized by Mr. Walter.

Mr. Walter's other study, "Von Windischgrätz über Welden zu Haynau; Wiener Regierung und Armee-Oberkommando in Ungarn 1849/50" (pp. 68-161), is outstanding, for it is chiefly based on unpublished sources housed in the Vienna archives. His main thesis is well-documented and convincing: "The sources which are widely accessible today show that the guilt of those responsible for the sharpest reaction is not as grave as that which historians and publicists of the liberal era wanted to load upon them" (p. 161).

Harold Steinacker deals with the development of Magyar nationalism and the attitudes of national minorities toward it under the title "Das Wesen des madjarischen Nationalismus" (pp. 29-67). Anyone who has access to the primary sources on the nationality struggles of the second half of the last century can fully agree with his interpretation of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 which did indeed seal the destiny of the Dual Monarchy. It is also a well-established fact that István Széchenyi's views of the nationality question are applicable to the structure of a multinational state. But the description of the development of

Magyar nationalism is the most vulnerable point of the study. Due to the fact that Mr. Steinacker's research is rigidly focused on the evolution phenomena in Central Europe, in his judgment universal concomitant symptoms of the nationality problem appear as individual, specific Magyar products. It is, for instance, the case in the Magyarization of surnames, although similar trends have always been characteristic of other regions of Central Europe, even of Yugoslavia. In 1959, Lazar Koliševski still complained of the recurrence of surname analysis: "Is it not outmoded today, more than a half century after Misirkov's statements, to seek in the surnames of our ancestors arguments for establishing the nationality of the Macedonians of that time, and even of the Macedonians of today?" (L. Koliševski, *Macedonian National Question*. Beograd: Edition Jugoslavija, 1959, 30).

Mr. Steinacker did not make use of the volumes *Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéz Magyarországon a dualizmus korában* (ed. by Gábor G. Kemény), the most complete collection of sources relating to the history of Magyar nationalism and the reaction of minorities to it. Mr. Steinacker uses surprisingly little and almost insignificant Hungarian-language material. Admittedly, his sole guide in describing the workings of Magyar nationalism was Gyula Szekfü's antiquated *Három Nemzedék* (Three Generations, 1st publ. in 1920) which was an apologia for Hungary's pro-German politics after a lost war. It is interesting to note that a few years later Szekfü himself modified many of the essential theses of *Három Nemzedék* in his main historical synthesis *Magyar Történet* and in a series of essays on the nationality issues. Mr. Steinacker's additional Hungarian-language sources are, in many cases misspelled or erroneously quoted. Some conspicuous examples: the author of the Eötvös-monograph is not József (p. 46) but István Sötér, and the correct spelling is *Látóhatár* and not *A látókör* (p. 67), a title which has never existed in Hungarian periodical literature. Furthermore, the date of the publication of Miklós Wesselényi's *Szózat a magyar és szláv nemzetiség ügyében* is 1843 and not 1842 (p. 58).

The otherwise well-edited volume contains many inconsistencies in the usage of Christian names, e.g. German Christian names are used in conjunction with a fairly large portion of Hungarian (Széchenyi, Eötvös, Lévay, Rákosi, Gyulai, Barkóczy, Batthány, Apponyi, Horváth) and Czech (Palacký) surnames, thus confusing foreign readers.

Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. FRANCIS S. WAGNER

JELAVICH, BARBARA, *Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, 1858-1859*. Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, Slavic and East European Series, Volume 17, 1959. Pp. 169.

This book is in many ways the very model of a modern monograph. It is based on a well defined and bounded topic. It draws on some original sources and makes good use of other available material. It is short, trying only on a few occasions to wring more out of the material than it is worth. The scholarship is careful and exemplary.

You will be disappointed only if you are looking for some startling new interpretations of Russian policy or of Rumanian politics. The book fills, with no surprises, a gap left in the works of Riker, Iorga and others because it is the first study to make use of the papers of N. K. Giers, who was Russian consul-general in Bucharest during these years before moving on to greater things, and of material from the Russian archives which, somewhat to the surprise of the author, the Soviet Government supplied on microfilm. The most important of these documents are the instructions of Prince Gorchakov to Lobanov-Rostovsky in Constantinople and to Giers in Bucharest.

The remarkable fact about Russian policy, in this crucial period in which the two Rumanian Principalities were united, was that it seemed to correspond so little to Russian national interests in Southeastern Europe. As Mrs. Jelavich so clearly confirms with the new material at her disposal, these first years after the Crimean War saw a diplomatic revolution. Russia, doing everything possible to find a counterweight to England and Austria and to get out of its isolation, found as its only possible ally the France of Napoleon III. Aside from the incongruity of this combination of the conservative court of St. Petersburg with a ruler whose "policy of nationalities" was encouraging the strongest revolutionary forces of the time, there was the strange fact that by following French policy on the lower Danube the Russian Government was helping the Rumanians to lay the foundations of a national state lying athwart Russia's route to the Balkans and Constantinople.

If Russia had had some prospect of enduring influence within the Principalities, the policy might have been more easily justified; but it had none. It split the opposing bloc, but only temporarily and without gain to itself. It blocked Austria, but blocked Russia as well. The conservative Rumanian boyars, the group that Russian policy tried to support, were not pro-Russian; and the National Liberals—the party of the future—had built their entire ideology and their political action on a nationalism aimed specifically at freedom from all Russian control and influence. Russia's self-assumed role of protector of the Orthodox Christians had no appeal for the Rumanians, as Mrs. Jelavich shows in her special chapter on the question of the Dedicated Monasteries. If it be said that Russian policy was based on broader European considerations, as it was, the sad fact was that it did not pay off on the European any more than on the more restricted Balkan stage.

One has to seek the explanation primarily in the views and the personal idiosyncrasies of the two men who figure most prominently in these pages, Gorchakov and Giers. In the author's estimate, there is nothing in the record of the foreign minister's handling of the Rumanian question to alter the general view of him as "essentially a courtier-diplomat" of the old school, quite out of his depth in the new age of realism. With the reservation that we still do not have enough published documentary material to assess his record fully and fairly, she makes the only possible judgment that emerges from the documents she uses here. As for Giers, of whose papers she makes extensive use (even to the inclusion of some items that border on the inconsequential), his views were neither perspicacious nor very influential despite his years of experience in the Principalities. He was constantly intervening in local political affairs, as it was natural that he should, the Principalities having been for so many years Russian protectorates and for the last few in the curious status of wards of a concert of powers which could not easily act in concert. He was guided in large part by his natural sympathies for the conservative boyars, but misjudged them as he misjudged Rumanian nationalism. In the broader sphere of policy he contributed little or nothing. Through it all he was unenthusiastic about his post and his job.

Not very promising substance for a book, one may say. The author seems to suggest as much from time to time. Yet she has managed to write a good book from the limited material. It fills the one remaining gap in the diplomatic history of the union of the Principalities.

Council on Foreign Relations JOHN C. CAMPBELL

Reiners, Ludwig, *Bismarck gründet das Reich 1864-1871.* Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1957. Pp. x, 550. DM 21.50.

This lively but shallow narrative focuses on Bismarck's foreign policy during the years 1864-71. It is the work of an amateur historian and biographer who seeks to entertain while arousing enthusiasm for his hero. In recent years, and in negative response to the standing invitation to take an "agonizing new look" at German history, Reiners has made a name for himself in western Germany as a eulogizer of Frederick the Great and Bismarck. His widely circulated books, written for popular consumption, entail a rather lonely revival of so-called *"historische Belletristik,"* which was in vogue in the days of the Weimar Republic and, to the annoyance of the professional historians, found a large receptive audience then. The most notable representatives of this genre were Herbert Eulenberg, Egon Friedell, Werner Hegemann, Emil Ludwig, Valeriu Marcu and, in a sense, Stefan Zweig. Reiners does not measure up to his predecessors in literary polish, critical acumen, imagination, and analytical skill, aside from being fundamentally different in his political preferences. He is a moderate conservative who in the present book has set himself the professed task "to disseminate the picture of the real Bismarck among the German people."

The work under review forms the second part of a trilogy devoted to the founder of imperial Germany. In this volume Reiners gives a romanticized chronological account of the surface aspects of Bismarck's diplomacy and of military events in 1864, 1866, and 1870-71. Except for occasional references to the changing temper of public opinion, this old story is treated in complete isolation and, moreover, diluted with a string of anecdotes and sentimental biographical episodes. Throughout, Reiners confuses simplicity with an insufferable oversimplification of the historical process. He has read rather widely but not deeply in the pertinent German secondary literature and printed primary sources. His presentation is studded with lengthy citations from the sources. Many of these are well-known but others are not. Save for the latter, this study adds nothing to our knowledge and better understanding. It merely repeats what was said before, on a more sophisticated intellectual level, for hundreds of times by inveterate glorifiers of Bismarck's *"Realpolitik."* To draw attention in a scholarly journal to such a book is justified only in the light of the sentiments, views, and standards of value expounded by the author. What makes his interpretation interesting is not its novelty but the surprising fact that such a hoary and dusty apologia seems to have become fashionable again.

Everybody knows that Bismarck was no Hitler. For trained historians in particular it is not exactly a startling discovery to be told time and again that Bismarck, as a maker of foreign policy, was a statesman of great moderation who, unlike certain Prussian army generals and liberal nationalists, did not lose his head in the hours of supreme external success. Reiners, in his glowing praise of Bismarck's statecraft, does not rest content, however, with fighting windmills. The "real Bismarck," as portrayed by the author, was a unique genius, a titan, a virtual pinnacle of political and moral perfection, a dedicated servant of humanity, who almost never made a mistake, almost invariably used the right means for the right ends, was inspired by high ideas and lofty ideals and, besides, was a simply wonderful human being. Conversely, his contenders and opponents at home and abroad are characterized as pygmies, political imbeciles, hypocrites or irresponsible adventurers, unless they learned to see the light by turning into admirers. Clearly, whatever the scholarly and interpretive shortcomings of Erich Eyck's biography of Bismarck, it is a masterpiece compared to this crude attempt.

University of California, Berkeley Hans Rosenberg

SENN, ALFRED ERICH. *The Emergence of Modern Lithuania.* (Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, No. 18). New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. Pp. xiv, 272. $6.00.

This book by the brilliant son of a distinguished father will be of great assistance not only to the wholly untutored but also to experts on the Baltikum from Finland and Karelia to the Ukraine in the unravelling of one of the most difficult, if also the most tantalizing, of historical problems: Just how did the unique nexus of territories which, during the inter-war period, became known as Lithuania actually come into being? Professor Senn has given us, with a high degreee of finality, a definitive answer. That answer was the more difficult to give because virtually every inch of the territory involved was litigious, and at times contested by two or three Powers.

For his presentation Professor Senn sharply curtails the background matrix of history, seeking to legitimate by rigidly immediate chronology the *raison d'être* of the renascent Lithuanian State, and in a sense to determine by a clear-cut, documented demonstration just when the fetal process ended and the "new" State was born. Certainly juridically the Russian Revolution found Lithuania utterly bereft of autonomous institutions, but by the end of 1920, as Professor Senn abundantly records, Lithuania, from all but the most meticulous standpoint, was full-born. Actually the process of formal recognition dragged out until 1924.

On the other hand nationalist historians of the diverse separatist movements on the territory of the former Russian Empire endeavored in a variety of ways to retrapolate, on rather shaky juridical ground, a respectable family tree, even a whole constitutional-international genealogy. This unfortunately does not lend itself psychologically to procrustean methods of reckoning renascence. Professor Senn is therefore likely to arouse some elements in the camp of extreme Lithuanian nationalism.

Actually loud rumblings of nationality consciousness dominate a much longer period, from 1906 to the outbreak of World War I in every Baltic country, although by now two world wars and at least three occupations have done much to destroy the documentary heritage. Fortunately the record has been better preserved in America, and Lithuania's rebirth is among the best documented. Approaching his subject successively from the point of view of the Lithuanian Nationalist, Clerical, Agrarian, Socialist and Communist parties, Professor Senn draws heavily on the vernacular press of the country to illustrate with keen sense of the different nuances involved the different doctrinal positions of the party groups. So far as this reviewer is aware, this is the first time that this has been done, and exceptionally well, for Lithuania. It is altogether regrettable that the period covered in this study is so short, for the vernacular press died suddenly with 1940, and the likelihood of any of it surviving the present period of sovietization is extremely small.

While certain consequences logically follow the decision to treat events as short periods, and there is a perceptible tendency to be tediously repetitious in detail, the use of this method does not deny to Professor Senn the advantages of bringing out the varying *Zeitgeists* of contrasting phases. The autumn of 1919 is one of the choice instances where the falling into ruins of the policy of the *cordon sanitaire* is brought into bold relief or contrast with the first stages of an alternative policy, witnessed in the Baltic peace.

The reviewer considers Professor Senn's treatment of the thorny problem of White Ruthenian nationalism one of the best in the book, meticulous yet done with accuracy and restraint. We are all in Senn's debt for an occasional interpretation, based upon fuller personal knowledge than quotable sources permit of the role of several outstanding personalities. Senn deserves strong commendation for his forthright defense, for example, of Slezevicius and Galvanauskas, men to whom the possessors of varying media of communication have been less than kind. On the other hand Senn now assumes, on the whole, a kindlier attitude than contemporary Lithuanians took toward Gabrys, Sillingas or Baron von der Ropp. And the roles of Klimas, Bartuska and Smetona, indubitable patriots, might with profit have been more thoroughly brought into relief.

But these are only minor errors of perspective. Professor Senn leaves us all deeply in his debt for putting together in an ingenious way a narrative which it has been difficult to amass in the raw, evaluate across half a dozen intervening linguistic barriers and interpret objectively owing to the envenomed atmosphere of contrarient national policies.

University of California, Los Angeles MALBONE W. GRAHAM

DREWNIAK, BOGUSŁAW, *Robotnicy Sezonowi na Pomorzu Zachodnim, 1890-1918,* Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1959. Pp. 400. 75 zł.

Carried out at the beginning of the last century, the enfranchisement of serfs did not basically change the paternalistic condition of German Trans-Elbian agriculture. Junker families continued to own most arable land, on which they grew grain. They had at their disposal an unlimited supply of labor from among the local landless peasants, the number of which kept increasing. The situation began to change after 1848, for many of the latter chose to follow the West Germans in their mass emigration to the Americas. After 1871, hundreds of thousands began to move to Westphalia, Berlin and other industrial areas. The *Ostflucht*—the flight from the East—took such proportions that many rural regions were actually losing population.

The Junkers felt alarmed, especially because they were abandoning grain-growing for the more profitable root-crops farming, which required a vast number of seasonal workers. Such workers were no longer available in Germany. The plans to recruit them in Italy, Finland and Rumania, even in China and Africa, having for various reasons failed, the necessity arose of bringing them across the frontier from Russian and Austrian Poland, as well as other neighboring lands which suffered from rural overpopulation and poverty. After the fall of Bismarck, who had violently opposed this idea, the Prussian government reluctantly agreed to the recruitment of seasonal workers in Eastern Europe. Starting in 1891, the seasonal immigration of the latter grew so rapidly that in 1914 it reached one million, more than half of them being Poles. Without their help, the Trans-Elbian agriculture would have come to a standstill. The situation changed again after 1918, thanks to the advent of modern farming machinery and to the *Osthilfe,* the Prussian state subsidy to the "exposed" Junker estates.

The existing large German and Polish literature on this chapter of Prussian economic history has been enriched by the book under review. Bogusław Drewniak went through the Prussian state archives which the Germans left behind in 1945, mainly in Stettin, then the capital of Provinz Pommern, now divided between Poland and East Germany. Incomplete though they are, since a part of them had been destroyed, these archives contain thousands of police reports and other evidence pertaining to the problem of seasonal workers in German Pomerania between 1890 and 1918. On the basis of these and other materials, Drewniak succeeded in drawing a convincing and well-documented (1075 footnotes!) picture of the twenty-year-long *Sachsengängerei* in Pomerania.

One part of the book is devoted to the description of a long seesaw struggle between the Junkers and their tools, the local *Landräte,* who for economic reasons insisted upon recruiting the Poles from across the frontier, and the Prussian Ministry of Interior supported by German nationalist associations. The latter feared that the influx of culturally inferior Polish peasants would hamper "the development of German community, culture and living standards" in Pomerania. They were at pains to persuade the landowners that they should look for labor among the politically reliable Galician Ukrainians, Volga Germans and Russians. The Junker influence prevailed, but the Polish workers were put under a strict police surveillance. In other parts of his book Drewniak discusses, on the basis of German documents, the working and living conditions of the seasonal workers. Around 1910, the latter were paid the equivalent of between 23 and 58 cents per working day which lasted from 5 a.m. to 7 p.m. (plus 12 kg of potatoes per week) ; slept, men and women together, in unfurnished and unheated hovels; were not permitted to mix with the local population nor to marry among themselves and, knowing no German, were often cheated out of their wages by unscrupulous landlords and foremen. Yet they kept coming, for their savings enabled them to live at home during the winter.

This scholarly book, written in a detached way, is not without its defects. The author, who is a sociologist, has not provided his study with enough historical and political background. For describing the events of a long-past era, he uses the present geographical terminology, which is grotesque. In his introduction and conclusion, he somewhat clumsily attempts to interpret the problem in the light of the Marxist philosophy, completely irrelevant though it be to the matter in hand. It is indeed sad to think that, under present Polish conditions, a serious scholar must, or believes he must, disfigure his study with these additions, or else run a risk that his dissertation will remain unpublished.

Washington, D. C. JAN WSZELAKI

PALLIS, A. A., *The Cretan Drama: The Life and Memoirs of Prince George of Greece, High Commissioner in Crete (1898-1906).* [Including selections from a Biography of the Prince, by A. S. Skandamis]. New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1959. Pp. 432. $5.00.

When the Greek edition of this book was put into circulation last year, the present reviewer was in Crete and his attention was drawn to it by a number of Cretan scholars and men of letters. They seemed to be disconcerted over what they regarded as a one-sided and untimely approach to Crete's Number One Historical Problem—the liberation of the island from Turkey and its union with Greece. Old wounds, they said, had been healed and the quarrel between Prince George and Venizelos, the protagonists of the "Cretan drama," had long been forgotten. In fact, an impressive statue of the Prince stood at Suda Bay, below the height of Akrotiri, where Venizelos lies buried, and the Prince's naval uniform and other relics, displayed in the Historical Museum of Candia, suggested to the visitor that the high commissioner of 1898-1906 had been fully accepted as a part of Crete's heroic tradition, despite the unswerving loyalty that the Cretans cherish for Venizelos. The publication of the Prince's memoirs, polemic or apologetic in style, revived the animosities of more than half a century ago. Even more, it gave rise to comments that might have been pertinent at that time. With an awareness of the past-in-the-present, so typically Cretan (the tomb of Nikos Kazandzakis stood on the Martinengo Bastion with the mountain of Sleeping Zeus in the distance), the leading newspapers of the island began a re-examination of the events of that fateful decade. The purpose of the amateur historians was to discredit the Prince's anti-

Venizelist thesis. Their serials, containing the rebuttal, provided topics of conversation in the coffee-houses from one end of the island to the other.

The crucial point in the relations between the Prince and Venizelos was on March 31, 1901, when the former dismissed the latter from the post of councillor for justice, which was that of the chief minister in the first cabinet of autonomous Crete. The cause of the quarrel, as it becomes clear from the Prince's memoirs, was Venizelos' insistence that the cabinet, appointed by the Prince, was competent to deal with the cardinal question of union with Greece. Prince George, as high commissioner of the Protecting Powers and as representative of the King of Greece, held the opinion that he should handle the question himself, partly on account of his personal views. In his book he explains that he had learned to distrust "parliamentarism," which had been anything but a blessing in Greece during the long reign of his father. Venizelos, though conservative at first (it was he who drafted the constitution that gave the high commissioner his powers over the cabinet), declared himself in favor of ministerial responsibility and unrestricted freedom of the press. As regards the latter, the Prince takes pains to clarify that he was not opposed to freedom of expression but to irresponsible and slanderous writing, whose damaging effects could never be remedied. It should be mentioned in this connection that Venizelos was sent to jail for an article he wrote against the Prince, and so was his friend the owner of the paper. The animosity between the two men increased from year to year and in 1905 Venizelos led an armed uprising (known as the Therisso Revolution) which finally compelled the Prince to resign his mandate.

The Prince alleges that in 1905 the insurgents adopted the slogan "union with Greece" and raised the Greek flag out of purely selfish considerations—viz. to deprive him of the possibility of restoring order by recourse to arms. He goes so far as to affirm that for Venizelos the union of Crete with Greece served as a mere pretext for the rebellion, as a mere shortcut to his goal, which was the assumption of power. The author's characterizations of Venizelos as "a modern Alcibiades" (pp. 143-152) emanate from this unfavorable opinion.

From the narrative of the events it becomes evident that the Prince believed in the union of Crete with the Mother Country and spared himself no effort to attain this objective. Consequently, the allegation of H. A. Gibbons and other biographers of Venizelos that the Prince sought to carve out a principality for himself, rather than be "a second son at Athens," seems to have no foundation. The Prince points out that he did not regard it politic to force matters in the face of the opposition of the Protecting Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy). But even more important and more impressive are the facts connected with the role of the Protecting Powers in Cretan affairs and particularly the decision of the British Foreign Office to force Prince George out of Crete. The British, it appears, made much of the fact that the Prince, who had saved Czar Nicholas' life in Japan, had (in 1898) the support of St. Petersburg and could therefore be described as "Russia's man." Instructions to the British Consul General (Howard) were issued "to let him down gently" (p. 186), in order not to displease King Edward VII, his uncle, and the Czar, another close relative. Under these circumstances, the Prince leaves the reader to understand that Venizelos undertook to play the role of "England's man." Venizelos continued his alignment with British foreign policy during the First World War and its disastrous epilogue, the Asia Minor campaign. The memoirs of Prince George, written originally in Danish shortly after the conclusion of the "Cretan drama," shed light on the political background of Greece's leading statesman and help explain the factors that went into the making of his character. The revolutionary tradition of Crete and the islanders' faith in the Mediterranean position of Britain are two important aspects of his personality.

The "Cretan drama," depicted in this book, closed the political career of Prince George but led to the first triumph of Venizelos as a statesman. After the Prince was forced to leave the island (September 25, 1906), the Protecting Powers asked the king of Greece to appoint the next high commissioner as consolation for the dismissal of his son. The appointment of Alexander Zaimis, the man whose chief virtue was silence, afforded ample opportunity for Venizelos to pursue his political ambitions, which finally carried him to the premiership of Greece, to the Balkan Wars, and to the Versailles Conference. The union of Crete with Greece was effected at the outbreak of the First Balkan War.

Many documents from the Prince's archives are included in the Memoirs, which form the principal part of the book (pp. 3-230). Supplementary material is presented in Part Two (pp. 234-355), in the form of selections from a biography of the Prince by A. S. Skandamis, published in Greek in 1955 and translated into English by A. A. Pallis of London. Much of Part Two consists of documents, the rest of a partisan presentation of the facts. The translator has skilfully avoided repetition of material that occurs in the memoirs. Skandamis' work is inserted to fill the gaps that exist in the memoirs of the Prince and is therefore subordinate to the first part of the book. The third part of the book is made up of appendices, mainly memoranda submitted by the Prince to the Protecting Powers. There is also a bibliography (unfortunately incomplete) and a list of the works of the scholarly Princess Marie Bonaparte, wife of Prince George, devoted companion of his post-Cretan life.

University of Texas G. G. ARNAKIS

FILJAKOWSKI, JUERGEN, *Die Wendung zum Fuehrerstaat. Ideologische Komponenten in der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts.* Köln & Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1958. Pp. xxiii, 222. DM 29.50.

Carl Schmitt, Professor of Law during the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, was one of the few outstanding German intellectuals who espoused wholeheartedly the cause of Nazism (the philosopher Martin Heidegger was another). Dr. Filjakowski does not propose to interpret the many facets of Schmitt's writings nor to offer his intellectual biography (which still remains to be written): the focus of the book, more limited than this is sharply centered on a problem that holds fascination for the political theorist. Which were, the author asks, the ideological elements in Schmitt's analysis of social structure and constitutional problems; at which points did this diagnosis of parliamentary democracy leave rational evaluation behind in order to offer an apology for totalitarian dictatorship?

Since Schmitt's thinking never lacked breadth and profundity, since his theories were sweeping and original yet never resembled the vagaries of a crank, since he abhorred vulgar adulation of the Nazi system, the task which the author set himself was arduous. He has acquitted himself brilliantly throughout, using rigorous methods not only when dissecting Schmitt's trends of thought, but also when analyzing the conditions under which a democracy can exist in a modern mass society.

The outline of the monograph is admirably clear. Schmitt's main constitutional treatises are scrutinized to determine his postulates for structure and functioning of a democratic government. What emerges here is the ideal-type of a liberal state in an open society; a minimum of governmental interference, parties of notables representing broad philosophical choices; the rule of law based on cartesian faith in the validity of rationality and of the *idées générales.* When comparing these postulates with the reality surrounding him, especially in the last years of the ill-fated Weimar Republic, Schmitt finds everywhere degeneracy, pluralist anarchy, constitutional perversion and potential civil war. What he calls "polycracy" prevents the formation of the general will until finally the republican regime is, in his eyes, deprived of all legitimacy.

When he proceeds to lay bare the ideological options underlying Schmitt's diagnosis. Dr. Filjakowski does not commit the opposite mistake. He does not maintain that everything in Schmitt's picture is caricature nor does he undertake a full-fledged apology for modern mass democracy. Without any undue polemic and aided in his analysis by some of the most thoughtful sociologically oriented British and American contributions to democratic theory, he succeeds in showing where Schmitt has erred and how his erroneous perspective leads him to the conclusion he had wished to reach from the outset.

While the republic lasted Schmitt looked for the guardian of a higher constitutional order; finding it in the President of the Republic, he thrust upon him the role of saving the "unity of the people" even against the positive rules of the existing constitution. (In 1932 Schmitt undertook, before the Constitutional Court, the defense of the Papen Government after it had forcibly removed the Prussian cabinet from office—the beginning of the end of the republican regime.) After the advent of the Third Reich Schmitt construed a triad instrumental for the maintenance of national unity and consisting of "state, movement (i.e. the Nazi Party), and folk, distinct but not divided, united, but not fused." Elimination of elections, of the classical separation of powers, of the features of federalism, scorn for equality before the law, do not in Schmitt's opinion negate but only transform the rule of law. He writes in scholarly earnestness about the "German *Rechtsstaat* of Adolf Hitler."

The author shows how such deductions follow from Schmitt's historical vision of the total "political" state as the synthesis of the absolute and liberal state. Having analyzed modern mass society as leading to an intolerable split between society and state, he accepts the *Fuehrerstaat* with all its monstrosities as being alone capable of mastering strife and reestablishing identity between ruler and rules, between society and state. This means that governmental penetration into every social cell is justified, in other words that the state may be as totalitarian as it chooses.

In measured terms one could wish that the author had treated more thoroughly Schmitt's concept of "friend-foe" relations which underlie all truly political relations. As explained by Schmitt in his *Der Begriff des Politischen* there could be no such thing as statehood or politics if it were not for the existence of potential enmity, by which he means the possibility of deadly physical combat. Here the intellectual parentage of Nietzsche is clearly evidenced, a relationship which the author did not explore.

Dr. Filjakowski determines Schmitt's place in the history of Western intellectual traditions. He sees in him a representative of political romanticism and counter-enlightenment sharing the internal contradictions of such thinking. His philosophy suffers from the acceptance of a false alternative between anarchy and authority and fails to understand the conditions under which ordered liberty can survive the downfall of many assumptions of the liberal-Bourgeois order.

The book, published in the excellent series of the Berlin Institute of Political Sciences, offers far more than a clue to the understanding of a major Nazi apologist.

Together with an important contribution to intellectual history, it furnishes valuable materials for modern democratic theory.

University of Colorado HENRY W. EHRMANN

REMAK, JOACHIM, *Sarajevo: The Story of a Political Murder.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1959. Pp. xv, 301. 30s.

This is a dramatic and extremely readable account of the plotting of the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo in 1914, the execution of the plot, the burial of the victims, the investigation and trial of the assassins and their accomplices, and their subsequent fate. The author sticks closely to his subject, and other historical events are only touched upon as they provide a setting for his narrative. Thus the Annexation Crisis of 1908 is covered in a couple of pages, and the attitude of the powers is summed up in the statement, "The great powers, while annoyed, in the end were satisfied when Austria paid a large cash compensation to the Turks" (p. 33). A little more on the Russian position and its effect on subsequent Serbian-Russian relations would have strengthened the narrative. In his haste to cover the Balkan Wars in a matter of a few lines, the author omits Montenegro from the list of allies who had "joined forces to detach Macedonia from Turkey" (p. 34). Likewise Serbia's answer to the ultimatum and the outbreak of the war are compressed into four pages. On the other hand, there is no other account which presents in such detail and in such an interesting manner the events connected with the actual Sarajevo crime.

There is no startling new point of view expressed here, but the author traces a sure and reasonable record of events from the mass of assorted evidence. He centers responsibility for the assassination plot in the leadership of the Black Hand Society in Belgrade, which was under the direction of Col. Dragutin Dimitrijević (Apis). "When Artamonov [Russian military attaché at Belgrade] apparently after consulting with St. Petersburg, reportedly assured him that Russia would stand by Serbia if Austria attacked first, Apis definitely made up his mind to have Franz Ferdinand killed" (p. 57). Three Bosnian youths in Belgrade were recruited to carry out the task, supplied bombs and revolvers, and smuggled across the Austrian frontier. The difficulties of their journey are excellently portrayed. In Sarajevo three more youths were recruited and supplied with arms. The Serbian government got wind of the plot, but failed to give Vienna adequate warning. Even the Black Hand's Central Executive Committee in Belgrade voted to call off the assassination, and Apis promised them he would do so, but his promise "was without meaning" (p. 78).

The author presents interesting material on the background of the Archduke, his marriage, his relations with Francis Joseph, and his political views. That he would probably undertake a reorganization of the Empire on his accession to the throne is considered one of the motives for doing away with him. How the different assassins spent their time in Sarajevo awaiting the appointed hour, their arrest and trial are well described. The transcript of the trial proceedings is examined and one has the impression of a meticulously correct procedure. The author underlines how adept the accused were in covering their relations to Belgrade. Since the assassins were under twenty years of age, they were not subject to the death penalty and received prison terms. Only three of the more directly involved accomplices were sentenced to death. The three assassins who came from Belgrade (Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež) died in prison from tuberculosis which they had contracted previously. Some of the others were subsequently freed, one to become a professor at the University of Belgrade, another to be Curator of the

Ethnographic Department of the Sarajevo Museum. In pursuing the fate of the "Cast of Principal Characters" who are conveniently listed at the beginning of the volume. Remak discusses the Salonica Trial of 1917, where Col. Dimitrijević (Apis) was sentenced to death by a Serbian military tribunal for plotting against the Serbian government. Mention should also be made of the moving account of the funeral of the Archduke and his wife, where Habsburg ceremonial rigidly prevailed to the last. Francis Joseph, who receives exceedingly generous treatment throughout, lifted the exile of the dead Archduke's brother for one day, so that he might attend the interment ceremony at Artstetten!

The author, Professor of History at Stanford, believes, although certainly not all his colleagues will agree, that "to interrupt the text of a historical narrative with frequent foonotes that list and discuss all the sources used in its preparation tends to weary the reader, if not distract his attention entirely" (p. 263). As a substitute he has written a bibliographical note to each chapter. Here abbreviations are often used, especially after the first citation, but it is difficult to check back to find the complete reference. For example, in the note on the last chapter, reference is made to "Funder, pp. 489-490," which would require a good deal of searching to discover the exact source quoted. Such documentation is also rather unjust when it comes to giving credit for direct quotations. Sometimes the author states in the bibliographical note where the quotation is to be found; at other times he does not. For example, on pp. 21 and 27 "contemporary observers" are directly quoted, but we have no idea who they were or from which books the remarks were taken. No one can, however, read the volume or the bibliographical notes without realizing that the author has canvassed the available material thoroughly and no doubt has used them correctly.

Bowdoin College E. C. HELMREICH

PAJEWSKI, JANUSZ, *"Mitteleuropa," studia z dziejów imperializmu niemieckiego w dobie pierwszej wojny światowej* ["Mitteleuropa," Studies in the History of German Imperialism during the First World War.] Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1959, Pp. viii, 447. 75 zł.

The dominant idea which runs through this collection of fifteen essays is the decisive part played by economically imperialistic considerations in the determination of German foreign policy at the outbreak and during the course of World War I. Unfortunately, despite all his patient research in Polish, Austrian and German archives, the evidence the author gathered fails to convince this reader of the decisive part these considerations played. That they were important, few will deny, but that on them hinged the key decisions of the war still remains to be proven. Back in 1928 Sidney Bradshaw Fay observed that "generally speaking . . . this economic imperialism is usually exaggerated as one of the underlying causes of the war." The present work, both in the causes and in the subsequent developments of the war, seems to be a case in point.

One example of this exaggeration might be seen in the author's fifth essay "On the Genesis of the Act of November 5th"—the proclamation of the Alliance of Emperors relative to the re-establishment of a Polish state.

According to the traditional approach to this problem, going back to the works of Dąbrowski, Askenazy, Sokolnicki, Stachiewicz and Handelsman, to mention only a few of the more outstanding earlier examples, and continued currently in the works of Wereszycki, Feldman and Grosfield, and in Komarnicki's work on the *Rebirth of the Polish Republic,* the principal cause for the proclamation was the desperate manpower shortage which Germany faced in 1916 and the decision of the German General Staff to tap Poland's huge manpower reserves, especially after the skill of Polish arms was proven at the battle of Kostiuchnowka.

Professor Pajewski discounts this contention, however, holding that this proclamation was the outgrowth of redirected German imperialistic schemes which came to prominence on the eve of the failure of the Russo-German peace feelers. The evidence for this contention is not convincing, the arguments seeming to be based more in principle on *post hoc ergo propter hoc* than on any other assumption. The author holds that there is not sufficient evidence for substantiating the traditional approach, yet he does not explain away any of the existing evidence; nor does he dispute Komarnicki's latest statement of these arguments, to which, though he quotes his work in his bibliography, he does not refer in the text or in any of the notes of this chapter; nor does he consider how the proclamation would have been in conflict with the plans of the German annexationists.

The work, however, is not limited to a discussion of Polish problems. In fact only four of its essays deal with Poland—largely with the background of the resurrection of the Polish state. Rather it is a presentation and an analysis of German imperialism in general and of the background in which it evolved.

The work opens with an essay surveying the origin of the idea of Mitteleuropa, which the author uses as a cover for all German imperialistic schemes, through a summary of the principal plans looking toward its establishment prior to the outbreak of World War I. Two essays on German imperialistic designs at the outbreak of the war follow, one dealing with these designs in general, the other with their specific application to Poland. Then follows a discussion of Naumann's concept of Mitteleuropa. Three chapters are devoted to the German-Turkish Alliance, largely a reflection of German imperialistic schemes. The same is true for the three remaining chapters on Poland, two on the background of the November 5th Proclamation, the third on German designs on Poland at the end of the war. Chapters on Germany's peace feelers, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, German Roumanian relations, and the question of the union of Germany with Austria-Hungary follow.

The work is No. 27 in the publications of the Instytut Zachodni.

St. John's University EUGENE KUSIELEWICZ

WENTZCKE, PAUL, ed., *Darstellungen und Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Einheitsbewegung im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhundert,* volume II, Gesellschaft für burschenschaftliche Geschichtsforschung. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, Universitätsverlag, 1959. Pp. 216.

The series of which this is the second volume continues a line of research previously conducted under the auspices of the *Burschenschaftliche historische Kommission.* Like its predecessor, this volume contains four essays unified only by a common focus on the development of liberalism in pre-1848 Germany. The scope is deliberately limited. These are specialized studies, admirable in depth of research and care of presentation, and aimed less at synthesis than at providing the materials for such. Professor Wentzcke suggests in his introduction, no doubt in the main rightly, that it is only through this kind of mosaic approach that an overall picture of so complex a period can take shape. Still one may question whether the results of such investigation are always commensurate with the effort involved, and whether somewhat greater boldness in interpretation might not be rewarding. By implication Professor Wentzcke himself raises this question. For the next volume he promises a cross section (*Querschnitt*) of the Frankfurt Parliament that will relate all the political, intellectual, social, and economic forces of the time. Such a study should prove highly valuable whatever its precise nature.

In the first essay Wolfgang Zorn analyzes the ideas of freedom and unity expressed by a number of German publicists of the late eighteenth century. He concludes that certain problems are perennial in German political thinking, as inescapable today as they have been in the past.

Two accounts of the Burschenschaft offer an interesting contrast. Walter Nissen has edited the diary of the Kiel student Wilhelm Olshausen recounting his trip to the *Wartburgfest* in 1817. Olshausen seems to have been a pleasant enough young man, earnestly concerned with self improvement and dutifully recording impressions of scenery and works of art met on the journey. His part in the *Wartburgfest* appears wholly innocuous; his lofty sentiments did not produce very specific plans, revolutionary or otherwise, for German unity and freedom. Like the majority of participants, he knew nothing of the notorious book burning. Doubtless Olshausen was more typical of the Burschenschaft than Maximilian Heinrich Rueder, whose account of his student years at Jena from 1827 to 1831 has been edited by Walter Barton. Rueder wrote his narrative at a late stage of a highly respectable career. Obviously he did not care to go too deeply into details of his youthful radicalism. That he belonged to the radical revolutionary group is reasonably clear, and one can only regret, with Dr. Barton, that details of program and activity are omitted or slurred over.

Paul Wentzcke continues his life of Heinrich von Gagern, the first part having appeared in the preceding volume of the series. During the period from 1836 to 1848 Gagern lived on his estate in semi-retirement, waiting for the revolution that he was confident would come. Never doubting that he himself would play a major role, Gagern prepared himself by formulating his ideas on the relationship of Austria to Germany, and by establishing contact with other prominent liberals. His singlemindedness and patience are impressive; his self-centeredness somewhat chilling. One follows with interest the building of a liberal party, beginning with the work of Itzstein and culminating in the founding of the *Deutsche Zeitung* and the meeting at Heppenheim. Professor Wentzcke follows closely the Gagern letters that he and Wolfgang Kloetzer have recently so well edited, and he seems consciously to avoid moving out from the details of Gagern's life to a more general treatment of pre-1848 liberalism. It is precisely because Professor Wentzcke's learning is so apparent, and because Gagern, as Professor Wentzcke himself notes, incorporates so many of the tendencies of early liberalism, that this reviewer would have been grateful for deeper probing and more imaginative generalization. Gagern's awareness of himself as an aristocrat, his preoccupation with the purely political and moral aspects of revolution, his sense of the urgent need for German unity, even his personal ambition and his assurance of being on the side of an inevitably triumphant progress, are all aspects of a complex phenomenon that few scholars are so well equipped as Professor Wentzcke to analyze further.

Connecticut College LENORE O'BOYLE

MARKUS, VASYL, *L'Ukraine Soviétique dans les Relations Internationales 1918-1923.* Etude historique et juridique. Préface de Charles Rousseau. Paris: Editions Internationales, 1959. Pp. 326.

This volume contains an exhaustive discussion from the juridical point of view of the international position of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the years 1918-1923, before it became a component part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but it will have a real interest for all students of Ukraine. The author lists and discusses briefly not only all the agreements and treaties made by the UkSSR but also those entered into by the Ukrainian National (Democratic) Republic during its struggle for real independence and the consequent efforts of the RSFSR to nullify these by exploiting its own creation, the UkSSR.

Only students of international law are competent to criticize the arguments of the author that Ukraine became an international entity only with the Third Universal and the recognition of the Ukrainian National Republic by the Council of Commissars of the RSFR. Once that was done, the agreements made by the UkSSR were agreements of the state of Ukraine, until that gave up the right to independent action by joining the USSR; and since 1944 the UkSSR has been developing or rather resuming some of its international rights by becoming a member of the United Nations. A layman feels very strongly that the success of the Russians in Ukraine allowed them to play havoc with international law as a concept after World War II and the author admits (p. 247) that the methods applied to the so-called satellite states and tolerated by the West were far too similar to the methods applied in Ukraine earlier.

There are valuable hints in the introduction (p. 15) which should be followed up, for they may give a clue to the process that led to the rapid development of the Ukrainian movement after the Russian Revolution, a growth that even Reshetar (*The Russian Revolution*) does not adequately explain.

The author brings out clearly that the Ukrainian people supported the Central Rada and that the Communists in Ukraine were largely of the Russian and Jewish proletariat and that almost all the Ukrainian Communists were either Borotbisty or Ukapisty, two parties that the Russian Communist Party later liquidated by forcing them to enter the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party subject to the discipline of Moscow. A meaningless game, for Moscow broke with impunity even those regulations which insisted upon incorporation in the constitution of the UkSSR. Article 4 of this declared that "the Republic of Soviets of Ukraine is firmly resolved to enter a socialist soviet single international republic, as soon as the condition necessary for its birth will be realized" (p. 52). At every turn in its foreign relations, the Ukrainian Soviet government stressed, like Lenin, the ephemeral character of all agreements with capitalists; now as then this is the implication back of all of Khrushchev's talk of peaceful coexistence.

At Brest-Litovsk the Central Powers recognized this. The Entente and the United States were so intent upon preserving a unified Russia that they refused aid to the non-Communist Ukrainians and likewise refused their aid, when it was offered, for fear that it would endanger Russian unity. When Poland and Rumania made agreements with the Directory, the West put pressure upon them and Lenin added to the confusion by advancing the independent state of Soviet Ukraine as a signer of the Treaty of 1920. Yet at Lausanne, although the Soviet Russian delegates held credentials from Communist Ukraine and Georgia, the delegates, to come to an agreement with the West, signed as representatives of Russia, not as of the RSFSR or the other Soviet Republics.

In 1918-1923, the policy of the Western powers was such an amalgam of meaningless idealism, legalism, ignorance and indifference that it allowed Lenin to treat at will Soviet Ukraine either as an integral part of Communist Russia or as an independent state governed by rulers picked by Moscow and to crowd out the representatives of the Ukrainian people. This created the pattern that Stalin used to extend Russian Soviet influence into the satellite states after World War II. Khrushchev is using the same policy and the free world in its search for peace has not even tried to find a legal and practical answer to it.

Dr. Markus must be congratulated, as Prof. Rousseau says (p. 7), on his ability to throw light upon this confusion and the way in which the Soviets used it for their benefit. It gives the book its importance for the general student. We can only hope that the author will continue his studies on the way Moscow used Ukraine as a legal testing ground for its ambitions and that other scholars will do the same for the other peoples who declared their independence and were then forced by a so-called National Communist government picked by Moscow into the new colonialism, while the world was being impressed by the Soviet solution of the nationality problem, the USSR itself.

Pleasantville, N. Y. CLARENCE A. MANNING

MEINCK, GERHARD, *Hitler und die Deutsche Aufrüstung 1933-1937.* Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Bd. 19. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1959. Pp. 246. DM 21.

This able monograph deals with the formative years of Hitler's *Wehrmacht,* during which he laid the foundations for his subsequent policy of expansion. It is based on most of the published sources available in 1958, and on unpublished materials from the Nürnberg trials and from the papers of Generals Liebmann and von Schleicher. In addition, Dr. Meinck has consulted a number of high ranking officers who participated in German rearmament. The result is a valuable contribution to our understanding of an important phase in Germany's preparation for World War II.

The author begins by discussing briefly the *Reichswehr's* attempts at secret rearmament during the Weimar period. In contrast to most non-German historians, he tends to minimize these efforts, although the facts he presents might be interpreted differently. Most of the first chapter deals with the disarmament negotiations in 1933-34. The main responsibility for their failure is assigned to France, whose refusal to recognize Germany's claim for equality prevented any kind of formal agreement, under which German rearmament might have remained subject to foreign supervision. Measures to triple Germany's armed forces were initiated in early 1934. Hitler's generals, of course, favored such a policy, although they preferred a slower pace. They were thus left in the dark until the last minute about the *Führer's* intention of denouncing the disarmament clauses of Versailles, on March 16, 1935.

The motives, alleged and real, for the march into the Rhineland, are discussed in the third and most interesting chapter of the book, entitled "Hitler's Intentions." The *Führer's* long-rang aims were partly revealed in his memorandum of August, 1936, which dealt with German economic mobilization for war. But the first unequivocal exposition of Hitler's aggressive intentions was not given until November 5, 1937, in a four-hour talk to his top aides. The gist of it is contained in the well-known "Hossbach memorandum." Its main theme was Germany's need for *Lebensraum,* to be won through foreign conquests. This aim, as Meinck shows, was hardly new. It had been hinted at on several earlier occasions, as far back as 1933. But even so, November 5, 1937, the author holds, was a key date on the road to World War II. "The *Wehrmacht,* which hitherto had only made preparations for the defense of the Reich, independent from Hitler's intentions of conquest, now was told to prepare for the expansion of German *Lebensraum* by use of force." The German army, in other words, did not realize until then that German rearmament was ultimately aimed at aggression. This defense of the *Wehrmacht* is ably argued by Dr. Meinck. To what extent it will be supported by future research in German military documents remains to be seen.

Johns Hopkins University HANS W. GATZKE

Hendel, Samuel, ed., *The Soviet Crucible.* Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1959. Pp. 594. $6.75.

Professor Hendel, of the City College of New York, has filled a conspicuous gap in the teaching of Russian history by compiling this useful collection of readings on the background and development of the Soviet régime. Although such books as Walsh's *Readings in Russian History,* Meisel and Kozera's *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System,* and J. L. Stipp's *Soviet Russia Today* are available for use as supplementary reading, none of these attempts the same task as does *The Soviet Crucible.*

The Soviet Crucible presents a representative cross-section of original documents, classical Marxian and communist writings, and commentaries by acknowledged authorities on the history of Soviet Russia. These selections are organized into seven major categories which trace the evolution of Soviet theory and practice from Marx through Khrushchev, and each section is prefaced with a useful introduction by the editor, which places the various readings in their historical context and provides the thread of unity often lacking in such collections of readings. Included in the book are sections dealing respectively with: the Russian legacy inherited by the Soviet leaders; the origins, essence, and role of Bolshevik theory; the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in 1917; the nature of the Soviet political system; the Soviet economic system; and a concluding section which presents some commentaries on the nature of the Soviet social system and its possible future prospects. Intentionally omitted by the editor are any readings dealing with Soviet foreign relations—a topic of major proportions in itself and one which has been covered in a fashion similar to this books by Professor A. Z. Rubinstein in his recent *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* (Random House, 1960).

Among the selections included by Professor Hendel in an effort to present objectively the range of opinion that exists today on the various subjects covered are such sources as the basic writings of Marx, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and Khrushchev, commentaries and studies by William Henry Chamberlin, W. W. Rostow, R. N. C. Hunt, Sigmund Freud, John Plamenatz, Harold L. Laski, Sidney Hook, Merle Fainsod, Maurice Dobb, Bertram Wolfe, and other prominent students of Soviet Russia, and finally a number of original documents, such as the constitution of the USSR. Taken together, these selections represent a fair and convenient compilation of some of the most basic literature in the Soviet field, and one can sympathize with the dilemma that must have confronted the editor in attempting to decide what must be included and what might be omitted in all fairness to the subject and the reader.

Apart from differences that will undoubtedly arise among users of this book in their courses on Russian history regarding the choices finally made by Professor Handel—and it is impossible to establish consensus among teachers of Soviet studies on this subject—one main shortcoming was noted by this reviewer. In common with other collections of readings designed to accompany a standard text book, this book contains a number of selections that are so brief and fragmentary that they fail to convey the spirit and temper of the writer as well as the central essence of his ideas. This undoubtedly results from Professor Hendel's effort to be as inclusive as possible within the frustrating confines of a single, practical volume, but such fragmentary excerpts taken out of context defeat some of the purpose and value of a book of supplementary readings.

Notwithstanding this possible defect, Professor Handel's book bids fair to become an inseparable companion piece to Walsh's *Readings*.

Colorado State University SIDNEY HEITMAN
Fort Collins, Colorado

KORBEL, JOSEF, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1948. The Failure of Coexistence.* Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. Pp. xii, 258. $5.00.

To write on the political development of Czechoslovakia in the period after the outbreak of the Second World War is indeed a difficult task. The major part of the primary sources are inaccessible and the documents published by the Communists are unreliable. It is with this consideration in mind that one has to approach Josef Korbel's book, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938-1948.* There is no doubt that the author has been very successful in compressing into a relatively small volume a great deal of information, some of it previously unpublished, on the tragic events which led to the Communist conquest of a country which only twenty-five years ago enjoyed the reputation of being a "bastion of democracy" in Central Europe.

The book is well written and well organized, presenting in systematic fashion the different techniques—political, economic, cultural, as well as military—used by the Russian and Czechoslovak Communists in the process first of infiltration and then subjugation of the Czechoslovak people. Of special relevance to students of Communist strategy and tactics is the very able analysis of the different stages in the relationship of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to their own state. At first, they rejected Czechoslovakia as a "rotten" creature of Western imperialism; but in 1938 they suddenly subscribed to its "great tradition of truth and democracy." After the Soviet-Nazi Pact, however, Czechoslovakia again assumed its old role of a "lackey" of Western imperialism to become almost overnight "our glorious fatherland," in the period of the Great Patriotic War and after. Having, in 1948, seized absolute power, the Communists crowned their policy of zig-zags by claiming that from the time of its foundation in 1918 independent Czechoslovakia was a result of their own and Soviet endeavors. Of similar interest is the discussion of the degree of Communist participation in the underground struggle against the invader in occupied Czechoslovakia. While not denying their share in the overall resistence, Professor Korbel demonstrates that the activities of the Communists in no way can stand comparison with the more wide-spread and better organized resistance movement of the non-Communist part of the nation.

Evidence adduced by the author on the violence, treachery, and perfidy of the Communists is convincing and overwhelming. Less, however, is said concerning the policies and reactions of the democratic political parties in their defense against the totalitarian menace. The whole burden of the anti-Communist struggle seems to be concentrated in the personality of Eduard Beneš. Czechoslovakia, however, was not a dictatorship, and Beneš was not an absolute ruler. Perhaps more should have been said on the means and methods by which, especially in the immediate post-war period, the Czechoslovak democratic parties attempted to stem the tide of rising totalitarianism.

Professor Korbel deals at some length with the different policies pursued by Eduard Beneš, whom he regards as a "democrat to the marrow of his bones" (p. 229). At times, however, his judgment of President Beneš appears, perhaps unconsciously, rather unfair. Referring to the 1945 Moscow negotiations over the new government and its program, the author claims that "in a moment of decision between freedom and totalitarianism" (p. 114) President Beneš abstained from the discussions, leaving the difficult task of dealing with the Communists to the leaders of the democratic parties alone. By this action, Professor Korbel maintains, "the cause of Czechoslovak democracy suffered irreparable loss." There is hardly anyone who would not admit that the Moscow negotiations and the adoption of the *Kosice Program* represented fateful steps on the way to disaster. Whether Eduard Beneš, who preferred to assume the role of a Constitutional President, could have improved the lot meted out to the democrats by the Communists is a matter of opinion. A critical attitude toward his tactics, however, fails to do full justice to the political significance of the Moscow negotiations, if not accompanied by similar criticism of the representatives of the democratic parties. As Professor Korbel correctly stated, they "had no plan for a common strategy" (p. 114) and accepted the Communist proposals without any substantial changes, going so far as to acquiesce in the prohibition of the Agrarian Party, in the naive belief that the former voters of this party would join their ranks.

The Czechoslovak democrats entered the critical phase of their struggle against Communist totalitarianism which started in the middle of 1947 with a serious and perhaps fatal handicap—the severe illness of their leader and main representative, Eduard Beneš. Professor Korbel is fully aware of this fact; but, like the main democratic actors of the February 1948 drama, he fails to draw the logical consequences from the crucial fact. That Eduard Beneš was no longer capable of energetic and vigorous leadership was a disaster. Even more tragic, however, was the fact that there was no one who could replace him.

Indiana University VACLAV BENEŠ

ANDERSON, GEORGE L. ed., *Issues and Conflicts in Twentieth Century American Diplomacy,* Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1959. Pp. ix, 374. $5.00.

This collection of essays, the result of a symposium on American diplomatic history held at the University of Kansas in 1957, is, as the preface states, characterized by heterogeneity both in subject matter and in approach. The essays group themselves nevertheless into certain broad categories.

The first three deal with the Far East. William L. Neumann examines a set of American myths about China, all finally shattered by the events of the last decade. "These myths, not least among them the optimistic illusion that the Chinese distinguished between Americans and other Westerners, contributed to the failure of American policy. Richard L. Walker adds a critical discussion of the shortcomings of the American approach in the cultural field. A very good analysis of the overall operation of American diplomacy and of the fundamental differences between the Chinese complex and the Japanese is given by Daniel Nelson Rowe.

Moving to the opposite end of Asia, the next two essays deal with the Near East. John A. DeNovo gives a scholarly survey of the state of affairs in what is essentially a new field for the operation of American diplomatic activity. His failure to take into account the influence of the Palestinian issue is made up for by Alfred M. Lilienthal's analysis of the Balfour Declaration and its latest effects. The Arab case is presented as the strong one that in fact it is.

The remaining ten essays concern thmeselves in the main with matters primarily European, among which American relations with Germany and with the Soviet Union loom large. Louis Martin Sears' discussion of "Historical Revisionism Following the Two World Wars" is in large measure an exposition—defense is perhaps better—of what may be described as the Barnes-Beard-Tansill interpretation. The concept of collective security is examined in two essays, by Roland N. Stromberg in connection with the early League of Nations debate, and by Richard N. Current who analyzes the significance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928; together they bring out the element of continuity as well as the damage that muddled thinking can cause.

An interesting discussion of the Nuremberg trials by Eugene Davidson emphasizes some of these same shortcomings, as well as the dilemma that arises from an attempt to combine wholly legitimate and desirable retribution with cruder political considerations. Arthur Kemp, rehearsing the familiar criticisms of Franklin D. Roosevelt's personal diplomacy, especially at Teheran and Yalta, raises the larger question of the significance and appropriateness of diplomacy at the summit. He feels that this method spells the end of both constitutional government and liberal civilization, surely a very large claim. Fritz T. Epstein gives an excellent survey of the alternating pattern of conflict and understanding in American relations with Germany; on the score of German cultural influence, which he very properly stresses, the never reversed reorientation stemming from the First World War and from the cultural flowering of America might have been given greater stress.

These essays represent for the most part solid scholarship and most of them have in common a highly critical view of past and current performance. It is indeed the proper function of the scholar to analyze the record and to pass judgment upon it. But in this last, more subjective activity, a large sense of perspective is desirable that the minutiae of scholarship may not always provide. The fact that American policy has, like all foreign policies, been dedicated to the promotion of American interest, or that present day Communist régimes dub America the arch imperialist, does not alter certain basic realities. There *was* a difference between the American approach to China and that of others; there *was* a difference between the American position and that of Western nations in 1919; the American revisionist school has been in part at least motivated by moral and emotional urges, and post-First World War revisionism has been in turn revised. To say that for the past two decades American policy is full of individual mistakes, yet somehow in its larger aspects has been fundamentally sound, may be optimistic oversimplification; it is certainly no justification for overconfident and careless relaxation of effort, or for the suppression of criticism; it is nevertheless a view that bears pondering if an historically fair estimate of it is to be made.

Barnard College RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ
Columbia University

WIEWIÓRA, BOLESŁAW, *The Polish German Frontier from the Standpoint of International Law.* Poznań-Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Zachodnie, 1959. Pp. xxxii, 224.

Dr. B. Wiewióra's book is the first monograph in English on the Oder-Neisse issue to emerge from Poland. The author, who is a member of the Faculty of Law at the University of Poznań, explains systematically in juristic terms such problems as the right of self-determination (p. 19) and the concept of frontier of delimitation (p. 101). He refers to certain political or juridico-political principles (such as security from the threat of aggression and revindication of territories) which affect the applicability of juristic devices and preclude a discussion in purely legal terms. On the other hand, Dr. Wiewióra refrains from introducing social, economic and ethical aspects with which many writers dealing with this subject have been concerned. His book is free from those mystical and emotional undertones that can be felt in the writings of some German revisionists. It also avoids, while remaining sufficiently technical, that narrowly juristic approach which may so easily serve as the vehicle for tendentious interpretations.

How imprecise are the tools of the discipline to which the book belongs has been pointed out by Professor Klafkowski, whose preface introduces the work: "There are no norms of International Law which would regulate such exceptional situations as the unconditional surrender of Germany and the ensuing legal consequences" (p. xvii). This lack of norms may easily place international law in a precarious situation, liable to become the victim of power politics. And it adds to the challenge that a modern jurist must face. The latter's dilemma is that although aware that what matters is the intention to implement an agreement and not its particular form (consequently that a *de jure* settlement is of less consequence than the *de facto* state of affairs) —he is still professionally concerned with legal solutions. Dr. Wiewióra is guided by a juristic solution which apparently originated with Prof. Klafkowski. According to the latter, the Potsdam Agreement settled the Polish-German frontier *de jure* and not merely *de facto,* so that attempts to obtain recognition of Poland's title to the recovered territories and to redefine the frontier at the future peace conference not only lack juridical value but constitute an abuse of the law (p. 201). This rational argument may serve as a memorandum to official circles in Warsaw, intent on obtaining West Germany's recognition of the Oder-Niesse line as a permanent frontier between Poland and Germay. Such recognition would be a major political success but legally unimportant. The recent history of international relations has demonstrated the limited value of treaties and agreements: major powers have frequently changed their policies without regard for existing contracts.

In presenting the Polish point of view—whose point is that the recovered territories are no longer German (both *de jure* and *de facto*) —the author grapples with current German revisionism, whose advocates are questioning the validity of the Potsdam Agreement and trying to muster the support of the Western democracies in order to reverse the Allies' early postwar decisions. A student of the Central European political scene will find interesting references to the revisionist maneuvers of the West Germans, who have neither presented sound legal arguments nor provided the basis for effective political action. He will feel that the Western democracies should be wary, lest a revision of the Oder-Neisse line awaken the German appetite for East Prussia. He will sense that the West is bent on preserving the status quo, while the Soviet Union remains the effective guarantor of the Oder-Neisse line.

Polish jurists agree on the irreversibility of the frontier, mainly on the grounds that the recovered territories are now inhabited by a Polish population that has accepted the sovereignty of the Polish State and that they constitute a part of Germany's war reparations.

Dr. Wiewióra's book gives a good deal of attention to the problems of resettlement and population transfer, as a result of which the recovered territories have acquired a homogeneous Polish population. The author stresses that these transfers, a direct consequence of the frontier settlement, were supported by the Western powers and are regarded, in international law, as a step toward ensuring Poland's sovereignty over the territories in question. He also discusses the impact of the possible re-unification of Germany on the Oder-Neisse question and finds it legally irrelevant. The political implications of such a change may, however, be important: they are related to a number of unknown factors which are bound to affect the issue. But there the juridical problem ends.

University of British Columbia W. J. STANKIEWICZ

LEONHARD, WOLFGANG, *Kreml ohne Stalin.* Cologne: Verlag für Politik and Wirtschaft, 1959. Pp. 646. DM 21.80.

Wolfgang Leonhard has special qualifications which entitle him to a hearing when the post-Stalin history of the USSR is examined closely. He is a refugee from the Soviet Zone of Germany where he was associated with the communist regime. In the course of his communist career, he spent some time in Russia proper. After defecting to the West, he studied for two years at Oxford working in seminars specializing in various aspects of Soviet policy.

Kreml ohne Stalin is a tightly packed listing and evaluation of events in Russia since the 19th Party Congress in the autumn of 1952 to the 21st Congress in January, 1959. The work will serve as a source of reference for the well-informed. It can act as a guide to those who are less initiated as to the indispensable sources of information which need to be explored by anyone attempting to establish the course and cause of policy changes in the USSR.

Aside from a voluminous text running up to 500 closely printed pages, there are appendices listing the shifts in Soviet leadership since 1953, a number of theses advanced by the author, and a chronology of events from the death of Stalin to the end of May, 1959 which closes with a Khrushchev visit to Albania. Listed are all important events, pronouncements, and changes in political personnel. It is a compendium worthy of German thoroughness, with little of the tedium usually associated with such works. An extensive classified bibliography is about equally divided between non-Russian publications and Soviet publications appearing in the German language.

In harmony with many authorities who explain the latest Khrushchev explosion on the summit as reflecting internal Russian tensions, Wolfgang Leonhard operates on the thesis of a "primacy of domestic policy" over foreign affairs. The work includes numerous illustrations of this view, theoretical formulations to this effect as well as concrete examples. "Foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy"—paraphrasing Clausewitz's famous dictum on war. The major purpose of Soviet foreign policy is to "establish favorable international conditions for the development of communism," to cite another example.

With the major emphasis on domestic affairs, the volume covers every aspect of Soviet life, from the fine arts, through the various economic categories, through the deemphasis and later revival of the cult of personality, to the different thoughts on the subject of a translation from socialism to communism. Nearly half of the volume traces the change from Stalin's Russia and the thaw that followed. The later chapters analyze the consolidation of Khrushchev's position and the "new look" in the USSR, in so far as the latter has taken a clear shape. A mass of facts drawn from numerous sources is given in every instance.

It is the belief of the reviewer that students of Soviet affairs will find the volume extremely useful and interesting. Wolfgang Leonhard, though a refugee from the communist world, shows an objectivity which is rare among such individuals. He recognizes that the first need is not denunciation but an understanding of what makes the enemy move.

Montana State University OSCAR J. HAMMEN

WASSERMANN, CHARLES, *Europe's Forgotten Territories.* Copenhagen: R. Roussell, 1960. Pp. 272. Illus.

KURTH, KARL O., ed., *Die deutschen Ostgebiete jenseits von Oder und Neisse im Spiegel der polnischen Presse.* Würzburg: Holzner Verlag, 1958. Pp 102. DM 2.40.

Falsification—beware, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Zachodnie. Pp. 237.

These three publications are related through their subject matter: the so-called German East, beyond the Oder-Neisse line, now under Polish administration. Mr. Wassermann, a Vienna-born Canadian journalist, made a trip of 4000 miles through this area by automobile in 1957, and published his findings in a book under the title *Unter polnischer Verwaltung* (Hamburg, 1958) which now appears in an English version. The author was interested in giving a report on the conditions he found in 1957 in the former German cities and countryside in Silesia, East Brandenburg, East Pomerania and Polish East Prussia. His findings were very discouraging. He found in general cities unreconstructed, roads in disuse, the people plainly disheartened, farms uncultivated, communications at times non-existent, rubble everywhere and, where there had been reconstruction, as at Danzig, he thought it was reconstruction of the wrong thing—the Old City was being restored to its hanseatic form. His report reappears after a lapse of three years, during which, he states, there has been little noticeable change. The conclusion the reader is obviously intended to gain from this report is all very sad. The Poles have been unable to handle the problem, populate the territories, or show any administrative capacity. The Germans Mr. Wassermann met (he spoke no Polish) were all clean and neat, and the Poles whose pictures we see are all slovenly, ill clad, poorly fed, and not infrequently drunk before noon. A few simple facts should be brought up at this point. It took the Germans six or more centuries to build the buildings (frequently with Polish labor) that a war which the Poles did not start or want turned into rubble and dust. The Poles are now criticized for not rebuilding the same buildings in fifteen years. The murder of over six million Poles at the hands of the Germans, including, so far as the Germans were able to compass it, the intelligentsia, bureaucracy and technical personnel who might have made more rapid progress with reconstruction than has in fact been made, does not leave the German case a clean one. The fact that the German press and radio is unremittingly proclaiming in broadcasts in Polish and by other propaganda media that these lands are rightly German and the Poles now there will have to leave is not conducive to stability or a feeling of security in the new settlers. The correctness of the author's observations is limited to what he saw and when he saw it. Since his report, 1957, much has been done and the Polish population in this area has substantially increased. One third of the Poles now in these territories have been born there, and the rate of population increase is almost fifty per cent higher than in the rest of Poland. In view of the handicaps under which the Polish administration has to labor the progress must be rated high. I saw this part of Poland in 1945 and 1946 and have seen much of it recently. Much remains to be done, but much has been accomplished and the years since 1956 have brought notable improvements both physically and psychologically.

Falsification—beware is a Polish answer to *Die deutschen Gebiete* published by the Göttinger Arbeitskreis. The latter booklet purports to be a collection of statements in the Polish press admitting the terrible state the Polish-administered East German provinces are in: farms deserted, crops untilled, the population deserting for the East, buildings in towns falling to pieces, markets unattended, the few Germans who still live in their ancestral plots kept in a condition of terror, and so on.

The data are said to have been taken from specific Polish papers, with a show of authentication. The staff of the Western Institute (Instytut Zachodni) at Poznań undertook to run down these quotations and found that perversion, usually a *suppressio veri* by omission or misquotation, ruled from cover to cover. The method pursued in answering the allegations of failure is quite direct. The statement made by the Göttinger Arbeitskreis is compared *ad verbum* to the original source from which it is supposed to have been taken. The German production is shown to be flagrantly false and dishonest. in statistics, in chronology, in simple translation, and in misconstruction of context. German irredentism will have to do better than this to convince anybody. It is disturbing to meet such malicious trash so late in the game, apparently well supported and smiled upon by the authorities of modern Germany. The same group publishes the *Expellee Press Service,* which carries regular "reports" from the German East.

University of Colorado S. HARRISON THOMSON

SHORTER NOTICES

GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH, *Journey to Poland and Yugoslavia 1958*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. Pp. x, 118. $3.00.

This is a short but significant and often brilliant report by the author of *The Affluent Society* about his lecturing tour of the two "Socialist" countries made in the Spring of 1958. This was the first comprehensive series of lectures on capitalist economics given by a non-Marxist in any Communist country. The book is written in form of a diary, supplemented by an Appendix, one of the lectures given by Professor Galbraith; it is entitled "Economic Power in the American Setting."

Besides many clever and witty remarks made by the author on people, politics and economics of Poland and Yugoslavia, the value of the book consists in the comparison of the two economic systems. The "market socialism" of Yugoslavia is a going concern, writes Professor Galbraith. And here the clue is in the price system. While in Poland most prices are fixed by the State, the Yugoslavs leave about 70% of prices to the determination of the individual enterprise, whether they are State or privately controlled. Unlike in Poland, individual Yugoslav enterprises have the power to adjust their prices: if the price proves too low, the firm can raise it and vice versa. This has a double consequence. First of all, earnings can be used as the test of performance; second, profits can be partly shared by management and workers as an incentive. This system works relatively well. The 30% of prices that are determined by the State include utilities and key products like steel or fertilizers, where there is a particular interest in the price.

Yugoslav workers' councils are also responsible for the considerable improvement in the operation of State controlled enterprises. Generally speaking, the Yugoslav system seems much more flexible and pragmatic than the Polish one. Consequently the standard of living in Yugoslavia has been improving at a much more rapid tempo than that of Poland. Here, however, one has to bear in mind that the Yugoslavs, free of Soviet tutelage, are determined to pursue this course. The Poles, on the other hand, cannot go too far in the direction of unwinding their economy without having an ideological conflict with Moscow. The Yugoslavs have been watching their Polish comrades very keenly: how far can they go in the direction of economic destalinization?

This reviewer, who made almost the same itinerary through both countries a few weeks later as Ford Exchange Professor, cannot but agree with the remarks and observations of the author.

Boston College M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI

MÁRAI, SÁNDOR, *Napló–1945-1957*. Washington, D. C.: Occidental Press, 1958. Pp. 235.

In this recent book, this eminent Hungarian writer presents a literary diary of thirteen tumultuous years. The first entry notes the appearance of Russian troops in a quiet Hungarian resort town; the last entry records his naturalization ceremony in New York City. In between, the book tells a life story characteristic of Eastern Europe—the uprooting from the fatherland, wandering over the continent, searching for a home and, finally, the settling down in America. The fabric of personal vicissitudes is interwoven with a rich thread of meditative remarks on people, books, politics and ideas. It eventually outgrows the limitations of a personal account and expands into historical source material. It reflects upon a neglected chapter of Hungary's post-war history—the great social change which wiped out the old social classes of semi-feudal origin.

Márai is the telling witness of this change. In his long literary career he came to be known as the Hungarian Henry James whose novels commemorated the life of the upper-middle class. As a diarist, he continues the old rôle, and chronicles the social cataclysm with the artist's predilection for important details. His work is a vivid picture of how the first blow of Communism deprived the upper-middle class of their old privileges and glamour, of how some of them disappeared into the drab mass-society of Communism, and how others slipped away to the border of the country and fled to America. He views the disappearing class with commiseration and criticism, like a philosophic observer who knows that the old order is a thing of the past, gone, beyond any possibility of return.

Cornell University JOHN KOSA

PEROUTKA, FERDINAND, *Democratic Manifesto.* With an introduction by Adolf A. Berle, Jr. New York: Voyages Press, 1959. Pp. 181. $3.00.

Perhaps a more appropriate title for this important book would be, "Democratic Credo." It is a thorough analysis of both the democratic and the present Soviet system. The author, a prominent Czech journalist, now the head of the Czechoslovak section of Radio Free Europe, shows the principles of modern democracy, rejection of dogma and mysticism, application of the scientific method which is based on controlled experience, and against democracy he puts the lame communist dialectics which considers the Soviet system the final "synthesis" of the capitalist thesis and the revolutionary antithesis. Lenin's disrespect toward the working class as "slumbering, indolent, and lazy" is put as a counterpart of the communist phrases of "people's democracy." Democracy is a method of solving arising social problems without violence by the rule of a majority of politically and legally equal citizens which, under the freedom of the press and other media of communication, represents the informed and active part of the citizenry.

At present, the author says, the main problem of democracy is the abolition of poverty. Democracy cannot remain only a system of equal right to vote, but it must create a real equality of opportunity to achieve a decent and rising standard of living and its security. Democracy is against the communist policy of sacrificing the present generation for the alleged benefit of the future.

The author often condenses his arguments in pithy and pointed aphoristic sentences, for instance: "Our generation has sometimes seen more people dying from politics than from disease." (p. 133) "History teaches that it is futile to attempt not to see, and history also teaches that no achievement is permanent" (p. 30.) "It will be more fruitful for the democrats to preach more to themselves than to this adamant secret society" i.e. the ruling communist revolutionary group, (p. 136). "Freedom would mean little if it meant only the formal right to disagree. The demand for freedom springs from greater depths of human existence; it is the claim to full life" (p. 126). "Democracy would have no hope of winning a majority in the world if it persevered in the embarrassed attitude towards poverty that marked it in the nineteenth century. For twentieth century democracy there is no alternative but to declare forthrightly that poverty is an evil that can be removed by practical action, and to affirm readiness for such a change" (p. 139).

This book was published also in French and Czech. Let us hope that it will stimulate political thinking in democratic countries, especially in America where many citizens consider democracy only the equal right to vote, and even do not care to make use of this right.

University of Pittsburgh JOSEPH MACEK

RIMSCHA, HANS VON, *Die Umsiedlung der Deutschbalten aus Lettland im Jahre 1939.* Eine Betrachtung. Hannover-Döhren: Harro v. Hirschheydt, 1958. Pp. 58. $.65.

In this study the author is less concerned with the "external" events relating to the return of the German Balts to the Reich than he is with the operation's "internal" aspects; namely, the psychological and the ideological. His story has to do with the Balts in Latvia, though much, but not all, that he writes is applicable also to those from Esthonia. He does not have much to say about the Latvian people and their policies (beyond a favorable comment here and there). He expressly foregoes the economic side of the story. He recognizes that the transfer as planned and carried out was influenced by the exigencies of wartime, but he holds that the policy behind it was essentially independent of these, being an integral part of the larger Nazi population policy. In the way of sources, he sees more of value in propaganda, contemporary with the events, than in later memoir material.

Rimscha's concern is to explain why so many of the Balts, roughly four-fifths of them, fell in with the transfer plan, dictated from Berlin. Some, he says, responded to the call of the Führer; some felt the pull of Nazi "Volk" theories. A modest number feared the advance of Bolshevism (a year later when those remaining were evacuated this fear was important). But more numerous, he holds, were those who were moved by feelings of Balt solidarity and a sense of loyalty to the 700-year history of the German group; to these it seemed better to accept the fate of the group than to desert it in this historic hour of trial. It is this phase of the author's argument which later may be most open to question. He rightly observes that it is yet too early to attempt the full story of the operation. But, we may add, whoever undertakes the task will, in covering its ideological aspects, need to give close attention to Rimscha's monograph.

OSCAR J. FALNES

WOLFGANG WACKER, *Der Bau Panzerschiffes "A" und der Reichstag*, J. C. Mohr, Tübingen, 1959, Pp. 180.

Dr. Wacker's monograph is Number 11 of the series of "Tübingen Studies of History and Policy" published with the support of the Ministry of Culture of Baden-Württemberg. It consists of two major parts, one an historical resumé of the rebuilding of the German Navy during the years 1919-1927, the other a detailed history of the controversial building of the first of the famous German "pocket battleships" of the *Graf Spee* type, known at the time as "Armored Ship A." The position of each of the main political groupings toward the problem of German rearmament in general, and naval reconstruction in particular, is examined in great detail, especially as reflected in the Reichstag debates, which reached their turning point in the highly publicized decision of November 1928, in which the pocket battleship program was approved. The crucial position of the Social Democratic Party and its policy of compromise is thoroughly examined and explained as a matter of political necessity, in spite of the publicity given to the Lohman scandal (involving the use of so-called "private" funds for illegal naval rearmament in the pre-Hitler period.

While the author has used the extensive documentation provided by the Nuremberg Trials and private correspondence with many of the principal figures involved, his tendency to accept at face value the apologias of military spokesmen such as Admiral Raeder and General Groener leads to certain highly questionable value judgments. For example, the French-Polish Treaty of Mutual Assistance is accepted uncritically as making German naval reconstruction "a matter of imperative military necessity," in spite of its admittedly "strictly defensive character" and strong French reservations about actually providing either ground or naval forces in support of "any adventurous Polish policy." The author bases this judgment solely on a memorandum of General Groener according to which French naval forces were supposed to be allocated to Poland, without direct French involvement in war. The author, in a note on page 40, himself admits that other than the testimony of General Groener, "there is no other evidence for this agreement."

It is regrettable that the author fails to avoid a major pitfall of much post World War II historical research in Germany, in that he seeks to limit the scope of his study to the exact boundaries of his theme without placing it in its broader context—in this case the entire problem of illegal rearmament in a Germany which, unlike Hitler's, had not yet openly committed itself to a policy of expansionism based on military aggression.

Washington, D. C. PAUL BLACKSTOCK

TONSOR, STEPHEN J., *National Socialism: Conservative Reaction or Nihilist Revolt?* New York: Rinehart, 1959. Pp. 27.

The subtitle of this tiny volume, one of the series "Source Problems in World Civilization," says that it is up to the reader to decide the major cause of Nazism. In a two-page introduction the author lists "liberal" and "conservative" historiographers as well as Marxist and psychoanalytic authors as possible sources of explanation. Then he presents short adaptations from Hegel, Rousseau, Nietzsche, Chamberlain plus corporative ideas of Rathenau, and some paragraphs from Hitler, A. Moeller van der Bruck, and E. R. Hubre's writings. Assessment of Nazism is presented by three authors, the conservative historian Fr. Meinecke, the Marxist Franz L. Neumann, and H. Rauschning who supported Hitler for some time in order to reject him by stressing the "nihilism of values" of the Nazi movement.

Within an extremely limited space, it was impossible to adapt many authors as "philosophical and ideological" sources of Nazism; nonetheless, H. von Treitschke could have probably also been mentioned. To present the values of the movement itself, Alfred Rosenberg would have also been relevant. The major point of criticism is, however, directed against the assessment part of the volume. The author appears to be predominantly concerned with values and ideas, though he refers to economic problems by presenting Neumann's Marxist explanation. France, e.g., also experienced a disenchantment after World War I as far as the old values were concerned, and yet it did not fall prey to a dictatorial and nonrational movement. Obviously, the ideological and value factor was a necessary but not a sufficient cause to precipitate the success of Nazism. There was the social system and situational factors such as the change from monarchy to republicanism, the defeat of Germany, the unusually severe unemployment, and to some degree also the unique personality of Hitler that all converged to the fateful triumph of National Socialism.

University of Kentucky JIRI KOLAJA

SLIJEPCEVIC, DJAKO, *The Macedonian Question: The Struggle for Southern Serbia.* Translated by James Larkin, Chicago, The American Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1958. Pp. 267.

As Dr. Slijepcevic well notes in his preface, many books, brochures and articles have been written on the Macedonian problem, many of them purely propagandistic in character. Moreover, as he points out, while little new may be said of the period prior to 1918, there is no "full and properly documented account" of the development of the Macedonian question since that time.

More than one half of this brief volume, however, is devoted to the earlier period. For example, Dr. Slijepcevic treats of Macedonia as a geographical concept, traces the arrival of the Slavs in the Balkan peninsula, gives an account of the work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, discusses both Bulgarian and Serbian rule over Macedonia, relates the sufferings of the Macedonians under Ottoman rule, and then comes down to the period of the 1870s, with the national awakening, the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate and the emergence of the Macedonian question prior to World War I. The Serbo-Bulgarian conflict, leading to the Balkan Wars is retold with vigor. The last three chapters deal with the problem between the two World Wars, the problem during World War II and the problem as it is today.

The author writes from the point of view of an ardent Serbian nationalist and, of course, is bitterly opposed to the government of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia. His book should be read with that in mind. He does not, for example, provide the balanced point of view which one may find in Elizabeth Barker's little volume on *Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics* (1950). Printed in Germany, the book is literally full of typographical errors, and the text, as translated, contains many foreignisms. There is a good bibliography of works in English, French and the South Slavic languages.

Beirut, Lebanon HARRY N. HOWARD

Festgabe für Arthur Rhode—Gestalten und Wege der Kirche im Osten. Ulm: Verlag "Unser Weg," 1958. Pp. 272 and map.

This "Festschrift" in honor of the 90th anniversary of Dr. Rhode's birth consists, as is usual, of articles contributed by his friends, students, and fellow-workers. He was born in Poland in 1868 and spent the major portion of his life in service of the German Lutheran church there. He served as pastor of the church in Posen (now Poznań) and later as superintendent of the southern region of the province. He taught Old Testament and Polish Church History at the Posen Theological School. In 1941 he retired and devoted himself to the study of the history of the Lutheran congregations of Posen, but in 1945 he was forced to leave Poland and found his new home in Berlin. He published *A History of the Evangelical Churches in Posen.*

The articles deal with miscellaneous subjects relative to the churches in Poland but are not restricted to the Lutheran themes. Thus they offer monographs of considerable interest and value relative to the religious history of Poland.

Claremont, California MATTHEW SPINKA

MARX, JULIUS, *Die österreichische Zensur im Vormärz.* Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1959. Pp. 76. AS 38.

The censor, too, has a case to be made. He has been too much abused in the past and those he has censored have generally received an over-supply of our sympathy. The censor, like any other good bureaucrat, merely does his job as best he can; he is bound by the policy decisions of his superiors (e.g. Metternich, Kolowrat, Emperor Francis). He is not the small-minded, anti-intellectual, and irresponsible enemy of genius and progress so often pictured. This vindication of the censor as a bureaucrat is the thesis of Julius Marx's study, a publication of the *Arbeitskreis für österreichische Geschichte,* which is committed to a deliberately Austrian interpretation of the country's history and is especially concentrated on the needs of "middle school" teachers.

Why an entire book, albeit a small one, should have been dedicated to such a narrowly circumscribed topic is a difficult question, and I shall not attempt to answer it. Perhaps, as Marx feels, the silent bureaucrat needs to be defended since we seem usually so well informed on the wrath of the injured party. But censorship is too important a topic to be discussed merely from the point of view of the censor. The title of the study here under review should made it implicit that the effect of censorship on Austrian society in the period prior to the revolution of 1848, the so-called pre-March period, deserves possibly as much attention as the censor. Marx may have in mind writing a larger, more comprehensive book, in which the present study and several articles on the subject by the author might well be included. A number of important questions might then very well be dealt with: Was the revolution hastened, deterred, or not at all affected by the censorship? Did this ". . . most complete censorship imaginable . . ." (p. 55) accomplish its purpose of preventing anything from appearing that ". . . was detrimental to the religion, the state, or good morals?" If so, was Austria not in fact ". . . a reactionary state . . . surrounded by a Chinese wall . . . to prevent ideas from the more advanced parts of Europe from penetrating . . . ," a claim that Marx denounces vehemently as nothing but a ". . . propaganda lie (*Kriegslüge*) of the Liberals" (p. 67) ? If not, what justification for censorship was there?

Altogether, I would say that *The Austrian Censorship in the Pre-March Period* is a book that falls far short of its promise. It gives us little more than the questionable assurance that the censors were honorable men.

Brooklyn College HERMAN FREUDENBERGER

BILL, VALENTINE T., *The Forgotten Class: The Russian Bourgeoisie from the Earliest Beginnings to 1900.* New York: F. A. Praeger, 1959. Pp. 229. $5.00.

The aim of the author was to present "a historical analysis of the spirit of private initiative in Russia and of the class which exhibited it." The book is rather a collection of essays and biographical sketches than an orderly and systematic discussion of the subject. Some chapters deal with the development of commerce and industry in Russia in a more general way, but others are concerned with such matters as personalities of outstanding Russian entrepreneurs of the XIXth century, their patronage of arts or their reflection in the Russian literature of the time. The book is, therefore, not a history of Russian bourgeoisie "from the earliest beginnings to 1900," but a series of glimpses into its past. However, it displays not only a thorough familiarity with the subject, but a considerable breadth of approach and ability to formulate significant historical problems.

The author e.g. draws an interesting parallel between the economic development of the West and that of Russia by suggesting that Russian capitalism like its Western counterpart had its roots in the religious zeal of Puritan sectarians and that Russian Old Believers played in their country's history a similar economic role to that of the Protestant reformers in the West. Although this thesis is no more than outlined by the author and would, undoubtedly, require a more thorough investigation of both the history of the Old Belief and that of Russian business, it clearly sets forth an important historical problem.

Equally penetrating is the author's analysis of the reasons for the ultimate failure of bourgeoisie as a dominant class in Russia in spite of its initial success in this role in the late XIXth century. The author attributes this failure to the basic ideological split which developed between bourgeoisie and intelligentsia as a result of bourgeoisie's predominantly conservative outlook and its manifest blindness to the social and economic problems of the country at large.

The author stresses that by the turn of the century the Russian bourgeoisie was showing considerable cultural progress and that it managed to establish rather close ties with such representatives of Russian intellectual elite as painters, musicians, actors, etc. However, it was already too late to win the masses of intelligentsia and their literary leaders from their ideological alliance with discontented industrial workers.

The author is planning to devote a separate study to the period from 1900 to 1917 when Russian bourgeoisie finally came of age as a social class to vanish almost immediately from the historical scene.

The book is very well written, but has at times somewhat novelistic overtones. The bibliography is selective rather than complete. Among the works dealing with Russia's social history one would look in vain e.g. for Kluchevski's *Istoriya sosloviy v Rossii.* Of the recent contributions to the history of Russian religious thought with which the author is much concerned, the omission of Fedotov's *Russian Religious Mind* is noticeable.

Wilkes College Konstantin Symmons

Walter, Friedrich, *Die Theresianische Staatsreform von 1749. (Österreich Archiv: Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises für österreichische Geschichte)* Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1958, Pp. 71. AS. 36.

This booklet, the fourth in the series, is modest in size and price, but is a work of excellence. Lengthy essays (or, if one prefers, short monographs) competently written are of great convenience to the scholar and the informed layman. As one might expect, Prof. Walter's effort measures up in competence. He has distilled his larger work, *Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung. Die Zeit Maria Theresas,* and presented the essence gracefully and informatively. This is no unseemly truncation as works of this sort sometimes are.

Walter recounts the development of the Habsburg monarchy between the sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries and describes the dismal prospects facing Maria Theresa at her accession in 1740. The young queen showed more courage than the men about her and fought a desperate war to preserve her inheritance. Even eighteenth century wars were expensive, and Maria Theresa decided, perforce, that she would have to remedy the chronic financial embarrassment of the realm she now ruled. With the advice of Friedrich Haugwitz she determined that administrative centralization was the means to the remedy which she sought.

Haugwitz removed nearly all the functions of government from the Estates and centered them in the *Directorium in publicis et cameralibus*. Only the administration of justice remained within the competence of the Estates, and even that was under the shadow of the *Kreisämter*. Despite early successes, affording a very considerable increase in tax income, the *Directorium* began to falter under the burden of the accumulated tasks imposed upon it. When Austria's fortunes suffered during the Seven Years War, Kaunitz blamed the miscarriage of his war on the failures of Haugwitz' government, and persuaded Maria Theresa to give Haugwitz a "kick upstairs." Then Kaunitz assumed the direction of internal as well as foreign affairs.

Centralizing the government of the disparate Habsburg lands would have been no mean achievement even for a man and under more propitious circumstaces. That Maria Theresa did it under the prevailing conditions was remarkable. This little book is a very able outline of her problems and achievements.

University of Minnesota **William E. Wright**

Schramm, Wilbur, ed., *One Day in the World's Press*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. Pp. 138. $6.95.

Friday, November 2, 1956, was chosen as a day of crisis by the editor and the Stanford University Press on which to focus press opinion and news evaluation throughout the world. In Hungary Soviet tanks had begun to mass on Budapest, in Egypt British bombers were darkening the skies over Port Said and Cairo. It was a good idea to make a comparative demonstration of how these crucial events were regarded in leading representative newspapers from New York to Tokyo. The procedure was to make a line for line, column for column translation, printed in very small type, of almost the whole issue for November 2, of the following influential newspapers, Moscow *Pravda*, Paris *Le Monde*, Warsaw *Trybuna Ludu*, Frankfurter *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Prague *Rudé Právo*, Stockholm *Dagens Nyheter*, Belgrade *Borba*, Cairo *Al Ahram*, Peking *Jen-Min Jih-Pao*, Tokyo *Asahi*, Buenos Aires *La prensa*, Bombay and Delhi *The Times of India*, London *Times*, *New York Times*. The treatments, as one might expect, range from enthusiastic, to nervous, to remote. The Soviet bloc, including Peking, apart from Warsaw, gave its space to the Suez incident and to the British and French outrage. Stockholm featured Soviet troops in Hungary. Warsaw was too close to its own October revolution to be able to discuss the Budapest situation, but counselled the Poles to discipline, calm and awareness of the danger to Poland of the "reaction" to which Hungary appeared to be succumbing. The visual appearance of these pages, and the very readable translations make a very vivid impression. The commentaries, setting each paper in the picture, are most useful.

S. H. Thomson

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REVOLUTION AND CONTINUITY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
1945-1946

by H. Gordon Skilling

DURING his second exile from 1938 to 1945 Eduard Beneš developed a program for liberation which was a curious amalgam of two seemingly discordant concepts: continuity and revolution. His hope was that Czechoslovakia would be restored in its prewar form, preserving the legal continuity of its constitution and political institutions, but also would be in many ways fundamentally transformed, in keeping with the revolutionary character of the war. At the close of the conflict, he assumed, popular revolts and struggles for power would occur throughout Europe. By maintaining harmony of action between the liberation movements at home[1] and abroad, and by preserving the continuity of the old and the new Republic, the transition in Czechoslovakia would, he hoped, be relatively peaceful and orderly. The very principle of legal continuity would provide "a method, a procedure, and a path" whenever it became necessary to introduce basic changes in the postwar Republic.[2]

All countries would, Beneš believed, develop towards more perfect forms of political, social and economic democracy, each on the basis of its own native conditions. The Czechs would be able to proceed by "our own Czechoslovak path, without intervention and without decision from outside, whether from the West or the East."[3] The 1917 revolution in Russia had been "of a special type suiting Russia only," and need not be imitated. Moreover, as a result of the stabilization of the Soviet revolution and the powerful position of Russia in world affairs, its political system could be expected to be gradually modified in a democratic direction, thought Beneš, just as Western democracy was tending toward a "socializing democracy."

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[1] There is little evidence of home opinion on postwar problems. See, however, *Za svobodu do nové československé republiky* (For Freedom in a New Czechoslovak Republic) (Prague, 1945), containing a program worked out in the years 1939-1941, and Karel Veselý-Štainer, *Cestou národního odboje* (The Path of National Resistance) (Prague, 1947), pp. 27, 114, 131, 159f, 209f. See the author's article "The Czechoslovak Struggle for National Liberation in World War II," in *The Slavonic and East European Review.*

[2] *Šest let exilu, a druhé Světové Valky* (Six Years of Exile and the Second World War) (Prague, 1946) (henceforth cited as *Šest let exilu*), p. 257. Cf. Beneš' address to the State Council in February 1944, *ibid.*, p. 386.

[3] Speech of November 12, 1942, *ibid.*, p. 328. See also *Demokracie dnes a zítra* (Democracy To-day and Tomorrow) (3rd. ed., Prague, 1946), pp. 257, 265f.

These mutual adaptations would facilitate the co-existence of the two systems, in spite of their continuing differences, and would minimize the danger of communism in Czechoslovakia.[4]

After the return of Beneš as President events seemed to confirm his basic presuppositions. In an important speech in December 1945 on the occasion of receiving an honorary degree from Charles University, Beneš restated his views that a gradual transformation of liberal democracy was in accord with the worldwide revolutionary trend of the times and could be effected by reasonable evolution adapted to the unique conditions of individual national societies. Rejecting the doctrine of dialectical materialism, and the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he declared optimistically that the Czech Communists would accept the idea of a gradual transformation without violence. Asserting his wartime doctrine of legal continuity, he sought to reconcile it with postwar revolutionary requirements. In a mature state, revolution did not necessarily involve "the abolition at one stroke of the whole of one juridical system and its complete replacement by a new, revolutionary juridical system." For the Czechs, the principle of legal continuity involved not only the restoration of democracy but "the systematic changing of legal norms." The question was:

> How were we to keep to our national tradition and connect it organically with the evolution of the world; to pass from the existing continuity of law and connect it organically with the revolutionary law being newly created; to remain democrats and accept the necessary, morally and politically justified revolutionary, socializing measures; in a word, to pass, in a spirit of national unity, from a decaying liberal régime to a new stage of modern society in its socializing phase?[5]

Beneš' concept of the postwar revolution was not far removed from that professed by the Communists. Klement Gottwald, in his first full formulation of the Communist view of postwar development, in a speech on July 9, 1945, explicitly denied that a "socialist revolution" was involved, and described it as a "national and democratic revolution," which had resulted in the establishment of a new form of state, a people's democracy.[6] The national aspect of the revolution was the transfer of power from the

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[4] *Šest let exilu,* pp. 254-62. Cf. also *ibid.,* pp. 365-9. For an even more optimistic view see Hubert Ripka, *East and West* (London, 1944). See also Curt F. Beck, "Can Communism and Democracy Coexist? Beneš's Answer," *American Slavic and East European Review,* XI, No. 3 (1952), 189-206.

[5] E. Beneš, *Světová krise, kontinuita práva a nové právo revoluční* (World Crisis, Continuity of Law and New Revolutionary Law) (Prague, 1946). An English translation was included in *Eduard Beneš, Ph.D., President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Doctor of Laws Honoris Causa, Ceremonial Conferment of the Degree at the Charles University* (Prague, 1946). Quotation on p. 36 (Czech), p. 61 (English).

[6] Klement Gottwald, *Deset let. Sborník statí a projevů, 1936-1946* (Ten Years. Collection of Articles and Speeches, 1936-1946) (Prague, 1947), henceforth cited as *Deset let,* p. 275. Gottwald, early in the war, revised the Communist view of the revolution in 1918, and worked out this new thesis of the coming revolution. See V. Kopecký, *Gottwald v Moskvě* (Gottwald in Moscow) (2nd. ed., Prague, 1948), pp. 16-19; *KSČ v boji za svobodu* (The CPC in the Struggle for Freedom) (Prague, 1949), p. 100f.

Nazi German occupiers to the Czechs and Slovaks. Its democratic aspect was the transfer of power from that part of the former Czech and Slovak ruling classes which had betrayed the nation and collaborated with the Germans, to the new ruling classes: the working class and their allies, peasants, tradesmen, the working intelligentsia, and part of the bourgeoisie.

There was, therefore, a strong national content to the Communist interpretation. Moreover, the idea that a violent civil war or a dictatorship of the proletariat on the Soviet model was necessary under Czech conditions was openly discounted.[7] This was a distinctively Czechoslovak revolution, issuing in "a regime of a peculiar, quite Czechoslovak type." "In sum," said Gottwald, in the July speech already quoted, "we are experiencing in our republic our own peculiar development, which cannot be squeezed into any pattern, and in the course of which we must seek our own paths, our own method, our own Czech and Slovak policy."[8]

At the end of hostilities there seemed to be no unbridgeable gap between the two leading spokesmen. In theory both accepted the twin ideas of continuity and revolution. The difference was chiefly a matter of degree, Beneš emphasizing continuity, and the Communists revolution. Neither side had publicly formulated, during the war, a full program of reforms, however. Both had expressly reserved the decision on these matters to the people at home. There was general agreement that liberation would bring certain immediate problems requiring urgent solution. Although the Communists were not represented in the London government, they were ready to recognize the legitimacy of the decrees issued by it concerning postwar matters and thus to assure a certain legality to the transition at home to a new system.[9]

Although the idea of legal continuity was thus implicitly accepted by the Communists, the viewpoint expressed privately at this time was directly contrary to this, as revealed by Gottwald in a speech to party functionaries in Košice on April 8, 1945.[10] He then declared that the Czech and Slovak bourgeoisie "does not have any firm constitutional institutions through which it could rule and with the help of which it could govern in the name of law, constitutionality and continuity." In contrast to other returning exiled governments, the Czechoslovak government "brings home nothing on which it could rely." "In our country the only constitutional factor coming from abroad is Beneš." This created, as Gottwald put it, "a clean slate (*čistý stůl*), a free road ahead." "In spite of the favorable situation," he went on, "the immediate target was not soviets and socialization, but the really consistent carrying out of the democratic and national revolution, in the current of which we now find ourselves; and this right to the end, so that we may eventually open the way to new objectives, as far as possible on a broad national front and at the head of the nation." For the "foreseeable future" cooperation of all the parties within the National Front would be necessary, but this would not exclude a continuing class struggle, a continuing fight against "reaction" within the National Front, "a struggle for the leadership of the nation." This challenge was openly proclaimed within three months.[11] Even in the private speech in April, however, the struggle was described as a political one, involving competition "as to who could best lead and manage the affairs of the nation." Even when this challenge was openly proclaimed to the nation, it did not seem to rule out the continuance of cooperation within a constitutional framework. It was only later that the conflict assumed more and more radical forms, culminating in a situation in February 1948 when the Communists could take over power in a highly unconstitutional manner and proceed, in a revolutionary fashion, to give rein to their "new objectives."[12]

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[7] *Deset let,* p. 349.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 284.

[9] See Václav Nosek, "Cooperation in Future Czechoslovakia," *Central European Observer,* XXI, No. 26 (Dec. 22, 1944). Although the idea of legal continuity was thus implicitly accepted by the Communists, the viewpoint expressed privately was directly contrary to this, as revealed in a speech to party functionaries by Gottwald in Košice on April 8, 1945, published later in Klement Gottwald, *Spisy* (Works), XII (Prague, 1955), pp. 13-25. He there declared that the Czech and Slovak bourgeoisie "does not have firm constitutional institutions by which it could rule and with the help of which it could govern in the name of law, constitutionality and continuity." In contrast to other returning exiled governments, the Czechoslovak government "brings home nothing on which it could base itself." "In our country only Beneš came from abroad as a constitutional factor." (p. 13f.)

[10] This was published only recently in Klement Gottwald, *Spisy* (Works) (Prague, 1955), XII, pp. 13-25. Quotations from pp. 14-16, 21, 24.

The Košice Program and the New Government

The first full statement of what was in store for the liberated Republic was the Košice program, agreed upon in the Moscow discussion of March 1945.[13] It is generally regarded as the work of Gottwald and the Czech Communists. Its content was such, however, that it was acceptable to Beneš and the non-Communist parties. Although radical in many of its provisions, it was not a Communist, nor even a Socialist document, in its basic principles. It placed strong emphasis on the national aspects of the revolution, but included radical economic and social provisions. Moreover, it was a program "limited in time" to the period prior to the convening of a national assembly.

The first three sections of the program dealt with the conduct of the war effort and the formation of a new Czechoslovak army, based primarily on the First Czechoslovak Corps in the Red Army and cooperating closely in organization and training with the Soviet forces. It was to be an "anti-fascist, democratic army," established by a purge of the officer ranks and by the political schooling of new officers.

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[11] See Gottwald's speeches in July, 1945, and early 1946, in *Deset let*, pp. 288f., 319.

[12] These developments are described in detail by the author in two articles, "The Breakup of the Czechoslovak Coalition, 1947-1948," in *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, August, 1960, p. 396ff., and "The Prague Overturn in 1948," in *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, IV (1960), p. 88ff. See also the recently published book by Josef Korbel, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948* (Princeton, 1959).

[13] Published in English by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Information as *Programme of the Czechoslovak Government of the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks, Agreed to at the First Government Meeting in Košice on April 5th, 1945* (Prague, n.d.).

The foreign policy of the state was to be founded on the alliance with the Soviet Union and on close relations with the other Slav states, but it was to include friendly relations with Britain, France and the U.S.A.

The Slovaks were to be recognized as an individual nation, with their own organs of government, in accordance with the agreement reached in 1944 between the Slovak National Council, created during the war in Slovakia, and the London government. Slovak units in the Czechoslovak armed forces were to use Slovak as the language of command. The problem of the Carpathian Ukraine (formerly known as Subcarpathian Ruthenia) was to be settled "in accordance with the will of the population and in friendship with the Soviet Union."

Germans and Magyars were to lose their citizenship and to be expelled from the state unless they had shown loyalty to the Republic in the years of crisis. German and Magyar war criminals, as well as Czech and Slovak traitors, including officials of the Prague and Bratislava governments, were to be punished by special people's courts. Their property was to be confiscated and transferred, in the case of industrial plants, to temporary national administration, and, in the case of land, to peasants and agricultural workers. A purge of the civil service would be carried through. The fascist parties, as well as the Agrarian, Small Traders' and National Union parties, were prohibited, and their officers barred from political activities.

Local government would be based on national committees, except in regions where a non-Slav majority required temporary administration by the state. A Provisional National Assembly, elected by the national committees, would confirm the President in office, and together with the new government prepare for the election in the shortest possible time of a Constituent Assembly, and the enactment of a new constitution. Full constitutional rights would be guaranteed, and racial discrimination prohibited.

The program concluded with detailed provisions concerning the restoration of industry and agriculture, social insurance and trade union rights, and a cultural policy emphasizing a Slavonic orientation and a new understanding of the Soviet world.

The government that was to implement this program was formed by agreement during Beneš' visit to Moscow on his way back to liberated Slovakia. Symbolic of the shifting balance of forces was the replacement of the wartime premier, Msgr. Šrámek, a member of almost every Czech coalition government since 1921, by the left-wing Social Democrat, Zdeněk Fierlinger, wartime ambassador in Moscow and confidant of the Communists. The government was representative of the traditional Czech parties, except for those prohibited under the Košice program. Even two former Agrarians, both Slovaks, were included.[14] Each of the six parties of the

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[14] Beneš, until his departure for Moscow in 1945, had conceived of a postwar government including Communists, Social Democrats, National Socialists (2), Populists (2), Czech Agrarians (2), 4 Slovaks (2 Left and 2 Right), and 1 neutral, Masaryk. The number

National Front, except for the Social Democrats, had a deputy prime minister;[15] each had also two other ministers.[16] Four non-party minister were appointed: Jan Masaryk, who had been in charge of foreign affair in the London government, as Minister of Foreign Affairs; General Svoboda who had been in command of the First Czechoslovak Corps in the Red Army, as Minister of National Defense; and Professor Zdeněk Nejedlý professor at Charles University and longtime Communist, as Minister o Education and Culture; and General Antonín Hasal, military advisor o Beneš in London, as Minister of Transport.[17]

This coalition represented a substantial amalgamation of the Moscow and London resistance movements, supplemented by leading participants in the Slovak uprising. The Cabinet contained ten non-Communist "Londonites," six of whom had been members of the government-in-exile; it included five Communist exiles, three from Moscow (Gottwald, Nejedlý and Kopecký) and two from London (Nosek and Clementis); and seven resistance participants, all Slovaks, three of them Communists. The Slovaks were well represented, having nine places, with sixteen for the Czechs. The inclusion of separate Slovak Communist representatives inflated the Communist strength, so that the united CPC had by far the strongest delegation, eight in number. General Svoboda and Fierlinger, as later events showed, were strongly pro-Communist and eventually joined the party. Cabinet positions of great political and economic importance went to Communists and Communist sympathizers: the premiership, national defense, interior, education, information, and agriculture. Nonetheless this was still a genuine coalition government, with other parties represented as follows: three Social Democrats, three National Socialists, three Populists, and four Slovak Democrats, together with four non-party members. Even if Svoboda and Fierlinger are not counted, there remained a substantial majority, fifteen in all, of non-Communists. With Beneš remaining in the presidency, such a government could not be considered a regime controlled by the Communists.[18] There could be no gainsaying the fact, however, that this was a coalition unique in Czech history, with the fulcrum of power in the hands of the Socialist and Communist Left, and the Center and Right (the Populists and Slovak Democrats) in a decided minority.

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of Communists and Socialists would be determined in the Moscow discussions. Whether or not he had in mind the representation of the prewar Agrarians is not known. See Z. Fierlinger, *Ve službách ČSR* (In the Service of the Czechoslovak Republic) (2 vol. Prague, 1948, 1951), henceforth cited as Fierlinger, II, 568ff., 580ff.; *Šest let exilu*, pp. 245f., 388.

[15] Msgr. Šrámek (People's Party); Josef David (National Socialist Party); Klement Gottwald (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, or CPC); Viliam Široký (Slovak Communist Party); Jan Ursíny (Slovak Democratic Party).

[16] Ripka, Foreign Trade, and Stránský, Justice (National Socialist); Nosek, Interior, and Kopecký, Information (CPC); Laušman, Industry, and Majer, Food (Social Democrat); Hála, Posts, and Procházka, Health (People's); Šrobár, Finance, and Pietor, Domestic Trade (Slovak Democrat); Ďuriš, Agriculture, and Šoltész, Labor and Social Welfare (Slovak Communist).

[17] Undersecretaries included Clementis, Foreign Affairs (Slovak Communist); Lichner, Foreign Trade (Slovak Democrat); General Ferenčík, National Defense (non-party).

[18] Cf. the more unfavorable analysis of the new government in H. Ripka, *Czechoslovakia Enslaved* (London, 1950), pp. 29-32; Otto Friedman, *The Breakup of Czech Democracy* (London, 1959), pp. 57-60.

The leading position of the three left-wing or workers' parties was emphasized in an agreement between the Communists, Social Democrats and National Socialists, creating "the national bloc of working people of town and country."[19] These parties, while preserving their own separate existence, agreed to cooperate closely in the implementation of the Košice program. Coordinating committees were set up to assume common action in local and district national committees. The bloc declared its intention to continue its collaboration with the People's Party and other elements of the National Front, but claimed to be "the chief and leading force, concentrating all the healthy elements of the nation." An important aspect of this united front was the pledge of each of the parties not to set up separate party unions, or cooperatives, or youth, gymnastic and other organizations, as had been the practice in the first Republic, but to create unified organizations in these spheres.

Czechoslovakia Restored and Transformed

In fulfillment of Beneš' wartime program Czechoslovakia was restored as an independent state, largely within its pre-Munich frontiers. But this restoration of the Republic was accompanied by a revolution in its national composition that made it fundamentally different from the old. For one thing, with its German minority gone and other minorities greatly reduced, Czechs and Slovaks were henceforth to live substantially alone, on a new basis of equality, in an overwhelmingly Slavonic state.

The treason of most Sudeten Germans, in 1938, and their active participation in Nazi rule over the Czechs, had sundered forever the bridge between Czech and German in Bohemia and Moravia. By the end of the war Czechs, Communists and non-Communists alike, had come to believe that the only solution was the transfer of most Germans to Germany, where their first allegiance lay.[20] The support of the great powers for this policy was formally given at Potsdam in 1945. By the end of 1946 the transfer of approximately three million Germans had been completed. Only those (some 200,000 to 300,000) who had demonstrated their loyalty to the Republic were allowed to retain their citizenship and remain. The Communists associated themselves fully with the transfer and took a leading part in its execution. Gottwald, indeed, in a defense of this policy in March 1946 claimed that it was Stalin's achievment at Potsdam to have won the assent of the other powers to the shift of population.[21]

Even more revolutionary in its implications, and in striking breach of the principle of territorial continuity, was the cession of Ruthenia (Carpathian Ukraine) to the Soviet Union. During the early war years Communists and non-Communists were agreed on the retention of this region in Czechoslovakia.[22] The course of events at the close of the war during the Soviet occupation of this area had led to a general recognition of the necessity of cession.[23] This was carried into effect shortly after the war, in the form of a treaty between the two countries on June 29, 1945.

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[19] For the text see *Čechoslovák v zahraničí,* June 22, 1945. The agreement was issued over the signatures of Fierlinger, Gottwald, and Zenkl.

[20] See H. Ripka, *The Future of the Czechoslovak Germans* (London, n.d.), with an introduction by the German Communist deputy, Gustav Beuer, dated November, 1944.

[21] *Deset let,* p. 309f.

Apart from this, the prewar frontiers of Czechoslovakia were restored, territories taken by Poland and Hungary in 1938 and 1939 being regained. The only significant minorities remaining in the new state were therefore the Poles, in the Teschen region, and the Magyars, in Slovakia. Somewhat as a by-product of the German transfer, a decision to move the bulk of the Magyar population was taken, in this case to be effected as an exchange for Slovak citizens in Hungary through an agreement between the two governments. Although the number of Magyars was somewhat reduced, the exchange of population soon broke down and was eventually brought to a close, leaving a minority of from 200,000 to 300,000 Magyars.

With this exception the new Czechoslovakia was an almost exclusively Slav state. The common suffering of all Slavs at the hands of the Germans, a joint struggle against the enemy, and ultimate liberation from Greman rule, seemed to create the basis for a "New Slavonic Policy," as Beneš termed it during the war.[24] He saw favorable conditions for this not only in the contribution made to victory by Soviet Russia, the greatest of the Slavs, but also in the evidence of the All-Slav Congresses held in the U.S.S.R. during the war.[25] This pan-Slavism would be radical and revolutionary in its political and social content, in contrast to the conservative form it had taken before 1914. The Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance of 1943, directed explicitly against a renewal of the German *Drang nach Osten,* showed, he believed, the possibilities of cooperation among Slav states, and could be supplemented by more positive forms of economic, political and cultural collaboration.

This Slav policy would have to exclude, according to Beneš, any "Communist Slav messianism," directed at the communization of the Slav nations. The Czech Communists at that time exhibited no overt evidence of any such intention, although the all-Slav ideas propagated in Russia won considerable sympathy. Their chief spokesman was Professor Nejedlý, who lectured on Czech and Slovak history at the University of Moscow during the war and was a prominent member of the All-Slav Committee. Dr. Vladimír Clementis, Slovak Communist, during his exile in Britain wrote a booklet entitled *Panslavism Past and Present,*[26] supporting the idea of a new Slavonic policy consisting of "cooperation and understanding between the Slav nations, all of them possessing independence and equal rights within states of their own, and developing in accordance with their respective spiritual traditions."

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[22] See Beneš, *Šest let exilu* p. 392ff.; Slánský's article on the Carpathian Ukraine in *Cesta k svobodě,* I, 49-55.

[23] See F. Němec and V. Moudrý, *The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia* (Toronto, 1955); Fierlinger, II, pp. 387 *et seq.*

[24] E. Beneš, *Nová slovanská politika* (New Slavonic Policy) (Prague, 1946). Cf. E. Beneš, *Úvahy o slovanství* (Thoughts on Slavism) (Prague, 1947). See also Fierlinger, II, 108-11, 182-89.

[25] For a general discussion of wartime pan-Slavism see A. Mousset, *The World of the Slavs* (N. Y., 1950), and Hans Kohn, "Pan-Slavism and World War II," *American Political Science Review,* XLVI, No. 3 (September, 1952), 699-722.

It was in this spirit that the Košice program, with its strong accent on Slavonic solidarity, was formulated. On this orientation all parties, Communist and non-Communist, were in agreement.

Provisional State System in London

During the war Beneš, in accordance with his doctrine of continuity, denied any legitimacy to the regimes which wielded actual power in Prague and Bratislava, and set up his own institutions of government as the rightful successors of the prewar organs. There were many legal difficulties, and much in the nature of a political myth, in this doctrine. For six years Czechoslovakia did not even exist except as a legal fiction. Working governments *were* in power in Prague and Bratislava. Even in London the provisional governmental system involved much that was new, and its foundation has been described by a sympathetic observer as the "London constitution."[27]

The London system consisted of three main elements, the President, the government, and the State Council, of which the first-named was the primary element on which the others depended.[28] Although Beneš had resigned from the presidency in 1938, and a successor had been elected by the National Assembly, Beneš later asserted that his resignation had been forced and was therefore legally invalid. He therefore argued that his election to the presidency in December 1935 was still effective, and that he was entitled to exercise its functions abroad. His term coming to an end in December 1942, he was continued in office, under a proclamation of the London government, based on article 58 of the constitution, and approved by the State Council, until the election of a new President.[29]

Having secured British endorsement of his action in 1940, Beneš then proceeded to endow himself with legislative powers by issuing, on October 15, 1940, a constitutional decree, by which he was assigned the right to issue laws, in the form of decrees, on the recommendation of the government. Enjoying this "temporary exercise of the legislative power," Beneš was able to issue, during the remaining war years, a series of important decrees, some called "constitutional" and affecting the basic law of the Republic.[30] With the assistance of the government the President had therefore emerged, at least for the duration of the "provisional stat system," as the chief law-giving agency abroad, as well as the head of th state with all the functions of that office under the constitution of 1920.

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[26] London, 1943, p. 64. See also two articles by J. Šverma in *Cesta k svobodě,* I, 5-11; II, 5-12.

[27] Zdeněk Peška, *Naše nové státní zřízení* (Our New State System) (Prague, 1945), p. 12f.

[28] This system is described by Peška, *op. cit.,* and Josef Budník, *Prozatímní státní zřízení Československé republiky* (The Provisional State System of the Czechoslovak Republic) (Prague, 1947). See also Eduard Táborský, *Czechoslovak Democracy at Work* (London, 1945), Chapter IX. A fourth institution, the Legal Council, was created by the president on February 4, 1942, to serve as a kind of judicial body, and to give, on request, advisory opinions as to the legality of governmental and administrative ordinances and decisions. See Táborský, *The Czechoslovak Cause, An Account of the Problems of International Law in Relation to Czechoslovakia* (London, 1944), pp. 128-33.

[29] Edvard Beneš, *Paměti, Od Mnichova k nové válce a k novému vítězství* (Memoirs, From Munich to New War and New Victory) Part II, volume 1, the only volume published (Prague, 1947), pp. 98, 163f.; *Šest let exilu,* pp. 395, 417ff.

Strangely enough, the President had already exercised legislative power, even before the issuance of the decree of October 15, in the "Constitutional Decree of the President of the Republic" of July 21, 1940, which had created the State Council as an "advisory body" and "auxiliary contro organ in the framework of the provisional state system." Its forty members later increased to fifty, were to be named by the President himself. Thi representative quasi-parliament became an important organ for the expression of opinion among Czech exiles. It did not, however, share the legislative power with the President and government, and remained purely advisory.[31]

The Cabinet lacked any specific constitutional basis for its wartime operations. Its members were appointed by the President, and became the latter's chief advisors in formulating and executing the policy of the exiled regime. It took on the dimensions of a normal government, having departments or ministries, and employing a considerable body of officials.

The governmental system in London was, then, a semi-revolutionary regime, consisting of a self-appointed President, and a Cabinet designated by him. Although many of its features, such as the presidential exercise of the legislative power, departed from the letter of the constitution of 1920, every effort was made to maintain that charter as the basis of the wartime institutions. Moreover, it was expressly stated that this system was provisional and would come to an end with the restoration of normal constitutional conditions at home.

Reconstruction of Governmental Organs

An important feature of the idea of constitutional continuity was the fact that it associated the Communists with the emerging new governmental institutions and warded off the danger of an independent, purely revolutionary approach. The general pattern of re-establishing political authority in liberated Czechoslovakia had been formulated in the Košice program.

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[30] These decrees were published in *Úřední věstník československý* (Czechoslovak Official Gazette) in London during the war years, henceforth cited as *Úř. věst. čsl.* The decrees still in force were later published in the official Czechoslovak collection of laws, *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení republiky Československé,* henceforth cited as *Sb.* Thus the constitutional decree on the temporary exercise of the legislative power was No. 2 *Úř. věst. čsl.* (No. 20/1945 *Sb.*). The decrees were also published by Peška, *Dokumenty k ústavním dějinám Československým, 1938-1946* (Documents on the Constitutional History of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1946) (Prague, 2 vol., 1947), henceforth cited as Peška, *Dokumenty.*

[31] Later decrees widened its powers, without, however, giving it legislative power. See No. 1, 3, 12, 13, *Úř. věst. čsl.*

The main provisional agency of administration was to be the national committees, essentially revolutionary in their origin, but having a semi-legal basis in the decree issued by the President on December 4, 1944 providing for their formation.[32] These organs of rebellion were to be subordinated to the returning government, and its delegate on liberated territory, and were to serve as the basis of a Provisional National Assembly.

In fact the transition to constitutional stability followed, with some departures and with the exception of Ruthenia, this projected plan. The President and the newly-formed government were able to return directly to Košice and then to Prague, thus making unnecessary the temporary administration of affairs through a government delegate. On April 4, the day of the naming of the new government on the soil of the Republic, the State Council, as provided in a decree of October 11, 1944, ceased to exist. Thereafter for a period of six months, until the convening of the Provisional National Assembly on October 28, 1945, there obtained a system of "government by presidential decree." By a decree issued in London on February 22, 1945, the exercise of the legislative power by the President had been prolonged until the formation of a provisional legislative body. Thus, with a semi-revolutionary assumption of power, without popular elections, a President who had assumed power in London and a government which had been formed in Moscow now took over office in Prague and proceeded to exercise the full powers of government, legislative as well as executive.

The most serious deviation from plan was the reorganization of the national committees, not on the basis of elections, as foreseen in the wartime decree of 1944, but by agreement among the political parties. As a result, Communist predominance in most of the existing committees, established during the course of liberation, was replaced by representation of the parties according to the principle of parity, each of the main parties having equal representation. In all districts or localities where the majority of the population was "unreliable from the point of view of the state," for instance in German regions, administration was to be temporarily in the hands of "administrative commissions" nominated from above.[33] In spite of some abuse of power, the national committees performed important emergency tasks and eventually emerged as effective organs of local government.[34]

The election of the Provisional National Assembly represented an important step in the direction of constitutional stability. As contemplated in the wartime decree, the Assembly was elected indirectly through the medium of the national committees.[35] Within each district, delegates of the reformed local national committees met in conference and "elected" not only district committees, but also delegates to provincial congresses Thereafter these congresses were convened to "elect" provincial national committees (in the case of Slovakia, a new Slovak National Council) and members of the National Assembly.

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[32] No. 18, *Úř. věst. čsl.* On August 3, 145, a government decision (No. 43 *Sb.*) confirmed the validity of the wartime decree.

[33] See the government ordinances of May 5, 1945, and August 7, 1945, No. 4 and 44 *Sb*. resp.

[34] See E. Táborský, "Local Government in Czechoslovakia, 1919-1948," *American Slavic and East European Review,* X, 1951, 214f.

This was hardly a normal constitutional election. For one thing, the choice of delegates and finally of deputies occurred in public meetings, and not through secret ballot. For another, only the six parties of the Nationa Front were entitled to propose lists of candidates. Only citizens of Slavonic nationality and of "loyalty" and "reliability" could elect or be elected Moreover, by agreement of the parties of the National Front, a common candidate list for the Assembly was agreed to beforehand, so as to guarantee equality to each of the six main parties (40 seats each) and assure representation to mass organizations (44 seats), to outstanding personalities (11), and to the Ukrainian population in Slovakia (5). A similar parity of representation was maintained in the national committees.

As a result, the Assembly was not a reflection of a free popular choice. Since the representatives of the mass organizations were almost without exception men and women affiliated with parties, the line-up in the Assembly of 300 (200 from the Czech areas; 100 from Slovakia) was as follows:[36]

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia	51
Czechoslovak National Socialist Party	50
Czechoslovak Social Democracy	50
Czechoslovak People's Party	49
Communist Party of Slovakia	47
Slovak Democratic Party	45
Ukrainian National Council	5

The new Assembly was convened for a ceremonial meeting on October 28, 1945. This represented a revival of an authentic legislative body after a lapse of seven years. Despite its limitations the election of such a parliament within six months of liberation was a striking step towards the restoration of constitutional stability. Under the decree of August 25, it was endowed with legislative power throughout Czechoslovakia until the election of a Constituent National Assembly, as well as with the full competence of the Assembly under the constitution of 1920.

One of its first actions was, through a simple resolution, to confirm the President in his functions.[37] In the government formed by Fierlinger after the elections, the only changes were the appointment of Stránský to a deputy premiership in place of David, who was elected president of the

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[35] See the presidential decree and government ordinance regarding the elections, August 25, 1945, No. 47, 48, 49 *Sb.*

[36] See Appendix.

[37] Beneš had hoped for a formal election of the President. See *Šest let exilu*, pp. 248, 395, 417ff.

National Assembly, and his replacement as Minister of Justice by Prokop Drtina, a National Socialist who had been in London during the war after a period of underground activity. Somewhat later, by a constitutional law in March 1946, the Assembly confirmed all the measures issued by the President under the wartime decree of October 15, 1940, including that decree itself.[38] These events gave, *ex post facto,* constitutional endorsement to the whole system of wartime government and the legal order thereby created, as well as to the postwar government of the National Front.

Revolution and a Constitutional Interim

According to the doctrine of legal continuity, the constitution of 1920 was still in force during the war and immediately thereafter. It had been Beneš' wish, while in exile, that "every change in the constitution or any other law whatsoever must be transitory for the period of the war and carried through so as to approach as closely as possible to the spirit and letter of the constitution and home legislation."[39] In the same spirit, the constitution was to be restored after the war, except insofar as it had been modified by the Czech authorities in London.

The attainment of this purpose had been sought through a decree, issued by the President on August 3, 1944, on "the restoration of the legal order."[40] It provided that all constitutional and other legal measures introduced prior to September 29, 1938 (the date of the Munich settlement) "are an expression of the free will of the Czechoslovak people and are the Czechoslovak legal order." Measures introduced during the "period of unfreedom," as the decree termed it, "are not part of the legal order." As an exception, "by will of the Czechoslovak legislative power," those which did not conflict with the content or the democratic principles of the Czechoslovak constitution could be applied "for an entirely transitional period."[41] This decree expressly excepted from invalidation the constitutional and other decrees issued by the President in exile. These were, however, subject to later approval by the "appropriate authorities" and were to lose their validity six months from the date of the meeting of the National Assembly.

This constitutional decree was given formal endorsement by the Provisional National Assembly on December 19, 1945.[42] Through these and other measures, already discussed, the constitution of 1920 was substantially brought back into force, at least provisionally until the drafting of a new constitution. At the same time, as a result of measures taken abroad and at home to meet the exigencies of the war and postwar situation, many changes had perforce been made in the original charter so that it was in many ways basically altered. The fundamental system of laws in operation in the postwar years was therefore a peculiar amalgam of legal and constitutional measures derived from the most varied sources: wartime decrees issued in London, revolutionary measures adopted during the Slovak uprising, and even some of the laws and decrees issued by the second Republic after Munich, by the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and by the separate Slovak state, all supplementing the larger body of laws in effect before 1938, under the constitution of 1920.[43]

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[38] No. 57/1946, *Sb.*

[39] Beneš, *Paměti,* p. 163.

[40] No. 3, *Úř. věst. čsl.*

[41] Similarly the first decree of the Slovak National Council, in 1944, provided in article 2 that "All laws, ordinances, and measures remain in force, as long as they are not in conflict with the spirit of the democratic republic."

[42] No. 12/1946, *Sb.*

A New Status for the Slovaks

A highly revolutionary aspect of the new constitutional system was the position of Slovak organs of government. During the London exile the absolute necessity of a single Czechoslovak state was taken for granted. Beneš personally favored a decentralization of authority such as the constitution of 1920 had not envisaged, with Slovakia enjoying autonomy. He was not, however, willing to prejudice the ultimate decision by the Czechs and Slovaks at home, and refused to promise a definite status for Slovakia such as was demanded by some Slovaks abroad. On the question of nationality, Beneš was a strong believer in the idea of a "Czechoslovak" nation, the official doctrine of the first Republic, but saw no reason for conflict with those who felt the Slovaks to be a distinctive nation. There should be no enforced acceptance of one or the other of these concepts.[44] The Communists, too, were committed to the reunion of Czechs and Slovaks in a single state, but had been vocal during the war in urging the recognition of the Slovak nation as an individual entity and the proclamation of the equality of Czechs and Slovaks.[45]

Events in Slovakia in 1944 rendered such discussions academic. During the uprising the Slovak National Council was formed, as an organ of rebellion and as the supreme legislative and executive power in Slovakia. Later decrees of this council created the *Sbor pověrenců* (Board of Trustees) as a kind of cabinet, although the Council retained the "executive and governing power," merely entrusting it to the trustees individually.[46] In reality, there were three organs in this embryonic system: the plenum of the Council, as a legislature, the presidium of the Council, as the political organ of leadership, and the Board of Trustees, as an executive agency. After the uprising was crushed, the legislative and executive powers were transferred to the smaller presidium.[47]

These revolutionary developments at once raised problems as to the relationship between these new bodies and the London government. The Slovak National Council was ready to cooperate politically with the London government. President Beneš was willing to admit the necessity of urgent measures taken by the Slovak Council, subject, however, to eventual ratification.

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[43] An attempt to construct a text of the existing constitution, as modified by war and postwar measures, was made by J. Morávek, *Ústavní poměr česko-slovenský* (The Czech-Slovak Constitutional Relationship) (Prague, 1947).

[44] See Beneš' speech in February, 1944, *šest let exilu*, p. 391f. See also his memorandum of 1944 in *Úvahy o slovanství*, pp. 330-55.

[45] See Kopecký's articles on Czechs and Slovaks, in *Cesta k svobodě*, I, 26-33, 34-42; and Šverma's article on the nationality problem, *ibid.*, II, 5-12.

[46] For these decrees of the Slovak National Council see Peška, *Dokumenty*, II, 136, 137f., 141f.

The constitutional implications of this situation caused more difficulty, however. The delegation of the Slovak National Council, during talks with Beneš in London in 1944, indicated willingness to accept "the principle of the constitutional continuity of the Republic," so as to safeguard the international position of the Republic.[48] Actual developments, both at home and abroad, had in their view so far departed from the principles of the 1920 constitution that "the constitution as a whole cannot be a basis for the settlement of domestic political relationships in the Czechoslovak Republic." Beneš welcomed the recognition of the principle of continuity and the acceptance of the legally existing Czechoslovak Republic and its President and government. He admitted the fact that the constitution had had to be changed at home and abroad, but argued that it would remain in force until a definitive legal settlement had been reached at home through the representatives of the people.

At the time of liberation an understanding on the legal and constitutional aspects of the new relationship of Czechs and Slovaks had not been reached. At best there was a mutually acceptable arrangement for the transfer of power from the government delegate for liberated territories to the Slovak National Council. The liberation of Slovakia before the rest of the Republic made possible the revival of the Slovak National Council, the presidium and the Board of Trustees on Slovak soil in early 1945, before the return of the President and government. At the Moscow talks in March, the Slovak delegation was able to urge the view that "the complete equality of the Czech and Slovak nations, in a unitary and indivisible Czechoslovak Republic" should be proclaimed, and that the Slovak National Council should be officially confirmed as the "Slovak government and Slovak parliament." It was also urged that there should be a threefold division of competence, with some matters treated as exclusively Slovak, others (foreign affairs, foreign trade, and national defense) as exclusively central, and yet others as divided.[49]

The Košice program gave full satisfaction to the Slovak view, and incidentally to the Communist conception of Czech-Slovak relations. The

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[47] For this and the following see *Slovenská Národná Rada, 1943-9* (Slovak National Council, 1943-9) (Bratislava, 1949), cited henceforth as *SNR;* Jozef Lettrich, *O Slovenskej národnej rade* (On the Slovak National Council) (Bratislava, n.d. 1945?).

[48] See Fierlinger, *op. cit.*, II, 410-19 for a full report of the London talks. See also for the Slovak viewpoint *SNR*, p. 38f.; for Beneš' viewpoint, *Úvahy o slovanství*, pp. 325-29; Lettrich, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-35.

[49] See the decision of the Slovak National Council, March 2, 1945, *SNR*, pp. 45-47; Lettrich, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-47. Exclusively Slovak affairs were to include internal affairs, education, food supplies, health, industry and trade, agriculture and land reform, public works, social welfare and the judiciary. The divided functions were to include railroads, post and telegraph, reconstruction and finance.

separate identity of Czechs and Slovaks, and the equality of the two nations in a common state, were both endorsed. The Slovak National Council was confirmed as "the rightful representative of the individual Slovak nation" and "the holder of sovereign rights on Slovak territory, that is, of legislative, governmental and executive powers." The central government declared that it would carry out common state matters "in closest collaboration with the Slovak National Council and with the Board of Trustees of the Slovak National Council as the executive, governmental organ of the Slovak National Council." Permanent Slovak organs were to be set up on the model of those already existing. The actual division of competence between Slovak and central bodies would be determined by the representatives of the two nations.

The existing Slovak organs of government at once clothed themselves with full constitutional authority. A decree of the presidium of the Slovak National Council of April 7, 1945, provided for the establishment of central offices, or trusteeships, and for the exercise of the "governmental and executive power" by the Board of Trustees. A new Board was thereupon formed in Košice and proceeded shortly afterwards to Bratislava. The Slovak National Council resumed the powers it had temporarily assigned to its presidium and proclaimed itself, in a decree of April 21, 1945, the wielder of legislative power in Slovakia except in matters of all-state character. In such matters the President was to exercise the legislative power "in agreement with the Slovak National Council." The division of competence as between Slovak and central authorities was left to a subsequent agreement.[50]

Such an agreement was reached on June 2, after lengthy discussions, between the Czechoslovak government and the presidium of the Slovak National Council.[51] Recognizing anew the legislative power of the President in common affairs until the formation of a provisional legislative body, this agreement listed twenty such affairs, and assigned the legislative power in all other matters to the Slovak National Council. The twenty all-state spheres were far-reaching and included the "determination in principle" of almost all matters claimed by the Slovak National Council in March 1945 for Slovak or divided competence. The Slovak National Council was assigned the governmental and executive power in all Slovak affairs; the executive power in common affairs was to belong to the central government, but to be carried out in Slovakia through the medium of the Board of Trustees.

In a paradoxical way, combining revolutionary action, Slovak legislative measures, and a political pact of Czechs and Slovaks, new organs of Slovakia had been brought into existence. True, like their Czechoslovak counterparts, they had not been elected, and had even less legal basis in the 1920 constitution. Within a month or two of liberation Slovakia possessed more institutions of government than the Czech lands in the western half of the Republic were ever to attain. Several months before the formation of a legislative body for the whole of the Republic, the Slovaks had their own National Council, with a considerable body of laws and decrees to its credit. Then, simultaneously with the election of district and provincial national committees and the Provisional National Assembly, a new Slovak National Council, of 100 members, was elected, in the same indirect fashion as the Assembly. The chairmanship of this legislative organ went to the Slovak Democrat, Lettrich. Immediately thereafter a new Board of Trustees was formed, endowed explicitly with the executive power. It was headed by the Communist, Šmidke, and included six other Communists and seven members of the Democratic Party.[52]

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[50] Peška, *Dokumenty,* II, 149f.

[51] *Ibid.,* II, 151ff.

It was only in April 1946 that these developments received endorsement by organs of the whole Republic. In the constitutional law providing for the election of a Constituent National Assembly the legislative power of that Assembly was proclaimed, with the limitation that the Slovak National Council would continue to issue ordinances "to the previous extent, as long as the Constituent National Assembly does not determine this question otherwise."[53] Moreover, the agreement of June 1945 was given legal underpinning, being here referred to as the criterion by which the extent of the Slovak competence was to be determined. Further negotiations between Prague and Bratislava proved necessary to define more precisely the competence of Slovak and central authorities.[54] The agreement among the parties of the National Front in June 1946 endorsed the Slovak legislative competence under the June 1945 pact, and provided that the central government should determine whether proposed Slovak ordinances were beyond its competence. In case of continuing difference of opinion, a board of arbitration was to decide the issue. Executive power in Slovak affairs remained with the Board of Trustees, responsible to the Slovak National Council; executive power in other matters remained in the hands of the central government, acting either directly or through the individual trustees, and having the power to suspend actions of the Board of Trustees exceeding its competence. This agreement clearly exhibited a greater degree of centralism than previously contemplated, and reflected the changed conditions produced by the results of the election of a Constituent National Assembly, to be discussed below. A final settlement of the controversial position of Slovakia had to await the outcome of discussions in that body. In the meantime the Slovaks had the safeguard that, for the passing of any constitutional law relating to the position of Slovakia, a majority of the Slovak members of the National Assembly was required.[55]

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[52] Vladimír Záděra, *Deset let parlamentní retrospektivy, 1935-1945* (Ten Years of Parliamentary Retrospect) (Prague, 1948), Publications of the National Assembly, 6, p. 46f.

[53] April 11, 1946, No. 65 *Sb.*

[54] The text of the agreements of April 11, 1946, and June 27, 1946, are given in Peška, *op. cit.*, II, 174-81.

[55] See article 9, No. 65 *Sb.* Cf. a similar provision in regard to the Provisional National Assembly, No. 47/1945 *Sb.*

Elections and a New Constitutionalism

The election of a Constituent National Assembly in May 1946 brought to an end the postwar transition period and established a legislative body elected by general, equal, direct and secret voting. The law of the Provisional National Assembly concerning the election of the new legislature endowed it with full legislative power and with all other rights enjoyed by the Assembly under the constitution of 1920. In other respects, too, the parliament was modelled, both in its form and in the method of its election, on the National Assembly of the first Republic. But important changes were introduced, such as the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18, the exclusion of non-Slav citizens from the suffrage, and the formation of a single-chamber parliament. Moreover, the Assembly had the specified task of drafting a new constitution and was itself to exist only until the legislative body under this law was convened, at the latest within two years. Although it was therefore regarded as a temporary institution, the Constitutional National Assembly was another important step in the direction of a permanent constitutional and legal order.

The elections were remarkable, not only for their procedure, but also for their results. Foreign troops had been withdrawn. The campaign was marked by a free and unfettered electoral struggle among the parties of the National Front. Only the existing parties, including two new ones formed in Slovakia just before the polls, were allowed to offer candidates. The voters, however, had the opportunity to cast a white ballot against all the candidates and the National Front itself. An insignificant number, amounting to less than 1% of the over seven million voters, availed themselves of this right of protest. There was evidently a general willingness to support the National Front and a desire to shift its center of gravity by supporting one or other of its constituent elements.

The Communist Party emerged as the strongest single party, securing 38% of the vote throughout the Republic, and 40% of the vote in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia. In the latter provinces no Czech party approached them in voting strength: National Socialist, 23%, People's Party, 20%, and Social Democratic, 15%. In Slovakia, however, the Communist Party suffered a severe reversal, securing only 30% of the votes cast, in contrast to 61% for the Slovak Democrats. Two new parties, Slovak Freedom and Slovak Labor, met with resounding defeats. It was evident that a serious disparity between the political orientation of the Czech and Slovak regions had emerged, although its significance was somewhat reduced by the numerical weakness of the Slovaks in general parliamentary representation—69 in a total of 300 seats.

In parliament a new balance of power had been established.[56] The Communists, Czech and Slovak, with a total of 114 seats, were the dominant factor. With the Czech Social Democrats and Slovak Labor, the left wing had a majority of 153, adequate to secure ratification of ordinary measures, although not of constitutional changes. This reflected a substantial popular endorsement of the new regime and its radical measures. Only in Slovakia was there clear warning of difficulties ahead, especially as Slovak consent for constitutional changes in the position of Slovakia was required.

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[56] See Appendix for party representation in the National Assembly.

Following the general elections, the national committees, at all levels, were "reorganized"; not, however, on the basis of separate elections, but according to the results in the parliamentary elections in the respective areas. This gave the Communists a pre-eminent position on most of the committees, at least in the Czech lands. A year later, on May 1, 1947, the composition of the district national committees totalled 4,436; of these, 1,947 were Communists, 982 National Socialists, 828 Populists and 679 Social Democrats. In the local committees, the Communists had almost 70,000 of a total of 154,000 members. In the two provincial committees (including the Ostrava branch), there were 80 Communists among the 200 members.[57]

There was a similar reorganization of the Slovak National Council on the basis of the electoral results in Slovakia. This necessitated a reconstruction of the Board of Trustees; Husák, a Communist, becoming chairman, with a Slovak Democrat as deputy chairman, and eight Democrats and four Communists as trustees.[58]

All parties had been in agreement that the National Front would remain after the elections, whatever the results. The Communist victory did not therefore cause a drastic change in the political system. Indeed, the left-wing success was exploited with restraint. In the government formed by Gottwald, as the leader of the largest party, changes in persons or in party strength were slight, and the political balance was tipped only lightly in favor of the Communists. Thus the new ministry contained nine Communists, and seventeen non-Communists, with a substantial balance for the latter, even if Fierlinger and Svoboda are discounted. The National Socialists, the People's Party and the Slovak Democrats now had four posts each; the Social Democrats remained with three. Masaryk and Svoboda continued in office as non-party experts. In terms of personalities the Cabinet was little changed. Fierlinger remained as deputy premier, stepping down in favor of Gottwald. Peter Zenkl, the National Socialist chairman, a concentration camp inmate during the war, became a deputy premier. Dolanský, as Minister of Finance, was the most important addition to the Communist ranks. Stránský replaced Nejedlý as Minister of Education. On the whole, the nature of the Cabinet seemed to augur well for the continuance of the National Front and its policy of ordered revolution. The re-election of Beneš as President by the new legislature seemed to point in the same direction.

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[57] See the government ordinance of May 27, 1946, No. 120 *Sb*. For the data cited see the Communist journal, *Lidová správa*, II, No. 12, June 15, 1947.

[58] See P. Korbel, *The Development of Slovakia's Constitutional Position* (National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., N. Y., 1953), p. 20.

In the first year or two after the war there was some reason for assuming the vindication of Beneš' theory of legal continuity and the triumph of his conception of liberation. Certainly there were significant elements of stability in the continuance of Beneš as President, the restoration in considerable part of the 1920 constitution, and the early holding of a free democratic election. At the same time there were basic transformations in the political system, some of them, for instance in Slovakia, constituting revolutionary changes, and seeming at first to represent a victory for Communist conceptions. Most significant was the shift in the political balance of power represented by the leadership of the Communists. However, these drastic changes reflected for the most part the desires of the population, and did not at once prevent government through mutual agreement within a constitutional order and a genuine coalition. It seemed to some observers that a successful compromise of the concepts of continuity and revolution had been achieved and a happy experiment in the blending of western and eastern ideas of government and society was under way.[59] Later events were soon to show that the issues had not been permanently settled. By the end of 1947 serious cracks in the structure of postwar unity began to appear, culminating in its complete collapse in February 1948 and its replacement by unrestricted Communist rule.

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[59] William Diamond, *Czechoslovakia between East and West* (London, 1947), pp. xi-xii.

APPENDIX

*Party Representation in the Czechoslovak National Assembly**

	Revolutionary National Assembly April, 1920	National Assembly elected in				Provisional National Assembly 1945	Constituent National Assembly 1946
		1920	1925	1929	1935		
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia			41	30	30	51	93
Communist Party of Slovakia						47	21
Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party	55	74	29	39	38	50	37
Czechoslovak National Socialist Party	29	24	28	32	28	50	55
Republican Agrarian Party	55	28	45	46	45		
Slovak Agrarians (merged with preceding, 1922)		12					
Czechoslovak National Democracy (National Union, 1935)	46	19	13	15	17		
Czechoslovak Small Trade and Commerce Party		6	13	12	17		
Czechoslovak People's Party	24	33	31	25	22	49	46
Slovak People's Party			23	19	22		
Slovak Club	53						
Democratic Party (Slovak)						45	43
German parties		72	66	67	67		
(Sudeten German Party)					(44)		
Hungarian parties		10	9	8	8		
Other parties	8	3	2	7	6	5	5
Total	270	281	300	300	300	297	300

*Sources:

1920-35: Karel Myšák, *Československá republika 1918-1939, Informační příručka* (Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1939, Information Handbook) (Prague, 1947), p. 38f.

1945: Vladimír Záděra, *Deset let parlamentní retrospektivy, 1935-1945* (Ten Years of Parliamentary Retrospective, 1935-1945) (Prague, 1948), pp. 48-72.

1946: *Statistical Digest of the Czechoslovak Republic 1948* (Prague, 1948), p. 105.

THE AGRARIAN-INDUSTRIAL FRONT IN BISMARCKIAN POLITICS

1873-1879

by Ivo N. Lambi

IN THE midst of the debates over the protective tariff of 1879 one of the main spokesmen of German liberalism, Eduard Lasker, declared: "Do you not see that you are opening a struggle which, we believed, had been buried in Prussia—the old struggle between agriculture on the one hand and industry and the cities on the other."[1] Lasker knew well that such a struggle might weaken German liberalism. While Bismarck, to whom both Lasker and doctrinaire liberalism appeared as a "disease of the state," sought the weakening of liberal tendencies, it was, in his view, not to be attained in the struggle between town and country but through the reconciliation of those age-old enemies, the iron and steel manufacturers and the East Elbian landowners. The former were the main representatives of the new, industrial, and urbanized Germany, which the Chancellor frequently misunderstood and never liked; the latter, the representatives of the *milieu* in which he had grown up. By bringing together these two groups, he hoped to transform the Reichstag from a representation of antipathetic political principles into an association of gratefully complacent economic interests.

The ironmasters and the junkers had been at odds for a long time. The former desired protective duties, but their main theorist, Friedrich List, had justified protection only for industry and not for agriculture.[2] The agrarians, on the other hand, wanted the free admission of industrial products, particularly iron and machinery.[3] Their representative, von Behr, had exclaimed during the debates of 1873 in the Reichstag which were to lead to the fall of the iron duties four years later: "You may be assured that we shall demand the free admission of iron as long as German ships sail the Baltic, as long as we have to buy iron in our eastern provinces where there are no mines."[4] He and his fellow agrarians pressed for free trade as one of the panaceas for agrarian ills. Cheaper foreign iron and machinery would provide the remedy for the serious shortage of agricultural labor which they attributed to industrialization.[5] Should not the industrialists pay through the loss of their duties for the damage they were causing to the deserving, and then politically impotent *Junkertum*?

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[1] *Stenographische Berichte des deutschen Reichstags, 1879* (henceforth abbreviated as *Sten. Ber.*), p. 1048.

[2] Friedrich List, *The National System of Political Economy,* translated by S. S. Lloyd (London, 1904), p. 217.

[3] According to Franz Schnabel, the free trading Prussian tariff of 1818 was partly aimed at the gratification of agricultural interests. *Geschichte Deutschlands im XIX Jahrhundert,* 4 vols., II (Freiburg, 1933), p. 299. For the agrarian free-trading activity in the 1850s and 1860s see W. Lotz, *Ideen der deutschen Handelspolitik von 1860 bis 1891* (Leipzig, 1904), p. 17. For the agrarian position in 1872-73 see particularly the *Bericht über die Erste und Constituirende Versammlung des Deutschen Landwirtschaftsraths vom 8 bis 13 April, 1872* (Berlin, 1872), pp. 84-88, and *Bericht über die Verhandlung der Zweiten Versammlung des Deutschen Landwirtschaftsraths 17 bis einschliesslich 22 Februar, 1873* (Berlin, 1873), pp. 215-54.

[4] *Sten. Ber.,* 1873, p. 832.

The optimism and prosperity which had marked the foundation of the German Empire[6] was not shared by the junkers, whose political influence the merger of Prussia into Germany threatened to destroy and whose material interests were endangered by the agricultural depression affecting Germany since 1863.[7] Their complaints were moved from the lunatic fringe to the center of national politics by Perrot's "Era-Article" of 1875 in the *Kreuz-Zeitung*. It linked Bismarck and the Government with the overexpansion and speculation of 1871-1873 which had made Germany a ready victim for the economic crisis of 1873.[8] Striking blindly at their real or imaginary enemies, the junkers attributed all their ills to the *laissez-faire* policy pursued by Delbrück and the liberal parties. To this narrow sphere of liberal influence over the internal policy of the German Empire they attributed their own troubles as well as the rapidly deteriorating industrial conditions, the rise of Social Democracy, and the sinister instances of speculation and swindle. They spoke of the formation of a political party

> which would eliminate the disadvantageous treatment of agriculture, consider the legitimate interests of all classes as opposed to those of capital, and those of the small towns and the countryside as opposed to the large centers of commerce; in short, restore harmony between the different branches of production and eliminate the abnormal conditions which serve to maintain the influence of international elements.[9]

By the last they meant the stock exchange, the liberals, and the Jews, but not the free traders with whom they continued to cooperate, regardless of political differences, in blocking the demands of the industrial protectionists. Their contradictory position appeared most strikingly in the speech delivered on November 20, 1875, by Freiherr von Minningerode in the Reichstag, in which he attacked in one breath both *laissez-faire* measures and protectionist demands.[10]

If, however, there was any logic to the position of the bewildered agrarian conservatives, the collapse of the hateful edifice of *laissez-faire* should also have included free trade. For, if free competition at home was pernicious, how could free international competition be defended? If international enterprises in general were to be avoided, how could free international exchanges be maintained?

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[5] Speech of Willmanns in *Reichstag, ibid.*, p. 1386.

[6] Best reflected in the *Jahresbericht der Handelskammer für den Kreis Essen pro 1871* (Essen, 1872), p. 3; and *Jahresbericht der Handelskammer in Breslau* (Breslau, 1872), p. 3f.

[7] E. Stock, *Wirtschafts-und sozialpolitische Bestrebungen der deutsch-konservativen Partei, 1876-1890* (Breslau, 1928).

[8] In the *Neue Preussische (Kreuz) Zeitung*, quoted by M. Nitzsche, *Die handelspolitische Reaktion in Deutschland* (Berlin, 1905), p. 93.

[9] Willmanns, *Die goldene Internationale und die Nothwendigkeit einer sozialen Reform* (Berlin, 1876), p. 2. Other pamphlets reflecting the agrarian dissatisfaction with *laissez-faire* legislation in 1875-1876 were A. Niendorf's *Die Geheimnisse der herrschenden Wirtschaftspolitik*, Rudolf Meyer's *Politische Gründer und Korruption in Deutschland*, and von Diest-Daber's *Goldmacht und Sozialismus*.

[10] *Sten. Ber.*, 1875/76, p. 210.

Realizing that "being a conservative is an ungrateful business,"[11] the junkers made preparations in 1875-1876 for the re-establishment of their political and economic ascendancy. They reorganized themselves into the German Conservative Party (*Deutsch-Konservative Partei*) which accepted German unity and excluded those members of the old guard who had incautiously alienated Bismarck by supporting the "Era-Article." Lest politics obscure their economic interests, they also organized the Association for the Reform of Taxation and Economy (*Vereinigung der Steuer- und Wirtschaftsreformer*). It pursued the following objectives:

> In the field of economic and personal relations the absolute domination of liberalism is to be broken. . . . If we want to win over to conservatism wider circles, we must go along with the times. Indeed, we cannot adulterate our principles, but must at the same time follow the trends which move the people. We live in an era of material interests. . . .[12]

While the agrarian conservatives were reorganizing their ranks, the iron manufacturers, grown desperate in the throes of the depression, were contemplating the prospect of being deprived of their duties in 1877.[13] In 1873, when the decision to abolish the duties on iron had been taken, their spokesmen had been at a loss for arguments.[14] After the crash of 1873, however, they were able to bring forward their suffering from the depression to demonstrate that free trade was impracticable. They were also convinced of the need for better organization. First, they used the Union for the Promotion of the Common Economic Interests of Rhineland-Westphalia (*Verein zur Wahrung der gemeinsamen wirtschaftlichen Interessen in Rheinland-Westfalen*) to agitate for the retention of their duties;[15] for the same purpose they subsequently formed the Union of the German Iron and

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[11] *Kreuz-Zeitung* at the end of 1871. Quoted by Heinrich von Poschinger, *Bismarck und die Parlamentarier* (Berlin, 1894), p. 179.

[12] *Bericht über die Verhandlungen der Vereinigung der Steuer-und Wirtschaftsreformer zu Berlin am 22, 23 und 24 Februar 1876* (Berlin, 1876, p. 1f.; also quoted by Lotz, p. 139.

[13] The effect of the depression on the iron industry can best be viewed in the *Stenographische Protokolle der Vernehmungen der Eisenenquete-Commission, 1878/79, Drucksachen des Bundesraths, 1878/79,* no. 24. This record of interviews with a number of iron manufacturers, merchants, and consumers amounts to over 800 folio pages. While this source indicates that the complaints of the ironmasters over the closing down of plants and the lay-off of workers were greatly exaggerated, it does show a 40-50% drop in prices and the operation of numerous plants at a loss. The state of the German iron industry during the depression of 1873-79 is also discussed by M. Sering, *Geschichte der preussisch-deutschen Eisenzölle von 1818 bis zur Gegenwart* (Leipzig, 1882), F. Kestner, *Die deutschen Eisenzölle, 1879 bis 1900* (Leipzig, 1902), and D. L. Burn, *The Economic History of Steelmaking, 1867-1939. A Study in Competition* (Cambridge, 140), pp. 18-42.

[14] For the speeches of Stumm, Kardorff, and Mohl, champions of iron industry interests in the Reichstag see *Sten. Ber.*, 1873, pp. 834f.; 1056-63; 1273-81.

[15] See the "Verhandlungen der 4. ordentlichen Generalversammlung des Vereins zur Wahrung der gemeinsamen wirtschaftlichen Interessen in Rheinland-Westfalen," Düsseldorf, November 17, 1874; "Referat über die Sitzung des Ausschusses von 21. August, 1875" in *Mitteilungen des Vereins . . . 1874,* pp. 385-90; *1875,* p. 211.

Steel Manufacturers (*Verein deutscher Eisen- und Stahlindustrieller*).[16] While not reluctant, if given the opportunity, to secure the realization of their exclusive interests in protection through this organization, by the end of 1875 they conceived an alternate policy of broadening their agitation through the inclusion of other industrial interests in a nation-wide protectionist movement. This policy was pursued by those ironmasters who joined the Central Association of German Manufacturers (*Centralverband deutscher Industrieller*).[17]

Yet, in comparison with the solid representation of agricultural interests by the Conservative Party, the industrial protectionists originally had fewer champions in the Reichstag. Only the relatively small Free Conservative Party, whose leaders Carl Ferdinand Stumm and Wilhelm von Kardorff were associated with the iron industry,[18] a number of National Liberal delegates, such as Johannes Miquel and Friedrich Hammacher,[19] and relatively isolated individuals like Dr. Wilhelm Löwe championed the interests of the iron industry. By 1876 politically impotent groups like the Catholic Center Party and some Social Democrats were begnning to show sympathy for the iron industry, but they were mostly concerned with the plight of the workers rather than with the dwindling profits of the iron magnates. However, the representative of the Union of the German Iron and and Steel Manufacturers in the Reichstag, the former Progressive Löwe, was able to predict in 1875 that if the iron duties were not retained:

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[16] The archives of the Union of the German Iron and Steel Manufacturers have been preserved and are available in the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Reichsakten 13, I, Akten des Vereins deutscher Eisen und Stahlindustrieller, den Autonomen Zolltarif betreffend, Fascicle 272; Den Zollwesen betreffend, Fascicles 273-78. (Henceforth abbreviated as B.A., Koblenz, R 13, I, No. of fascicle.)

[17] The iron manufacturers realized the need of cooperation with other interest groups after the rejection of their demands for the maintenance of the iron tariffs in the Reichstag in December 1875. Baare's letter to the secretary-general of the Union of the German Iron and Steel Manufacturers, Rentzsch, on December 9, 1875, is typical of the new outlook. B.A., Koblenz, R 13, I, 278. Kardorff, who was closely associated with the interests of the iron industry, provided the initiative for the formation of the Central Association of German Manufacturers. While the leaders of the Union of the German Iron and Steel Manufacturers participated in the constituent assembly of the new association (H. A. Büeck, *Centralverband deutscher Industrieller, 1876-1901,* 3 vols., Berlin, 1901, I, 136), after its formation this union decided against joining. Instead, its Rhenish-Westphalian group was allowed to become a member of the new body. *Protokoll der Vorstands-Sitzung des Vereins deutscher Eisen-und Stahlindustrieller,* May 1, 1876, B.A., Koblenz, R 13, I, 278. By taking this decision, the Union of the German Iron and Steel Manufacturers was not bound to cooperate with the other industrial protectionists, but was free to agitate for its exclusive demands. Other protectionist industries, however, had to support the iron manufacturers' interests, knowing well that they could not secure their own demands without them.

[18] F. Hellwig, *Ferdinand von Stumm-Hallberg* (Heidelberg, 1936), and S. von Kardorff, *Wilhelm von Kardorff, ein nationaler Parlamentarier im Zeitalter Bismarcks und Wilhelm II, 1828-1907* (Berlin, 1929). The best account of the Free Conservative Party in this period is F. Aandahl's unpublished doctoral dissertation, *The Rise of German Free Conservatism*, Princeton, 1955. However, it sheds little new light on the tariff policy of the party.

[19] See H. Herzfeld, *Johannes von Miquel, sein Anteil am Ausbau des Deutschen Reichs bis zur Jahrhundertwende* (Detmold, 1938), and U. Bein and H. Goldschmidt, *Friedrich Hammacher, Lebensbild eines Parlamentariers und Wirtschaftsführers, 1824-1904* (Berlin, 1832).

> a great shift will occur in the political parties—in the west at least—a very great shift, indeed, and then you will find that no longer will the general interests of the state be discussed here, but there will be an exclusive representation of interest groups who will freely select their allies with the sole aim of securing their interests.[20]

In 1875 the free conservative leader Wilhelm von Kardorff presented a program which united the industrial interests and created a bond between them and the East German agrarian conservatives on the basis predicted by an ex-progressive. Although a man of modest means, Kardorff was connected with both agrarian circles and industrial enterprise. He was one of the founders of the joint stock iron plant, the *Koenigs und Laurahütte* in Silesia, and was considered by many to be the parliamentary representative of Bismarck's banker, Gerson von Bleichroeder. In his *Gegen den Strom* he applied the economic views of the American sociologist and protectionist, Henry C. Carey, to German conditions.[21] He propounded a general system of protection, embracing all productive branches of the German economy, both industrial and agricultural. Such a system would not only reconcile the differences between the various producers, but also those between productive interests and the consumer public, since in Kardorff's view most consumers were also producers. It was on the basis of this program that the agrarian-industrial interest front could be formed, and economic interests instead of political parties be represented in the Reichstag.

The iron manufacturers had first established contact with the agrarians prior to the publication of Kardorff's program. In August 1875 Baare, the manager of the Bachum Union steel plant and Löwe's father-in-law, had advised the executive council of the Union of the German Iron and Steel Manufacturers to approach the representatives of agrarian interests, for

> . . . if some intelligent landowners are won over . . . and exercise influence over their friends and colleagues, such a move could be of utmost importance for our procedure. . . , since we can support their complaints over the land tax.[22]

When the resulting negotiations bore no fruit, the iron magnates decided to reverse their tactics by trying to detach the agrarians from the free traders by threats against the remaining agricultural duties rather than by promises.[23] They received the news of the formation of the agrarian Union for the Reform of Taxation and Economy with dismay. In June 1876 H. A. Büeck, who had unsuccessfully negotiated with the agrarians on behalf of the Union of the German Iron and Steel Manufacturers, warned the industrial protectionists of Rhineland-Westphalia against any alliance with that body. He argued that while the agrarians might accept such an alliance for their own advantage, the industrialists would be deserted when the price for their cooperation in the form of the consideration of industrial interests in tariff legislation would be demanded. For in spite of the affinity of their outstanding interests, industry and agriculture will still remain mortal enemies as long as on the one side will stand the self-centered agrarian politicians and not the German agriculturists.[24]

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[20] *Sten. Ber.*, 1875/76, p. 450.

[21] Wilhelm von Kardorff, *Gegen den Strom!* (Berlin, 1875).

[22] Baare to Rentzsch, August 10, 1875, B.A., Koblenz, R 13, I, 276.

[23] Baare to Rentzsch, November 27, 1875, *ibid.*

While Büeck continued to hold this view until December 1876, other ndustrialists were more aware of the need for detaching the agrarians from he free trade front.[25] In the beginning of 1877, the representatives of the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial union negotiated with regional agrarian rganizations and reached an agreement by which they undertook to support agrarian demands for the revision o fthe land tax in return for agrarian pproval of industrial protection.[26] Thus the type of agreement sought in ain in 1875 by the Union of the German Iron and Steel Manufacturers was btained on a regional level.

However, the increase in the imports of foreign grain into Germany ffered a more substantial basis for an agreement. In December 1876 the otton manufacturer Lohren expressed the view before the Central Association of German Manufacturers that the opposition of the agrarians to the ron duties had been due to their desire to secure protection for themselves: hey wanted the iron industry to be deprived of duties so that it would be ompelled to cooperate with them in the establishment of a general system f protection.[27] The Catholic Center Party first united the demands for ndustrial and agricultural protection on the political plane. Drawing its oters from the industrial and agricultural areas of western and southern Germany where the two rival interests could be more easily reconciled, the Center spoke in 1876 and 1877 in the Reichstag in favor of industrial rotection and advised the agrarians not only to vote for the iron duties, ut to concern themselves with the increasing inflow of foreign grain to Germany. In 1876 the initiative for a bill stipulating the retention of the ron duties came from the Center Party. The arguments of the Westphalian agrarian leader, the "peasant king" von Schorlemer-Alst, about the ffinity of agricultural and industrial interests and the indirect benefit of ndustrial duties to agriculture, were convincing appeals to the East German junkers.[28]

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[24] H. A. Büeck, "Die Schutzzöllner und die Agrarier, ein Referat," June 3, 1876, *Mitteilungen des Vereins zur Wahrung der gemeinsamen wirtschaftlichen Interessen von Rheinland und Westfalen,* 1876, Nos. 5-6, May-June, p. 261f.

[25] See the exchange of views between Bück and Lohren in the Central Association of erman Manufacturers on December 16, 1876, "II Delegierten (und Auschuss) Sitzung es Centralverbandes," *Verhandlungen, Mitteilungen und Berichte des Centralverbandes eutscher Industrieller,* No. 3, February 5, 1877, 4, 29.

[26] "Kurzer Bericht über die am 10. und 24. Februar und 10. März 1877 in Cöln tattgehabten Versammlung," March 22, 1877, *Mitteilungen des Vereins zur Wahrung der emeinsamen wirtschaftlichen Interessen von Rheinland und Westfalen,* 1877, Nos. 4-5, pril-May, p. 85.

[27] For Lohren's views see fn. 25. The statistics for the imports of grain into Germany ppear in *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich,* II, 1881, 81f.

[28] Donald Freiherr von Hirsch's doctoral dissertation at the University of Cologne, *Die tellungnahme der Zentrumspartei zu den Fragen der Schutzzollpolitik von 1871 bis zu*

A formal agreement remained to be worked out on the national level between the main representations of industrial and agricultural interests. While both entertained some doubts about the wisdom of mutual cooperation, the agrarian Union for the Reform of Taxation and Economy departed quite early from the time-honored free trading policy. At its constituent meeting in February 1876 several members favored concessions to the industrialists on the tariff question. A resolution regarding tariff policy left the question open.[29] In February 1877 this ambiguity was clarified by a further resolution in favor of a comprehensive protective system, but one which safeguarded agriculture against any one-sided consideration of industrial interests.[30] At the initiative of the Central Association of German Manufacturers an agreement was reached between it and the Union for the Reform of Taxation and Economy in February 1878, whereby the two organizations agreed to support one another in their demand for a general system of protection as propounded by Kardorff.[31] Yet this understanding was based on general principles; it could only be tested on particulars, such as the exact relationship between industrial and agricultural duties. Not all agrarians had departed from a free trading policy,[32] and industrial interests were fearful of having to raise wages if agricultural duties increased the price of food stuffs.[33]

In spite of these difficulties, the industrial-agricultural agreement slowly emerged on the political scene. Traces of it appeared first in the policies of the Center Party and the speeches of Kardorff; then it formed the backbone of the *Freie Volkswirtschaftliche Vereinigung* of the Reichstag, which in 1877 united 140 members in proposing a state investigation of both industry and agriculture. Its progress was marked during the

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Bismarcks Rücktritt (München, 1926), provides a very sketchy account of the policy of the Center party. For the stand of the Center in the Reichstag see *Sten. Ber.*, 1876, p. 759; 1877, p. 692ff.

[29] *Bericht über die Verhandlungen der Vereinigung der Steuer-und Wirtschaftsreformer zu Berlin am 22, 23 und 24 Februar 1876*, pp. 15-18.

[30] *Ibid.*, am 15, 16 und 17 Februar, 1877, pp. 83-91.

[31] *Ibid.*, am 14 und 15 Februar, 1878, pp. 15-50.

[32] See particularly the reports of the Prussian ministers to the German courts in 1879, *Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, German Foreign Ministry Archives, Michigan University Library*, Grad R.R. 4, Film 2274, Reels 124-125. Auswärtiges Amt, Abth. A, Acta betreffend die finanzielle und wirtschaftliche Reform. Deutschland, No. 103, Vols. 1-4 (Henceforth abbreviated as Mic. G. F. M. Ar., Mich. U. Lib., No. of Reel). The German Agricultural Council, the agricultural associations of Brandenburg-Prussia, Königsberg, the Provincial Diet of Prussia, and the diets of the predominantly agricultural states of Oldenburg and Lippe continued to champion free trade. See *Denkschrift des deutschen Landwirtschaftsraths betreffend die Steuer und Zollpolitik des Reichs*, February, 1879; also *Anlagen zu den Sten. Ber. des Reichstags, 1879*, Anlageband 6, "Verzeichniss der eingegangenen Petitionen," pp. 28, 71, 86.

[33] The most striking expression of this attitude appears in a letter addressed to the chairman of the Imperial Tariff Commission, Freiherr von Varnbüler, by the veteran Swabian protectionist Moritz Mohl in December 1878: "I wish that you would not act in favor of increasing the fiscal tariffs on essential articles of consumption such as coffee, petroleum, cattle, and grain, but would use your benevolent and exalted influence . . . in dissuading the Conservatives and the Chancellor from it." Quoted by Max Bühler, *Die Stellung Württembergs zum Umschwung in der Bismarck'schen Handelspolitik, 1878/79*, Tübingen doctoral dissertation (Göppingen, 1935), p. 47.

lections of 1878 by the declarations made by the Free Conservatives, the Conservatives, and the Center in favor of a protectionist course. In October 878, finally, a declaration, drafted by the National Liberal Hammacher, circulated in the Reichstag and secured the signatures of 204 of its members, including 87 of the 94 Centrists, 39 of the 57 Free Conservatives, 36 of he 59 Conservatives, 27 of the 99 National Liberals, Löwe's faction of the Progressive Party, and assorted members of splinter groups.[34] This committed the majority of the Reichstag to a protectionist course.

By now Bismarck had agreed to assume the leadership of the agrarian-ndustrial protectionist front.[35] Since the protectionists constituted a majority in the Reichstag, he had only to guide the movement, avoid interest clashes which might split its ranks, secure the support of the state governments, and boost their cause with his prestige. Bismarck's earlier aloofness from the tariff controversy contrasts sharply with his energetic action once he agreed to take a stand. Yet his tariff policy was never based on any real principles. Rather, his opportunism extended also to this phere of his policy. In 1865 he had stated that "economic theories can only be applied insofar as they are reduced to the measure and conditions of a given situation."[36] Until 1873 this rule could be used to justify the policy of free trade. Once the depression set in, however, Bismarck was low to depart from the policy of free trade. Until April 1876 the free rading president of the Imperial Chancellery, Rudolf von Delbrück, continued to guide the course of German tariff policy; without any obections on Bismarck's part, he had succeeded in overruling the Emperor's objections to the abolition of the iron duties.[37] After Delbrück's resignaion, the Prussian minister of finance, Otto Camphausen, carried on the free rading tradition until February 1878, when he was forced by Bismarck to esign over the fiscal issue.[38] On the other hand, the Emperor, the new president of the Imperial Chancellery, Arthur Hofmann, and the Prussian minister of commerce, Heinrich Achenbach, favored a policy more sympahetic towards the industrial protectionists.

The differences between these men were finally resolved in a compromise which made possible a consideration of the complaints of the industrial protectionists. Bismarck, however, played little part in this solution. When, in the summer of 1876, the Emperor had requested the reconsideration of the question of repealing the iron duties, Bismarck did not concern himself with the matter, but referred it to the ministers of commerce and finance and advised the aged Emperor to consult them in the future. His interest lay as yet in the comparatively insignificant fiscal aspect of the matter rather than in the protective side.[39] Apart from recommending retaliatory duties on imports from states discriminating against German products or using other unfair methods in international competition, he had no concrete suggestions.[40] In the controversy which arose between the ministers of commerce and finance, Achenbach and Camphausen, he refused to take sides. He was equally reluctant to take the initiative in changing the law stipulating the abolition of the iron duties in January 1877. With all the unbecoming scruple of a constitutionalist, he wrote to the Emperor:

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[34] H. von Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirth* (Berlin, 1891), p. 141; also Bein and Goldschmitd, p. 76.

[35] Bismarck's letter of October 25, 1878 to Varnbüler, quoted by Poschinger, p. 147.

[36] Poschinger, *Dokumente zur Bismarcks Wirtschaftspolitik,* 2 vols. (Berlin, 1889-90), I, p. 64.

[37] On October 13, 1875, Delbrück had praised in the *Bundesrath* the reply of the Munich chamber of commerce to the request for support by the Union of the German ron and Steel Manufacturers as "eine vortreffliche Abfertigung der Schutzzöllner," Report of the Hanseatic Minister, Krueger, to Berlin, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Cl. I. Lit. T, o. 3, Vol 2b, Fasc. 12. In two memoranda, dated August 31, 1875, and September 13, 875, he had refuted all objections raised by William I to the abolition of the iron ariffs. Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Merseburg, Rep. 89 H, Geheimes Zivilkabinett III, Deutsches Reich, 11, Zollvereinsangelegenheiten, Band 6. (Henceforth abbreviated DZA, Merseburg, number of fascicle).

[38] The details of Camphausen's position appear in the documents of the Geheimes ivilkabinett and the Ministerium für Handel und Gewerbe, DZA, Merseburg.

> If I took the initiative in the *Bundesrath* in changing an imperial law, it would be contrary to the constitutional position of the Imperial Chancellor towards the Imperial Legislature.[41]

The failure of the bills proposing retaliatory duties in the Reichstag, the difficulties confronting the German negotiators of a commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary, and the continued campaign of the protectionist interests finally led to the establishment of two imperial commissions: one to examine the condition of the iron industry, the other, that of the cotton and linen manufacture. Their findings were to form the factual basis for any possible revision of the tariff.[42]

Yet by the time these decisions were made, Bismarck had decided to take more far-reaching steps towards the revision of German tariff policy. The work of the commissions of inquiry was partly superseded and partly disregarded by the Imperial Tariff Commission, which proceeded to draw up a new tariff for the entire German economy.

Why, then, did Bismarck so drastically depart from his own disinterest in tariff policy as to disregard completely the previous steps taken towards the revision of the tariff? Was it due to any sudden realization that the German economy required protection? Several writers have, in effect, attempted to trace the development of his protectionist views. Some have attributed Delbrück's resignation in April 1876 to his master's growing sympathy toward protection;[43] others have connected Bismarck's conversion with the influence of his favorite bureaucrat, Christopher von Tiedemann.[44] It is possible to enumerate other influences: the Emperor, the program and personality of Kardorff, the memoranda of protectionist interest groups, particularly the Central Association of German Manufacturers, the ever-present but elusive connection with agricultural interests, and, finally, Bismarck's political astuteness.[45] One cannot disregard or minimize these influences; one can only wonder why Bismarck did not intervene on the protectionist side in that *cause célèbre* of tariff controversy, the restoration of the iron duties, any earlier than April 5, 1878, when it was already evident that the findings of the commissions of inquiry would most likely have justified a similar decision without any initiative on his part.

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[39] William I to Bismarck, July 22, 1876, in *Kaiser Wilhelm I und Bismarck im Briefwechsel,* 2 vols., ed. E. Kohl (Berlin, 1901), II, 268f.; also in *Anhang zu Bismarcks Gedanken und Erinnerungen* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1905), p. 268. The sequel to this letter has not been hitherto published. Bismarck's reply to William came as late as August 12, 1876, DZA, Merseburg, Rep. 89 H, Geh. Ziv. Kab. III, D.R. 11, Zollver. Ang. Bd. 6. Bismarck's referral of the matter to Achenbach is dated August 6, 1876. DZA, Merseburg. Rep. 120, Min. für Handel und Gewerbe, C VII, 2, 8A, Acta Secreta betr. die Eisenzölle.

[40] For a résumé of Bismarck's views and Achenbach's reply see Achenbach's letter to Bismarck, August 22, 1876, DZA, Merseburg, Rep. 89 H, Geh. Ziv. Kab. III, D.R. 11, Zollver, Ang., Bd. 6.

[41] Bismarck to William, October 9, 1876, *ibid.*

[42] The correspondence between Camphausen and Achenbach relating to the establishlishment of the commissions of inquiry appears in DZA, Merseburg, Rep. 120, Min. für Handel und Gewerbe, C VIII, 1. 19, Der Zolltarif und dessen Erläuterung, Bd. 16. In the course of these discussions, Camphausen pursued a policy of delay, but eventually agreed with Achenbach's modified stand.

One clue to the answer to this question can be found in Bismarck's concern about the state of agriculture. By March 31, 1878, he had decided to introduce agricultural duties[46] to arrest the decline of agricultural prices and landed income, by which he was personally affected.[47] Soon after he had convinced himself that agriculture required protective duties, he made increased industrial protection dependent on their adoption. Since no provision had as yet been made for any investigation of the needs of agriculture, the work of the imperial commissions of inquiry had to be either supplemented or superseded. The Chancellor's decision to link agricultural and industrial protection, first mentioned to Kardorff and Stumm on March 31, 1878, followed close upon the agreement reached on February 14-15, 1878, by the representatives of industrial and agricultural interests.

Bismarck's conversation with Kardorff and Stumm on March 31, 1878, also announced his plan to link his protectionist scheme with his policy of augmenting imperial revenue. He had considered this connection as early as February 13, 1877, but could at that time only contemplate the pittance of revenue that would be secured from retaliatory duties.[48] Once, however, he had decided on a comprehensive system of protection, this connection became a more important one, since such a system was bound to yield considerable revenue.

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[43] Particularly O. Schneider, *Bismarcks Finanz und Wirtschaftspolitik. Eine Darstellung seiner volkswirtschaftlichen Anschauungen* (München and Leipzig, 1912), p. 51.

[44] This is the personal opinion of C. Tiedemann, *Persönliche Erinnerungen an den Fürsten Bismarck* (Leipzig, 1909), p. 36. O. Schneider and A. O. Meyer (*Bismarck, der Mensch und Staatsmann*, Stuttgart, 1949, p. 478) are prepared to accept this explanation.

[45] In his doctoral dissertation, *Fürst Bismarcks Stellung zur Landwirtschaft, 1847-90* (Bamberg, 1910), O. Forkel has attempted to trace Bismarck's connection with agriculture.

[46] Bismarck's interview with Kardorff and Stumm on March 31, 1878. Cited in Kardorff's letter to his wife. First published by Friedrich Thimme in "Kardorff und Bismarck Briefe," *Deutsche Revue*, 1916, XLI, 4 Band, 142 ff.; reprinted in *Bismarcks Gesammelte Werke*, 15 vols. in 19 (Berlin, 1924-32), VIII, 253ff., and by Siegfried von Kardorff, p. 139ff.

[47] Bismarck's conversation with Moritz Busch in October 1878. M. Busch, *Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History*, 2 vols. (London, 1898), II, 370f. The English version is the unexpurgated one.

[48] Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirth*, p. 249ff.

The Chancellor's fiscal plan also had political and economic implications. In 1875 he had declared that the revision of the taxation system was the really big game in German politics, the central plank of the second *Reichsgründung.*[49] The increase in indirect taxes would be less burdensome for the taxpayer than direct taxes;[50] it would free the imperial executive from the Reichstag's budgetary control, which was the only serious limitation on its power. In addition, by increasing imperial sources of revenue, indirect taxes would make possible the abolition of fiscal contributions by the individual states and strengthen the ties of unity without making necessary the concessions to ministerial responsibility demanded by the liberal parties.[51] Instead of being referred to the imperial treasury, local taxes could thus be either diminished for the benefit of the agrarians, who were complaining of the burden of the land tax, or used for local welfare purposes to allay social discontent.[52]

The dissolution of the Reichstag in the summer of 1878, the ensuing elections which weakened the liberal parties and made possible the protectionist majority in the Reichstag, and, finally, the encouraging stand of the financial ministers of the individual states at the Heidelberg conference on fiscal reform, and their not discouraging attitude towards the linking of fiscal reform with protection,[53] prepared the ground for the proclamation of Bismarck's program in October-December 1878.[54] It is difficult to evaluate which aspect of his plan was of primary importance to him, since he consistently regarded it as a single unit. He threatened the industrial protectionists with isolation if they refused to approve of agricultural duties;[55] similarly, he had to bring all his pressure to bear on the governments of those states which were hostile to or half-hearted about agricultural protection.

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[49] Tiedemann, *Aus Sieben Jahrzehnten,* 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1909), II, 127f. He had made a similar statement a year earlier to Ballhausen. Lucius von Ballhausen, *Bismarck-Erinnerungen* (Stuttgart, 1921), p. 46.

[50] His genuine preference for indirect taxes was expressed by Bismarck throughout his career. Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirth,* pp. 69, 171; O. Bismarck, *Die politischen Reden,* ed. E. Kohl, 14 vols. (Stuttgart, 1892-95) IV, 210, 235.

[51] Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirth,* p. 249ff.

[52] W. Gerloff, *Die Finanz und Zollpolitik des Deutschen Reichs* (Jena, 1913), p. 98f.

[53] The *Protokolle der Sitzunge der Heidelberger Conferenz wegen der Reichssteuerreform* are available in most of the state archives of Germany. They have been supplemented by the *Berichte des Hamburgischen Bevollmächtigten zur Heidelberger Conferenz.* Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Y 1, Zollkommissariat, Akten betreffend die Heidelberger Conferenz wegen der Reichssteuer-Reform (which also include the official protocols).

[54] *Bismarcks Circular an die Gesandten bei den deutschen Regierungen,* October 28, 1878, printed by Poschinger, *Dokumente zur Bismarcks Wirtschaftspolitik,* I, 287 ff.; Bismarck's letter to the *Bundesrath,* November 12, 1878, *ibid.,* 290-94; his more important letter to the *Bundesrath* of December 15, which was published by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* on December 25, appears in Poschinger's *Bismarck als Volkswirth,* pp. 171-77.

[55] Tiedemann, *Aus Sieben Jahrzehnten,* I, 326.

Until 1878, many of the state governments had entertained more protectionist views than were held by the Imperial or Prussian governments. The governments of Bavaria and Württemberg had never wholeheartedly endorsed the free trading policy pursued by Delbrück, and continued to sympathize with the protectionist wishes of the iron and textile industries.[56] At the Heidelberg fiscal conference in August 1878, the governments of Saxony and Brunswick also voiced their demands for higher duties on manufactured products.[57] These protectionist governments were balanced by those of the three Hanseatic cities, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, and Mecklenburg and Oldenburg which, influenced by commercial and agricultural interests, favored complete free trade.

However, once Bismarck had combined industrial with agricultural protectionism, his program became too drastic even for some of the protectionist state governments. Only Saxony and Brunswick appear to have welcomed it wholeheartedly.[58] The governmental circles of Bavaria and Württemberg were too deeply imbued by the Listian tradition and too concerned about the export trade to accept unquestioningly any possible increase in the cost of manufacture through the imposition of duties on food stuffs and raw materials. Even the personal influence of Bismarck only succeeded in securing their approval of moderate grain duties.[59] In the case of other states, such as Baden and Saxe-Weimar, Bismarck had to intercede personally with the rulers in the name of conservatism and monarchical solidarity before their governments agreed to support his program.[60] In the Imperial Tariff Commission, where the representatives of the larger states were entrusted with the task of drawing up the new tariff, only the unexpected approval of agricultural protection by the free trading government of Mecklenburg made the acceptance of the grain duties possible.[61] Yet these duties did not satisfy Bismarck, who would use the agrarian-industrial front in the Reichstag to exert pressure on the state governments to approve of higher grain duties.

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[56] For the Bavarian position see the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, München, Ministerium des Handels, Fasc. 9712; Württemberg's position is outlined in Max Bühler's *Die Stellung Württembergs zum Umschwung der Bismarck'schen Handelspolitik, 1878/79,* Tübingen Doctoral Dissertation, Göppingen, 1935. Additional material has been found in Württembergisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stuttgart, E 46-48, Ministerium der Auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, III, Verzeichniss I, Fasc. 369-70: Zoll und Handelssachen, 1871-77; 1877-85.

[57] *Berichte des Hamburgischen Bevollmächtigten zur Heidelberger Conferenz,* no. 2, August , 1878, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Zollkommissariat, Y 1; and *Protokoll der III Sitzung der Heidelberger Konferenz wegen der Reichssteuerreform,* August 7, 1878, *ibid.*

[58] For the position of Saxony see the report of the Prussian minister to Dresden to Bismarck, March 29, 1879. Regarding Brunswick, consult the report of the Prussian minister to Oldenburg to Bülow, March 23, 1879. Both documents appear in Mic. G. F. M. Ar., Mich. U. Lib., Reel 124.

[59] For Bavaria see Bay. H. St. Ar., München, M.H. 9715, which includes the correspondence and discussions between the various Bavarian ministers. For Württemberg see Bühler, p. 28f., and Württ. H. St., Stuttgart, E 130: Württembergisches Staatsministerium, Verzeichniss I, Abt. W, IV, 1, Zollgesetzgebung, 1878-79.

[60] Particularly Bismarck's *Circular an die Gesandten bei den deutschen Regierungen,* March 13, 1879, Mic. G. F. M. Ar., Mich. U. Lib., Reel 124.

[61] See the *Protokolle der Commission zur Revision des Zolltarifs,* St. Ar., Hamburg, Cl. I, Lit. T, no. 21, vol. 2, Fasc. 1, Inv. 15, Zoll und Steuersachen; also the report of the Hanseatic member to the Tariff Commission, February 24, 1879, *ibid.,* Cl. I, Lit. T, no. 21, vol. 2, Fasc. 5, Inv. 12.

While this attitude indicates Bismarck's concern for agriculture, it was not his foremost consideration. Purely practical reasons also played their part: without the support of the agrarian conservatives, the industrial protectionists would have remained a minority in the Reichstag. For the same reasons Bismarck could not demand the passage of agricultural duties without any increase in the industrial schedule. Nor is there any evidence that in 1878-79 the fiscal motive was more important than the protectionist one. True, he had stated earlier: "We must give the protectionists a drink; they are our best allies in fiscal reform."[62] Now, however, he was equally prepared to pour a drink for those who were interested in fiscal reform so as to secure supporters for protective duties. Much of the free trade opposition could have been eliminated if Bismarck had insisted only on increased duties and taxes on non-essential consumer articles, which would have provided the bulk of the desired revenue without demanding the less revenue-yielding protective duties. Instead, he blocked all attempts on the part of the free traders to isolate the protective from the fiscal aspect of the tariff project (which they were prepared to grant), and used the fiscal lure to win over individual state governments to protection.[63]

An important reason for Bismarck's insistance on the interconnection between the fiscal and protectonist aspects of the tariff project lay in his desire to use it as his tool in the second, internal, *Reichsgründung*. For the first *Reichsgründung* had circumscribed Bismarck's political activity by isolating him from those political parties whose authoritarian views most closely corresponded to his. Of the five main groups in the Reichstag, the Prussian Conservative Party and the Catholic Center Party still questioned his solution of the problem of German unification: for the conservative junkers of Prussia the Bismarckian Empire was too broad; for the Roman Catholic Party it was too narrow. Therefore, they were both excluded from governmental coalitions, and further embittered by hostile measures such as the *Kulturkampf* and the Prussian school bill. On the other hand, the Free Conservatives, the National Liberals, and the Progressives wholeheartedly accepted the limits of the new Empire; yet they disagreed among themselves over the relationship between the Imperial Government and the Reichstag. The Free Conservatives stood closest to Bismarck's position; they both agreed on the consolidation of the Empire, the preservation of monarchical authority, and the independence of the Chancellor from the Reichstag. The Progressives were willing to collaborate in the consolidation of the Empire, but only on their own terms: the introduction of full ministerial responsibility. The National Liberals held the intermediate position between the Free Conservatives and the Progressives. Their motto, *Freiheit und Einheit*, included on the one hand individual liberties and the development of ministerial responsibility, and on the other hand the consolidation of the Empire. After the successful conclusion of the Austro-Prussian war, they had demonstrated their willingness to accept a delay in the realization of the former part of their program, if only the latter could be attained. But the former could not be ignored entirely, and once it emerged to the forefront of their platform, a clash between them and the Chancellor became inevitable.

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[62] Tiedemann, *Aus Sieben Jahrzehnten*, I, 250. April 10, 1878.

[63] On April 3-4, he blocked the attempt on the part of Hamburg's representative in the *Bundesrath* to isolate the discussion of the fiscal aspects of the tariff from the protective. Reports of Hamburg's *Bundesrath* representative, April 3-4, 1879, St. Ar., Hamburg, Cl I, Lit. T, no. 3, vol 2b, Fasc. 16; *Protokolle des Bundesraths des Deutschen Reichs*, 18 Sitzung, April 3, 1879, 130-31.

Until the middle of the 1870s the collaboration between Bismarck and the National Liberals was very fruitful because both concentrated on the consolidation of the Empire.[64] They were drawn together in developing the unitary ties of the Empire and in executing the *Kulturkampf*. In the latter part of the decade, however, this cooperation was beginning to show signs of strain. This was mostly due to the intransigence of the left wing of the party under the leadership of doctrinaires like Eduard Lasker and Ludwig Bamberger, and the opposition of the entire party to Bismarck's fiscal plans. In 1875-76 the National Liberals rejected Bismarck's project of increasing the indirect taxes on non-essential consumer articles and thus reducing the contributions of individual states to the Imperial Treasury. In 1878 they voted against his scheme to raise revenue through a new tax on tobacco. It was only natural that the National Liberal Party should oppose such measures, for increased revenue from indirect taxes would diminish the only effective control of the Reichstag over the Imperial Government through the budget. Yet Bismarck viewed the increase of indirect taxes as the prerequisite for the reduction of contributions by individual states and for the further consolidation of the Empire. Therefore, the refusal on the part of the National Liberals to support this policy appeared to him as tantamount to desertion.

These factors serve to explain Bismarck's increasing dissatisfaction with the National Liberals. In 1875, for instance, he remarked that he had no sympathy for them and was forced to collaborate with them only because of his desertion by the Conservatives.[65] Although in 1876 the Conservatives, now accepting German unity, returned to the political arena, the National Liberals could not be dispensed with entirely. Henceforth Bismark's policy became one of either taming the National Liberal Party through the weakening of the left wing, or of weakening the entire party through the splitting of the left wing from the main group.[66] The elections of 1877 and 1878 partly accomplished the former aim. After the polls of 1877 Bismarck made a major overture to the National Liberals by offering the conciliatory leader of the party, Rudolf von Bennigsen, the portfolio of Prussia's minister of the interior. By this he hoped to bind the majority of the party to himself, and, under the shadow of its participation in policy-making, to secure support for his fiscal program. As yet, the National Liberals were unwilling to participate and countered Bismarck's offer with the demand for ministerial responsibility; the only effective safeguard of the powers of the Reichstag if its control over revenue was curtailed.[67]

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[64] H. Oncken, *Rudolf von Bennigsen, ein deutscher liberaler Politiker,* 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1910), II, 295.

[65] F. Friesen, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, Nachlass herausgegeben von H. von Friesen,* 3 vols. (Dresden, 1910), III, 281.

[66] For statements on this issue see Ballhausen, p. 80; Poschinger, *Bismarck und die Parlamentarier* (Berlin, 1894), p. 84; *Bismarcks Gesammelte Werke,* VIII, 175; Tiedemann, *Aus Sieben Jahrzehnten,* II, 16.

The failure of the overtures to Bennigsen called for the drastic policy of splitting the National Liberal Party. Such a break might strengthen the moderate elements under Bennigsen and weaken Lasker's more radical group. Then an understanding might be achieved between Bennigsen's group and the Conservative and Free Conservative parties who would form a pro-Government coalition in the Reichstag.[68]

A weakening of the National Liberals and better relations with the Conservatives necessitated a reappraisal of relations with the Center Party. In fact, more friendly relations with the Center were made possible in February 1878 by the succession to the papal throne of the conciliatory Leo XIII, who had prior to his election expressed hope for the improvement of relations between Berlin and the Vatican.[69]

The tariff issue could cement the ties between the new coalition and link it to the Government. Industrial protection was favored by the Free Conservatives and the more moderate National Liberals; agricultural duties by the Free Conservatives and the majority of the reorganized Conservatives. The Center Party combined the protectionist interests of both industry and agriculture. Conversely, free trade sentiment prevailed among the hateful Progressives and that "Progressive group within the National Liberal Party" led by Lasker, Bamberger, and other advocates of ministerial responsibility—the very groups Bismarck was most opposed to. Protection might draw together the Conservatives and the "Chancellor's friends" of the Free Conservative Party; it would conciliate the Center, and might split the doctrinaire group from the more moderate National Liberals. Eventually, the Center and the moderate National Liberals could alternate as the third group in the Chancellor's coalition based on the Conservatives and the Free Conservatives.

Throughout Bismarck's speeches and letters during the tariff controversy there appears the differentiaton of the productive, pro-Government, and protectionist majority from the unproductive, anti-Government, and free trading minority, which had somehow succeeded in monopolizing the representation of the nation. Such views he could express with all polemic bitterness in the Reichstag:

> I might just as well tell delegate Lasker that his is the policy of a pro-

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[67] Oncken, II, 307-39; E. Richter, *Im alten Reichstag*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1894-96), II, 3; D. Sandberger, *Die Ministerkandidatur Bennigsens* (Berlin, 1928); and E. Eyck, *Bismarck*, 3 vols. (Zürich, 1941-44), III, 205-15.

[68] Ballhausen, p. 46.

[69] Eyck, III, p. 215.

> letarian. He is one of those gentlemen who form the majority in the formulation of all our laws, and of whom Scripture says: They sow not, neither do they reap, they toil not, neither do they spin. . . . Those gentlemen whom our sun does not warm, whom our rain does not wet. . . , who neither engage in industry nor pursue any occupation, unless, perhaps, they feel that they are constantly representing the nation in different ways. Since they do that all year around, they lose sight of those interests with which a property-owning minister may sympathize. . . .[70]

More concretely, such views could be expressed in schemes proposing the establishment of an economic senate;[71] more practically still, they could be applied to the remoulding of the Reichstag itself. Already in 1878 rumors of changing the suffrage circulated with impunity in the *Bundesrath*;[72] yet the Social Democratic vote did not impress the Chancellor enough for him to risk his career in an attempt to abolish universal manhood suffrage or to exchange for its inconveniences an increased liberal majority such as he had to suffer in the Prussian House of Representatives in 1861-1866. Perhaps universal manhood suffrage was not the only idea which the conservative junker had adopted from the socialist Jew Ferdinand Lassalle, of whom he spoke in glowing terms in 1878; perhaps he had also learned something about more positive social policies. A glimmer of this influence appears in a circular addressed by Bismarck to the Prussian ministers at the various German courts on March 13, 1879. In it he considered both anti-socialist legislation and protection as mere half-cures for the troubled times. A change in parliamentary institutions was necessary to complement them:

> If our parliamentary activity is to run parallel to the practical conditions of our life, the consideration of material interests must be put more fully into the foreground than now. As opposed to the pampered and blinded parliamentary attitudes, such consideration will only then be fruitful and effective, if . . . in times of need such as the present, the governments will with honest intent and their full weight intercede on behalf of the material interests of the nation.[73]

The question of protection served not only to bring material considerations to the forefront of the political scene, but to rearrange the political parties. Most Progessives remained hostile to both the protective and fiscal aspects of Bismarck's tariff project; those who represented industrial regions and had to give in to the protectionist wishes of their constituents were still unable to support Bismarck's fiscal plans.[74] Their leader, Eugen Richter, was one of the most bitter opponents of the tariff project in the Reichstag.[75] As expected, the National Liberal ranks were entirely split. Their electoral manifesto of June 16, 1878, left the tariff question open to the discretion of individual members.[76] Accordingly, several members joined the agrarian-industrial front; Bennigsen took the protectionist side in his Reichstag speech of May 5, 1879, after having been advised by Miquel to isolate the agrarians by satisfying the industrial protectionists.[77] The historian Heinrich von Treitschke wrote in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* in favor of the departure from a free trade policy.[78] The left wing of the party, however, cooperated with the Progressives in opposing the protectionists. Bamberger and Lasker were among the main speakers on the free-trading side in the Reichstag; outside it, the vice president of the Reichstag and the mayor of Berlin, Forckenbeck, attempted to rally the representatives of the cities to a campaign patterned on the British Anti-Corn Law League. Just prior to the opening of the debates over the tariff, the meeting of the National Liberal Reichstag element found itself "unable to discuss the most important task of the session," with twenty-seven of its members bound to the agrarian-industrial front, forty-two free trading, and twenty-eight noncommittal.[80] With several clashes raging between its members during the debates in the Reichstag, the National Liberal party soon split. The extreme rightists seceded in 1879 over the refusal of the majority of the party to accept the arrangement for the disposal of the revenue from the tariff, an act which they considered prejudicial to the national cause.[81] In 1880 they were followed by the free-trading doctrinaire wing, who considered the protectionist leanings of the moderates prejudicial to liberal principles.

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[70] *Sten. Ber.*, 1879, pp. 1047-48.

[71] Regarding the economic senate see Kurt Marzisch's doctoral dissertation for the Universit yof Marburg, *Die Vertretung der Berufsstände als Problem der Bismarck'schen Politik* (Marburg, 1934), esp. pp. 1-9.

[72] Report of the Bavarian representative in the *Bundesrath*, June 7, 1878, Bay. H. St. Ar., München, Abt. Geh. St. Ar., Politisches Archiv: 126, Acta des königlichen Staatsministeriums des Königlichen Hauses und des Äussern. Auflösung des Reichstags, 1878, betreffend.

[73] Bismarck's *Circular an die Gesandten bei den deutschen Regierungen*, March 13, 1879, Mic. G. F. M. Ar., Mich. U. Lib., Reel 124.

The Center, the Free Conservatives, and the majority of the Conservatives were adamant in their adhesion to the protectionist declaration of October 1878. The members of the Center, who had been accused of international tendencies during the *Kulturkampf*, now posed as champions of economic nationalism against free-trade internationalism,[82] actively supported the tariff rates proposed by the Government, and won over both other.

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[74] See the Progressive Electoral Manifesto of November 26, 1876, quoted by F. Salomon, *Die deutschen Parteiprogramme,* 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1932), II, 29. For the position of the Saxon Progressives consult the report of the Prussian minister to Dresden, February 28, 1879, Mic. G. F. B. Ar., Mich. U. Lib., Reel 124.

[75] *Sten. Ber.,* 1879, p. 980.

[76] "Wahlaufruf der Centralwahlkomite der Nationalliberalen Partei," June 16, 1878, quoted by J. Heyderhoff and P. Wentzcke, *Deutscher Liberalismus im Zeitalter Bismarcks, eine politische Briefsammlung,* 2 vols. (Berlin, 1925-26), II, p. 202.

[77] *Sten. Ber.,* 1879, pp. 1027-36; Heyderhoff and Wentzcke, II, 232.

[78] H. von Treitschke, "Zur Lage," in *Preussische Jahrbücher,* 1879, I, Heft III, p. 332.

[79] His speech before the banquet of the *Deutscher Städtetag* resulted in his resignation from the presidency of the Reichstag.

[80] The quotation is from E. Boettcher, *Eduard Stephani: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der nationalliberalen Partei* (Leipzig, 1887), p. 244; the figures are from Poschinger, *Bismarck und die Parlamentarier,* p. 340.

[81] Poschinger, *Bismarck und die Parlamentarier,* p. 348.

[82] Reichenberg's speech on May 3, 1879, *Sten. Ber.,* p. 943.

Bismarck and the two conservative parties to their program for tariff revenue disposal.[83] Their leader, Ludwig Windhorst, intimated that the Center was now an indispensable political force, perfectly willing to cooperate with the government in return for political concessions.[84] Bismarck, for his part, made several conciliatory remarks and gestures, one of which cost the Prussian *Kulturminister,* Adalbert Falk, his office. While, henceforth, the *Kulturkampf* lost its acerbity, neither side surrendered to the

The real test of the solidarity of the agrarian-industrial front occurred in the determination of the relationship between the duties on industrial and agricultural products. While the leading industrial protectionists supported the rates proposed by the Tariff Commission for the benefit of the agrarians, many agrarians, encouraged by Bismarck himself, considered these rates to be inadequate. In the Reichstag von Mirbach proposed the doubling of the grain duties, a very controversial issue in view of the rampant opposition to agricultural protection. Other agrarian conservatives doubted the value of the agreement with the industrial protectionists.[85] Von Wedell-Malchow and von Saucken-Tarpuschen declared that neither the industrial nor the agricultural duties would benefit German agriculture. The former demanded the reduction of the proposed iron duties by 50%,[86] while the latter advised continued adherence to free trade[87]. On the other hand, the representatives of the Union of the German Iron and Steel Manufacturers in the Reichstag, Loewe and Rentzsch, were pressured by dissension within the ranks of the iron magnates to propose higher tariffs for certain iron products which would have met serious opposition from the agrarians.[88] Eventually, however, a compromise was reached according to which the duties on both grain and certain iron products were increased.[89] "This bargain," indignantly remarked the free-trading *Hamburgische Börsen-Halle,* "could hardly have been made more openly."[90]

Thus the agrarian-industrial front emerged victorious in 1879. As long as Bismarck continued to control German politics, it remained the basis for his political alignments; periodically, it was reinforced by the passage of further instalments of protection and other economic benefits.[91]

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[83] Reports of the Hanseatic minister to Berlin, June 24 and 26, 1879, St. Ar., Hamburg, Cl. I, Lit. T, no. 2, vol. 2, fasc. 1, inv. 12.

[84] *Sten. Ber.,* 1879, pp. 1064-66, 2200.

[85] *Ibid.,* pp. 1409-12.

[86] *Ibid.,* pp. 1269-71.

[87] *Ibid.,* p. 1347.

[88] Particularly to reconcile the objections of the cast iron manufacturers who wanted higher duties for their own products as compensation for the proposed duties on pig iron. See B.A., Koblenz, R 13, I, p. 272.

[89] *Sten. Ber.,* 1879, pp. 2280-90. The Union of the German Iron and Steel Manufacturers was in constant touch with these developments. Rentzsch was able to report to Lüg on May 13, 1879: "The rate of 50 Pfennig [per centner] for pig iron has been vigorously attacked; as yet, however, we can hope to carry it through as soon as we approve of the 50 Pfennig rye tariff." B.A., Koblenz, R 13, I, p. 272.

[90] *Hamburgische Börsen-Halle,* July 12, 1879, "Dritte Lesung des Zolltarifs."

[91] The tariff was increased in 1881, 1885, and 1887 for the particular benefit of the agrarians. Certain rates were also raised in the interest of industry.

Only with Caprivi's disregard of agricultural interests in the conclusion of commercial treaties did the ways of the industrial magnates and the agrarian junkers part, but even then many industrialists continued to conciliate the agrarians. The Bülow tariff of 1902 finally settled the differences between town and country to the satisfaction of both. Apart from the *Freisinnige Partei,* formed in 1884 by the so-called unproductive interests, and the Catholic Center, many of whose principles, being not of this world, were incorruptible by worldly promises, the German party system came to be based on real material interests. Thus the events of 1878-79 were of almost equal importance to Bismarck's unification of Germany in determining the nature of the German political system until 1918.

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[92] See particularly Sarah R. Tirrell, *German Agrarian Politics after Bismarck's Fall* (New York, 1951).

IMPERIALISTS WITHIN GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY PRIOR TO 1914

by Abraham Ascher

PRIOR to the First World War the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), echoing the views of the Second International, in its official pronouncements unequivocally condemned every manifestation of imperialism. The party, as a matter of principle, refused to look with favor upon any policy pursued by a capitalist state, which, by definition, was considered an enemy of the working class. The SPD also advanced a host of economic arguments against imperialism: colonial expansion was imposing heavy financial outlays upon Germany, and because of the prevailing system of indirect taxation the proletariat would have to bear an inordinate share of the expense; as capitalists invested in colonial areas and utilized the cheap labor of coolies, the consequence would be either lower wages or mass unemployment in Germany; as long as capitalism could expand abroad the catastrophe that was expected to result from internal strains would be postponed, and, according to Marxist theory, economic collapse was a precondition for the demise of the entire capitalist order. Finally, the SPD evinced a genuine moral revulsion against the frequently brutal treatment of the natives in the colonies and against the saber-rattling engendered by imperialist rivalries. The latter, socialists feared, would lead to war between major countries, producing terrible destruction and frightful losses in human lives.[1]

By 1912, however, two groups of apologists for imperialist expansion had emerged within German Social Democracy, one in the right wing of the party and one in the left wing. This paper will examine only the ideas of the right-wing imperialists, who, already by the late 1890s, had begun to reject the revolutionary aspects of Marxist thought. The entire left wing of the socialist movement, of course, viewed this tendency with the strongest disapproval, but by 1912 there were even a few avowed radicals who no longer accepted the position on imperialism traditionally upheld by the SPD. As strict determinists—which they claimed their commitment to Marxism obliged them to be—they argued that imperialism was a necessary stage through which capitalist society must pass before reaching socialism. Opposition to it was therefore senseless as well as potentially harmful to the cause of socialism.[2] Though of considerable interest, the "radical imperialists" were not as numerous, vocal or influential as the right-wing proponents of territorial expansion.

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[1] The SPD's arguments against imperialism were set forth most cogently in the minutes of the Party Congresses. See especially the *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1901,* p. 61, hereafter cited as *Protokoll.* See also: *Protokoll, 1898,* pp. 51, 140; *Protokoll, 1900,* pp. 156-8; *Protokoll, 1912,* p. 529.

[2] For a discussion of the left-wing imperialists see Abraham Ascher, *National Solidarity and Imperial Power: The Sources and Early Development of Social Imperialist Thought in Germany, 1871-1914* (Unpubl. Diss., Columbia University, 1957), pp. 249-299.

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The appearance of imperialists in the right wing of the SPD must be viewed as part of a larger development—the gradual modification of the party's revolutionary outlook. Because of the fairly steady rise in the standard of living of the average worker after 1879, the extensive program of social reform initiated by the state and the rapid growth in size, wealth and effectiveness of the trade unions and of Social Democracy, an increasing number of socialists came to doubt several Marxist dogmas. They were no longer persuaded that the capitalist economy was headed for collapse, that the lot of the proletariat would inevitably deteriorate and, most important, that a gradual introduction of socialism was unlikely.[3]

The leading spokesman of the Social Democrats who rejected these Marxist doctrines was Eduard Bernstein, who, in a series of articles published during the years 1896-98, developed a new ideological orientation within the SPD, Revisionism. Bernstein urged the SPD to cease "speculating on a great crash" and instead to "organize the working class politically and develop them as a democracy and to fight for all reforms in the state which are adapted to raising the working classes and transforming the state in the direction of democracy."[4] Ultimately such a course would lead to socialism: neither the class struggle nor violent revolution would be necessary. Within a few years Bernstein's views gained so many adherents that Revisionism became a major tendency within the socialist movement.

It must be stressed that the Revisionists adopted a much less hostile attitude toward the existing state than was prevalent among orthodox Marxists. The Revisionists contended that as the state became democratized—and they saw a trend toward democracy throughout Western Europe—it ceased to be an organ of class repression that the proletariat must overthrow and was gradually being transformed into a potential liberator of the proletariat.[5] Instead of destroying the state, therefore, the working class ought to conquer it for the purpose of establishing socialism.

Moreover, with the abandonment of free trade during the 1870s it became increasingly apparent that, contrary to previous expectations, the tendency was not toward the emergence of an interdependent world economic system. On the contrary, the capitalist economy was breaking down into highly competitive national units. None of those units could hope to outstrip its rivals without active working-class support of its economic program. At the same time, it was implicit in Revisionist theory that within a thriving capitalist economy the workers' lot would continue to mprove. This growing recognition of the mutual dependency between capitalist and worker was crucial in bringing about the "nationalization of socialism."[5]

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[3] Harry J. Marks, "The Sources of Reformism in the Social Democratic Party of Germany, 1890-1914," *The Journal of Modern History,* XI (1939), pp. 334-56; William Maehl, "The Triumph of Nationalism in the German Socialist Party on the Eve of the First World War," *The Journal of Modern History,* XXIV (1952), pp. 15-41; Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx* (New York, 1952), *passim.*

[4] Eduard Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation,* trans. Edith C. Harvey (New York, 1911), p. 13, hereafter cited as *Evolutionary Socialism.*

[5] Erika Rikli, *Der Revisionismus: ein Revisionsversuch der Deutschen Marxistischen Theorie (1890-1914)* (Zurich, 1936), p. 110f.

The widespread contention by the 1890s that colonies were an absolute necessity for the prosperity of the national economy therefore confronted German socialists with a baffling problem: Should they continue to oppose mperialism even though Germany's failure to acquire colonies would result in economic hardships for the working class? Several refused to endorse a policy that might have such dire consequences. In any case, it seems reasonable to suppose that, as life in Germany became less onerous for the worker and for the SPD or trade union official, even the most dealistic of Marxists must have found it difficult to remain immune to a certain pride in their country's enhancement of its prestige, to resist completely a certain exhilaration in the face of the vast conquests their community had made.

In addition, the apologists for colonial expansion drew upon a storehouse of pronouncements by the most eminent theorist of socialism in order to buttress their imperialist arguments. Karl Marx had, to be sure, repudiated nationalism and the idealist concept of the state; for him the prime mover in the historical process was the social class. Yet he passed certain judgments in matters of foreign policy which sanctioned conquest and domination by one country over another. In evaluating international conflicts the crucial question for Marx was whether the policy of a paricular country tended to promote or retard the coming of the revolutionary ituation. Thus, Marx in effect exonerated British rule in India on the ground that it had been instrumental in "causing a social revolution in Hindustan." On the basis of similar reasoning he advocated Prussia's eizure of Schleswig-Holstein in 1848, supported Prussia in her war against France in 1870-71, urged a revolutionary war against "reactionary" Russia and the annihilation of the "South Slavic barbarians."[6] But it must be kept in mind that, unlike the SPD imperialists, Marx did not favor any of hese policies because he believed that they would result in immediate maerial benefits for the proletariat of the victorious nation. Dedicated to the dea that the working class must attempt to seize power and to destroy he bourgeois state as soon as capitalism developed to its highest point, he was convinced that economic and social progress, even if achieved by violent means, would quicken the process which would prepare the way for the ocialist revolution.

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[6] On Marx's attitude toward British rule in India see *New York Tribune,* June 25, 853. For Marx's views on contemporary foreign political developments see: Franz Mehring, ed., *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle,* III (Stuttgart, 1902), pp. 187-91, 236; August Bebel and Eduard Berntein, eds., *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Friedrich Engels und Karl Marx, 1844 bis 1883* (Stuttgart, 1913), pp. 319-23; Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz, eds., *The Russian Menace to Europe* (Illinois, 1952), *passim.* For a discussion of Marx on imperialism see olomon F. Bloom, *The World of Nations: A Study of the National Implications in the Work of Karl Marx* (New York, 1941), pp. 48-56.

It was the leading exponent of Revisionism who first suggested that the SPD modify its position of unqualified opposition to imperialism. Already in 1898 Bernstein argued that during the 1840s, when workers did not possess any political rights, Marx's dictum that the proletarian had no fatherland reflected reality accurately. By the late nineteenth century, however, the worker's interests had become enmeshed with those of the state, of which he was now a full-fledged member. Therefore an increase in the nation's markets and international trade, both of which always acted as a "lever" for "social progress," vitally affected the well-being of the proletariat; for "the wealthier society is, the easier and more secure will be the realization of the socialist program."[7] Bernstein also asserted that the German economy genuinely needed certain tropical products, which he claimed were of no use to the natives.[8] While he conceded that the importation of such goods had benefited the upper classes most, he emphasized that the proletariat, too, had gained. "Without the colonial expansion of our economy the misery that we can still observe in Europe today and are trying to root out would be infinitely more severe and the possibility of eliminating it would be considerably slimmer than it is. Even if the outrages that have accompanied imperialism are taken into account, it must still be said that these are heavily outweighed by the benefits it has brought."[9]

In justification of his position, Bernstein developed the doctrine of the superior rights of higher civilizations over lower ones. His basic premise was that no tribe, nation or race had an absolute right to any part of the inhabitable earth, for the entire universe belonged to humanity as a whole. Originally, occupation, conquest, accident and brute force had determined the division of property. Bernstein cautioned that if mankind did not want to resort to those crude methods to resolve conflicts over the newly-discovered lands, it would have to adopt a "law of civilization" (*Culturrecht*) (sic).[10] According to the "law of civilization" it was impermissible for "wild" or "half wild" tribes to prevent an industrialized state from utilizing essential raw materials available in their territories.[11] Bernstein thought it justifiable to force open a country to foreign trade if there was a "pressing need" for such trade; he echoed an opinion voiced by Marx when he said that it was "senseless romanticism to permit the uncivilized to build a wall around their border that would effectively hinder the commerce of the civilized world."[12]

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[7] Eduard Bernstein, "Der Kampf der Sozialdemokratie und die Revolution der Gesellschaft," *Die Neue Zeit*, XVI (1897-98), p. 556. Bernstein expressed this view in many of his writings. See, for example, his "Die Internationale Politik der Sozialdemokratie." *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, XV (1909), p. 614, hereafter cited as *SM;* Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism*, p. 170.

[8] Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism*, p. 178; *Internationaler Sozialistenkongress zu Stuttgart, 18. bis 24. August, 1907* (Berlin, 1907), p. 29, hereafter cited as *Kongress zu Stuttgart.*

[9] Bernstein, "Der Socialismus und die Colonialfrage (sic)," *SM*, VI (1900), p. 559, hereafter cited as *Socialismus.*

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 551.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 553.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 552-53.

Not only would the loss of the vast resources in the backward areas deprive he Western nations of the "greatest material, intellectual and aesthetic enichment of life";[13] the colonial peoples, too, would suffer. Bernstein ointed to the many advantages that would never have accrued to them had hey not come into contact with Europeans. The latter had abolished the lave trade in the colonies; they had curbed robbery and internecine warare; they had severely limited the importation of liquor; they had introluced Western principles of justice. Critical though he was of European ivilization, Bernstein felt constrained to acknowledge its relative supeiority to that of the colonial natives.[14]

But as a sincere humanitarian Bernstein showed a deep concern for the thical aspects of imperialist expansion. He repeatedly expressed his horror t the brutalities committed by Western states, but he refused to believe that hese were a necessary concomitant of expansion. To think so, he declared, vas equivalent to maintaining that the misery resulting from industrializaion was inevitable and that the only remedy was the destruction of all nachines. The industrial system could be "de-brutalized," and so could mperialism.[15] Nine tenths of the blood spilled in colonial areas could have een averted by "tactful, honest and considerate" policies.[16] In general, the im should be the cultural and material uplifting of the natives. In his iew there was every reason to suppose that with the increasing influence f the "worker's democracy" in civilized states such a humane approach vould triumph.[17] England's colonial policy, which had brought freedom nd self-government to backward areas, came close to his conception of a ensible, progressive program of expansion.[18]

But Bernstein could never bring himself to support German imerialism. It lacked, he said, "that bit of democracy characteristic of Engish imperialism."[19] And he was vehement in his denunciation of what he onsidered Germany's bellicose policy of *Weltpolitik,* which he feared would ead to a military conflict between "civilized states." German commerce, he eclared, had prospered without a large fleet, and he was convinced that nilitarily Germany had nothing to fear from England, a nation that would ot launch an unprovoked attack.[20] He therefore rejected the idea of voting or the "unnecessary" naval program, and, in fact, favored a negative vote by the SPD on any measure providing for overseas expansion by the existing undemocratic regime.[21]

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[13] Bernstein, "Die Kolonialfrage und der Klassenkampf," *SM,* XIII (1907), p. 993, hereter cited as *Klassenkampf.*

[14] Bernstein, "Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und die türkischen Wirren," *Die Neue eit,* XV (1897), p. 109; also see Bernstein, *Klassenkampf,* p. 995.

[15] Bernstein, *Socialismus,* p. 560.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 559f.

[17] *Vorwärts,* November 4, 1907.

[18] *Protokoll,* 1911, p. 239; also see Bernstein, "Die Kämpfe ums Burenland," *Die Neue eit,* XIV (1896), pp. 484-90; Bernstein, "Einiges über das indische Problem," *Die Neue eit,* XV (1897), pp. 618-24; Bernstein, "Der südafrikanische Krieg und die Sozialdemoratie," *SM,* VII (1901), 99-107; Bernstein, "Meine Stellung zur Resolution Bebels," *Die eue Zeit,* XVIII (1900), pp. 99-110.

[19] Bernstein, "Socialdemokratie und Imperialismus," *SM,* VI (1900), pp. 248, 251, hereter cited as *Imperialismus.*

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 249.

Nevertheless, Bernstein was anxious to bring about a systematic reappraisal by the SPD of the whole problem of imperialism. Total opposition, as advocated by Kautsky, Ledebour and Parvus, he regarded as "entirely useless" and "unrealistic." The logical consequence of their contention that all colonies be returned to the inhabitants would be the return of the United States to the Indians. What Bernstein urged was an acceptance of the stark reality that colonies did exist and that somehow they had to be dealt with; instead of dogmatically condemning every manifestation of imperialism the party should judge each case on its merits. In brief, Social Democracy ought to appreciate the fact that "imperialism can and must . . . constitute *Kulturpolitik.*" Such was the only course worthy of a party which, by virtue of its mass appeal (over three million votes by 1903), could not afford to adhere to an irresponsible program of sheer negativism.[22]

Bernstein's position, then, may be defined, concisely, as qualified approval of imperialist expansion. But despite his moderation he was subjected to savage criticism by a majority of the SPD at the yearly congresses, not only, or even primarily, for his views on imperialism but for his entire Revisionist program. In order to remain a member in good standing in the party, therefore, Bernstein had to strive for a greater latitude in ideological matters within the socialist movement than had ever before prevailed. He succeeded in this. But since a large number of Social Democrats continued to cling to the old radical slogans, a certain polarization—based until 1907 mainly on domestic issues—of the movement set in. At the two extremes of the party there were now individuals who, from an ideological standpoint, had relatively little in common with each other. The ideological unity of the SPD had been shattered. As a consequence, when a new current of thought arose, one that strayed far from the very essence and spirit of Social Democracy, Bernstein could hardly advocate that it be curbed. In the name of the freedom he and the Revisionists had won for themselves, they felt obliged to uphold the right of any socialist to propound his views, no matter how radically these differed from the party's official program. Thus it became possible for the imperialists to develop their political theories without seriously jeopardizing their membership in the SPD.

II

It was not until the year 1907 that imperialism emerged as a serious issue in SPD deliberations. Indeed, from 1900 to 1907 a full-fledged debate on foreign policy in general was held only at the party congress of Mainz in 1900. Officially, of course, the party expressed strong opinions on all major international issues, but the members of the movement—even the active ones—rarely paid much attention to them; they accepted the party's views more or less automatically. Even Bernstein's modification of the SPD position on imperialism had not aroused a heated discussion. This indifference stemmed from a widespread view within Social Democracy that "the best foreign policy is none."[23] The party occupied itself almost exclusively with domestic affairs, which, it felt, far outweighed foreign affairs in importance and, indeed, determined their course.[24] But with the electoral defeat of 1907, suffered by the SPD to a large extent because of its strong stand against colonialism, party theorists swung into action.[25]

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[21] Bernstein, "Was folgt aus dem Ergebnis der Reichstagswahlen," *SM*, XIII (1907), p. 111f., hereafter cited as *Reichstagswahlen; Vorwärts*, February 12, 1907; Bernstein, *Imperialismus*, p. 250. It should also be noted that one year after the outbreak of the First World War Bernstein dissociated himself from the SPD majority, which was supporting Germany against the Allies, because he had become convinced that the German Government, far from waging a purely defensive war, harbored imperialistic aims.

[22] *Vorwärts*, October 4, 1907; *Kongress zu Stuttgart*, p. 28f.

In the soul-searching analyses undertaken by socialists to determine the cause of the unexpected set-back no one, not even Kautsky, denied the crucial importance of the colonial issue. All readily conceded that the SPD had underestimated the appeal of imperialism to the mass of the electorate.[26] However, whereas the orthodox Marxists did not propose any basic change in the party's program or tactics, the Revisionists argued that unless the SPD shed its revolutionary phraseology and excessive radicalism, it could not hope to win more "fellow-travellers" from the middle classes.[27] And the imperialists among the Revisionists admonished the party to change its position on the one question which, more than any other, had led to its defeat.[28] From this time on hardly an issue of the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* (next to *Die Neue Zeit* the most important socialist journal) appeared without at least one article in some sense favorable to colonial expansion.

The clamor from the Right for changes in the party's attitude and tactics was not without its effect. Although the SPD remained, in its official pronouncements, a staunch opposition party right up to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, its criticism of the regime's policies became markedly less truculent after the election of 1907.[29] This new mood of moderation manifested itself in many ways,[30] but here we are mainly concerned with its impact upon the party's stand on imperialism. From year to year the principled opposition to colonialism weakened. Increasingly the argument rested on the financial consideration, that is, that the profit on the heavy monetary outlays was so meager as not to warrant a continuation of overseas expansion.[31] But the changes wrought within the SPD by the 1907 election can best be illustrated by citing a concrete example.

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[23] This view was expressed by Karl Liebknecht, prominent member of the radical wing of the SPD. See Kurt Mandelbaum, *Die Erörterungen innerhalb der deutschen Sozialdemokratie über das Problem des Imperialismus (1895-1914)* (Schweinfurt am Main, 1926), p. 22; P. R. Anderson, *The Background of Anti-English Feeling in Germany, 1890-1902* (Washington, 1939), p. 117.

[24] Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917: The Development of the Great Schism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), p. 68f.

[25] On the election see George Dunlap Crothers, *The German Election of 1907* (New York 1941).

[26] Karl Kautsky, "Der 25. Januar," *Die Neue Zeit*, XXV (1907), pp. 589, 596; *Vorwärts*, February 10, 1907; Bernstein, *Reichstagswahlen*, *passim*.

[27] Schorske, *op. cit.*, p. 63ff.

[28] See especially Richard Calwer, "Der 25. Januar," *SM*, XIII (1907), pp. 101-107.

[29] Crothers, *op. cit.*, p. 215; Carlton J. H. Hayes, "Influence of Political Tactics on ocialist Theory in Germany, 1863-1914," in Charles Edward Merriam and Harry Elmer Barnes (eds.), *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times* (New York, 1924), p. 303f.

[30] See Maehl, *op. cit.*, *passim.*; Max Victor, "Die Stellungnahme der deutschen Sozialemokratie zu den Fragen der auswärtigen Politik (1869-1914)," *Archiv für Sozialwissenchaft und Sozialpolitik*, LX (1928), pp. 151-56.

At the International Socialist Congress of 1907 in Stuttgart the issue of imperialism came up for discussion. The committee on colonialism, controlled by the Revisionists of the imperialist powers, was to bring before the whole assembly a resolution on imperialism. Led by David of Germany and van Kol of Holland, it formulated one that radically departed from the pronouncements of the International in 1896, 1900 and 1904, all of which had condemned imperialism without reservation. The first paragraph of the new resolution read: "The Congress confirms that the usefulness or the necessity of colonies in general—but especially for the working class—is greatly exaggerated. But it does not repudiate in principle and for all time every form of colonialism, which under a Socialist system could perform a civilizing mission."[32] The committee minority was so enraged that it proffered its own resolution, one identical in spirit to those passed by previous Congresses. Bernstein spoke at length in favor of the majority version;[33] and a majority of the German delegation voted for that resolution. But mainly due to the votes of the delegates from non-imperialist countries the resolution quoted above was rejected; instead, one was adopted that condemned imperialism with traditional vehemence.[34] The margin of victory, however, was slim—127 to 108. It was a clear indication of the degree to which international socialism had abandoned revolutionary radicalism.

Actually, if it had not been for the vote of the International, the recent electoral defeat might have induced the SPD openly to adopt a much less hostile stand against imperialism than in the past. For when the party convention met at Essen a few weeks later it accepted the Stuttgart resolution only because it was considered improper to repudiate a declaration passed by an international congress. There could be no doubt, however, that a sharp cleavage existed, even though Singer, perennial chairman at the yearly party congress, tried to smooth out all differences with the following statement: "It [the difference at Stuttgart] was actually more a dispute over words than one that involved profound differences over the question under discussion."[35] Bebel also minimized the importance of the disagreements that had emerged at the Congress. He contended that it was impossible to foretell what socialists would do with colonies once they assumed power. The whole disagreement was therefore not worth "the time and paper that had been expended upon it."[36] But at the same time he placated the imperialists by saying that "under certain circumstances" colonial policies could operate as a civilizing factor, and if such were genuinely the case he, for one, would approve of them.[37] Both Singer's and Bebel's views were in keeping with a procedure by now customary at SPD congresses: basic ideological differences were made to disappear by talking them out of existence. Open splits that might weaken the party had to be avoided at all costs.

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[31] Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
[32] *Kongress zu Stuttgart,* p. 24.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 28f.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 24.
[35] *Protokoll, 1907,* p. 266.

During the next electoral campaign, in 1912, the SPD adopted a very restrained attitude towards imperialism;[38] it stressed domestic issues, and even there the emphasis was on moderation. These new tactics proved highly successful. One third of the votes cast went to Social Democracy, which surpassed its 1907 total by one million. And due to more effective cooperation with the bourgeois *Fortschrittliche Volkspartei* on the second balloting the SPD captured 110 parliamentary seats.

Although the general attitude towards imperialism within German Social Democracy tended to change under the impact of political and economic exigencies, only a small group can be classed as outright advocates of colonial expansion. Most of these belonged to the Revisionist wing, but their views on many crucial issues differed so radically from those of Bernstein that it is hardly correct to speak of one Revisionist ideology. Indeed, what tended to unite the Revisionists more than anything else was their common opposition to the Centrists and Radicals[39] in the party. What divided them was the fact that the full-fledged imperialists—subsequently dubbed social imperialists[40]—were proponents of tariff protection, of aggressive Anglophobia and of collaboration with the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie, the "captains of industry," the stratum most ardently promoting imperialism in Germany.[41]

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[36] *Ibid.*, p. 272.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

[38] Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

[39] The Radicals were those in the SPD who espoused the revolutionary seizure of power by the proletariat and refused to compromise in any way with "bourgeois aims or ideology." The Centrists, on the other hand, while echoing these sentiments, were, in "spirit and practice," quite close to the Revisionists. Thus, the Centrists showed little interest in the problem of revolution; nor did they pay much attention to the violence that might have to accompany a revolutionary upheaval. Indeed, they seem to have thought of the revolution as something that would occur in the distant future and that therefore there was not much point in thinking about it in any detail. For these distinctions between the various groups of Social Democrats see Maehl, *op. cit.*, p. 19ff.

[40] The term "social imperialism" was coined by Lenin, to whom it connoted the ideology of those Social Democrats who, in his view, had been "bribed" by the "superprofits" of imperialism to gain their support for the bourgeois governments during the "imperialist war" of 1914. See V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, I (Moscow, 1947), p. 635f. More recently, the term has been used in scholarly works; there it refers to any political program espousing an interrelationship between social reform for the working class and imperialist expansion. See, for example, Franz Naumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (2nd. ed.; New York, 1944), *passim.*; Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes*, trans. Heinz Norden (New York, 1955), p. 175. It is in the latter sense that the term will be used in this study.

[41] Alfred Meusel, "Der Klassische Sozialismus," Goetz Briefs, ed., *Die Wandlungen der Wirtschaft im kapitalistischen Zeitalter* (Berlin-Gruenwald, 1932), p. 54f.; Rikli, *op. cit.*, p. 64f.

The similarity between the arguments of the social imperialists and those of bourgeois imperialists is striking. Economic need, nationalism, cultural superiority of the Western states—these were the basic theoretical ingredients in both cases. But the socialists made three important additions. First, they emphasized not so much how imperialism profited the bourgeoisie or even the nation as a whole, but rather the immense benefits it brought to the working class. Second, the SPD advocates of national expansion were convinced that the pursuit of imperialist policies greatly facilitated the attainment of socialism. Third, they were willing to give unqualified support to German imperialism only if the Empire were genuinely democratized. In advancing these three theses they felt that they were remaining faithful to the basic socialist creed.

To avoid repetition, the views of the SPD imperialists will not be described separately. Instead, they will be arranged topically and presented in that form. Only where one of the imperialists diverged radically from the others will his ideas receive independent analysis.

III

The most common argument put forth by socialists in favor of imperialist expansion was that of economic need. In the words of Richard Calwer,[42] the "fate of the German proletariat is intimately intertwined with the development of German capitalism."[43] One simply had to recognize the brute fact that "economic stagnation does not permit an improvement in the lot of the workers."[44] The truth of these assertions, Calwer contended, was borne out by developments in England, where the workers lived better than their counterparts in any continental country. English capitalists had derived enormous profits from their overseas ventures and could therefore afford to be more generous to their employees. The SPD imperialists in general were convinced that conditions in Germany were not basically different from those prevailing in England. If anything, the German proletariat, suffering from the pressure of a rapidly growing population, was even more dependent upon the prosperity of the capitalist class. Only the ability to expand economically, they believed, could assure such prosperity.[45] But how could German capitalism be guaranteed the opportunity to expand?

For the social imperialists the answer lay in territorial aggrandizement. Colonies, they maintained, assure the mother country relatively inexpensive land upon which to erect factories, a labor supply at a much lower cost than in Europe, a possibility for capital investment, cheap raw materials and, above all, they provide an already harassed economy with lucrative arkets.[46] To prove the validity of the latter contention, Ludwig Quessel[47] ited the following statistics: in 1909/10 the German metal industry ex- orted thirty-four times as much as the English industry to Germany's olonies; whereas the situation was almost exactly reversed with regard to etal exports to British India, even though both countries permitted free ade in metal.[48] From these statistics Quessel concluded that "It is evident at neither England nor Germany needs protective tariffs to insure the olonial markets for her metal industry, for the mere existence of an empire as proven adequate to achieve this . . . The great value imperialists set pon colonial markets is, then, based on good grounds."[49]

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[42] Richard Calwer (1868-1927) was a journalist who wrote widely in socialist periodicals and dailies. His main interest was economics. He became one of the leading right-wing imperialists, discussing various aspects of the colonial queston at regular ntervals. He frequently wrote for the *Sozialistische Monatshefte.*

[43] Calwer, "Der 25. Januar," *op. cit.,* p. 106.

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 105; Calwer, "Weltpolitik und Sozialdemokratie," *SM,* XI (1905), pp. 741f., 746, hereafter cited as *Weltpolitik.*

[45] Calwer, "Kolonialpolitik und Sozialdemokratie," *SM,* XIII (1907), p. 193f.

In the minds of the SPD imperialists there was no doubt that the work- g class would benefit from the increased economic activity that would esult from territorial expansion. To be sure, the initial advantages ould accrue to the capitalists. But because Germany had a strong and ell-disciplined labor movement, they were certain that it would be pos- ble, as soon as the prosperity of the entrepreneurs became noticeable, to rest higher wages from them. The imperialists therefore considered it advisable and unrealistic for German workers to attempt to prescribe to erman capitalists what action they should or should not take to insure eir own economic well-being. Their sole concern—like that of the British roletariat—should be the question of what conditions are most conducive an improvement of the standard of living of the laboring class. If, as the ocial imperialists firmly believed, one of the conditions was territorial xpansion, then the workers ought to desist from criticizing the German ourgeoisie when it pursued such a course.[50]

Socialist, no less than bourgeois, advocates of imperialism attempted to ain lower-class support for their program by pointing to the deprivations e entire community, and particularly the workers, would have to endure Germany did not succeed in her quest for empire. They reiterated, time nd again, that modern societies could not possibly forego the products ound only in tropical areas, such as cotton, plant oil for margarine, and ap, tea, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, raisins, oranges and lemons.[51] Who con- umed these goods? Quessel's reply was unequivocal: "One can say without esitation that . . . by far the greatest percentage of these products is used proletarian or semi-proletarian households."[52] Indeed, the "enlightened onomist cannot possibly have any doubt that should the colored people cease to produce these valuable goods for the white population, the standard of living of the white worker and of the *Mittelstand* would suffer a catastrophic decline."[53]

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[46] *Ibid.*, p. 200; Calwer, *Weltpolitik*, p. 741f.

[47] Ludwig Quessel (1872-1931) was a watch-maker in his youth. After receiving his rly education at home, he attended the University of Zurich. He became one of the ost prolific of the SPD publicists and after 1912 he served in the *Reichstag*. A leading ember of the right-wing imperialist group, in 1919 he brought out a book re-evaluating e socialist ideal. It was entitled *Der Moderne Sozialismus*.

[48] *Protokoll, 1912,* p. 429.

[49] Ludwig Quessel, "Die ökonomische Bedeutung des Imperialismus," *SM,* XVIII 912), p. 714f., hereafter cited as *Bedeutung*.

[50] Calwer, *Weltpolitik*, p. 742f.; Calwer, *Kolonialpolitik*, p. 193.

[51] See, for example, Quessel, *Bedeutung*, p. 712f.; Quessel, "Gebrauchswert in den olonieen," *SM,* XX (1914), p. 340, hereafter cited as *Gebrauchswert*.

[52] Quessel, *Gebrauchswert*, p. 339.

There were two reasons why the SPD imperialists did not think it wise for Germany to rely upon trade in order to bring in the needed products. First, they argued that England and France, because of their colonial possessions, were able to "get so much for nothing"; Germany, however, had to pay for the products she imported "with the fruits of arduous labor."[54] Equally serious, in their minds, was the fact that many of the tropical items were scarce. If their country, therefore, did not appropriate more colonies and assure for herself an adequate source of those goods, severe shortages might ensue.[55]

Exploitation of natural resources in the tropical areas by private entrepreneurs—a possible way of avoiding imperialist control of those lands—was rejected by the SPD colonialists as unfeasible. In modern times large-scale production was held to be possible only within "the framework of an efficient state administration." The natives in the backward areas still lived in a society in which the security necessary for an orderly exchange of goods did not prevail. Without the establishment of an empire, therefore, "without the participation of the state . . . it is impossible economically to open up the tropics. . . . All experts testify to the effect that the practice of imperialism by entrepreneurs leads to intolerable conditions."[56]

From these arguments one SPD imperialist drew the conclusion that colonial expansion constituted the "physical basis of proletarian existence. . . . It is therefore very much in the interest of Social Democracy to promote imperialism."[57]

The most startling and most elaborate socialist rationale for economic imperialism was devised by Gerhard Hildebrand, erstwhile member of Naumann's National Social Association.[58] Hildebrand was deeply disturbed by the economic transformation that the backward areas were undergoing. Up to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries these areas, comprising North America, Austria-Hungary, Russia and especially Asia, Africa and Australia, had served two basic purposes for the highly industrialized Western European states: as markets for the ever-mounting surplus of industrial products and as suppliers of much-needed agricultural goods and raw materials. It was Hildebrand's contention that to a large extent "our well-being, our civilization is based upon the payment of tribute by foreign peoples."[59] Europe's technological supremacy was feasible only because economically the world had been divided into an "aristocracy of industrial states," composed of the West European nations, and a "lower stratum of agrarian states." As usual, the "aristocrats" appropriated the most important and the most lucrative positions, profiting from numerous privileges, annuities and large property-holdings.[60]

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[53] *Ibid.*, p. 340.

[54] Quessel, "Der Krieg als Erzieher," *SM*, XXI (1914), p. 477f., hereafter cited as *Erzieher*.

[55] Quessel, "Die Baumwollfrage und die Sozialdemokratische Reichstagsfraktion," *SM*, XIX (1913), p. 470f., hereafter cited as *Baumwollfrage*.

[56] Quessel, *Bedeutung*, p. 711f.

[57] Quessel, *Erzieher*, p. 478.

[58] The National Social Association, founded in 1896, was a movement composed largely of intellectuals who vigorously advocated imperialist expansion as well as social reform for the working class. See Theodor Heuss, *Friedrich Naumann, Der Mann, Das Werk, Die Zeit* (2nd ed.; Stuttgart and Tubingen, 1949), *passim*.

However, far-reaching changes were taking place within the agricultural lands—changes which tended to jeopardize the economies of Western Europe. As they gained in economic strength and learned western technological processes, the agricultural areas gradually developed their own industries and thus were assured of a closer and more profitable market for their products. Consequently, the quantity of their exports declined appreciably.[61] To Hildebrand this was an inevitable trend, one that would result first in rising prices and then in food shortages. In time it would lead to a narrowing of the available markets for European industrial products. Two dangers—scarcity of food and lack of markets—thus confronted Europe with the spectre of disaster.

For Hildebrand the impending catastrophe was the overriding economic problem, surpassing all others in gravity. Of what use was it to press for higher living standards for the proletariat if the entire economy was on the brink of collapse? Even the assumption of power by the proletariat, Hildebrand warned, could not avert or in any way mitigate this collapse. The interests, the well-being, the very existence of the proletariat were as much at stake as those of any other social class. He strongly urged that the class struggle and all national squabbles be suspended and every effort directed at seeking a solution for the economic difficulties confronting not merely one class, nor even one nation, but all of Western Europe.

But what was a feasible solution? Hildebrand had no doubt that the only remedy lay in retaining the backward areas as colonies.[62] Thus and only thus could Western Europe assure itself of adequate food supplies, raw materials and markets. The right to exploit the colonies was grounded upon sheer economic need: "A mass of humanity consisting of 290-300 millions, crowded into the narrow space of the western half of Europe, which is blessed with a superior civilization, must claim the right to colonize backward, sparsely populated lands such as Africa, where the people have proved themselves incapable of progress."[63]

Hildebrand suggested that Western European states cooperate in this entire colonizing enterprise; he thought they ought to found a "United States of Western Europe" for that purpose. The first step would be the lifting of national tariffs, thus reducing the need for new industries, for each country's demands would be met by international trade. And as the need for each country to engage in all industrial endeavors diminished, the tempo of industrialization would slow down. Within Europe farming should then be encouraged to lessen the dependence upon agricultural imports. With free trade, moreover, greater agricultural specialization in any one section of Europe would be feasible, perhaps even profitable. A further suggestion by Hildebrand was the institution of a uniform system of taxation. He advocated a progressive income tax and a heavy tax on large fortunes and inheritances to prevent excessive investment in industrial establishments. A union of Western Europe, thought Hildebrand, would also permit businessmen of the various countries to reach agreements concerning markets, thus eliminating the cut-throat competition that had been harming all of them. Only by combining, moreover, would the manufacturers be economically strong enough to withstand the competition of the agrarian countries turning to industry. In fact, Hildebrand believed that then it might eventually be possible, by means of economic pressures, to slow down the process of industrialization in the agrarian lands—an even happier prospect.[64]

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[59] Gerhard Hildebrand, *Die erschütterung der industrieherrschaft und des . . .* (sic) (Jena, 1911), p. 6, hereafter cited as *Die erschütterung.*

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 197f.

[61] See especially Gerhard Hildebrand, *Sozialistische Auslandspolitik* (Jena, 1911), p. 6.

[62] Hildebrand, *Die erschütterung,* p. 224.

[63] Hildebrand, *Sozialistische Auslandspolitik,* p. 11.

So clear-cut a deviation from the socialist program could hardly be ignored by the SPD leadership. Other socialist proponents of imperialism—as we shall see—hedged their views with a welter of qualifications and thus somehow fitted them into the accepted pattern of socialist thought, or at least they emphasized the particular benefits that would accrue to the proletariat., With Hildebrand, ~~however,~~ supposed economic need overrode all considerations, ethical or political. His plan meant, of course, a subordination of the class struggle to the quest for colonies. This deviation from SPD principles came to the attention of the SPD court of arbitration, which, after considerable deliberation, decided by a vote of 4 to 3 that "Hildebrand no longer adhered to the program of the party and that he ought therefore to be expelled from the organization."[65]

Hildebrand appealed this decision to the entire Party Congress in 1912, where the issue was debated at length. In his defense Hildebrand pleaded that, while he could not subscribe to every detail of the SPD program, his political sympathies did lie with the proletariat and that he certainly favored a planned socialist economy "wherever that is possible and necessary." Membership in a political organization other than the SPD was therefore out of the question for him.[66]

The Revisionists wholeheartedly came to Hildebrand's defense on the ground that the party must tolerate differences in ideological and intellectual matters.[67] Obviously, they were motivated, in part, by the fear that once a certain uniformity of belief was enforced they might be the next to come under attack. The majority at the Congress, however, took its cue from Klara Zetkin, who said that "The party is not a hall in which all amiable and interesting enthusiasts may dance. The building is a fort in which we are all united and armed, ready to do battle."[68] After an extended debate, Hildebrand was expelled. But no serious attempt was ever made to discipline any of the other imperialists, although the deviations of some from the party platform were only slightly less striking than those of Hildebrand. Party unity was considered more important than ideological uniformity.

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[64] Hildebrand, *Die erschütterung,* p. 235ff.

[65] *Vorwärts,* April 11, 1912.

[66] *Protokoll, 1912,* pp. 475-92.

[67] August Erdmann, "Die moralische und politische Bedeutung des Falles Hildebrand," *SM,* XVIII (1912), pp. 726-33; Edmund Fischer, "Parteijustiz," *Ibid.,* pp. 656-61; Ernst Heilmann, "Parteijustiz," *Ibid.,* XIX (1913), pp. 1267-76; Wolfgang Heine, "Die Bedeutung der Ausschliessung Hildebrands," *Ibid.,* XVIII (1912), pp. 1289-1301; Wolfgang Heine,

IV

In Germany, perhaps more than in any other country, imperialism had as one of its well-springs a certain nationalistic exuberance, which expressed itself in two ways: in a yearning to surpass in economic and political power every other state and in a growing conviction that the German nation belonged to a culturally superior breed of men. In both forms the nationalistic strain appeared frequently in the writings of the SPD imperialists.

Calwer, for instance, argued for an enlarged navy for Germany on the ground that a nation's strength and influence were measured in terms of naval power. Since other countries, especially England, had no intention of reducing their naval strength, it was unrealistic of German socialists to expect their country to do so. While they should not lend active support to the policy of building a war fleet so long as an undemocratic capitalist government was in power, once the socialists took over they would have to proceed with the program of naval construction.[69] Maurenbrecher expressed indignation at the moderation with which the SPD criticized the "naval chauvinism" of England and the vehemence with which it attacked the German naval policy. Why should German workers give preference to English capitalism over German, he asked. In his view both were equally evil. A double standard, according to which England was permitted to have a powerful fleet and Germany was not, was totally unfair. Furthermore, Maurenbrecher felt that since sea power was essential for every industrial state with a capitalist economy, the SPD had no right to agitate against it in Germany. In view of England's reluctance, he could see no possibility of a genuine program of disarmament being carried out. Germany therefore ought not to be expected to keep her military power at a minimum.[70]

"Autodafé." *Ibid.*, XVIII (1912), pp. 531-38; Paul Kampffmeyer, "Meinungsfreiheit innerhalb der Partei," *Ibid.*, pp. 599-605; Quessel, "Worin bestand eigentlich Hildebrands Verbrechen," *Ibid.*, pp. 1301-04; Bernstein, "Darf Hildebrand ausgeschlossen werden," *Ibid.*, XVIII (1912), pp. 1147-50.

[68] *Protokoll, 1912*, p. 494.

[69] Calwer, *Kolonialpolitik*, p. 198.

[70] Max Maurenbrecher, "Englische oder Proletarische Politik?" *SM*, XV (1909), p. 627f.; Calwer, "Englands Absichten und die deutsche Sozialdemokratie," *SM*, XI (1905), p. 920f., hereafter cited as *Englands Absichten*. It is hardly necessary to discuss the arguments the

It was Richard Calwer who, more than any other SPD imperialist, elaborated upon the nationalistic argument. In doing so he revealed a conflict in his mind that must have beset many other socialists, the conflict between his deep emotional attachment to the fatherland and his intellectual commitment to the ideal of internationalism. He tried to reconcile these two loyalties. As a consequence, he advanced proposals which, though somewhat inconsistent with each other, paid lip-service to both loyalties. On the one hand, he felt very strongly that the SPD should oppose all manifestations of nationalism, should even maintain an attitude of pure hostility toward the German Government. At the same time, however, he warned Social Democracy that it must guard against giving the impression of favoring the capitalists and governments of foreign countries over those of their own land.[71] For in proposing such a course the party would be advocating policies detrimental not only to Germany as a whole but—and this was crucial—to the German proletariat. It was on the basis of this line of reasoning that Calwer justified his support of certain German foreign political moves and of certain German imperialistic ventures.

During the Moroccan crisis of 1906, for example, a crisis which threatened to embroil Germany in a war against France and England,[72] Calwer condemned as erroneous the socialist stand against the German Government. For this was a conflict, he said, between three capitalist states, and in agitating against their own regime the German socialists were, *ipso facto,* strengthening the other two and weakening only one. And yet, remarked Calwer, it was certainly as incumbent upon the German socialists to weaken foreign capitalist nations as their own.

If the SPD should actually succeed in weakening only Germany, the attainment of socialism in that country might well be retarded. It was Calwer's contention that at a certain stage of its development the capitalist economy became imperialistic; this was a necessary step before socialism. By hampering the German Government in its expansionist drive the SPD was enfeebling one competitor and thereby facilitating the acquisition of colonial areas by other countries, especially France and England. The economies of the latter would therefore progress more speedily and thus be ready for socialism earlier than Germany.

> But as a German socialist I want Germany to be in the forefront of economic progress. And this requires the unfolding of German political power. I do not have to be an active champion of this kind of unfolding

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other socialists advanced in support of a German navy, as they were all very similar. It is sufficient to cite the following sources: Hildebrand, "Weltpolitische Bilanz," *SM,* XV (1909), pp. 683-88; Erich Rother, *Der Industriestaat und die arbeitenden Klassen* (1897), p. 10; Karl Leuthner, "Vom Seekrieg zum Landkrieg," *SM,* XVIII (1912), pp. 347-51.

[71] Calwer, "Der 25. Januar," p. 105f.

[72] The immediate cause of the crisis had been Germany's attempt, in 1905, to stop France from transforming Morocco into a French protectorate. At the international conference held early in 1906 to resolve the crisis Germany suffered a thorough diplomatic defeat; most of the European powers as well as the United States supported France. For a concise treatment of the Moroccan problem see Parker Thomas Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (New York, 1947), pp. 197-211.

> of German power; my attitude might even be quite reserved and passive, but on no account should I, through hostility to the foreign policy of my country, take the risk of giving foreign capitalist countries the opportunity to overtake Germany. From these considerations it follows that Germany was not only entirely justified in taking action against the Anglo-French Agreement [during the Moroccan crisis], but, from the standpoint of capitalist interests, was duty-bound to do so. Even socialists must in this instance concede that Germany could not tolerate in silence the disrespect and rejection France and England inflicted upon her.[73]

Calwer urged Social Democracy, moreover, to accept the facts that national states did exist and that Germany, as an economic unit, had certain specific and unique problems to solve. For the individual socialist a recognition of these facts meant that he must "exert his influence within the realms of the national economy, if he does not want to get lost in the lofty heights of pure theory. He must support all those measures which are necessary for the expansion of the national market, be it tariff union, colonies, or both means."[74] Calwer noted that it would take considerable time before these national divisions disappeared, before the world could be organized as one economic unit. When that stage was reached, then and only then, would socialism be instituted on a world-wide basis. In the meantime, however, socialists in all parts of the world had to follow a realistic path and support those policies which would promote the prosperity of those particular economies in which they must operate.

Not only did the SPD imperialists exhibit a deep concern for Germany's political and economic power; they also felt very keenly that Germany, along with other European states, must be given every opportunity to discharge her cultural mission. They articulated this sentiment in simple terms. The natives of Africa and Asia were culturally inferior to the white man—that, it was claimed, could not be disputed. Was it not true, for example, that many Western countries had developed a system of universal suffrage while the peoples in colonial areas had remained in the stage of absolutism and feudalism?[75] Had not the natives proven themselves incapable of orderly self-government? Morocco, for instance, still did not possess a legal system adequate for modern international trade. Indeed, the primitive peoples were incapable of developing a civilization in consonance with the requirements of present-day economic life. Western nations were therefore duty-bound to impress their superior skills and customs upon the natives and thus uplift them in a material and moral sense. To argue otherwise would be to echo the views of the reactionaries, who in Germany still wanted to retain the old backward methods of production, small farming and individual artisanship. And if the Social Democrats voiced the views of the reactionaries, they would, in effect, be suggesting that impediments be put in the way of those colonial lands trying to effect far-reaching economic changes; their development into modern, eventually socialist, states would thus be retarded.[76]

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[73] Calwer, "Das Fait der Marokkoaffaire," *SM*, XII (1906), p. 356. Similar arguments were advanced by Hildebrand, Max Schippel and Eduard David. See Hildebrand, "Die deutschen Interessen im Ausland," *SM*, XVII (1911), p. 1219, hereafter cited as *Die deutschen Interessen;* Schippel, "Consument und Producent," *SM*, VI (1900), p. 791; *Kongress zu Stuttgart,* p. 31.

[74] Calwer, *Kolonialpolitik,* p. 196.

[75] Hildebrand, *Die deutschen Interessen,* p. 1221.

Of course, it could not be denied that brutality frequently accompanied this cultural uplifting of the natives. But if the aim of socialists was to be to minimize the degree of cruelty perpetrated in the colonies, said the imperialists, the best way to proceed was to charge the state, which was susceptible to political pressure by the citizenry, and not private capitalists, with the task of economically exploiting and governing the backward lands. If that course was actually followed it would be all the more important for German socialists not to be overly hostile to their own government's imperialist program, for, as Hildebrand put it:

> The more influence Social Democracy or the workers' party wields in any given state, the less defensible is it to leave all colonial pursuits to other countries, where its brother parties exercise much less power. Applied in practice, Social Democracy's hostility towards imperialism on principle means that imperialist expansion will be carried on only by states in which the workers have no influence; therefore the colonial policies of these countries will be guided by the unbridled lust for profits of the capitalists.[77]

Overseas expansion, according to the SPD colonialists, not only served to spread the blessings of European culture; it also helped to preserve that superior civilization. Since time immemorial, wrote Max Schippel,[78] advanced civilizations had arisen to a large extent by means of exploitation of less fortunate human beings. Without slavery there would have been no Greek state, no Greek philosophy, art or science. The Roman Empire, too, was inconceivable without slavery. Similarly, in the twentieth century the development of European culture hinged upon the exploitation of the natives in colonial lands. As mentioned above, many of the goods needed by Europe had to be imported and if the flow of those materials should cease, the standard of living of the West would decline, with the inevitable consequence of a decay of its civilization.[97]

Furthermore, it had become evident to Schippel that the conflict between "lower" and "higher" forms of economic endeavor—an inevitable conflict according to Marxists—was not restricted to the internal affairs of specific countries, but also applied to the realm of foreign relations. In his view, the aspiring European economy must, if it was to continue its upward swing, revolutionize the economically weaker lands. The conflict between the two economies was comparable to the struggle between social classes. This did not mean that socialists ought not to favor the most humane treatment possible for the natives, but, as he very bluntly expressed it, some brutality would always accompany exploitation:[80]

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[76] Hildebrand, "Was ist Kolonisation?" *SM,* XV (1909), p. 32f. See also Quessel, "Aufgaben Sozialdemokratischer Kolonialpolitik," *SM,* XVIII (1912), p. 1492f.

[77] Hildebrand, *Die deutschen Interessen,* p. 1222.

[78] Max Schippel (1859-1928), a foremost spokesman of the right-wing imperialists, served in the *Reichstag* from 1890 onwards. A regular contributor to the *Sozialistische Monatshefte,* he was most interested in the study of economic developments, particularly international trade.

[79] Max Schippel, "Marxismus und Koloniale Eingeborenenfrage," *SM,* XIV (1908), pp. 273-85, hereafter cited as *Marxismus.*

> For us, as convinced Marxists, a certain development is not disastrous, contrary to progress and therefore to be repudiated simply because it came about by means of even the most barbarous exploitation. Rather, it appears to us . . . that for a long time the entire social development of the civilized states of Europe has been an inevitable succession of stages, always arising out of maturer and higher forms of exploitation: starting with slavery . . . through serfdom up to the most modern form of European wage work. With regard to present conditions in Europe we can say: Without the former type of exploitation, that is, surplus labor, there would have been no appreciable economic progress![81]

V

There is one important aspect of the imperialist program propounded by the socialists that remains to be discussed, namely, the manner in which Germany was to acquire colonies. Large, fertile, unappropriated areas simply did not exist any longer. Territorial aggrandizement was possible only at the expense of some other "civilized" power. And these powers were hardly likely to give up their holdings to Germany without a bitter struggle, be it diplomatic or even military. Most of the outright imperialists in Germany fully understood this situation and were prepared to face the consequences of their program. Hence the great emphasis on a powerful army and especially on a mighty navy. This stress on force was, of course, diametrically opposed to a basic and traditional socialist stand against the armaments race and against all attempts to settle international conflicts by recourse to war. Bernstein, as we noted, while not wholly opposed to imperialism, never wavered from this policy of peace and disarmament. The other socialists favorably disposed towards imperialism, however, were more evasive on these issues and at times came close to supporting the Government's naval program.[82]

To be sure, these socialists repeatedly averred their peaceful intentions, and in this they felt they were remaining true to the socialist credo. Quessel, for example, called for "*Weltpolitik* without war."[83] And Hildebrand drew the following distinction between the imperialism of the bourgeoisie and that of the socialists:

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[80] It should be pointed out that the SPD imperialists were of one mind in urging a *humane* colonial policy. While they contended that the natives would have to suffer some hardships, they reiterated time and again that every effort must be made to keep suffering at an absolute minimum.

[81] Schippel, *Marxismus,* p. 279f.

[82] See Mandelbaum, *op. cit.,* p. 30.

[83] Quessel, "Das Parlamentarische Regierungssystem und der Imperialismus," *SM,* XX (1914), p. 551.

> The forceful solution of international disputes is nationalistic, the solution by means of agreements is socialistic. . . . The guiding principle of the nationalist is always to take whatever is available. In self-defense the socialist may also resort to violence. His guiding rule, however, is to promote the general recognition of the principle of reasonable and legal settlements, arrived at by peaceful understanding.[84]

Despite the emphasis on "peaceful understanding," neither Hildebrand nor any of the other imperialists shrank from the assertion that the colonial areas would have to be redivided to provide Germany with a more equitable share.

Most of the SPD imperialists thought it possible to satisfy Germany's legitimate demands by depriving some of the smaller states of their colonies and dividing them up among the larger countries. Thus, Hildebrand had no objection to Holland and Belgium retaining their empires, for they were both advanced, civilized states that could promote the development of the backward areas. But Portugal was an entirely different case. She had not proven herself capable of developing culturally on the same high level as Western Europe. How, then, could she be expected to "civilize" her colonies? Germany and Italy, the underprivileged countries, could do just that and at the same time solve their grave economic problems. The great powers, therefore, ought to negotiate the redistribution of the entire Portugese empire. Peace would then be preserved and at least part of the colonial issue resolved to the satisfaction of the have-not powers.[85]

Ludwig Quessel agreed with Hildebrand on the need to redistribute Africa. Germany's acquisition of colonies had been so pitifully meager that he could appreciate the anger of the bourgeois imperialists. "No wonder," he wrote, "that a certain vexation is again manifesting itself in the press of the parliamentary majority, which is imperialistically inclined. Even the pacific English imperialists acknowledge that Germany has good cause to be dissatisfied."[86] But Quessel favored not only the dismemberment of the Portugese empire; he thought the Belgian colonies should also be divided among the have-not nations. In the case of the former, he foresaw no difficulty. Since the Portugese possessions were already an English sphere of influence, it would be a relatively simple matter to transfer them to a new country. Only English good-will was necessary. Given such good-will, it would be possible, thought Quessel, for Germany to pursue a course of "pacific imperialism."[87]

To implement a "peaceful and lasting settlement of international conflicts," Hildebrand and the two Maurenbrechers (Max and Hulda) introduced a far-reaching resolution at the 1911 Congress of the SPD. It declared that an amicable settlement was feasible only if the monopoly of one country over colonial possessions ceased. All the colonies were either to be under the common tutelage of all the civilized states or else there had to be a redistribution of them proportionate to the colonies' economic worth and the needs of the Western states. Should such a proposal be refused, the resolution declared, the party ought to join the rest of the German nation in opposing all further economic or political expansion by foreign powers. For in so far as German diplomacy defended the legitimate interests of the entire German nation, "Social Democracy has no reason to transfer its attitude of opposition to the German Government from the sphere of domestic to that of foreign policy."[88] A resolution in this form, which would have openly altered the entire foreign policy of the SPD in one sweep, had, of course, not the slightest chance of adoption. No one except its sponsors voted for it. But it was perhaps a sign of the changing orientation of the SPD that such a resolution was even proposed.

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[84] Hildebrand, *Sozialistische Auslandspolitik,* p. 21.

[85] *Ibid.,* pp. 27, 30, 60, 61.

[86] Quessel, "Die Neuaufteilung Afrikas," *SM,* XIX (1913), p. 715.

[87] *Ibid.,* p. 716ff.

In developing their reasons for territorial aggrandizement, the SPD imperialists introduced a note of hostility towards England. This was something new within Social Democracy, for by and large the movement was favorably disposed towards England. Here was a country that had gradually evolved into a democratic state, one in which the proletariat had continuously made progress both in the matter of economic benefits and political rights. Essentially this was the type of society the SPD—by now largely reformist in outlook—yearned to establish in Germany. For the SPD imperialists, however, England was the one country that had deliberately blocked German aspirations at every turn. Calwer, for example, was sure in 1905 that England had such hatred for Germany that if Germany became embroiled in a war with France, England would come to the aid of the latter country no matter what the specific causes of the conflict.[89] And Hildebrand was convinced that the Triple Entente of England, France and Russia constituted "an almost systematically organized syndicate for the distribution of territory." The "syndicate's" aim, he believed, had been to stifle Germany in her expansionist drive, and in this its success had been "phenomenal."[90]

Some SPD imperialists actually devised elaborate plans to stop English expansion. Calwer, echoing a demand widespread among German colon- alists, proposed the creation of an economic union of states to form a new rea which he termed *Mitteleuropa*.[91] The basis of such a union was to be a rapprochement between Germany and France, impelled by a desire o withstand the advance of their common foes, England and the United States.[92] Politically and economically, Calwer predicted, such a union had mmense potentialities. It would greatly lessen the burden of military preparedness on both countries without leaving either one defenseless. Above all, it would at last make possible an effective stand against England, whose economic interests were, in his view, necessarily at variance with those of every state on the European continent. Calwer maintained that England was incapable of retaining a lasting friendship with any European state, for her rapaciousness must lead to a decline in the economic prosperity of the Central and Western European countries. Realizing that she was incurring the enmity of European nations, her policy had been to isolate Germany diplomatically and in that manner prevent the formation of a European coalition powerful enough to offer effective resistance to her economic and military encroachments upon continental powers. The conflicts between Germany and France were, in the last analysis, not nearly as crucial as those both had with England. They could and ought to iron out their minor differences. Once they had joined forces the Central European nations would, he confidently expected, also adhere to the coalition.

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[88] *Protokoll, 1911,* p. 156f.

[89] Calwer, *Englands Absichten,* p. 919.

[90] Hildebrand, *Sozialistische Auslandspolitik,* p. 41. This attack upon England as the ountry scheming to prevent Germany from developing into a world power became really ituperative during the First World War. A cursory perusal of the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* makes this abundantly evident.

[91] Calwer, "Deutsch-französische Annäherung," *SM,* XIV (1908), p. 665.

[92] Calwer, *Englands Absichten,* p. 922.

In pondering the SPD imperialists' approach to foreign policy one is struck by two different, though not unrelated, aspects of it: a remarkable naiveté and forthright *Realpolitik.* The Social Democratic adherents of colonialism thought it a simple matter to confiscate the territorial holdings of smaller countries; they took into account neither the wishes of the weak countries nor the apprehension that might, justifiably, trouble English statesmen at the very thought of establishing the frightful precedent of parcelling out colonies already held by Western countries. They were equally unconcerned about England's anxiety regarding Germany's construction of a strong fleet. They were confident that Germany would use the fleet for the purpose of gaining concessions but not to wage war. But they failed to ask themselves what might happen if other—though by themselves weak—countries refused to grant the concessions demanded by a militarily powerful Germany. Nor did they fully understand that a constant enhancement of Germany's power, endangering as it would be to the European balance of power, could not have been tolerated by England. Their naiveté may have been a result of the long-standing socialist refusal to have anything to do with foreign affairs. Ignorance often breeds highly simple solutions to difficult problems. The explanation for the growing tendency of socialists to espouse a course of *Realpolitik* is perhaps to be sought in the fact that they, too, had been influenced by the climate of violence, the cult of force, that had become widespread in Europe after 1900.

But it must be pointed out that the SPD imperialists did evince a certain uneasiness about *Germany's* imperialist program. They found it difficult to offer support to a regime so hostile to Social Democracy and all it stood for. So long as social inequalities and injustices prevailed, so long as Germany was not a genuine democracy, the working class, they argued, could not fully support the Government. The implication, however, was clear. Once the proletariat had acquired rights and privileges equal to those of the rest of Germany's population, it would give unstinting support to the Government's program of expansion.[93]

Ludwig Quessel contended that not only was the existing government undeserving of proletarian support; it was incapable of pursuing a sound imperialist course. In his mind a sane, successful policy of imperialism could not be carried out without a genuine parliamentary system. The German bureaucracy, insensitive to pressures from below, had bungled the nation's foreign policy. It had thought it possible to promote the state's welfare simply by means of bellicosity and bayonets, when in actuality political astuteness was a far more useful tool. He pointed to France as a country in which the parliamentary system had permitted the rise to power of the most capable political figures. They, in turn, had to be given credit for France's great colonial empire and enormous international prestige. Democracy in Germany could, of course, accomplish the same "*Weltpolitik* without war."[94]

VI

For the most radical of the left-wing critics of the SPD imperialists social imperialism was basically a set of ideas reflecting the interests of the upper stratum of the proletariat, who ostensibly had been sucked into supporting colonial expansion by the material benefits they had been granted by the bourgeoisie. The favorite formulation of Lenin and Zinovyev was that the "labor aristocracy" had been "bribed," while the bulk of the working class, whose lot continued to deteriorate, had remained faithful to revolutionary socialism. The "aristocracy," controlling the machinery of the SPD, had willfully led the movement down the road to "social chauvinism" and "social imperialism."[95] This thesis is highly tenuous. In the first place, there is no conclusive evidence that only the upper crusts of the working class benefited from the general upswing of the German economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; on the contrary, it seems fairly clear that all sections of the proletariat made economic advances during those years.[96] Also, it cannot be argued that in 1914 there was a split between the rank and file of the SPD and the leadership or between the unorganized workers and the SPD on foreign political questions.[97] Finally, there is no proof that the capitalists ever made a deliberate attempt to gain lower-class approval for imperialism by means of economic concessions. True, the bourgeois advocates of imperialism often said that if they could not exploit colonies they would not be able to better their workers' lot, but neither they nor the state ever granted material benefits to the laboring class in order to persuade them to favor colonial expansion.

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[93] *Ibid.* p. 922; Calwer, *Kolonialpolitik*, p. 197f.

[94] Quessel, "Das Parlamentarische Regierungssystem und der Imperialismus," *SM*, XX (1914), p. 551.

[95] Lenin, *op. cit.;* Grigorii Sinowjew, *Der Krieg und die Krise des Sozialismus* (Vienna, 1924), pp. 530-53.

[96] John Harold Clapham, *The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914* (4th ed.; Cambridge, 1936), p. 404ff.; Marks, *op. cit.*, p. 342; Gay, *op. cit.*, p. 116ff.

[97] See Abraham Joseph Berlau, *The German Social Democratic Party, 1914-1921* (New York, 1921), pp. 73, 77; Schorske, *op. cit.*, p. 289f.

Rather than recipients of bribes the SPD imperialists were victims of misconceptions and slogans that enjoyed wide currency in all European countries and in all social strata in the three decades preceding the First World War:[98] they had no doubt that imperialism would prove a great economic boon to Germany, and hence to the German working class. In reality, the question of the profitableness of colonies is extremely complicated, and no clear-cut answer can be presented here. But some of the claims of the SPD imperialists can be critically scrutinized.[99] Above all, the contention that England's prosperity—and the relative well-being of her proletariat—could be attributed to England's successful exploitation of colonies must be challenged. There is little doubt that the country's economic progress was mainly a result of her having been the first to industrialize.[100] If anything, it was England's industrial achievements that were an important factor in making possible her imperialistic successes in the late nineteenth century.

The SPD advocates of colonial expansion also believed that through political control of a "backward" area Germany would be able to control that area economically, especially as a market for her surplus goods. This, too, was oversimplified economics. Factors such as geography and trade facilities can be as important as domination over foreign lands in determining trade relations. Early in the twentieth century, for example, French Indo-China purchased only 40% of her imports from France. All that can be said as a generalization is that by governing a colony the mother-country will most probably appropriate a larger share of that colony's market than would otherwise be the case.

But colonies are not simply a source of income; they also require expenditures, and there can be no guarantee that profits will always exceed costs. It is expensive to acquire colonies, to administer them and, most important, to cover the cost of wars and revolts not infrequently engendered by imperialistic ventures. Certainly, the acquisitions of Italy and Germany prior to the First World War proved financial failures.

A further illusion under which the SPD imperialists labored was that the only way Germany could assure herself of an adequate supply of tropical goods was to control the lands in which they were available. In

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[93] For the arguments advanced in favor of imperialism see William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902* (2nd ed.; New York, 1951), pp. 67-101.

[99] For the analysis of the SPD imperialists' claims I have relied on the following works: Moritz Julius Bonn, *The Crumbling of Empire* (London, 1938), pp. 289-339; Herbert Feis, "Raw Materials and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XVI (1938), pp. 574-86; William L. Langer, "A Critique of Imperialism," in Herman Ausubel, ed., *The Making of Modern Europe*, II (New York, 1951), pp. 919-32; Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 513-66; Leonard Woolf, *Empire and Commerce in Africa* (London, n.d.), pp. 315-52; *The Colonial Problem: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (London, New York, Toronto, 1937), pp. 40-45.

[100] See John Harold Clapham, *An Economic History of Modern Britain*, II (Cambridge, 1952), especially pp. 440-88. Clapham shows that Great Britain and her working class had made substantial economic advances *before* the heyday of imperialism.

actuality, experience has shown that the laws of supply and demand are more important in determining the flow of goods than the laws of an imperial power. Producers will sell to the highest bidder regardless of nationality. Thus, for example, most of the cobalt and nickel mined in the French colony of New Caledonia went to Belgium. Similarly, most of the crude rubber produced in the Malayan colonies owned by Great Britain was sold to the United States. The obvious conclusion is that if a country has the means she can obtain the necessary products.

Hildebrand's assertion that the advance of industrialization in agrarian areas constituted a threat to the economies of Western Europe is also controverted by the facts of economic life. As Germany became industrialized during the last third of the nineteenth century the volume of her imports from Britain did not decline but rose sharply. Likewise, with the development of India's factory system the country's imports from Britain increased at a phenomenal pace. As the economy of a country becomes more complex and more mechanized there is a greater need for industrial products than ever before, and by no means can all of them be manufactured at home.

In their defense it must be said of the SPD imperialists that their arguments were no more faulty or spurious than those of numerous publicists, professors, businessmen and political leaders who, from the 1880s onward, propagated the imperialist gospel. What is striking about the socialists is that in adopting the imperialist creed they had perforce to abandon the substance of what had traditionally been regarded as the Marxian socialist dogma.

It is true, of course, that there were only a few outright imperialists within the German Social Democratic Party prior to 1914; but their significance should not be underestimated. Their existence and, more important, their toleration by the party are further evidence of the basic transformation the SPD was undergoing during the first decade of the twentieth century. Officially, the party continued to cling to a revolutionary program: it still called for an intensification of the class struggle, it persisted in regarding the state with the utmost hostility and refused to concede that in the long run the proletariat and the other classes in Germany had common interests. Within the ranks of the socialist movement, however, a sizeable group rejected each one of these notions; the imperialists were the most extreme in doing so.

The actual behavior of the SPD after 1914 was striking proof that this entire group was far from uninfluential. To be sure, the party never became openly imperialistic, but it did support Germany during the First World War and a growing number of socialists did swing over to the group of outspoken expansionists within the SPD in the course of the conflict.[101] In fact, it is noteworthy that a year or so after the war had begun there was no sharp and clear-cut line separating the SPD imperialists from the so-called Majority.[102] And after the war, when the SPD began to collaborate with other parties in the formation of governments, it was clear that it had become transformed into a radical labor movement dedicated to democracy and to gradual socialization of the means of production; there could no longer be any doubt that it had fully abandoned its long-standing position of uncompromising hostility toward the German state and its national policies. The imperialists whose views have been examined in this study helped bring about this far-reaching change in Social Democracy's political orientation.

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[101] See William Livingston Spalding, *Social Imperialism: The Impact of Nationalism on German Socialist Thinking during the First World War, 1914-1918* (Unpubl. Diss., Cornell, 1949), *passim*.

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[102] Lenore O'Boyle, *German Marxist Theory, 1914-1918* (Unpubl. Diss., Radcliffe College, 1948), *passim.*, but especially p. 198.

TWO DOCUMENTS OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT OF 1794

By R. R. Palmer and Peter Kenez

HUNGARY, like other countries within the orbit of Western civilization, at the time of the French Revolution had its share of democratically oriented or potentially revolutionary agitation. If little has been known of this agitation in Hungary, it has been largely because of difficulties of language. Many of the documents are either in Hungarian, a language little known outside Hungary, or in modern Latin, a language little used by historians of modern Europe even when Latin was more widely read than today. A conjuncture of circumstances makes it possible for the first time to present two of the most significant of these documents in English. Professor Kálmán Benda of Budapest has recently published a huge collection of the writings of the Hungarian "Jacobins."[1] These include two revolutionary "catechisms" of 1794, one in Latin, "Catechismus occultae societatis reformatorum in Hungaria," and one in Hungarian, "Az embernek és a polgárnak oktató könyvetskéje" (A catechism of man and citizen). Of the present writers, Mr. Palmer has translated the Latin catechism, Mr. Kenez the Hungarian.

The two documents arise from what is commonly though misleadingly known as the Martinovics Conspiracy of 1794. The term is misleading because Martinovics, who brought the movement to a head by organizing two secret societies, was essentially an adventurer and an outsider to Hungarian revolutionary circles, with which he was associated for only a few weeks in 1794. The potential revolutionaries, whom he momentarily led, may have numbered about two or three hundred in the two societies together, and were for the most part men of more serious purpose and greater personal integrity than their very temporary chief. Since a full account of this group has been recently given by Professor Benda in both French and German,[2] no more will be said here than is necessary to explain the significance of the two documents herewith translated.

Martinovics organized the two secret societies in the spring of 1794. One, the Society of the Reformers of Hungary, was composed of lesser nobility and gentry. The other, the Society of Liberty and Equality, was made up of "Jacobins" who believed in the abolition of noble distinctions. So slight, however, was the development of a Hungarian bourgeoisie, that only two members of the Society, a locksmith and a printer, are known to have been actual burghers; the rest were intellectuals of noble or gentry birth. Both societies were broken up by the Austrian police in July 1794, and Martinovics and six others were executed.

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[1] Kálmán Benda, *A magyar jakobinusok iratai,* 3 vols. (Budapest, 1952-57). (*Fontes historiae hungaricae aevi recentioris.*) The two documents here translated are in vol. I, pp. 1002-1036.

[2] "Die ungarischen Jakobiner," in W. Markov, ed., *Maximilien Robespierre 1758-1794: Beiträge zu seinem 200 Geburtstag* (Berlin, 1958), pp. 441-72; "Les Jacobins hongrois," in *Annales historiques de la Révolution française,* No. 155, janvier-mars 1959, pp. 38-60. These two articles are nearly identical.

Martinovics manipulated the two societies with a cynicism unique among eighteenth-century revolutionaries. The noble Reformers were left in ignorance of the existence of the other more radical Society; their leader, Sigray, first learned of it at the trial which sentenced him to death. Members of the more radical Society of Liberty and Equality, however, knew of the Society of Reformers. Martinovics told them that he intended to dupe the Reformers, to use them as a tool of the Society of Liberty and Equality, to make common cause with insurrectionary nobles at the beginning of the rebellion, only to liquidate them thereafter. Some of the more scrupulous democrats objected to this plan, but were persuaded by Martinovics that such tactics were necessary.

For the Society of Reformers Martinovics wrote a catechism in Latin, the official political language of Hungary. For the Society of Liberty and Equality he wrote one in French, for it seems that Martinovics did not know his native Hungarian well enough to write it. A translation was immediately made into Hungarian, and since Martinovics' French original disappeared at an early date, it is the Hungarian version that Benda has published.

The contrast between the two catechisms is of very great interest. Written by the same hand, by an adventurer of whom it cannot be said that he had any principles, they illustrate the political and social views of the two distinct audiences to which he wished to appeal. They clearly reflect two kinds of revolutionary agitation of which evidence can be found in many countries at the time.[3] One of these was primarily aristocratic or nobilitarian, concerned with the defense of privilege against monarchy, and often rooted in existing institutions of parliamentary type, like the ancient Diet of Hungary. Such was the Hungarian Society of Reformers. The other was more democratic, opposed to nobility and to privilege, often called "bourgeois" by later writers, and known as "Jacobin" in its belligerent phase. Such were the Hungarian "Jacobins" of the Society of Liberty and Equality.

The catechism of the nobles is by far the more concrete of the two. It is more politically and historically minded, and more nationalistic. Its spirit reflects actual institutional life in the county assemblies and national diets of the Kingdom of Hungary. It is anti-German, anti-foreign and anti-Habsburg, expressing definable grievances against the Habsburg rulers by name. It mentions relations with the neighboring Turks, Styrians, Bohemians, and Poles. It sees Hungary as the victim of colonialist exploitation, the Vienna court being said to treat Hungary as the English, Dutch and Spanish treat their overseas possessions. Conscious of national differences, it even proposes a federal structure for Hungary in which various ethnic groups may enjoy autonomy. With seeming concreteness, it offers figures, and although the numbers of Hungarian soldiers and amounts of taxes are absurdly exaggerated, they lend an air of practical argument to the charges made. Figures are again offered for the revenues that an independent Hungary would possess, and which would enable the future republic to exist normally without any taxes at all. A brief but intelligible account is given of how a new constitution may be drawn up by a "convention-congress." Actual tactics of rebellion are suggested.

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[3] This is a theme of R. R. Palmer. *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800,* Vol. I (Princeton, 1959).

The democratic catechism, on the other hand, is abstract and rationalistic. With its question-and-answer form, its blunt oversimplifications, its naive air, and its bold echoes of Holbach and Rousseau, it seems almost a travesty on the *philosophes* of Western Europe. It breathes the facile radicalism of men who do not really expect to do anything. It departs, *a priori*, from propositions on "man" and "reason." Adversaries are simply "the wicked." No actual political life or institutions are called to mind. The tone is cosmopolitan, or at least wholly without national feeling. There is no anti-foreignism; the word German does not occur; no Habsburg ruler is referred to by name. Grievances comprise an unspecified "slavery," a word apparently used to mean both agricultural serfdom and the low estate of the burgher class. The future constitution is left indefinite; the legislature will be supreme, but whether in one chamber or two is not specified. There shall be no distinctions except those of public authority; nobility is a "scourge"; but uniform citizenship is not explicitly asserted. On tactics and methods there is nothing; the solution for Hungary's problems is "enlightenment," which of itself is expected to produce rebellion.

Clearly, the democratic catechism was addressed to men who, unlike the nobles, had formed no habits of political activity through existing institutions. Even so, one suspects that Martinovics, in writing the democratic catechism, was being not merely abstract but deliberately evasive, or perhaps only hasty. Many important concrete questions, such as the right of non-nobles to own rural land, had been turned into practical issues in Hungary by Joseph II a few years before, and were currently presented by the Polish revolution and constitution of 1791. To the nobles, Martinovics says that they shall continue to be sole landlords; to the democrats, on this matter, he says nothing at all.

In the noble catechism the preservation of nobility is a central idea. Equality means the equality of the lesser nobility with the great magnates, who together are to constitute a superior class, in a "twofold classification of citizens." Nobles will continue to receive rents, labor services (*robotas*) or dues under the "feudal system." Joseph II had been a "pretended" friend of the people. Non-nobles, in the independent Hungary of the future, having been called to political life or "raised" to a second chamber by the nobles themselves, will warmly support the nobles, so that these in the future republic will be "invincible." With king, magnates and prelates gone, Hungary will be a gentry or nobilitarian republic.

The democratic catechism speaks of the "feudal system" in a wholly different sense, finding it "awful." Nobility is as bad as the king; there are great and small nobles; the great are the worst, but the lesser, being "haughty," are insufferable. In the noble catechism, the continuation of forced labor for peasants is assumed. In the democratic one, the evils of serfdom are denounced. The private life of the nobility is inane, brutal and vicious.

Toward the French Revolution and the war going on in 1794 between the French Republic and the Habsburg monarchy, the two catechisms reflect a significant difference of attitude. The noble Society of Reformers hopes to use French aid, but it also blames the Habsburg government for needlessly starting the French war. The war is deplored because it has brought "democratic principles" into Hungary and because, if the French win, "nobility perishes." As a model for revolution the Reformers prefer Poland. The Society for Liberty and Equality admires the French Revolution with less reservation.

In two ideas the catechisms agree: kings are frauds; priests are charlatans who deceive in order to swindle. Toward the Church, however, there is a nuance of difference. In the catechism of the nobles the feeling is primarily against the great prelates, who as celibates and as associates of the Habsburg monarchy make poor Hungarian patriots, and upon whose extensive landholdings the noble revolutionaries look with a jealous eye. In the democratic catechism, with its rational emphasis on man, reason and nature, all priestcraft and supernatural religion are seen simply as an imposture.

Both catechisms call for an independent republic. For the Society of Reformers, it is to be a republic with "good laws by which both nobles and non-nobles may be happy." For the Society for Liberty and Equality it is to be a "democratic republic."

Both catechisms issue a call for rebellion. In the democratic catechism the cry is "To arms, citizens! Let us swear freedom or death!" In the noble catechism, in a more limping imitation of the Marseillaise, we find, *Ad arma, cives patriae nobiles et ignobiles!*

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

I

CATECHISM OF THE SECRET SOCIETY OF REFORMERS IN HUNGARY

Chapter I

Of the Pernicious Rule of the House of Austria over the Hungarian People

Question: Is the Hungarian nation happier under the Austrian scepter than formerly under its own kings?

Answer: No. The Hungarians were indeed divided under their kings, which gave rise to factions, but they preserved their strength and energy of mind, the freedom of the nobility flourished intact, and the Hungarian nation remained independent in the manner of all the leading nations of Europe. Under the Austrian scepter the Hungarian militia, which formerly constituted the national strength, is in the hands of the Germans; the Hungarian nobility has wholly lost its vitality, sells its patriotism to the Cabinet of Vienna in exchange for vain titles, and has retained the liberty of the nobleman in name only.

Q. In what way is the Hungarian nobility sold to the Cabinet of Vienna?

A. Since the counties, outside the Diet, dare no more than to submit petitions and humble representations to the king, the Cabinet of Vienna neglects to convoke the Diet and leaves the nation to be duped by its own factions. Maria Theresa refrained for many years from holding elections in the kingdom. Joseph avoided them. Leopold evaded them by his machiavellianism and corruption. Francis, ignorant and incapable of ruling, has solemnly promised, under instigation of his ministers, that elections shall never be held. This assertion is secret, but quite true.

Q. What means does the court of Vienna employ to put down the patriotic representatives of the counties?

A. Commissions of inquiry, the army, and penalties. Joseph used his army against the landed nobility and the counties. Leopold and Francis appoint commissioners to search out the authors of patriotic representations, that they may be punished.

Q. How does the Cabinet of Vienna maintain this slavery of the Hungarians?

A. It keeps Hungarians away from the ministry and council, lest they oppose the enslavement of Hungary. All princes of Austria, except Joseph, in getting Hungarians to sell their freedom have made use of Hungarian prelates, who by their celibacy have ceased to be citizens of their country, and who owe their Church preferments to these Austrian rulers. The magnates of Hungary, created by Austria, are induced to live in Vienna, where they slowly develop habits of fawning on the court, and where German women and Viennese courtesans extinguish all love of country in them. Thus influenced by the court of Vienna, the magnates hold the highest dignities and sell their country, elude its laws, and spend their Hungarian revenues in Vienna. Since these magnates began to be corrupted by the court of Vienna, the Hungarians have been unable to raise up another Rakoczy, or Tököly, or Bercsényi. So love of country remains only in name.

Q. What evil did the house of Austria bring upon Hungary by the Seven Years War with Prussia?

A. 500,000 Hungarians fell in this war. Subsidies drawn from Hungary by the Cabinet of Vienna reached almost 400,000 florins during this war. Hence Hungary suffered depopulation and loss of its substance.

Q. Did Hungarian soldiers gain any rewards after the war?

A. None at all. Nadasdy, disgraced, had to return to Croatia, because he had spoken out with Hungarian firmness against the drunkenness of Duke Charles of Lorraine and his ignorance in military matters. Hungarian troops were always in places of greatest danger, the first to be exposed to the enemy, and yet were despised by the German Austrians. The only military leader to benefit was Hadik, who received the domain of Futak as a royal gift, and so was made into the slave of the Cabinet and of the Austrians.

Q. How is the Hungarian soldier treated by the court of Vienna today?

A. Most ungratefully. As in the past, Germans and Italians now obtain Hungarian commands, together with most other military ranks, while the Hungarian officer is put off.

Q. Why does the nefarious court do this?

A. Because it is afraid that a homogeneous Hungarian army, made up of Hungarians only, would punish its crimes against the Hungarian people.

Q. Why did Maria Theresa introduce German normal schools in Hungary?

A. Because she wished to open the way to absolute despotism for Joseph. She hoped that the Hungarian nation would give up its language and in adopting the corrupted language of Austria would also accept the manners and the despotism of Vienna to the ruin of Hungarian liberty.

Q. Why did Joseph wish to elevate the common people under the pretext of humanity?

A. Because he wished thoroughly to destroy the nobility and its resistance.

Q. Can Joseph be regarded as a defender of humanity in his relation to the Hungarians?

A. No. A king, who should work for the happiness of all, does wrong if he opposes one class on the plea of elevating another; for with one class depressed he wishes to subjugate the other, in order to put both beneath his yoke, like beasts. Even the best actions of a king, if they have a bad end, are evil.

Q. Why does the Cabinet of Vienna always have a German, not a Hungarian, as its ambassador at Constantinople?

A. Because it fears that a Hungarian would enter into an alliance with the Turks for the good of his own people and so shake off the heavy Austrian yoke.

Q. Why does that Cabinet so readily declare war on the Turks?

A. Because the Hungarian nation has no representative at Constantinople who might prevent this evil in accord with the laws of his own country.

Q. Did Leopold give satisfaction to the Hungarian nation in sending Eszterhazy to Sistova to make peace with the Turks?

A. Obviously not. The ambassador, a German [Austrian], Herbert, received the real instructions for negotiating with the Turks, while Eszterhazy was only allowed to show ostentatious pomp, in contempt for Hungary, at the Congress. By such action the machiavellian Leopold shamefully prostituted the Hungarians before Europe.

Q. Of what advantage to Hungary was the last war with Turkey?

A. None. It did her harm. A hundred thousand Hungarians and eighty millions in Hungarian subsidies disappeared in the war.

Q. Is it true, as alleged by the Viennese Germans against the Hungarians, that the court of Vienna was forced by tumults in Hungary to make peace with the Turks?

A. It is altogether false. The court of Vienna made a secret agreement at Reichenbach and Pillnitz for the partitioning of Poland, and for the subjugation and extermination of the French with the aid of the other kings. Hence peace was made with the Turks, and the fruits of the Turkish war, which might have been to the advantage of the Hungarians, were brought to nothing. . . .

Q. Is it true, as asserted by Francis in the coronation diet, that the French had declared war on him against his will?

A. It is altogether false. The treaty of Pillnitz was prior to the French declaration of war. In this treaty it had been concluded that the allied kings should take military action against the French under the leadership of Vienna, and therefore a large army, beyond all necessity, was being sent into Belgium. So, Hungarians, you may see the clumsy imposture and gross untruth of Francis!

Q. What gain can the Hungarian nation expect from the war with France?

A. None, only the utmost evil. For if the French should triumph, nobility perishes in Europe, and consequently in Hungary. Already 135,000 Hungarians have gone off to this war, and 56,000,000 florins, in cash and in kind, have been taken out of the kingdom. Hungarian soldiers in the war against France are bringing home democratic principles, which undermine the nobility. The absence of soldiers from the kingdom is causing great scarcity of money and the kingdom is exposed to Turkish incursions. The export of grain to France is forbidden.

Q. Are the laws of the country being violated during the war with France?

A. Certainly. The ingenious way of taking revenues out of Hungary without [consent of] the Diet is a true evasion of the laws of the country, which Hungarian laws prohibit. This project was conceived by the primate of the kingdom, and by the [chief?] justice and chancellor.

Q. What penalty do they deserve for this?

A. Death. Whoever violates the laws and deceives a whole nation is a traitor to his country, and deserves the penalty of death.

Q. How has King Francis so far deceived the Hungarian nation?

A. He interferes with the freedom of the press assured by the laws. He secretly threatens the county meetings which defend this freedom according to law. When his [Hungarian] minions return from the French war, he wishes (as he himself declared despotically in a certain audience given to his agent Bujanovics) to cut off their heads, for fear that they might later resist or oppose him.

Q. Why did King Francis take the oath according to Hungarian laws?

A. So that, once crowned and the oath taken, he might violate the laws of the country with impunity, and treat the Hungarian nation as an ignoble colony.

Q. Would Hungary in this way be a true colony of the court of Vienna?

A. Yes. (1) The King of Hungary does not dream of residing in Hungary just as the kings of England, Spain and Portugal and the stadtholder of Holland have no desire to reside in their colonies. (2) As kings levy intolerable taxes on goods of the colonies belonging to them, so the Cabinet of Vienna burdens all Hungarian products with a tax of almost 50 percent. (3) As Mexican gold is continuously and freely taken out by the Spaniards, so are gold, silver, copper and iron carried from Hungary to Vienna. On some of our coins the Cabinet of Vienna deigns to put the phrase "Protectress of Hungary," but the protectress counsels only ruin under the German [Viennese] Cabinet.

Q. Has the recent lot of the Poles under the Russians and Prussians been more shameful than that of the Hungarians under the Austrians?

A. It is the same. As the Russians and Prussians are foreign peoples in relation to the Poles, so are the Austrians in relation to the Hungarians.

Q. What then must be done by the Hungarians to liberate themselves from political nullity and from the Austrian yoke?

A. Like the Poles, they should raise up a holy insurrection, wrest the royal dynasty from the hands of Francis, and introduce a republic and good laws by which both nobles and non-nobles might be happy.

Q. Is the Hungarian people under any obligation to recognize the archducal family of Austria as legitimate?

A. No. Because the unjust and usurping Joseph broke the line of succession. Because the nation made no solemn contract with Leopold, and never accepted him as the first of a new line. Hence his son Francis cannot be the true heir to the kingdom. Even if he were, he has lost the right by breaking and violating the laws, and is a true usurper of the Hungarian scepter and tyrant over the people.

Q. Among what nations should Hungary be placed, in view of its political situation?

A. Among the Wallachians [or Vlachs] and Moldavians. For the Poles are a hundred years ahead of the Hungarians in civilization [*cultura ingenii*]. Recently the Sardinians threw off the yoke of Piedmont, but Hungary still bears its yoke.

Q. Can Hungary subsist alone?

A. Very well. Nine million people living on the best of soil could, by introducing a proper order, resist Turks and Germans.

Q. In that case should Francis be allowed to remain on the throne, if he consented to live in the kingdom and rule well?

A. Not even in that case, because royal promises are always false. On the first occasion, every king breaks his word and deceives his people without shame, and, if he can, puts them under the yoke without mercy. The system of a single king is arbitrary and leads to tyranny. Infants need a nurse, children a father, orphans a guardian, but only stupid nations need a king. Intelligence is not lacking to the Hungarians, if only the national educational institutions can be improved. A good king is a useless animal for the mass of the nation, consuming its wealth, perverting its moral character, fomenting misery for the people. A perfidious king is a traitor to his country, and should be put to death. King Francis in his stupidity is guided by other men's lies; he is unfit to govern, and is himself to be put rather under perpetual tutelage. Why then should he be allowed to rule, when by his lack of judgment and discretion he should be perpetually ruled himself?

Chapter II

On the Political Reform of Hungary

Q. In what way, then, should the Hungarians improve their political lot, and shake off the yoke of the infamous Cabinet of Vienna?

A. By adopting a new and better form of government, more suited to the genius of the nation.

Q. What should this consist in?

A. Let the Hungarian nation take back the supreme power from the king, and declare the country a free and independent republic.

Q. What should be the form of this republic?

A. Since, under the name of the Hungarian nation are comprised all the peoples who inhabit the provinces belonging to Hungary and who are in effect different nations, each nation ought to constitute a province by itself, have its own particular constitution, and be united by a close bond with the others. That is, the Hungarian republic should be federal; each nation freely enjoying its own language, its own manners and customs, and its own freedom of religion. It is enough for the welfare of the republic if each nation is joined in a union with every other.

Q. What should be the basis of the republican union?

A. There are two kinds of security in any society: external and internal. The former guards against usurpation and injury by outside powers, the latter restrains domestic tumults against public order. All the Hungarian provinces should constitute a unified indivisible republic so far as external security is concerned, but a confederated republic in matters of internal security.

Q. How should the Hungarian republics be organized according to these mixed principles?

A. 1. Let the Hungarians adopt a twofold classification of citizens. Let one class contain the greater and lesser nobility, with no distinction between magnates and [other] nobles. Let the second class include all non-nobles, both urban and rural. 2. Since the population of the Hungarian provinces is about 9,000,000, the deputies or representatives in a general congress may number 248, of whom half, or 124, should be elected from among the nobles, the other half from among non-nobles. 3. From 30,000 to 40,000 non-nobles shall elect one representative. For the nobles, however, as many as have, taken together, annual incomes from real and personal property of 100,000 to 130,000 florins shall combine to elect one deputy. Alternately, for periods of a fortnight a noble or non-noble shall be chosen to preside. Special committees, e.g., for public safety, public instruction, etc., should have an equal number of representatives from each class of citizens. Each congress should last one year, except that the first or convention-congress should sit until the reform is completed. Let the convention-congress then form a constitution in which two chambers are adopted and the following principles accepted. The entire executive power should depend on the legislative body. Each federated province is to use its own language and be obliged to make its provincial constitution consistent with the fundamentals of the general constitution. Freedom of religion, thought and writing should be complete, commerce unrestricted, justice administered gratis to all, the militia purely national, the arts and sciences cultivated.

Q. What will be the difference between the noble and the non-noble?

A. The noble alone will be the proprietor of [rural] land. The cities, formerly called royal, will be called national, and in them even the non-noble will have the right to real property. Non-nobles who are peasants and villagers will be tenants of the landowners, and in accord with the agreements with the landowners will pay an annual amount either in money, or in kind, or in labor services. Since the noble is the same as the landowner, he should receive his customary revenues either by way of the feudal system, or through rents. The noble may also use armorial bearings, and will have the first right to commands in the cavalry.

Q. What does the noble gain by this reform?

A. Much. For the noble is freed from three tyrants by this reform: the king, the magnates and the estate of the upper clergy. Moreover, the nobles, since they would be raising the non-nobles to a second chamber and declaring them free from slavery, by being perpetually joined with them and in mutual support, would themselves be invincible.

Q. What commerce could a reformed Hungary carry on?

A. A considerable amount, both internal and external. The peoples neighboring on Hungary, poorer than we in many products, would carry on trade and bring money into the republic. Hungary could most especially develop two ports, at Fiume and Zimony; since after a commercial treaty with the Turks there could be navigation from Zimony to the Black Sea. The huge forests of

Slavonia and Croatia, suited for shipbuilding at Zimony, would bring grea riches to their owners.

Q. But the funds necessary for this reform are lacking in Hungary?

A. Upon abolition of the useless royal dignity, Hungary would receive the roya and crown lands, the palatine lands, the payments made by nobles to th crown for their mineral lands, the salt revenues, the postal fees, and the incom from taxes, lotteries and lesser sources. If the property of the clergy wer added, then by an accurate calculation it is certain that annual revenues o 40,000,000 florins would be available. And since Hungary has no public debts it cannot be doubted that these revenues would grow through wise administration, and provide for all needs of the republic, the army, the political offices, etc

Q. In that case, would it be necessary to pay any tax or subsidy?

A. No, since these revenues are sufficient for public needs, except for an occasiona urgent necessity, in which event each man for his own welfare should pay a slight tax.

Q. The bishops and prelates say that it is dangerous to convert Church properties to profane uses. For if these should be taken for that purpose, then even the noble properties would be endangered.

A. That is false. For the nobles are true owners of their goods, because they have obtained them by gift, inheritance or purchase, in a word, by means admitted in the law. The nation on such a question uses intelligence, observes the rights of humanity, and will never violate property. It is different with the Church's wealth, which the nation long ago conquered by arms from the Romans and entrusted to King Stephen as the first representative of the nation. He, in turn, with consent of the estates, turned over the usufruct to the bishops and other churchmen to advance the Christian religion. This aim has been achieved, and the bishops who propagated the Christian religion made sufficient use of this wealth. The modern ones use it to enrich whores and concubines or their own relatives, worship God only with the lips, immerse their minds in worldly arts and so spend great riches on corruption. Hence the nation ought to take back from these men both the incomes so perversely expended and the goods themselves.

Q. But can the nation convert these goods, destined for spiritual uses, to profane ends?

A. The nation has always retained these goods by proprietary right, having only granted, through the king, the usufruct to the prelates. In any case, it would be a more spiritual end for the nation to use these goods to relieve poverty, help needy parish priests, and aid or relieve mendicity, than for the prelates to waste them on feasting, on luxury and extravagance, and on concubines and other perverse creatures of their own.

Chapter III

On the Insurrection of the Hungarians

Q. How can the Hungarians accomplish this reform?

A. By insurrection against the Austrian despotism and against the magnates and prelates.

Q. How should this insurrection be arranged?

A. If the Society of Reformers gains enough strength and understanding from this catechism, and numbers among its members some of the more influential nobles in each county, then even the non-nobles may be invited to join, and the whole of this catechism may be revealed to them. When this is done, two or three neighboring counties should print and publish an act of insurrection against the house of Austria, the magnates and the prelates, and invite the other counties to accede to it.

Q. What should the act of insurrection contain?

A. It should list the crimes of the Cabinet of Vienna against Hungary, from Ferdinand to Francis [1526-1794], proclaim the insurrection, and conclude with these words: "To arms, citizens! Let us swear to lose life rather than liberty, to seek death rather than admit dependence on the house of Austria, to endure any extremes before ceasing to uphold the integrity of the Hungarian republic with all our strength."

Q. In this event, what must we do with the Hungarian armed force?

A. That part which is absent will be called home under penalty of being declared in a state of emigration. The rest, which is in the country, will rally to the national standard and take the oath to the nation.

Q. Is this insurrection an easy matter?

A. Very easy. The French have declared that they will defend all regenerated nations that are their friends. The Poles, in their present troubles, will be friendly to us, and it will be agreeable to the Turk to see the house of Austria weakened. Styria can hardly wait for Hungary to throw off the Austrian yoke, and will desire admission into a union with Hungary. The only difficulty lies in throwing a few German regiments out of the kingdom.

Q. In that case what will the Cabinet of Vienna do?

A. It will bewail its fall, but too late, and will return to its original status as an archduchy. For the Bohemians, too, have ideas of separation from the perfidious Austrian Cabinet, which, thus attacked, will expiate its inveterate crimes.

To arms, citizens, noble and non-noble! Vindicate the innocent blood of our brothers who have perished in German wars fatal to us! Establish a more sound form of government, that our people at last, at the end of our century, may be blessed with a truly free constitution!

II

Catechism of Man and Citizen

Paragraph One

On Man

Question: What is man?

Answer: A reasonable animal.

Q. What is reason?

A. It is a faculty with which one may form ideas, make judgments about them, and reason, remember the past and estimate the future.

Q. Has man anything besides his reason?

A. Yes, he has a species of body, whose physical strength is useful in serving the instincts of the mind.

Q. What will happen to man, if he does not follow his reason?

A. He will become an animal, with the outward appearance of a human being, but in reality no more than a beast.

Q. What does reason tell man?

A. To take care of himself and his happiness.

Q. How can he do that?

A. In no other way than by labor, with which he can fulfill his physical and moral needs.

Q. How can he fulfill these needs?

A. With methods given by reason. For example, to acquire personal and real property, to trade, to do manual work and agricultural toil, to labor in the sciences, to do domestic work, and so forth.

Q. What is necessary if reason is to teach man to do all the above-mentioned things?

A. Reason must be free of all diseases.

Q. What are the diseases of reason?

A. Ignorance and blind faith. They result in a kind of madness, which through habit dominates the feelings and makes beasts out of men.

Q. What must be put against ignorance and blind faith?

A. Observation and experiment, from which enlightenment stems.

Q. In these methods, which would ensure our happiness, what are the principles?

A. That a man should become free, and his freedom be guided by his reason.

Q. What is the essence of this freedom?

A. The opportunity of doing everything which is necessary for ourselves and does harm to no one.

Q. Who hinders man in exercising his freedom?

A. Wicked people.

Q. Where would lie their main attack on man in order to suppress his freedom?

A. On two things, his life and property.

Q. What does property mean?

A. It means anything belonging to an individual, to the exclusion of other persons.

Q. How many kinds of property are there?

A. Two kinds; first, an inner kind, which is born with a man, such as his idea of justice and speech, and the right to communicate with anybody, by any means. Secondly, an external kind, which he acquires, such as land, fields and clothing.

Q. Has any man the right to deprive another of his life, freedom and property?

A. First, no man or human agency has the right to punish a human being with death, because life is a gift of nature, and therefore only nature can take it away. Second, the exercise of freedom, and the owning of some property, arises from the nature of man, and is the most innocent and most sacred instinct of man, and his most natural right; therefore no man or human agency has the right to disturb another in his freedom and property. Third, all men are the same kind of beings and therefore have equal rights. This equality should be upheld for their own happiness.

Paragraph Two

On the Citizen

Q. But what should a man do if evil people, against the law of nature, attack his life and property?

A. Then it is necessary for him to resist oppression.

Q. If the strength of one man is not enough to resist oppression, what should he do?

A. In that case, it is necessary for all the oppressed to unite. They should form an alliance among themselves, and so form a citizen society.

Q. What is the aim of this society?

A. The united security of every one of the members.

Q. What should be the name of the members of the society?

A. Citizens. Every other name or privilege, such as king, count, baron, priest, etc., is illegal and criminal, and against the social contract.

Q. What is the social contract?

A. It is summarized in this sentence: We, the members of this citizen society, wish to resist oppression with all our intellectual and moral force, and to guarantee each other's natural rights, liberty, property, life and equality.

Q. What are the means with which we can maintain this social contract?

A. They are the laws invented by wisdom, and which show the rectitude of the heart.

Q. What is the thing called law?

A. The natural and fundamental will of the people, with which the country tries to secure its status.

Q. Must every citizen be present when the law is made?

A. Yes, either personally, or through the elected representatives of the counties.

Q. Why?

A. Because in making the law, the well-being of each individual citizen is at stake; therefore it is necessary that every member of the society should be present in the legislature. Also, since the people are equal, and similar to each other in their natural rights, no one could be excluded without violation of the social contract.

Q. Is there anything that could interfere with the people in this legislature?

A. Because the physical and intellectual strength of the people is superior to anything, and can defeat any internal and external obstacles which might hasten the disorganization, disintegration and oppression of the people, the strength of the people can ensure the supreme power and rule of the people.

Q. What are the characteristics of a society where the social contract is in effect?

A. The characteristics are as follows: The collection of the main laws, called the Constitution, which upholds the right to life, liberty, property and equality, for each individual and for society as a whole.

Q. What are the different powers of the society?

A. The constitution is prepared either by the people, or in the parliament by the representatives of the people, to whom the people have granted unlimited power. A legislative body should be set up to promulgate laws in the spirit of the constitution. The legislative body should be composed of the representatives of the people. Finally, a government should be set up, an executive power, which would execute the laws of the legislative body. But this executive power is always under the legislative body, and dependent thereon.

Q. Should there be an order in the rule of the people and in the government?

A. Yes. First, there are local meetings where the rule of the people is first exercised, and where representatives are elected. The Constitution prepared by the representatives is either accepted or rejected in these local meetings. Second, there are meetings where the people can choose the office-holders. Third, there is the national assembly, which is above the other two assemblies. The government has as many secretaries or commissioners as there are branches in the government. The county councils are responsible to the government. The counties are subdivided into smaller units, such as villages. The various branches of the government are the army, finances, criminal law. justice, national education and commerce, naval forces and trade, various skills, science, and so forth.

Q. Is there any discrimination in a citizen society?

A. Only persons in public office have a kind of superiority, because they may command in the name of the law. For the same reason, all public offices, created by the common will, should be respected.

Q. What characteristics should a man have who wishes to hold office?

A. He should be an intelligent, complete and talented man. One trait without the others is not sufficient. A clever, shrewd and vile person is just as dangerous through his meanness, as a witless good one through his stupidity.

Q. When can we say that society fulfills its aim: the security of human rights?

A. When the three parts of society are reconciled with one another. The state is like God, the form of government is his servant, and the citizens, abiding by the laws, are his beloved children.

Q. Society does not need any other parts; but what kind of beings can we find in the society of today?

A. They are like bastard animals and demons who constantly work on the corruption of society, which was created perfect by Politika, the daughter of Nature.

Q. What is the citizen thinking of daily?

A. Of virtue, love of country, work, courage, and death.

Paragraph Three

On Slavery

Q. What is a slave?

A. A slave is a man whose will depends on his lord.

Q. What is a slave called in the countries of despotism?

A. The miserable name of serf.

Q. What is the essence of despotic countries?

A. The supreme power of the people is unlawfully usurped.

Q. How is the supreme power of the people usurped?

A. The supreme power of the society is seized by one or more men. In the first case, we call it a monarchy; in the second, aristocracy.

Q. What is the nature of these forms of government?

A. Both are tyrannical. As we know, one person (we call him king or emperor), or a small number of families can manipulate a vast nation according to their pleasure.

Q. What is the primary abuse of these forms of government?

A. The people works only for the pleasure of the king and the aristocracy, and itself suffers in poverty.

Q. How do the king and aristocracy abuse the people in time of war?

A. They declare war for their own profit, and then command the people to attack an enemy, which became an enemy because of their own pride and treachery. Then the people must provide every means for this unjust war: money, food and arms. There is no place for war among the people.

Q. What is the result of these wars?

A. People are murdered in the butchery of war. Poets, in the pay of scoundrels, praise the events of war, and under the veil of fancy words create the superstition of horrible things, which are the shame of human intelligence. The end of this unnatural butchery is that the people lose their property, taxes and debts grow, and thus the tyrant becomes even more powerful and tyrannical, because the people have become weaker as the result of taxes.

Q. Are the serfs consulted before the taxes are increased?

A. Never! The serfs, being genuine slaves, do not dare to utter their will, and are therefore forced to pay the taxes, however heavy, to the tyrants.

Q. Is there any difference between beasts and slaves in the way they are provided for?

A. Not a bit. Just as the farmer drives his cattle before the plow, as he pleases, so do the king and the aristocrats treat their slaves.

Q. Yes, but the king and aristocrats help their serfs in times of starvation?

A. Yes, but so does the owner who feeds his cattle. He does so only in order to preserve them for future work, which will increase his wealth.

Paragraph Four

On Rebellion

Q. Does the slave lose his rights?

A. Not completely. The rights of man cannot be completely abolished. While he is alive, he has the right to defend his life, freedom, property and equality.

Q. How does the tyrant abuse the rights of man?

A. Tyrannical coercion can silence the natural rights of man, but when he has an opportunity to break the chains of slavery, he must rebel.

Q. What does rebellion mean?

A. Just that the power of the nation turns against the tyrant. This is the end of slavery and the dawn of freedom.

Q. How does the rebellion come about?

A. The serfs cannot bear the chains of their slavery any longer; they form a common opinion on the natural rights of man, through writing, discussion and alliances. Then those who are the most talented, and those whose hearts are opened by enlightened philosophy to the crimes of kings and aristocrats against their fellow citizens, turn to the people: "To arms citizens! Let us swear: freedom or death!"

Q. What must the people do at the time of rebellion?

A. One part must arm. The slave soldiers must join their citizen friends. Others must go on with their work to support the revolution. The people must immediately elect representatives to the constituent assembly, which should punish the tyrants and their mercenaries, and abolish all the crimes of tyrannical rule.

Q. Are there sufficient reasons for rebellion in every state of Europe?

A. Yes, there are enough. With the exception of France and a few Swiss cantons, all the other states are governed for the profit of a few families, and the people, deprived of their natural rights, suffer under the feudal system, and have no other inheritance save misery and poverty.

Q. Is the power of the nation sufficient to execute the revolution and reconquer liberty?

A. Yes. This is a principle in politics: Every nation can become free immediately, when it wishes to. A tyrant, abandoned by the people, becomes nul, and the body of the nation can easily crush him.

Q. What principles should govern the insurrection?

A. The omnipotency of strength, talent and moral character.

Q. What should happen to the tyrants and traitors?

A. They must all die for the good of the liberated people.

Q. What kind of rule should be set up after the rebellion?

A. Nothing but a democratic republic, which promises the defense of the aims of the insurrection, the natural rights of man.

Q. What is the difference between an enlightened nation and a corrupt one, at the time of insurrection?

A. The first can destroy arbitrary rule and acquire freedom without bloodshed. The other is unable to do so without war, murder, death sentences, and anarchy, meaning complete disintegration. This results in confusion, but out of it order and freedom may be born.

Q. Who oppresses the people to the point that insurrection becomes necessary?

A. The privileged orders, such as the nobility and the clergy. Philosophy and mankind regard them as a threefold scourge of humanity.

Paragraph Five

On the King

Q. What does "king" mean?

A. It means one who handles the people and its property arbitrarily and who thinks he can buy or sell men, trade his provinces, be lenient to evildoers, and punish those who dare to turn against him.

Q. What is the origin of kingship?

A. Every society ruled itself democratically at the beginning, but there was soon one among the citizens who surpassed the others in arrogance and courage in war. He became the leader of his nation in war, and was admired as a conqueror by the ignorant, who were ruled by him. In this way the nation gave the highest power to him. He abused it. He made slaves of free men, and was adored by the people at the price of their welfare.

Q. But people say that kings derived their power from God.

A. This is a lie, which abetted kings through centuries of darkness. Thus they became more feared, because their own prestige was supported by the "wrath of God."

Q. Has the nation the right to force the king to abdicate?

A. The nation not only has the right to abolish the monarchy, but must do so if it wants to live freely, enjoying its most sacred rights.

Q. Perhaps this punishment is necessary only if the kings are bad and tyrannical, not when they are good, wise and just?

A. It is necessary in either case. If the king is bad, the monarchy becomes an evil institution, offering the king opportunities to tyrannize over his people. If the king is a good one, then it is the system of monarchy, vile by nature, which is responsible for ills. In that case, the poison comes from the hands of the ministers of the king. In the first case, the people is oppressed by the king and the system of government; in the second, by the system of monarchy and the ministers.

Q. What kind of characteristics in a king would be sufficient to make his people happy?

A. Such a king should have morals and wisdom proportionate to the extensive body of the people, since every citizen expects his happiness from the king's actions.

Q. Is such a king possible?

A. Nature never created a man of infinite wisdom and deep morality who could work for the happiness of his whole people. Every king is deceived by his courtiers or deceives others, either by his vile nature or his stupidity.

Q. Can the good achieved by a king's blind instinct of justice be lasting?

A. Never. Because if a good king dies, whatever good he did usually disappears with him, and the arbitrariness of the next one changes everything. Remember the proverb: *Novus rex, nova lex.* New king, new law.

Q. By what means do kings oppress their people?

A. Several. The most important are: their haughtiness, their splendor, their luxury. They buy conscience, they lust for conquest, they desire profit. Finally, they abuse the ignorance of the downtrodden people.

Q. What is the nature of kingly arrogance?

A. Kings hide themselves from their people in their castles, keeping themselves far from those who sustain them. They give audience with a great deal of ceremony, and they force those who seek an audience to bend their knees before the throne. The granting of justice—which they owe to the people—they call mercy. Finally, every subject must sign his petition with these degrading words: "The most humble and most obedient slave and vassal of your majesty," who is often the haughtiest, meanest and stupidest of rulers.

Q. What is the nature of royal splendor?

A. It is immense and extremely expensive. One has only to see the coronation of the emperor and the king of Hungary, or the marriage of the dauphin of formerly enslaved France, or the coronation of the king of Spain or Poland, or of the Pope. All this splendor is at the charge of the people, which lives in poverty. Through it, kings hope to convince the weak-minded that they are a species of animal superior to human beings.

Q. What is extent of their luxury?

A. It is limitless. Look at the infinite number of castles, gardens, hunting forests, guardsmen, animals, gold and silver tableware, treasure, clothes, courtiers, men and women, whores, whorehouses, ministers with wigs, horses, opera singers, comedians, esquires and house-servants of those who, as mercenaries, are willing to serve the haughtiness and tyrannical meanness of their lord. And all this luxury does not suffice those who want to pose before the world.

Q. How do the kings buy conscience?

A. The whole wealth of the people is in their hands. They abuse it. One of these abuses is the subversion of conscience. Their ambassadors are nothing but privileged spies who receive immense sums of money to bribe the ministers of foreign courts. This spying costs millions. They encourage low instincts, but they pretend they honor only men of morals. They attract the overambitious to their court with money and offices, and the weak souls with empty titles. In this way, they spoil the morals of the people and corrupt the whole nation.

Q. What are the results of their desire for conquests?

A. The kings declare and start war in order to conquer some provinces. The result of this is that the people's wealth is destroyed, cities are depopulated, meadows and fields are devastated, so that the poverty of the people is increased.

Q. How do they handle the people's wealth?

A. Their management is the worst in the world. All kings are loaded with debts. Tolls and taxes and all kinds of monopolies, which they use to pay the interest on their debts, are not sufficient. The finance ministers can cover their wastefulness for a short term with new taxes, for which they invent fancy reasons.

In England expenditure surpasses income in peacetime by 11 million pounds, in Austria by 30 million florins.

Q. What should the people do to avoid bankruptcy?

A. What France did: abolish the monarcy, set up a democratic republic, and pay the debts through the national economy. The tyrants, together with their mercenaries, should be punished.

Q. Why do kings maintain ignorance?

A. Since their system is so criminal, it must be covered with the night of ignorance. Observation and light would remove their mask, and would serve the interest of the people. Therefore they hate these, wholeheartedly.

Q. What is the effect of this conduct of the kings on the character of the people?

A. Because human beings are born in ignorance and immorality, the faults of the kings are easily passed on to them, and the rich ones imitate them in their haughtiness, splendor, luxury and immoderateness, which deserve every kind of punishment. Thus the soul of the subject becomes inferior, venal, and completely corrupt. Poverty induces a vast number of people to become thieves and murderers, who destroy and kill, and thus the peaceful citizen has no security for his property. *"Regis ad exemplum totus componitur orbis."* As the king's example, so the world.

Q. How is it possible that there were so many traitors in the French Revolution?

A. The oppressive system of the French monarchy and the spirit native to the French produced many great and enlightened men, who aroused the spirit of freedom in their fellow citizens, yet who were spoiled by the previous system of government. Therefore, while many of them are great legislators, others are scoundrels, who are now being punished by the nation, and have died beneath the guillotine. Because of the inheritance of the monarchy, the democratic way of government is almost impossible. The good laws are severe, and the corrupt cannot tolerate them.

Q. Then give your final judgment on the king.

A. The good king is a useless and heavy burden, who makes the people sweat blood, and brings them into final poverty. The bad king is the source of all evil in a monarchy.

Paragraph Six

On the Nobility

Q. What is the nobility?

A. A class of men who are exempt from many sacred duties to society, and believe themselves superior to the multitude, and better and more noble than other citizens. For this reason the honorable body of the people is nothing to them but rascally peasants.

Q. What is the origin of this institution?

A. The origin of the nobility is the same as that of the king. The first conquerors became kings, and their fellow fighters received certain privileges. In this way they were freed from the sacred duties to society; and because the world in past times thought it a great merit to kill people in a knightly fashion, only soldiers could become nobles. Nowadays the usurer merchant, money-changer, rich Jew, useful spy, wealthy beer-brewer, and the majestic and imperial and apostolic whorehouse owner can become one too.

Q. By what right is nobility called the scourge of human kind?

A. What kings cannot achieve with their criminal acts, nobles achieve by special oppression of the serfs.

Q. What is the power of the nobility over their serfs?

A. The noble considers his serfs and his cattle his inseparable property. Often he goes so far that he violates even the life of his serfs. This is the awful feudal system!

Q. What kind of oppression do the serfs suffer from the nobles?

A. The serfs—who are called parasites by them—are forced to interrupt their own work according to the arbitrary will of their lords, and go to work for them. These peasants have to accept peaceably the multiplication of their tolls and taxes. In certain provinces these poor victims do not even have the right to complain against their lords, and so they are left with the sad choice of death by starvation or of killing their tyrannical lords and then being hanged as common criminals.

Q. What are the manners of the nobility?

A. The worst possible. The nobility consists of two parts, the great nobles, and the petty nobility. The great nobles are the most ignorant of all. They call each other "du," and talk of nothing but horses, stables, hunting, whores, how to waste money, and all sorts of perversities. They hate the lesser nobility and talk of the peasants as cattle. All of them are debt-ridden. They marry, but despise the duties of marriage. The wives of princes and counts and so on take their barbers and servants as lovers; their husbands consort with female comedians and whores, and enjoy raping innocent girls whom they can buy with their accursed money, against the voice of nature and conscience. The petty noble is powerless, and owns nothing but his noble name to be haughty about. He has only the will to oppress the people, but he is less ignorant.

Q. What are the relations of kings and nobles to each other?

A. The history of every country proves that kings and nobles have always engaged in the bloodiest wars, and have always tried to outdo each other in arrogance. If the kings were victorious the fate of the nobility was slavery; but if the nobility won the power of the king was brought within limits, or was completely abolished. In that case, the aristocracy ruled. This was a sad game for the people who fought for king or aristocracy, but in the end remained in poverty.

Q. What is the fate of the nobility under an absolute monarch?

A. The kings are absolute sovereigns, and the nobles are only slaves of the court. The people, like cattle, feed the king and his servants.

Q. How does an all-powerful king handle the nobility?

A. The king permits the nobles to come to court, to wear fancy ribbons and artificial stars, and carry gold and silver keys. He bestows all sorts of titles, such as "excellency," and so on. The great nobles win the highest civil and military posts. Since they are the haughtiest and most ignorant and corrupt, they are the closest and most similar to the king.

Paragraph Seven

On Priests

Q. What does "priest" mean?

A. A man who believes he has unlimited power over our souls, which he knows very little about. He considers himself the only interpreter of God's will.

Q. Could he ever prove he has a rightful power over our souls and conscience?

A. Never. The brahmins, lamas, caliphs and popes, together with secular priests, deceived the world in order to swindle the ignorant and subjugate them. This in brief is the content of their history, for which the world has been the sad playground.

Q. What was their aim in establishing their power in such a way?

A. To attain power and to maintain the eternal slavery of the subjugated. These scoundrel priests saw that the people obey more easily if threatened with eternal fire, not merely with earthly punishments. They immediately founded so-called holy societies, such as the sacred mother church, where there was no question of maintaining the original social contract, but rather of imposing blind and severe obedience, which provided the basis of power over peoples and kings.

Q. Did the priest achieve unlimited power?

A. Yes, the priest everywhere, by playing the saint and through superstitions, rules countries in the name of an avenging God. The priests have always pitted father against son, and one religion against another; they have lighted the torch of civil war and crusades, using any means to enlarge their power. In past centuries even the kings bowed before them, and, in general, there is no crime or meanness which priests have not committed. They pretend they desire only heaven, but in reality they mix in worldly affairs. The first priests were usually atheists.

Q. Are there ways to extinguish this triple scourge?

A. Yes, there are: Observation and enlightenment, which breed sacred rebellion against kings, nobles and priests.

NOTES

The first number of *Polish Western Affairs* has just reached the Editor's desk. It is published by the Instytut Zachodni at Poznań. The Editor in Chief is Professor M. Sczaniecki, of the Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań. The Instytut has been publishing the *Przeglad Zachodni* since 1945. The *Przeglad* was for a while at the beginning published in French and English editions, but these editions were soon discontinued. It has now been decided to reestablish an organ that will make available to western scholars in various disciplines some of the important results of the researches of Polish scholars in the history and culture of the Western lands bordering on the Oder and the Nyssa rivers. The wide dissemination of the views of German scholars and publicists in publications of the many German institutes for "Eastern Research" has contributed to induce their Polish opposite numbers to answer in kind.

The present number contains articles which cover a wide span of interest: from a brief but precise discussion by Professor Gieysztor of the founding of the Polish state in the tenth century to "Polish Comments on a book dealing with the German Fifth Column" or a collaborative study of a "Manual of German Revisionism" (*Das östlich Deutschland*). One of the most useful articles in this valuable number is a listing of "The Ostforschung Centers in the German Republic." There appear to be around thirty such institutes. The amount of publications, scholarly and otherwise, put out by these centers is staggering.

A somewhat bitterly amusing paper in this number is a "Letter from Professor Wagner to Congressman Reece." It would have been difficult for anyone to have compiled a larger number of factual errors and misconstructions of history than Mr. Reece put into his speech (July 11, 1957) which has received such wide publicity from German irridentist circles. One has a right to wonder where Mr. Reece could have obtained his "information."

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The Imre Nagy Institute for Political Research, 467 avenue Brugmann, Brussels, Belgium, has begun publication of *The Review,* a quarterly dedicated, it would appear, to problems of international socialism. This first issue (October, 1960) contains a number of articles on socialism in various countries, e.g. Italy, China, Scandinavia, and France. There is an interesting diary on the Kilian Barracks during the Revolution, running from October 23 to Novembr 8, 1956. Some hitherto unrecorded details of the reaction of the Hungarian army come out. The most substantial contribution is Erich Fromm's "Socialist Manifesto and Program."

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Almost in the same mail there arrived the first number of *The New Hungarian Quarterly,* published by the Corvina Press, Budapest, and edited by an editorial committee headed by Ivan Boldiszár. The original *Hungarian Quarterly* suspended publication in the early years of World War II. It was partly literary, partly feuilletonist, partly historical and partly artistic. The *New Quarterly* follows the same policy. It presents the new post-war Hungary in its various aspects, with surveys of economic development, several short stories with Marxian overtones, an article on "The Unknown

Hayden" (Denés Bartha) "A Journey to England" by a leading Hungarian translator from English who visited T. S. Eliot in London, and some interesting documents of Hungary's position in the late War, and finally a whole section on the Theater and Cinema. The list of articles coming in the next number promises a selection as varied and entertaining as the present one. There is still room for a solid scientific Hungarian journal in western langauge or languages. This journal is attractively printed and the English is quite good.

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The Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America has moved to a new home, 59 East 66th Street, New York City. The dedication of the new quarters took place on November 18. The president of the Institute, Professor Oscar Halecki presided, and there were addresses by Professor Arnold J. Zurcher, Mr. Alfred Jurzykowski and Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Institute is to be sincerely felicitated on its achievement of permanence and a very impressive status.

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Professor R. John Rath of the University of Texas has just published the first *Austrian History New Letter,* under the auspices of the United States Committee to promote Studies of the History of the Habsburg Empire. Professor Rath has been for several years the dedicated secretary of this committee and this newsletter, a bibliography of amazing extent, is the result of his faithful and painstaking work. The New Letter contains: Austrian Doctoral Dissertations dealing with the problems of the Habsburg Monarchy from 1848 to 1915, a classified compilation by Walther Rechberger of the University of Vienna; Austrian Dissertation in the Library of Congress (compiled by Fritz Epstein) ; Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation in the United States: a supplement to the January 1960 Publication and Research Projects List, miscellanea and news items. A most useful and substantial New Letter, which is ample evidence, if any were needed, of the vigor and *Stoff* of the field.

BOOK REVIEWS

BERKIS, ALEXANDER V., *The Reign of Duke James in Courland 1638-1682*. Lincoln, Nebraska: Vaidava, 1960. Pp. 213.

Although not large in volume, this is a valuable addition to Baltic historiography which abounds not only in historical material in many languages, but also in a number of contradictory interpretations and approaches.

To the reader unfamiliar with the peoples dwelling on the eastern shores of the Baltic, and with the processes of centuries of political development in that region, this book will offer a graphic picture of how peoples lived and struggled in one of the so-called neuralgic zones of the Euorpean continent. The well-informed Baltic historiographer, however, will be interested to observe the author's attempt to introduce some novel ideas and suggestions which enliven already complicated phenomena around the Duchy of Courland and its central figure, a man of great abilities, Duke James himself.

The book's value is augmented by the fact that the author, as befits a true historian, has tried to work out his analyses as much as possible from primary sources of information, referring to second-hand material only where there is no other alternative. The many juridical, administrative and diplomatic texts he seems to have examined with great care, and his polemics—in which he uses all possible restraint—are based objectively on historical evidence.

Thus the author's work is completely free from any taint of the national ambitions, national prejudice and hatred which so plagued the German-Balt school of thought at the end of the nineteenth and in the beginning of the twentieth centuries, and which in recent years have emerged again and flourish today in the dogmatically intolerant, biased and often tiresome creations of Bolshevik historians.

Expressive, for instance, is the author's account of international relationships before the Swedish-Polish War, which began in 1655, and proved tragic for the Duchy of Courland in its precarious situation between a large continent and an inland sea, in a position geographically highly exposed and vulnerable, at the juncture of constantly vying forces and their thirst for power. To a certain extent the same can be said of Duke James' colonial policies, which were a kind of unique *tour de force* in that century, when great political powers were continually pushing toward expansion. In this respect, however, the author has some serious predecessors among the German-Balt historians, and there his personal approach should have been less obvious. In dealing with Latvians, his kin, and stressing their national role, their conditions and trends, he shows originality of thought. In chapters 5 and 6, for instance, concerned with the condition of burghers and peasants, and religious and intellectual life in Courland, the foreign reader should find some interesting parallels. Particularly likeable are the many and substantiated testimonies of the attachment the Latvian peasants felt for "their Duke", whose liberal ideas and their subsequent realization had gained wide response and popular loyalty even in times of danger (pp. 95-99, 140-141, 150 and others).

A few critical remarks must be added. Why, in the first chapter of his book, has the author included some pages on the history of Courland before the German Conquest? Unfortunately these pages are rather mediocre. The author's persistence in applying the German version of Latvian place names is surprising. Would it not have been better to have included a special list of place names in their different variations, or perhaps indicated at least the non-Latvian names in parentheses after the Latvian names?

In the beginning of his book the author in some instances is unable to free himself from the imperialistic impact of former historical schools: the Duchy of

Courland remains to him "small". But how large were the Italian seafaring republics of Amalfi or Pisa, for instance? Here historians do not deem it necessary to apply the adjective "small".

In conclusion, I would like to stress to the international reader that during these past years, when small and medium-sized republics have sprung up like mushrooms after a rain, and only the "anti-colonial" policy of Soviet Russia continues to hold in its clutches the once free Baltic States, Mr. Berkis' book is not only interesting, but timely as well.

Washington, D.C. A. Spekke

Peukert, Herbert, *Die Slawen der Donaumonarchie und die Universität Jena 1700-1848.* Pp. xx, 277. Berlin. Akademie-Verlag, 1958. DM 33.

The number of German historians who have obtained and use an adequate training in West-Slav languages and literatures is limited, and by and large the regions of contact between the Germans and their immediate neighbors to the east have been more frequently and more successfully studied by Slavic than by German scholars. (This is, indeed, no new situation, though there were always some notable exceptions such as Jacob Caro, Friedrich Bezold or Hermann Markgraf.) More than 40 years have now passed since Germans and West-Slavs had at least a common field of direct interaction in the political arenas of the Habsburg monarchy, and in these few decades many inducements for the learning of Slavic tongues seem to have disappeared. At the University of Vienna, for instance, one of that great school's most distinguished teachers sadly complained to the present writer that, for lack of linguistic skill, none of his students was any longer interested in or capable of doing any work touching Czech or Slovak history. It is welcome when a very thorough and competent German study throws light on an important development of Western Slav history, closely interconnected with the intellectual history of Germany.

The title of Peukert's book, while perfectly correct, nevertheless promises too much and too little at the same time. Of the Habsburg Slavs only Czechs, Slovaks and Jugoslavs are treated, since neither Poles nor Ukrainians found their way to Jena in any numbers. But of those other groups only the Slovaks receive a really thorough treatment—for the simple reason that in the period in question the Slovak contingent among the foreign students at Jena was many times as large as that of the other Slavs taken together. On the other hand, this is much more than merely a discourse on the role of those foreigners at Jena, or on the function of the University of Jena in their lives. What we get, rather, is a pretty thorough—and in many ways exciting—history of the spiritual and intellectual awakening of a small nation, in its beginnings in the eighteenth century and in its great early flowering in the first half (mostly the second, third and fourth decades) of the nineteenth.

Jena was not the only German University which became an important seedbed for this growth. Before Jena Halle played a similar role; and beginning with 1848—when the Slovak intelligentsia, under Magyar government pressure, began to abandon its long Czechoslovak orientation and its almost exclusive use of Czech as its literary language, and turned instead toward the Slovak forms of writing as developed and propagandised by L'udovit' Štúr and his adherents—Halle again supplanted Jena as the Mecca of Slovak higher education. But by then the original Czechoslovak Renaissance—and the term "Czechoslovak" without hyphen is constantly and rightly used by Peukert—had lost most of its original spontaneity and brilliance.

It is the in-between period, then, to which the more than a hundred pages under the chapter heading "Slovak literature" (*Das Slovakische Schrifttum*) are devoted. Within the eighteenth century the earlier years, down to Joseph II's Edict of tolerance of 1781, are little more than a phase of gestation, in which the Slovak visitors come mainly under the influence of the early Enlightenment represented by Buddeus and his son-in-law, Walch. In the following phase however, the ate 'seventies and the last two decades of the century, the increased chances for the Slavs of the Habsburg Empire to go on prolonged study travel abroad coincide with the extraordinary flowering of Jena, largely and directly due to the rule and patronage of Duke Charles Augustus and his unique minister and cultural advisor, Goethe. In Weimar the circle of great men includes, besides the Olympian himself, men like Wieland and Herder. But the number of important men who held chairs in Jena in this same period was nothing short of dazzling. It included, for longer or shorter periods, Friedrich Schiller and almost all the important figures of Germany's great Romantic literature, but also Hufeland, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hegel, the two Humboldts, Fries, Oken, Luden, and many others of high distinction. For the Slovaks this galaxy was bound to be a great experience, even though it was by no means simply a story of teachers and pupils. Many of the young Slovaks studying then at the Thuringian University had behind them a very respectable career of academic work, and brought with them ideas—for instance concerning the nature and future of the Slavic world—which they could not possibly receive from their German mentors except, in some cases and to a certain degree, by way of a general and necessarily inexact analogy of romantic nationalism.

Nevertheless, the high proportion of people with this Jena experience among the leaders of the Slovak intelligentsia in the decades immediately before and after 1800, almost all of them Protestants and many of them, at least temporarily, devoted to theology, remains remarkable. Some of them were geniuses, as e.g. the Protestant pastor and strong represenitive of Josephinist enlightenment, Jan Hrdlička, the strong poet (in Latin and Czech), Pavol Tešlák, and above all Jiří Ribay, the first among the great Slavicists of this gifted generation, all people who found the outlet for their thinking and teaching in the mid-'eighties in the *Staré Noviny literního umění*, published at Banská Bystrica. To the same group belongs Samuel Čerňanský, the "Slovakian Gellert", and, initially, Jiří Palkovič, a highly nfluential man, certainly not a genius but an effective organizer and teacher—the man who for several decades held the first professorship for Czechoslovak language and literature at the Lyceum of Bratislava and who, as author of a successful Czech-German-Latin dictionary, was perhaps the most important predecessor of Josef Jungmann. In his later years Palkovič was often harshly criticized as ineffectual or reactionary, even by his friend and co-student Bohuslav Tablic, who, ike him, trained at Jena, but was a more conscious representative of the idea of Slavic and Czechoslovak unity in its early romantic-cultural form. Only one of the mportant men of this generation, Pavol Jozeffy, was eventually ready to follow Stúr on his way toward a separate Slovak literary language. But before this step becomes successful and irreparable, the idea of complete cultural unity between Czech and Slovak seems to celebrate its greatest victories through three men, all of whom were—mainly in the years between 1816 and 1819—students at Jena and who (but especially the first two) were to figure among the greatest spirits of the Czechoslovak Renaissance: Pavel Josef Šafařík, Jan Kollár and Jan Blahoslav Benedikti. Peukert does not have to portray or discuss the role that these men—in lose contact with their greatest Czech contemporary, the Moravian František

Palacký—were to play in the later course of Czechoslovak cultural history. Here he can limit himself to their connection with Jena, their interests, their teachers, their friends, and last but not least their relations to Weimar and its greatest minds Herder and Goethe.

It is quite natural that the second-longest chapter of the book should be devoted to Slovak schools and educational organizations—that is to say especially those institutions that had prepared the "Jena Slovaks" for their graduate adventures in Jena and that later served in so many cases as missions, where their strengthened spiritual leadership could bear fruit. These are particularly the Gymnasiums and Lyceums (we should think of them as colleges in the American sense rather than high schools) in Bratislava, Banská Štiavnica, Kežmarok, Levoča, Banská Bystrica and Prešov, most of which were supported, morally and to some extent financially, by the Lutheran Church (whereas the Calvinist, sharply distinguished and divided from the Lutheran organization, was far more ready to submit to the idea of Hungarian cultural unity as against Slavic or Czechoslovak cultural unity, and consequently, no less than a considerable part of the Catholic Church, was willing to support or, in the case of conscious Slovaks, to tolerate Magyarization).

We cannot here follow Dr. Peukert into the details of the history of these schools or of the roles of the many "Jenenser" among their teachers. All of this, written in a lively style and with warm sympathy for the Slovak people, is highly interesting to the specialist. But the book permits some more general conclusions about the nature and significance of the Czechoslovak Renaissance from the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. It is precisely the question of the Czechoslovak—rather than the Czech and/or Slovak—character of this Renaissance that should give us food for thought. It used to be one of the pet theories of German (and Magyar) nationalists as well as of some Slovak autonomists of the Hlinka-Tiso school that there never was such a thing as a Czechoslovak tradition, and that Czechoslovakia as a state was the completely artificial creation of a few politicians—Czech, French and others—during the later years of World War I and at the Paris Peace Conference. (It almost goes without saying that this theory is still maintained by the loud and often malicious and misleading propaganda which Sudeten-German organizations and publications are permitted to spread in Western Germany.) Yet if we want to look for something truly arbitrary and artificial in the modern history of the Czechs and Slovaks it is much more the grim attempt, made by Magyar nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century and especalliy in the time following the Ausgleich, first to destroy the cultural unity of Czechs and Slovaks in which Slovak leaders had played such an important, even glorious part, and then, once the Slovaks had become isolated, to destroy and completely eliminate their culture and their national identity in the name of the historical unity of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. In this endeavor they received considerable help—partly unintentional—from the various forms of Slovak autonomism, and some also from the overemphasis of Czech political groups on a purely historical orientation which would somehow seem to present a parallel to the Hungarian attitude, though a much less successful one. It is perhaps the principal merit of Peukert's book to show how extraordinarily strong, creative, relatively long-lived and potentially viable had been the idea and policy of Czechoslovak cultural—and thereby in a sense also national—unity in the period up to 1848, thereby creating a precedent and a tradition which made the re-creation of such unity 70 years later an event neither artificial nor historically unjustified.

University of Alberta, Calgary **Frederick G. Heymann**

Lemke, Heinz, *Die Brüder Załuski und ihre Beziehungen zu Gelehrten in Deutschland und Danzig. Studien zur polnischen Frühaufklärung.* Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin: Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas. Band II. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958. Pp. x, 192. DM. 22.

The brothers Załuski were remarkable men who contributed greatly to the development of learning, arts and sciences in Poland in the eighteenth century. Princes of the Catholic Church, magnates and dignitaries, expected to remain within the orbit of conservative thinking, they became, however, imbued with new ideas and the new spirit spreading from the Western centers of European civilization. Their incessant assiduous work helped to pave the way for the approaching era of Enlightenment in Poland. While the older of the brothers, bishop Andrzej Stanisław Załuski, in addition to his varied activities in many fields was instrumental in fostering the philosophy of Christian Wolff in Poland, the younger, bishop Józef Andrzej Załuski, was obsessed by an intense desire to amass books. He described his own passion as "cupiditas possedendi libros." The most spectacular joint achievement of both brothers was the building of en enormous collection of books and manuscripts which would be impressive even by contemporary standards. They later transformed their private collection into the first great public library in Poland.

A proper evaluation of the activities and the role of the brothers Załuski would require enormous work and concentrated research surpassing, probably, the possibilities of one person. No wonder, then, that up to now no adequate biography of the two brothers has been available. The urgent need and importance of such a study is well understood and often emphasized by Polish scholars.

The author of the book under review did not attempt, of course, to fill this gap, and the scope of his work is much more limited and modest. What he did aim to provide was a short sketch of the intellectual profiles of the two brothers Załuski and a presentation of their relations with certain scholars in Germany (Gottsched, Trotz, Perard, Christian Wolff and others) and with Gottfried Lengnich in Gdańsk (Danzig). In the fulfillment of this plan the author has shown great skill. His scholarship is noteworthy, his efforts to collect all the necessary data not only from printed materials but also from sources in the *Biblioteka Narodowa* (National Library) in Warsaw and in the archives in Saxony deserve high praise. It is also to the author's credit that in the presentation of the lives and works of men like Załuskis' librarian, J. D. Janocki whose original name prior to its polonization was Jähnisch) and Lorenz Mitzler, the well-known publisher, editor, journalist and economist, he stands apart from the crowd of Pan-German authors who are ruled by a propensity to prove that all great cultural achievements in Poland were due to the activity of Germans.

It is surprising how conspicuously reticent Mr. Lemke is in his treatment of some events in which the Russians were involved. Thus, for instance, he only briefly mentions (p. 52) the arrest of J. A. Załuski by the Russians and merely sketches the circumstances leading to this arrest and to the subsequent deportation of Załuski to the Russian town of Kaluga for a period of five years. Yet to the story of these five years he gives not a single word. No less timid is Lemke's description of the looting of the splendid Załuski library by Suvorov, by order of the Empress Catharine II. This barbarous act receives no comment, despite the fact that a whole chapter is devoted to the history of this library. No works describing the looting are quoted, not even the eloquent protest by the great Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz in his *Appel aux peuples civilisés pour la formation d'une bibliothèque à offrir à la Pologne,* published in connection with a similar act of vandalism committed by the Russians in Poland after the suppression of the insurrection of 1830/31, which protest refers also to the Załuski library. A detailed bibliography on this subject is to be found in the article by Professor Ludwik Krzyżanowski, "Joseph Conrad's Prince Roman. Facts and Fiction," *The Polish Review,* vol. I (New York, 1956), p. 56 f.

Among works which the author failed to consult the following deserve to be mentioned: P. Bańkowski, "J. A. Załuski i jego dzieło" (J. A. Załuski and his work), *Przegląd Biblioteczny,* vol. XVI, Nos. 1-2, 1948; the chapter on Mitzler in Professor Edward Lipiński's *Studia nad historią polskiej myśli ekonomicznej* (Studies on the history of economic thought in Poland) (Warsaw, 1956); T. Mikulski, "Stan badań i potrzeby nauki o literaturze Oświecenia" (The state of research and the needs of studies on the literature of the Enligtenment), *Pamiętnik Literacki,* vol. 41, 1950. These are, however, minor omissions which do not diminish the usefulness of the book under review.

Columbia University MATTHEW M. FRYDE

JANKOVIĆ, DRAGOSLAV, *Francuska štampa o Prvom Srpskom Ustanku.* Srpska Akademija Nauka. Gradja. Knjiga XIII. Istoriski institut. Knjiga 10 (Belgrade, 1959), Pp. 408.

With the fall of Belgrade to the Turks in 1813 nearly all important collections of documents concerning the First Serbian Revolution (1804-1813) were lost. For this reason the Serbian historians have, to a large extent, come to rely on foreign documentary materials in the investigation of the Revolution. The collection and publication of documents on this subject is, therefore, a very important task of contemporary Yugoslav historians, who have, since 1945, published collections of letters, Austrian and Turkish documents, and a volume of French press reports. The last of these is edited by Dragoslav Janković, an able and very active Marxian historian.

After Turkey, Austria, and Russia, France was the country most interested in Serbian developments at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was not until 1805, however, that Napoleon began to show active interest in Serbia. After acquiring Dalmatia, France became more vitally concerned with the welfare of the Ottoman Empire and the Russian expansion to the Balkans. France ignored its ideological affinity with the Serbian Revolution and viewed the situation purely from the standpoint of military considerations. Only after the Treaty of Tilsit in the period between 1807 and 1809 did France show some sympathy for Serbia. After 1809 she again began to identify the Serbian Revolution as the work of Russian intriguers.

Even though the French press was controlled by censorship, Janković found that it published much information which was not consistent with official policy. In part, this was due to the ineffectiveness of the censorship, in part, to the fact that the French papers merely printed the reports carried by Austrian and German journals. The first reports of the Serbian Revolution were given sympathetic treatment in the French press, but after the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 1806 the French press, in line with official policy, showed partiality for the Turks, although occasional reports favorable to the Serbs were also published. After 1807 the press changed its line again; it hailed with enthusiasm the Turkish victory over the Serbs in 1813 and the collapse of the Serbian Revolution.

During the period of the Serbian Revolution, eight political journals were published in France; some of them changed their names and continued to appear and others appeared for a time and were never resumed. Janković collected 708 reports which were published in these eight journals. Each item is preceded by a short summary of the content in Serbian. A register of persons mentioned in the reports and an index of geographical terms add to the value of the book. In a few instances the editor attempted to establish the original source of the information. Some of the materials included in the book were previously translated from German and Austrian publications and published in Serbian journals. (p. 6) Janković incorporated these materials in order to make this book complete. He is fully aware that the press reports which he collected cannot be treated as primary sources, but he believes that as auxiliary information they will make possible fuller treatment and the solution of some specific problems, while also contributing toward a more complete chronology of events during the Revolution, which is still lacking. (p. 7)

Most of the reports published in French papers concern military aspects of the Serbian Revolution, the kind of material that is abundant in Serbian repositories. But as it turned out the reports published in French papers were frequently inaccurate. They exaggerated the number of Serbian troops and the size and quality of their equipment. Many of the reports on the Serbian armed forces (e.g., organization, training, uniforms, equipment, etc.), on the other hand, are very good. The information on social and economic conditions in Serbia—the type of data particularly cherished by Yugoslav historians—is rare among the items published in French papers. There are, of course, a few valuable reports concerning economic regulations, the character of Serbia's economy, the Austrian embargo on imports of Serbian livestock, and mining developments in Serbia.

Several reports are on the social and ethnic problems of Serbia. They discuss the relations between Turks and Serbs, the murder of Turks and the expulsion of Jews, the sale of Turkish and Jewish properties, the problems of refugees and deserters, good and bad Turks, banditry and *Krjalis.* These reports give a fairly accurate explanation of the causes of the Serbian Revolution. Some of the reports describe the struggle for power between the oligarchs and Karadjordje, dissension inside the *Sovjet,* and the final days of liberated Serbia. The French papers depicted both the sufferings and hardships of the Serbs and the leisurely and extravagant life of the Russian officers in Belgrade. (p. 10)

There are reports on the Serbian government, the *Skupština* and the *Sovjet,* on the administrative subdivision of the liberated territory, the founding of the school in Belgrade, and educational developments in general. Some of the prominent men were mentioned in the French press, including (beside Karadjordje) Jakov Nenadović, Father Matiga Nenadović, Mladen Milovanović, Milenko Stojković, Konstantin Rodofinikin, Miloje Petrović. What appeared in the French press on the diplomatic affairs of Serbia is not very reliable, although there are some interesting bits of information on the attitude of Austria and Montenegro toward the Serbian Revolution. There are several reports on the alleged support which Prince-Bishop Peter I of Montenegro extended to Karadjordje. The French papers also reported on the Serbian missions to Russia and Russo-Serbian negotiations. Even floods, thunderstorms, earthquakes and fires in Serbia were reported. One report concerned an alleged attempt to assassinate Karadjordje. (pp. 10-12)

Most of the reports published in French newspapers had their origins in Zemun (374) or Vienna (116) and only a small number of them (28) were traced by Janković to other places of origin. Some reports originated in circles close to Rodofinikin, Metropolitan Stratimirović, or Austrian border officials, and some were brought out of Serbia by Serbian merchants. (12-15) All in all, historian Janković has produced a very useful and interesting work, which does not contain information that alters existing interpretations of the Serbian Revolution but which does fill in many gaps and clarifies some points in the French policy toward Serbia.

Stanford University WAYNE S. VUCINICH

WALTER, FRIEDRICH, ed., *Aus dem Nachlass des Freiherrn Carl Friedrich Kübeck von Kübau,* Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs, vol. 45. Graz-Köln: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachf, 1960. DM 16.80.

Baron Karl Friedrich Kübeck was one of the outstanding administrators in the civil service of Austria. His career stretched from the first decade of Francis' I reign halfway through the neo-absolutist period to Kübeck's death in 1855. In well over half a century of public service he made a distinguished contribution to the Austian financial and commercial administration and, in particular, also to that of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. During the revolutionary period he represented the Austrian Government for a time in Frankfurt at the *Bundeszentralkommission.* During the Hungarian campaign he was Windischgrätz's chief advisor in matters of civil administration of the occupied territories. Prior to the dissolution of the Reichstag of Kremsier, he also served as deputy for a brief period. The high tide of Kübeck's public life was, however, reached only in 1850, when he became President of the Reichsrat, in legal terms an advisory position, yet in actual influence second only to that of Schwarzenberg and Bach. There is no question that Kübeck took a major share in the abolition of Stadion's March Constitution of 1849 and the shaping of the whole neo-absolutist course whose breakdown and consequences he was spared to see.

Kübeck represented the elite type of the Austrian civil servant who, from an enlightened Josephine and to a point even liberal philosophy, proceeded gradually to a position of extreme conservatism. This conservatism, though based on an excellent education and wide knowledge, was less sophisticated than that of Gentz. Gradually it became in a sense even more extreme than that of his superiors: Metternich, revered for his wordly wisdom, Schwarzenberg, suspected for his fickleness, Bach, hated and despised for the zealotic eagerness of the political convert. In a way, none of these men exemplified the straight consistency of the experienced civil servant, whose image represented the transition from the semi-feudal to the bureaucratic state built on the foundation of armed forces, civil service, and union between Church and state. This respect for unwavering consistency is presumably the main reason why, after the retirement of Metternich, Kübeck valued above all Field Marshal Prince Windischgrätz, the narrow-minded and incapable champion of the outgoing feudal era, yet the only one of the palladins of Francis Joseph's early reign who was in no way affected by the intellectual revolution of the eighteenth century.

This scheme of values is reflected in the last volume of the diaries and letters which forms Kübeck's literary *Nachlass.* This small volume, edited under the sponsorship of the Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs by Friedrich Walter, is focused in particular on the period from fall 1848 to fall 1855, the most dramatic phase of Kübeck's career. Thus Mr. Walter's edition serves as a most valuable supplement to the three earlier volumes of the diaries edited some 50 years ago by Kübeck's son Max. Inasmuch as these three previous sections are concerned chiefly—though not exclusively—with the years 1795-1809 and 1830-1839, when the author's position was a more modest one, this last volume is perhaps the most interesting part of the Kübeck papers in regard to strictly political history.

Inferior in literary value to the earlier publications, it surpasses them in topical interest. The transition to absolutism in Austria, the coup d'état in France, the establishment of the second empire and the crisis leading to and persisting throughout the Crimean wars are just as much part of this story as the character portraits of the champions of the absolutist regime and their and Kübeck's political philosophy. It is the philosophy of a man of reflection and counsel rather than of action, who frequently availed himself of the benefits of hindsight and I-told-you-so. Yet were it otherwise, Kübeck might never have written these diaries and letters. The historical profession owes a very real debt to Mr. Walter for the competent editorship of this valuable source.

Rutgers University Robert A. Kann

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V., *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. Pp. viii, 296. $5.00.

The reign and personality of Nicholas I are finally beginning to interest Western scholarship. Yet the approach remains that of the liberal tradition of nineteenth-century historiography, which was based on preconceived ideas and often even open bias. This is unfortunate, since such an approach handicaps the scholar, at times leads him astray and often prevents his presenting the truth. It is high time that writers on Russian history realize that not all was bad in nineteenth-century Russia and that the good was the result of the ideas and labors of conservative-minded people and not of the Belinskys, Herzens, Chernyshevskys, Pisarevs and Dobroliubovs. After all, it was the conservative gentry which produced the great culture of Russia. As Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard so aptly remarks: "Both liberalism and its by-product, socialism, were in Russia imported forces which, even after they began to play a significant political role, lacked concrete social foundations. . . . Conservatism, on the other hand, is in Russia native in inception as well as development. No other political movement offers such valuable insights into the inner processes of Russian politics."[1] Unfortunately, Professor Riasanovsky fails to make good use of the opportunity presented by a study of the thiry-year reign of Nicholas I, who came to the throne of Russia after crushing an open revolt and saved Russia from any political upheaval while the rest of Europe was passing through one revolutionary turmoil after another.

In the first place, the title of this book is misleading, since there was no "official nationality" in Russia. The term *narodnost'* does not mean "nationality," but rather "closeness to the people" or "national spirit." In the second place, Uvarov's famous dictum: *pravoslavie, samoderzhavie, narodnost'* was never the official policy of Nicholas I or of his government, *Samoderzhavie* was, of course, the fundamental and unquestionable principle, not the other two concepts of this triptych. More than any one else, Nicholas realized this, since he was the sovereign of a multi-national empire whose people practiced many different religions. Could he really demand adherence to Orthodoxy from Nesselrode and Kankrin, his trusted ministers of many years, both of whom were of Jewish descent and professed Lutheranism? And he showed that he was above any narrow Russian nationalism (such as manifested itself through the policy of russification toward the end of the nineteenth century) when he admonished young Yury Samarin, who had advocated the protection of Russian national interests in the Baltic provinces at the expense of the Germans there.

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[1] Richard Pipes, *Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. 5.

It is true that Nicholas I was a devout Russian Orthodox with a simple and direct faith, but to call it "blunt" (p. 15) is perhaps going too far. The author also seems to imply that because the Emperor had never experienced any doubts and because he believed, as he had said himself, in the manner of a peasant, there was something lacking in his faith. But did not the great Louis Pasteur say, when admitted to the French Academy, that he believed with the faith of a simple Breton fisherman and hoped, before he died, to believe with the faith of a simple Breton fisherwoman? In our materialistic days with insistence upon rights, it may be difficult to understand a sovereign who could write to his wife: "Our salvation is *over there yonder,* . . . if we earn it down here by the fulfillment of our duties" (p. 17). A historian dealing with such a sovereign should not only understand but appreciate such belief.

On the whole, one is led to remark that Professor Riasanovsky's attitude toward his subject is thoroughly unsympathetic or, using a sociological term, lacking in empathy. Good biographical studies can be written out of antipathy, but in the case of Nicholas a certain sympathy with the man is likely to lead to an understanding of the monarch. This reviewer takes a most definite exception to the author's assertion that "Nicholas I's insistence on firmness and stern action was based on fear, not on confidence; his determination concealed a state approaching panic, and his courage fed on something akin to despair" (p. 4). The Emperor's behavior on December 14 (26), 1825, would belie this statement.

It is also untrue that "the Russian emperor hated Leopold of Belgium in a similar manner and for somewhat the same reasons as Louis-Philippe" (p. 257). Nicholas I refused to recognize the regime of Leopold I because the Belgian revolution deprived the heir of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, who was Nicholas' brother-in-law, of a large part of his domain. As to Louis-Philippe, Nicholas considered him a usurper, although he did criticize Charles X for violating the French constitution and remarked: "If I had sworn to observe a constitution I would have kept my word," which was exactly in character.

The author is also mistaken in listing among the "practical" schools founded by Nicholas I the Imperial School of Jurisprudence (which he calls "a school of law"—p. 215). This school, like its prototype—the Imperial Alexander Lyceum, of which Pushkin was a graduate—had a broad curriculum in the humanities besides courses on jurisprudence.

Finally, the author relies uncritically on the works of C. de Grunwald (reviewed in this *Journal,* vol. 16, no. 3, October 1956) and of Polievktov and Presnyakov, of whom the first is an amateur historian while the latter two were Marxists. At the same time the author fails even to mention this reviewer's pioneering work on a western language: *L'Empereur Nicolas Ier et l'esprit national russe* (Louvain, 1928), and the most important study on Nicholas I's foreign policy: S. S. Tatishtchev, *Imperator Nikolay i Inostrannye Dvory,* St. Petersburg, 1889.

University of Toronto LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY

WENTZCKE, PAUL, *Ideale und Irrtümer des ersten deutschen Parlaments 1848-1849.* Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959. Pp. 319. DM 18.50.

After several decades of research in German political history from 1815 to 1848, Dr. Paul Wentzcke produced an analytical study of the Frankfurt assembly of

1848-1849. It appeared in a collection of sources and monographs relating to the movement for German unification and is by its theme closely connected with two volumes of miscellaneous contributions by which the series had been inaugurated. In fact, it is an organic continuation of Dr. Wentzcke's articles on the early life and career of Heinrich von Gagern, whom he presents in his new book as the leading figure among the apostles of constitutionalism and of national unity. Although conceived as a critical confrontation of "the ideals and errors of the first German Parliament," the book under review is primarily an investigation into the circumstances facilitating von Gagern's rise to national prominence as well as into the forces causing the ruin of his endeavors.

Presented ably and sympathetically by Dr. Wentzcke, Heinrich von Gagern moves on the stage of German history as a champion of two cherished postulates, freedom and unity. Coming from one of the smaller states, he sought contacts with other representatives of the "third Germany" by which the author designates the middle-size and smaller states in the southwest, different in many respects from the two leading forces in the Bund, the Austrian empire and Prussia. It was von Gagern's firm conviction that neither the Habsburgs nor the Hohenzollerns should be allowed to use their military strength for the establishment of hegemony over the German-speaking orbit, but that consent of all concerned should be obtained by unfettered elections and free exchange of either theoretical articles or practical recommendations. As an ardent advocate of parliamentarism, Heinrich von Gagern easily found supporters among liberal deputies not only from the southwestern states, such as Baden or Württemberg, but also from other areas, and he had no serious rival when presented by his intimate collaborators as the best candidate for the presidency.

As the author demonstrated, Heinrich von Gagern found no discrepancy between his adherence to liberal tenets and his belief that Prussia, or more particularly the Hohenzollern house, should be assigned a highly active and responsible role in the German progress toward unity and freedom. Attention should be called to Dr. Wentzcke's sketch of the events that followed immediately after the overthrow of the Orléanist monarchy. While inspired by the march of revolution on the other side of the Rhine, the moderate liberals reacted sensitively to any manifestation of republicanism. Fears that France, if re-established as a republic, might revive the policy of expansion eastward, supported the opinion of many West German patriots that out of all German states Prussia was the only shield against both an invasion and political extremism. Austria seemed to be too remote to come into account as a *Wacht am Rhein.*

True to the traditions of German scholarship as it flourished in his formative years, Dr. Wentzcke prefers quiet narrative methods to *a priori* formulas or dogmatic statements. His book is not a passionate confrontation of ideals and errors, as the title would make us believe, but a painstaking search for the adverse forces on which the efforts of von Gagern's associate as well as of some affiliated groups had ultimately foundered. Knowing Prussia mostly from his contacts with Rhenish liberals and not being familiar with court circles in Berlin, von Gagern failed to fathom the gap between the dynastic and military traditions of the Hohenzollerns and his own vision of Prussia dissolving gradually into its various provinces, and those in turn uniting by constitutional processes with other parts of Germany. While recognizing clearly the Prussian dilemma, the author has about the same hazy notion of Austrian perplexities as had the Frankfurt leaders. True, the process of disintegration, of which the multinational empire of the Habsburgs was destined to become ultimately a victim, was in its initial stage when the first representative body of the Germans came into existence, but it is one of the historian's duties, if not a privilege, to see in their real significance those forces which the contemporaries failed properly to evaluate.

In order to give a full account of von Gagern's activity the author has paid a good deal of attention to the formation of the first cabinet to serve as the executive branch along with the constituent assembly. As the change on the Austrian throne early in December 1848 made inevitable a withdrawal from the embryonic imperial government of Anton von Schmerling, Heinrich von Gagern exchanged the presidency of the legislative body for the less gratifying office of prime minister with which he combined, like his predecessor, the portfolios of foreign and interior affairs. In this capacity he strove for realization of his scheme with no less devotion than from the speaker's desk in the *Paulskirche*.

Dr. Wentzcke has not written his book for novices but for students possessing a fairly wide knowledge of the trends of German life in 1848-1849. His story is concentrated on its main theme and is told in a somewhat involved style, which at one time seemed the only permissible approach to the perplexities of the past.

University of Pennsylvania OTAKAR ODLOZILIK

GOSIOROSKÝ, MILOŠ, *Dejiny slovenského robotníckého hnutia (1848-1918)* (History of the Slovak Workman's Movement). Bratislava: Slovenské vydavatelstvo politickej literatúry, 1956. Pp. 412. Kčs 10.70.

A "workman's movement," Gosiorovský writes, "is the movement of the class which emerges during the period of the capitalist production process, which lives from selling its own labor power to the owners of the means of production, and which . . . comes to the recognition of its historical role to overthrow capitalism in a revolution and to build a new society according to the principles of scientific socialism" (p. 17). This Marxist-Leninist definition leaves no room in the workmen's movement for either trade unionism—be it liberal, Christian, or socialist, or for non-Marxist organizations of any kind. The vanguard of the movement, Lenin is cited as saying, is a revolutionary party led by the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia of bourgeois origin. The working man does not know what his true interests are, and "workers themselves could not even have social-democratic consciousness" (p. 117). Therefore, the party and professional revolutionaries of middle-class origin must develop socialist consciousness on the part of the workers and represent them.

No workman's movement, as defined by Gosiorovský, existed either in Slovakia or in Hungary, to which Slovakia belonged throughout the whole historical period, from 1848 to 1918, discussed in this book. The author expressly states that the Slovak working class had "no revolutionary party," and that "no one single member" of the Slovak intelligentsia "put his abilities at the disposal of the working class and thus helped it to place itself in the leading position in the Slovak nation" (p. 116). In the absence of either a Slovak or Hungarian revolutionary party, and thus with a "workman's movement" nonexistent (pp. 116, 117, 137, 143, 299, etc.), Gosiorovský discusses its nearest kin—the Hungarian Social-Democratic party (in whose leadership the few Slovak members had no representation or influence), and the Slovak Social-Democratic party after its foundation in 1905.

The organizers of both the Hungarian and Slovak Social-Democratic parties were far from being "professional revolutionaries" of Lenin's kind, and both the parties are called "opportunistic," "nationalistic," and "lacking class consciousneess." They are reproached for their willingness to cooperate with the national bourgeoisie under its leadership.

Slovakia, formerly a part of Hungary (Austria-Hungary), but now belonging to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, has obviously produced very few Marxist-Leninists. This ideology has no historical roots in that country, and the book cannot prove otherwise. While the work many have some value for the regime in its attempt to indoctrinate the young Slovak intelligentsia, on the other hand, any non-Marxist student of the labor movement in Slovakia (or in Central Europe) cannot fail to notice the narrow treatment of what is called a "workman's movement," and the failure to discuss objectively all attempts to organize laborers by either Socialists, nationalists, or religious groups in that country. By the author's own admission, the Slovak Social-Democratic party was not the only political representative of the Slovak workers (p. 189).

It would be hardly worth-while to waste time refuting the obvious fallacies which suggest that the "revolutionary proletariat" (i.e., the non-existent revolutionary party) was responsible for the uplifting of the Slovak nation and the emergence of its political consciousness. Had the book not contained these and other such misinformation, and had it not been written from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, it would not have been published in Communist Czechoslovakia.

Saint Joseph College JOSEPH KALVODA
West Hartford, Connecticut

FRAENKEL, ERNEST, ed., *Amerika im Spiegel des deutschen politischen Denkens* Köln and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959. Pp. 333. DM 20.

As the author, a distinguished professor of political science at the Free University of Berlin, points out in his preface, there are two ways that Germany's image of the U.S.A. can be presented to the reader: by a secondary account based on the sources or by a selection of the sources, to speak for themselves. Fraenkel has chosen the second approach. Here, then, is an anthology of political commentaries by German statesmen and *Staatsdenker* about state and society in the United States which ranges from Schubart and Schlözer to Hitler and Heuss. The editor has successfully tried to make his selections as representative as possible. While excluding, with some justifiable exceptions, fictional accounts, he has ncluded not only the whole spectrum from extremely hostile to warmly sympathetic comments on the U.S.A., but also has seen to it that the various approaches—historical, legal, philosophical and cultural—are represented. Furthermore, Fraenkel has paid special attention to authors who are important because of their influence on the German public rather than for the intrinsic value of their contributions.

An excellent introduction of about forty pages traces the pattern of German attitudes toward the U.S.A. from the Revolutionary War to the end of World War II. Fraenkel concludes that the German picture of America of the earliest period, when a Franklin and a Herder felt themselves to be common citizens of a republic of scholars, has faded into oblivion. Like so much else in German intellectual history, the basis of the German America-image was laid during the Romantic period. However, the current America-image in Germany was created during the econd half of the nineteenth century, at a time when the two nations were probably in many respects farthest apart from each other. That picture, characterzed *inter alia* by a feeling of cultural superiority and economic inferiority on the part of the Germans, was so deeply ingrained in their consciousness that it remained alive in good years and bad, essentially untouched even by the wars which he two countries fought with each other in this century.

The selections, though inevitably often frustratingly brief and fragmentary, achieve the editor's purpose of furnishing a social and political psycho-analysis o the German America-image by making the reader aware of the many subconsciou associations connected with the U.S.A. in the German mind. Moreover, they revea the heavy intellectual mortgage which burdens the numerous attempts of the contemporary generation of Germans to come to a better and deeper understanding of the bewildering realities which have characterized the United States ever sinc its birth.

While the anthology is impressive in range and illustrious names, it is somewhat disappointing. There is, of course, no German book and no German autho whose comments about America can compare with de Tocqueville or Bryce. Bu even apart from this, the deep insights, with notable exceptions, like Schmoller's and Max Weber's, are relatively sparse. How disappointing it is to realize tha even a Hugo Preuss misunderstood the nature of the American party system and the character and meaning of Congressional investigations. The anthology also demonstrates, in parts, the disadvantage of trying to understand American society through that humanistic-aesthetic-literary approach which was so prevalent in the German intellectual tradition. (Even today, *Amerikanistik* in the German univerities is all too often taught in terms of language and literature rather than of the social sciences.) The misunderstanding on the part of German authors and observers of the role of sharp and outspoken social criticism in a free society like the American has also done its share to distort the German America-image, as even such a recent book as Leo L. Matthias' *Die Entdeckung Amerikas anno 1953* illustrates. One must notice, however, how much progress has been made since 1945 in reaching a better understanding of the United States. Golo Mann's little book, *Vom Geiste Amerikas,* or Carl Zuckmayer's delightful essay, "Amerika ist anders" (*Der Monat*, January 1953), grasp American realities better than half the selections in Fraenkel's anthology. These selections, indeed, provide a correct mirror of German political thought regarding the U.S.A. between 1776 and 1945. Their real value lies, of course, in telling us so much more about the mirror than about the reflected object. One almost wishes that the selections were frequently annotated with necessary corrections to set the record straight.

Amerika im Spiegel des deutschen politischen Denkens should stimulate scholars to give us a broader and more elaborate picture of German political thinking about America during the last two centuries. It is also to be hoped that the book achieves the therapeutic purpose which its editor intended.

Cornell College ERIC C. KOLLMAN

ANTONI, CARLO. *From History to Sociology: The Transition in German Historical Thinking.* Foreword by Benedetto Croce. Transl. by Hayden V. White. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1959. Pp. xxviii, 249. $4.50.

The "circulation of ideas" is a fascinating though difficult subject for investigation by "intellectual historians." For many years Italian historians (especially those influenced by Croce, among whom Professor Carlo Antoni of the University of Rome is one of the worthiest) have been stimulated by German historical thought. And in recent decades a growing number of Americans have become interested in both German and Italian historical and social science methodology; of these, H. Stuart Hughes is noteworthy—his recent *Consciousness and Society. The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930* (N.Y.: Knopf, 1958) being concerned in no small way with some of Antoni's critiques here under review.

With the publication in English of Antoni's book, non-Italian-reading scholars will now have easy access to his solid appraisals of four highly influential social theorists of the pre-Nazi Germanic world: Wilhelm Dilthey, Ernst Troeltsch, Friedrich Meinecke, and Max Weber. To the foregoing Antoni has appended two related essays on Johan Huizinga, the Dutch medievalist, and Heinrich Wölfflin, the Swiss art historian.

The *Leitmotiv* of Antoni's brillant essays is that the transition from "historicism" to classificatory "typological sociologism" represented a decline in historical thought. Repetitive empirical data became the subject to be studied rather than the unique aspects of human creativity and activity. Antoni's arguments parallel those of Croce's well-known criticisms of positivism (and hence of much of sociological thought). Certainly it will be no simple task for self-confident social scientists to refute Antoni. Here only the briefest notion of his judgments can be set forth.

Dilthey, in his search for a "collective soul," provided "the point of departure for that typology (*Typenlehre*) which is to be found everywhere in German intellectual life during the first quarter of the century. . . . In fact, once the real movement and novelty of history were denied, it was inevitable that history be transformed into typology and sociology. . . . Dilthey . . . foreshadowed a crisis in the German genius. In the throes of that crisis, the German intellectual world turned to the interpretation of history and life in a skeptical and relativistic mood, and we are met with the so-called 'crisis of historicism'." (p. 38)

Troeltsch "made no concession whatever to the principle of development." For him history was only the separation of elements originally united; he thus "assumed a negative attitude towards history itself." (p. 57) Nations, states, civilizations, and religious communities became only so many "individual totalities."

Meinecke "translated political historiography into the history of ideas." (p. 92) He "attempts to understand individualities through ideas, to give to the ideas themselves an incomparable coloration as they are passed from hand to hand and are reborn in individual thinkers." (p. 117)

The most incisive of Antoni's essays deals with the transcendent figure of Max Weber, whose "sociology is the most coherent expression of the historiography of an epoch which has ceased to believe in history and has banished ideas of development, unfolding and progress to a place among the myths of optimism. In fact, Weber consigns any 'meanings' found in history to the non-scientific realm of value judgment. Thus envisaged, historiography has to confine itself to the construction of a gallery containing portraits of types of civilizations." (p. 167) While not going as far in his enthusiasm for Weber as Hughes does, Antoni concedes that Weber "did not conceive his sociology as a science in itself, but saw it as a construction of concepts useful to the orientation of historical investigation." (p. 177) There were no "collective personalities" in Weber's sociology; "only the specific social operations of individuals." (p. 178)

The original Italian edition of Antoni's work was entitled *Dallo storicismo alla sociologia* (Florence: G. G. Sonsomi, 1940). In the preface thereto Croce wrote: "I limit myself to recommending this exceedingly enlightening book . . . only to those who are seriously interested in the problems of philosophy." Unquestionably the book is slow reading; and the fault does not necessarily lie in the translation —which, as a matter of fact, is as good as one can reasonably hope for in a book dealing with such a high-level abstraction as "historicism." The translator (a young history professor at the University of Rochester who became intrigued with Antoni's work while in Italy on a Fulbright) has seen fit to render "historicism" in the original title simply as "history," on the ground that the term has so elusive a meaning in English. He has included a fourteen-page introduction of his own to clarify "historicism" in Crocean thought ("the tendency to interpret the whole of reality, including what up to the romantic period had been conceived as absolute and unchanging human values, in historical, that is to say relative, terms").

While the translation is generally satisfactory, the printing leaves much to be desired: one could easily double the number of misprints listed in the lengthy *errata* already appended to the book. Both the translator and the publisher, however, are to be warmly congratulated for bringing out a valuable critique which will long be pondered by those interested in the epistemological bases of historical and social investigation.

Vanderbilt University CHARLES F. DELZELL

BLUMENBERG, WERNER, *Kämpfer für die Freiheit*. Berlin and Hanover: Verlag nach J. H. W. Dietz GmbH., 1959. Pp. 183. DM 14.80.

The author of this book points out that during the last several centuries there have been many groups of varied aims who have carried on the "struggle for freedom." For example, free, Catholic, evangelical, and democratic trade unions have worked for social justice through the years. For political freedom, the author says, the various liberal parties have fought over the years, as has the Center Party on occasion, but the Social Democratic Party always. This book is a record of the latter sector of this fighting front, "which is also its most important sector."

This is by no means a history of Social Democracy. What the author has done is to select just 22 leading Socialists and to give biographies averaging seven pages of each one. Each entry is adorned with a handsome photograph as well as a specimen of the subject's handwriting. What emerges is a kind of elaborate Who's Who of the Socialist movement, with this exception—the author of the volume and not the subject of the biography has written the entry. The book could also serve as a campaign document for Social Democracy.

The selection appears to be a strictly personal one. The first group includes Johann Jacoby (representative of the old Prussian liberalism), Wilhelm Weitling ("Utopian radical"), Stephen Born (the first German trade unionist), and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (without taking part in the foundation of the party they nevertheless had a strong influence on it).

The second group (Ferdinand Lassalle, Wilhelm Liebknecht, August Bebel, Ignaz Auer, Georg v. Vollmar, Eduard Bernstein, Karl Kautsky, Carl Legian, and Ludwig Frank) have this in common: They were the ones who pulled the movement of Social Democracy together and it was under their leadership that Social Democracy reached its strongest power in the *Kaiserreich*. The third group (Friedrich Ebert, Otto Braun, Otto Wels, and Rudolf Hilferding) consists of those who led the movement during the Weimar Republic, as heirs of the crushed Reich. These men, says the author, were not equal to their historical task. The fourth group (Julius Leber, Hans Böckler, Kurt Schumacher, and Ernst Reuter) is composed of those who became leaders in the new drive for freedom and social justice in post-World War II Germany.

The author admits that his choice is a delicate one. There is no room, for example, for such names as Franz Mehring, Kurt Eisner, Clara Zetkin, Philip Scheidemann, Hugo Haase, Karl Liebknecht, Carl Severing, Hermann Müller, among others. But the author contends that he has done as well as possible considering the limitations of space. All his selections, he says, "lived for a better world." "These men did not ask what would come after them; they simply did what was right. Therefore they could become leaders in the struggle for freedom."

Non-Socialists, especially those described by the author as "the bourgeois-capitalist society," will be inclined to question the accuracy of the title "Fighters for Freedom" and insist that a more exact and appropriate title, in view of the nature of the book, would be "Socialist Fighters for Freedom from Capitalist Exploitation." "Freedom," in the sense used in this volume, apparently means freedom of the workers' movement as seen by Social Democracy.

For the Socialist this book is a kind of welcome house organ devoted to the life stories of its outstanding heroes. For the scholar and student it is a much-needed study devoted to the lives of leading Social Democrats. For libraries it is an indispensable addition to their reference shelves.

The City College of New York Louis L. Snyder

Pollack, Emmanuel. *The Kronstadt Rebellion.* New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1959. Pp. 98. $3.00.

Books on the Kronstadt Rebellion are few and Dr. Pollack's informative work on this subject is quite welcome. In ten well-documented chapters the author gives a vivid description of that tragic attempt of the "Pride of the Russian Revolution," i.e. the Kronstadt sailors, to establish the rule of the "Soviets without Communists."

In Chapter I, "February 1921," the author describes the immediate cause of the Kronstadt Rebellion. The misery and mistreatment of the Petrograd workers who, in February 1921, were "cold, hungry and bitterly disillusioned" forced them to present a list of demands for betterment of their living conditions to the Petrograd Executive Soviet, and to gain these demands they went on strike on February 24th. During that strike the demands of the workers became more and more insistent and even included "a complete change in the policies of the Government." Then the authorities declared martial law.

The élite of the Revolution, the Kronstadt sailors, who continued to have connections with the Petrograd workers, their allies in the October Revolution, decided to learn the true situation in Petrograd for themselves and sent an investigating committee there. The report of that committee on the mistreatment of the Petrograd workers aroused deep indignation among the sailors.

On March 1st, 1921, at an open meeting attended by 16,000 sailors, soldiers and workers of Kronstadt, the "Resolution of the General Meeting of the Crews of the First and the Second Squadrons of the Baltic Fleet, March 1st, 1921" was adopted. Space does not permit quoting this resolution in full, but in general it favored the demands of the Petrograd workers, stated that "the present Soviets do not express the will of workers and peasants" and called for new elections; demanded that "freedom of speech and press for workers and peasants, for Anarchists and the left Socialist parties" be established, that political prisoners of Socialist affiliation and workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors imprisoned in connection with the labor and peasant movements be liberated, etc. All these demands were completely unacceptable to the Bolsheviki; from their point of view the Kronstadt sailors and workers were rebels against the regime and its power. They immediately acted in self-defense. On March 2 Lenin and Trotsky declared that Kronstadt had mutinied against the Soviet Government and that they (the sailors, etc.) were "tools of former Tsarist generals, who together with the Socialist-Revolutionary traitors staged a counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the proletarian Republic."

They outlawed General Kozlovsky (an obscure artilleryman appointed to

Kronstadt by Trotsky and made a scapegoat of the alleged rebellion). They put the city of Petrograd and the Petrograd province under martial law and placed the Petrograd district in the hands of the Petrograd Committee of Defense.

The Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Kronstadt on March 3 insisted "that no blood be shed," and few Kronstadters believed that Communist authorities would make any physical attack upon them. They could not believe that they, who were the physical force which had made the October Revolution possible, could be treated as counterrevoluntionists. They were mistaken. "Trotsky appointed General Tukhachevsky Commander-in-Chief of the Kronstadt attack." There were 60,000 picked men under his command, and at 6:45 p.m., March 7, 1921, the heavy guns of the Sestoretsk and Lissy Nos batteries began the bombardment of Kronstadt. Chapters V and VI describe the struggle and fall of the fortress. Chapter VII, "the Lesson of Kronstadt," and Chapter VIII state that the New Economic Policy (NEP) was the direct result of the Kronstadt Rebellion. Chapter IX describes "What the Bolsheviki say about the Kronstadt Rebellion," and Chapter X summarizes the book. At the end of the volume there are a List of References, an Appendix with quotations from the Bolshevik and Kronstadt documents, a Bibliography and an Index.

There is an amusing misinterpretation of the Russian word "Shkurnik" in the text. The author renders it as "Skinner," while this postrevolutionary contemptuous word means "self-seeker" in the sense of "extreme egotist."

On page 42, in the note: "Maliuta Skuratov . . ." it is stated that "The avowed purpose of the Oprichnina" was to "forestall the development of an independent baronial class." This is historically incorrect. The Oprichnina existed in order to exterminate the political influence of the class of great feudal landlords by confiscating their lands and, at times, by direct physical liquidation. (See. P. A. Sadikov, *Outlines of the history of Oprichnina,* Part I, p. 6.)

Boulder, Colorado ALEX. NENNSBERG

PAGE, STANLEY W., *The Formation of the Baltic States. A Study of the Effects of Great Power Politics upon the Emergence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.* Harvard Historical Monographs, Vol. XXXIX. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. Pp. ix, 193. $4.50.

Professor Page suggests a foreign traveler who, supplied with a number of guide books and propaganda pamphlets, heads for some strange territory in order to acquaint his fellow countrymen with it. He does not know the languages of the local population and wanders in a strange country without being able to understand the inscriptions on the road signs. His guide books and records turn out to be written by equally ignorant travelers, or by adventurers who, with a better knowledge of the area, have good reason to cover up their infamous deeds there and to blame the local population for what they have done to it.

In his preface Page announces that his is the first attempt to examine in detail the sequence of events leading to the independence of the Baltic countries. He has not been the first one to do this nor, obviously, will he be the last. His 167 pages of text do not indicate a closely detailed approach to the very complicated problems he deals with. Pretending to be the first scholarly expert on Baltic problems, Page says: "I estimated correctly (sic!) that a knowledge of German, Russian, French, and English would be adequate for my purpose" (p. vi). He actually considers it a great advantage not to have a direct acquaintance with the Baltic area, not to understand the Baltic languages and not to be able to read the Baltic historical literature and study the local sources!

Page says: "Whatever my biases, I was not at the outset inclined toward any group, party, or country, nor was I attempting to prove any side right or wrong, good or evil" (p. vii). Apparently, later on, he decided to depart from this scholarly approach. He admits that the Baltic peoples have been inextricably involved in the Russian Revolution, the civil war, and the intervention, and that "an ignorance of Baltic national affairs in this period precludes a full understanding of many aspects of those three years that shook the world" (p. viii). He does not, however, attempt to study Baltic national affairs, and he relies heavily on the faulty or biased records left by various foreign wanderers or adventurers in the Baltic area during those years.

The author does make some attempt to acquaint his readers with the intricate history of the Baltic in a disproportionately long introduction (26 pages out of 193). Ten pages are devoted to Lithuanian history from the thirteenth century to 1914; sixteen pages cover Latvian and Estonian history from 1721 to 1914. The reader remains ignorant about the Baltic nations as such, their original culture, their early independent life, the role of the Baltic Confederation in the Middle Ages and of the Duchy of Courland later on. The introduction only reveals Professor Page's fragmentary and superficial knowledge of the Baltic area despite the fact that he is the first American author who has tried to spell correctly the Baltic names of places and persons.

In this study Page actually covers seven, not three years of Baltic history. He finishes his study rather abruptly in mid-1920, without informing the readers of what happened to the Baltic States and how they developed their independence. Studiously ignoring Baltic sources, giving full credence to the most dubious German militarist, Bolshevik and Nazi sources, he jumps rapidly from one subject to another without adequate transitions or explanations. In some places his treatment of events is excellent, especially where he deals with the German occupational policy. Sometimes he goes into unnecessary detail, but most often he is deplorably superficial. The treatment of the Bolshevik phase is not adequate. The Allied policy is treated only sketchily, while in regard to the Baltic national policy the reader catches only a few glimmers.

Page admits that no great power had as its political aim the establishment of the Baltic States (p. 183). At the same time he says: "It is manifestly absurd to conclude that the achievement of their liberation is explained solely by the courage and the heroism of their people." Page fails to notice that the Baltic nations needed extreme courage and determination to fight for their independence in the most perilous times and in the most desperate circumstances. The activities of some expert Baltic diplomats and courageous, well-trained officers are hardly mentioned in Page's book. He deals mostly with freebooters, commissars and some well-meaning but ignorant Western diplomatic and military observers.

The number of errors in Page's book is so great that only a few can be mentioned. There were nine Latvian Rifle Regiments instead of some mysterious battalion of Associated Latvian Rifles in 1917 (p. 65). In the elections of November 1917 the Bolsheviks captured 72% of the votes only in the two Latvian districts still under Bolshevik occupation. Seventeen districts did not participate in the elections and therefore Page should not conclude that all Latvia had turned Bolshevik (p. 67). The independence of Latvia was not proclaimed twice—in 1917 and in 1918 (p. 68), but only on November 18, 1918. The Latvian Democratic Bloc did not include 30% Bolshevik representatives. There was not even one Bolshevik present. After the country was liberated from both the Bolsheviks and the Germans, the Bolsheviks never could win in free elections more than seven percent of the total votes. Page talks about a serious pro-Bolshevik "revolution" of the Latvian soldiers in December 1918 and the "thunder" of British naval guns on December 27 suppressing this revolution (p. 121). Only one anti-German company of soldiers mutinied, and there were just three salvoes on December 30. The British warships were not chased by the Bolsheviks out of Riga in 1919 (p. 123) but left peacefully on January 1, 1919, some time before the Bolsheviks moved in. Page says that the British Baltic Fleet was unwilling to intervene decisively on the side of the Baltic nations (p. 147). The British and French naval records and Admiral Cowan's memoirs prove the opposite. The badly outnumbered and ill-supplied Latvian troops, with only two old guns to face Bermondt's splendidly equipped forces in October 1919, could not be described as "excellently equipped" (p. 165). The British-French naval forces could not possibly chase Bermondt's forces to Jelgava (p. 165), fifty miles across dry land. The job was done by the Latvian troops, hastily recalled from the Eastern Front where they were fighting the Bolsheviks. Vilna was founded by Lithuanians, who can not be described as Slavs (p. 171); etc.

Page has worked hard, read a lot, and been careful about his footnotes; but he suffers from a general lack of knowledge about the area he has chosen and from his indiscriminate use of inadequate and even antiquated sources. He was unaware of a great number of scholarly publications pertaining to his subject and made available by Baltic scholars, and did not even use some modern Western, especially British, sources. Page also argues that the past has shown the impossibility of the strategically situated small Baltic States remaining independent alongside a powerful neighbor (p. 184); he considers the independent Baltic States a historical anomaly. He would be more careful in his statements if he knew more about Baltic history. Historians better acquainted with the Baltic area would not describe the efforts of the highly cultured Baltic nations to maintain an independent political and cultural life as "feeble"; as does Stanley Page (p. 184).

San Jose State College EDGAR ANDERSON

ILVESSALO, JAAKKO, *Suomi ja Weimarin Saksa.* Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1959. Pp. x, 179, and appended map.

Studies in Finnish foreign relations have generally emphasized the dramatic events of 1917-1919 and 1939-1944. This fine study ("Finland and Weimar Germany") by a younger Finnish scholar is a welcome and valuable exception to this rule. Finnish relations with Weimar Germany were relatively friendly and never characterized by crisis. There were, nevertheless, serious differences between Finnish and German foreign policy goals. German-Soviet cooperation in the 1920s was viewed by most Finns (even those with a past reputation of being ardently pro-German) as contrary to the Finnish national interest. No attempt was made, or even seriously proposed, to use the opportunity (which, on the basis of evidence presented by Ilvessalo was, immediately after Rapallo, real) to exploit the German ties with the Soviet Union in order to improve Finnish-Soviet relations. Ilvessalo, along with Finnish policy-makers in the first decade of independence, views the "basic problem" (p. 116) of Finnish foreign policy as the strengthening of the Finnish position against the danger from the Soviet Union. Such strengthing, by gaining the support of third powers, was undoubtedly important; but one may ask whether improvement of Finnish-Soviet relations was not equally important, especially since, in 1939-1940, when the chips were down, Finland stood alone.

Instead of asking what could be done to improve relations with the Soviet

Union, Finns were content to argue for or against Rudolf Holsti's view that Finnish foreign policy should be based on cooperation with the three small Baltic States and Poland. As Stinnes and Brockdorff-Rantzau, among other Germans, recognized, however, the chances for continued Finnish independence were greater than for most of the other border states. The accuracy of this judgment is clear today, when Finland alone of these border states is not only independent but free. Finns of all political persuasions (except those who possibly do not favor continued independence) can therefore be grateful that Holsti's Warsaw Pact orientation was rejected by the Finnish Parliament in 1922. The irony of this rejection lay in its motivations. The National Coalition (Conservative) and Swedish People's parties voted against the Warsaw Pact because they saw in it an anti-German as well as an anti-Soviet combination. In view of Holsti's pronounced Germanophobia, and the clearly-expressed opposition of the German Government and press (the *Germania* stated that Finland entered the camp of Germany's enemies upon signing the pact), this interpretation was quite accurate. Finnish Social Democrats also voted against the pact, not only because it was unneutral, but because it was aimed at least partially against the new Germany, in which Social Democrats had such a prominent role. Only the Agrarians and Progressives (Holsti's party) supported the pact. After it was defeated, the Cabinet resigned. It was Holsti's fate to return to the position of Foreign Minister fourteen years later, when he attempted, energetically but belatedly, to improve Finnish-Soviet relations. Despite the lack of realism shown by his enthusiasm for the Warsaw Pact, the picture emerges of a Holsti far superior as a diplomat to any of his Finnish contemporaries—especially Hjalmar Procopé.

Several errors and omissions deserve comment. Ilvessalo states (p. 155) that in 1926 the Social Democratic bloc became the largest in the Finnish Parliament. Other than the fact that there was no parliamentary election in that year, this bloc had been the largest since 1907. It is impossible to accept the statement (p. 154) that the extraparliamentary Lapua Movement was not concerned with foreign policy. German-Finnish economic relations are not analyzed. Most regrettably, Finnish attitudes—far from unanimous—towards the decline and fall of the Weimar Republic are not even mentioned. It may well be, as Ilvessalo argues (p. 150), that during the 1920s the Finnish extreme right wing did not, as its opponents claimed, support an alliance with Germany. It should, however, be noted that this attitude changed with the rise to power of National Socialism. After 1933 the Finnish extreme right wing could again embrace Germany—as it did before 1918.

Brown University MARVIN RINTALA

SHANDRUK, LT. GENERAL PAVLO, *Arms of Valor*, with an introduction by Roman Smal-Stocki; translated by Roman Oleśnick. New York: Speller, 1959. Pp. xxxiv, 320. $6.00.

Arms of Valor is General Pavlo Shandruk's military and political autobiography. It consists of thirty-three brief chapters which proceed from "The Eve and the First Days of the Russian Revolution" to the years following the Second World War. Although the author devotes a few chapters to his life and military service in Poland in the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties, he concentrates heavily on two segments of time: the period of the Russian Revolution and the resulting struggle in the Ukraine, and that of the Second World War. In addition to General Shandruk's narrative, the volume includes a lengthy introduction by Professor Smal-Stocki, an appendix containing some cryptic excerpts from correspondence, an index, many illustrations, and two misplaced military maps.

Arms of Valor makes no major contribution to knowledge. The author restricts himself to a narrow, if often detailed, account of his own experiences, and these experiences possess very limited historical significance. Thus, he spent the years immediately following 1917 largely as a line officer fighting in the ranks of the Ukrainian army. In the Second World War he did rise, to be sure, to command the Ukrainian military forces and to deal with the German Foreign Office. But all this happened in the very last months and even days of the War and lacked substance and weight. Still, the book has something to offer. The early part may be of a certain interest to military historians dealing with the confusing period issuing from the Russian Revolution. The late chapters present another glimpse of the fantastic final weeks of the Third Reich, and contain several striking vignettes, such as General Shandruk's meeting with General Vlasov (pp. 219-222). And, of course, those studying the important subject of the Ukrainian national movement should profit from the abundant information concerning the ranks, appointments, and assignments of many Ukrainians, meticulously listed by the author. General Shandruk appears to know his military affairs; and he impresses the reader as a well-meaning and sincere person.

Unfortunately several defects mar the book. It is poorly written, incompetently translated, and miserably published. In fact, it contains considerably more mistakes and misprints than than any other volume I have read in the last few years. The punctuation has to be seen to be believed. The story, frequently detailed, difficult and technical—as well as completely lacking in literary grace—often becomes nonsense in translation. For example, we read on p. 116: "Moreover, detachments of the UHA and individual Galicians joined our troops, so that by April its ranks had grown to 6,000 men, including over 1,000 horses." Other sentences fail to carry even that much meaning.

More intrinsic importance attaches to the author's point of view. It is that of extreme Ukrainian nationalism, simple and unquestioning. Therefore General Shandruk, for instance, generally fails to differentiate among imperial, Provisional, and Soviet governments; and he constantly accuses the democratic West of failing to live up to Woodrow Wilson's principles and support the Ukrainian cause, while at the same time making an agreement with Hitler and noting that the flower of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia joined the Nazi SS. Division *Galicia*. Throughout the book, Ukrainian nationalism is assumed rather than analyzed, no effort being made to explain such facts as the willingness of the Ukrainian peasants to fight against General Denikin's White army. World history, too, acquires a strange coloring:

> "The world has suffered much harm because of the Russophile tendencies and political shortsightedness of such political leaders, or rather dictators, as Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and to some extent Winston Churchill. We should always keep in mind that they were the undertakers of the Ukrainian freedom cause and actual creators of the power of Bolshevism" (p. 84).

All in all, *Arms of Valor* is a disappointing book.

University of California, Berkeley NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

FISHER, HAROLD H., ed., *American Research on Russia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959. Pp. xiv, 240. $5.00.

Since the end of World War II American research on Russia has mushroomed in output. Scholars in the social sciences and humanities with research interests in Russia are finding the task of keeping abreast of new publications increasingly formidable, to say nothing of keeping informed of research activities in allied fields. The tendency to rely on book reviews and notes in a few professional journals for bibliographical information grows, while one's knowledge of research in allied fields sadly diminishes.

The Joint Committee on Slavic Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council have recognized the problem and have sought to alleviate it by sponsoring the publication of a book of essays that examine recent research on Russia by American scholars in a variety of fields. The result is a volume entitled *American Research on Russia* that should command the attention of all who are interested in the Russian studies area. Each essay is by a specialist in his field and the emphasis is on research done since 1945 by American scholars outside the government. The eleven fields surveyed—history, geography, political science, economics, social relations, philosophy and religion, literature, linguistics, music, fine arts and science—do not claim to represent all the fields in which research on Russia has been or is being conducted. There are obvious gaps—anthropology, psychology, medicine—to mention a few, but reasonable explanation are offered for the exclusion of certain fields, while others are dealt with in part under the larger headings cited above.

In a collaborative work of this nature variations in approach to subject matter and depth of treatment are to be expected, and the present volume is no exception. Some of the contributors have examined their fields by topics, others by major works. Some have furnished lengthy lists of book titles with little critical comment, others have presented modest-length bibliographies with critical comments of the works cited. There is a notable emphasis in some of the essays on journal articles as opposed to books, and in others a somewhat heavy reference to European publications on Russia that contribute little to the discussion. One questions the propriety of giving any space in a short essay to the content of unpublished master's and doctoral theses (pp. 158, 167, 168), particularly when such information comes from the authors of the theses.

In some of the essays the authors reflect the uncertainties that persist in defining the boundaries of their fields and manifest a rather parochial view of the responsibilities of their disciplines in area research. John Armstrong, for example, professes difficulty in measuring the progress of research in political science because his discipline is still "hard to define." He furnishes, nevertheless, a first-rate critique of research in political science. Gregory Grossman, who finds few works in economics worthy of full admiration, notes the reluctance of many economists to work on research problems that preclude a statistical approach, thus ruling out the re-examination of economic problems of prerevolutionary Russia that have hopefully awaited probing by modern economists. He explains that the historical approach often overflows into political and social realms from which the economist withdraws, and infers that the economist, with a few exceptions, prefers to leave economic history before 1917 "to his gracious but somewhat undisciplined colleague, the historian." Grossman, has written, nonetheless, one of the best and most provocative essays in the series.

Aside from these possible defects, the book has been well conceived and well executed. It unlaboriously fulfills the expectations of its title. While not an exhaustive work, it depicts with clarity and imagination the scope and trends of recent research on Russia. The pattern of scholarship that unfolds is an imposing one. Much excellent work has been done, more remains undone. Abundant opportunities exist in all fields of Russian research; in some the territory is virtually unclaimed.

The American Council of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council and the Indiana University Press are to be congratulated for supporting the publication of this volume. They have given scholars a comprehensive view of their activities and accomplishments and indicated research opportunities in a wide number of fields that should attract many more recruits to the Russian area during the next decade. They have provided the non-specialist concerned with bibliographical matters with a reliable evaluation of recent scholarly publications on Russia that should serve him well.

University of California, Davis C. Bickford O'Brien

STUDIA HISTORICA w 35-lecie pracy naukowej Henryka Łowmiańskiego (*Studia Historica* to honor 35 years of scientific activity of Henry Łowmiański.) Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1958. Pp. 438.

The high standard of Polish historical scholarship, and especially that of the works of Polish medievalists, is since long well known. Despite all the hardships and suffering during the last two decades, those of the Polish historians who survived the era of terror and misery continued to produce most valuable works and—which is truly extraordinary—succeeded in educating and guiding a young generation of serious and independent-minded scholars. To be sure, there are still various taboos in existence in Poland which must be respected by the historians, yet it cannot be denied that great efforts have been made to find the way back to objectivity. The book under review is an illustration of the trends prevailing since 1956.

The essays in the volume are written to honor Professor Łowmiański, a recognized authority on the early history of Lithuania and author of numerous works on Polish history. All of the essays are of high value and constitute a broadening of historical horizons. Limitation of space permits consideration of only a few of them.

The volume opens with a bibliography of Łowmiański's works published up to 1957. It was completed by L. Zytkowicz and J. Ochmański. The next article, by Prof. T. Manteuffel, is devoted to the analysis of the meaning of World History. The sceptical and relativistic attitude of the author, questioning the possibility of a historical presentation acceptable to readers throughout the world, is not sufficiently outlined to convince historians familiar with the current discussion of this subject, recently elucidated by Prof. Barraclough. The eminent prehistorian, K. Jazdzewski, made a moderately iconoclastic attack on the highly controversial problem of the origins of the Russian state, basing his study on archaeological evidence. In opposition to the established theory which rejects any foreign influences in shaping the early Slavic states, Jazdzewski is ready to admit that the state of Antes, considered to be a continuation of the so-called "Chernyakov Culture," was moulded, to a certain degree, by Gothic influences. The author stresses, at the same time, that he is not a "Normanist." Another distinguished Polish historian, Prof. A. Gieysztor, presents a well-balanced, impartial and erudite analysis of the role not only of national but also of foreign elements in influencing the old Russian culture—a problem which requires special attention in view of the sharp nationalistic bias of contemporary Russian historians. R. Kiersnowski discusses the problem of the so-called "Russian" coins minted by the Polish ruler Bolesław the Brave, bearing his name in the Cyrillic alphabet. The author is a noted expert in numismatics as well as in the history of money in medieval Poland. He reaches the correct conclusion that the coins in question were minted following the occupation by Bolesław of the region of Czerwień and Przemyśl (Red Russia) and that Bolesław was guided not only by purely economic considerations but largely by his policy of expansion and political integration.

Among the most interesting contributions is the article by Prof. Tymieniecki on the Slavic "smerds" (or "smards" or "smurds"), i.e. on a category of peasants often mentioned under that name in Russia sources (and, therefore, thoroughly discussed by the Russian historians), sometimes also appearing as "smurds" in sources pertaining to the Slavs who lived along the river Elbe and, in isolated cases, found in Polish medieval documents. The name "smerd" does not appear, however, in Czech sources. Nobody is better equipped to attack this most difficult problem than the distinguished author. Yet to this reviewer it seems that, in spite of every effort and great skill, Prof. Tymieniecki does not solve satisfactorily the riddle of the "smerds" in the Western Slavic territories. Whatever his ingenious arguments, the role of the "smerds" in early Western Slavic agrarian history still remains a puzzle; and by no means can the "smerds" be considered as an institution peculiar to all Slavic medieval societies. It should be added that Prof. Tymieniecki contributed to the subject of the "smerds" in a later special study, *Smardowie Polscy* (Polish Smards), Poznań, 1959, wherein the specific Polish aspect is investigated.

Prof. G. Labuda, in his essay "The Towns Located Under the Polish Law," points out, and rightly, that this type of towns did exist in Poland prior to the spread of the so-called "German Law" during the era of "colonization." It is significant that recently—as the author observes—some of the German scholars, especially W. Schlesinger (*Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. 183, p. 532) came to the same conclusion.

The essay by St. Zajączkowski deals with the actual state of historical research concerning Polish-Lithuanian relations under the Jagiellons. The author gives a lucid and informative review of the most important works on this subject and emphasizes correctly that Polish pre-war scholars (Lewicki, Halecki, Kolankowski and others) had collected and thoroughly analyzed a tremendous amount of source materials which may be used as a firm and solid basis for the investigation of the problem of the Polish-Lithuanian Union.

The study by Prof. J. Bardach on indivisible property under the provisions of the three consecutive Lithuanian statutes, i.e. Codes of Laws (1529-1588), deserves special attention. On the whole, the author follows the approach to the problem of communal ownership of land as developed by scholars like Mauer, Engels and Kowalewski or Kadlec, and Balzer, as well as by many Russian and Jugoslav historians and sociologists. As is known, the "zadruga" and various other types of undivided property are considered by these scholars and their followers to be relics of the communal ownership of land. This theory, since the epoch-making investigations by Fustel de Coulanges, Seebohm and Dopsch, is under scrutiny even in Germany, the motherland of the concept of "Markgenossenschaft." Prof. Bardach stresses that the institution of indivisibility was wide-spread in Lithuania, particularly among the upper classes. One of the problems, discussed by the author on a basis of vast Polish and foreign literature, deserves special attention, namely whether Lithuanian indivisible landed property was a *condominium* (an assumption widely accepted by many scholars) or an older form described as *propriété à mains unies*. Bardach's answer is that at the beginning of the sixteenth century both forms co-existed in Lithuania. It seems that Prof. Bardach, in his treatment of the character of "indivisibility" in Lithuania, failed to consult the fundamental works by Berger, Gaudemet and others, where the question of the community of goods among co-heirs and its historical development and transformations in Western Europe are thoroughly investigated. Bardach's study, in spite of its great merits, does not provide a satisfactory solution of the problems he has attacked. To the reviewer, this could be achieved only if the starting point of Bardach's investigation and his basic methodological approach were revised.

The essay of Prof. T. Lewicki contains a most valuable historiographical review of Polish works devoted to the study of Arabic and Hebrew sources related to the medieval history of Eastern Europe.

Many other authors have contributed to the *Mélanges Łowmiański.* These papers are quite varied in character. While the majority discuss topics of importance for the study of prehistory or early medieval history, others are devoted to the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. All of these contributions are marked by a high standard of scholarship.

Columbia University MATTHEW M. FRYDE

MERAY, TIBOR, *Thirteen Days That Shook The Kremlin.* Translated by Howard L. Katzander. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. Pp. vi, 290. $5.00.

This book occupies a special position in the vast literature on the Hungarian Revolution. Because of the author's personal background, his narrative contributes a special flavor to the discussion of familiar events although he adds little new factual material to the known chronology of the Hungarian Revolution. Meray belonged to the group of communist intellectuals in Hungary who, reaching the zenith of their career as Stalinists, became disillusioned, accepted Imre Nagy's leadership and believed that the "new course" would be the fulfillment of their communist dreams. He joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1946 and began to write violent, anti-American articles shortly thereafter for the *Szabad Nép,* whose foreign editor he became. In 1951 he was elected first secretary to the Writers' Union. *Szabad Nép*'s Korean correspondent in 1951-1952, he received a Kossuth Prize for his infamous *Korean Testimony* in 1953. During Imre Nagy's first premiership he underwent a metamorphosis, traveled in several Western European countries and became a follower of Imre Nagy. Censored by the Central Committee in connection with the anti-Rákosi's downfall in July 1956, he emerged from oblivion after Rákosi's downfall in July 1956. Subsequently the Central Committee annulled its disciplinary resolution against him and he was elected a member of the Writers' Union in September 1956.

Meray's intellectual and emotional commitment to a version of national communism during the period covered in his book—from July 1953 to the execution of Imre Nagy—acted as blinkers which made it difficult for him to understand, let alone explain, a paramount fact underlying the Hungarian Revolution, namely, the totally alien nature of communism to Hungarians. Since communism was imposed on Hungary by the occupying Soviet army and maintained by police terror, to the Hungarian people all forms of communism are distinctly Russian. This important clue to the "Thirteen Days" is missing from Meray's story because he apparently believed that a "liberal" form of national communism would be acceptable to the Hungarian people. This type of thinking underlay Moscow's repeated errors with respect to the Hungarian question. When the masters of the Kremlin realized the failure of Rákosi's communism in Hungary, they sought a more popular man and eventually replaced Rákosi with Nagy. Subsequently, Nagy openly confessed the overall failure of communist policies and outlined a "new course." This reversal of communist policies under his premiership became more far-reaching in Hungary than the changes that have taken place in any other captive country. Although Nagy lost to Rákosi and was ousted from the Communist Party in April 1955, he was reinstated as prime minister to stem the revolutionary threat during the crisis of October 1956. When Nagy tried to obtain popular support for a moderate communist regime, it became clear that his personal popularity in the country did not involve an approval of communism. The Communist Party disintegrated in a few days and the overwhelming majority of Hungarians, primarily workers and students, turned violently against any brand of communism. Thus the Hungarian people forced a course of action on Nagy which the Kremlin was unwilling to tolerate, and Nagy's cause was doomed. Soviet treachery and Nagy's execution made clear to the world the tragedy inherent in the situation.

Meray is a skillful writer. He has given a forceful and personalized account of the Hungarian Revolution, and his compassionate summing up makes interesting reading. However, a measure of *poetica licentia* characterizes his chapters, and it is doubtful whether the book is an objective and reliable source. Meray's involvement in the course of events discussed in his book and his allegiance to various shades of communism makes it difficult for him to approach his subject with an attitude of detachment. Because of his background he had little knowledge of noncommunist politicians and movements, and consequently did not properly evaluate them. Moreover, some of his generalizations are vague and several of his statements lack sufficient factual support. He quotes a number of intimate conversations in which he did not participate. The presentation of such conversations as direct quotations makes the reading more interesting, but the verbal accuracy of most of these dialogues is doubtful.

University of Notre Dame STEPHEN KERTESZ

POUNDS, NORMAN J. G., *The Upper Silesian Industrial Region.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958. Pp. 242. $4.00.

The difficulty of obtaining facts and untainted evidence concerning economico-geographical developments in certain countries, coupled with linguistic inadequacies in the training of researchers, has worked adversely against the production of significant geographic research-in-depth in foreign areas. Because of this lack of linguistic tools, as well as due to restrictive visas and often unsympathetic hosts abroad, perhaps half the inhabited world remains generally beyond the critical purview of geographers in this country. In view of these difficulties, the work done by a few geographers cooperating with research centers, and their contributions to Slavic, East European, and Asiatic area-studies attain added significance. One such work is Norman J. G. Pound's monograph, *The Upper Silesian Industrial Region*, which has appeared as Volume XI of the Slavic and East European Series issuing from Indiana University since 1956. Professor Pounds is familiar to geographers for a number of European studies.[1]

The postwar Polish administration of the Upper Silesian region by means of planning programs and commissions (such as that which administers the industrialized *Górnośląski Okręg Przemysłowy*) has been intent on healing the dismemberment of productive units through the creation of a horizontally integrated area to enhance Silesia's high manufacturing potential. This contemporary phase of exploitation of a densely inhabited area provides Poland with the balance between agriculture and industry which the country's economy requires. Upper Silesia appeared prominently in the European economy in the mid-eighteenth century, when Frederick's conquest of the region resulted in the implantation of an administrative system involving a number of *ad hoc* regional *Amte* to oversee and promote mining operations. This system, with developments promoted by utilitarian interests of landed estates, brought to an impoverished rural area its most determined orientation toward industry and manufacturing based on the coal and resources of the regional complex east of the Odra river.

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[1] For example: *An Historical and Political Geography of Europe* (London, 1947); "The Origin of the Idea of Natural Frontiers in France," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 41 (1951), 146-157; *The Ruhr: A Study in Historical and Economic Geography* (Bloomington, Indian, 1952); *Coal and Steel in Western Europe* (London, 1957) (with W. N. Parker); "Historical Geography of the Iron and Steel Industry of France," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 47 (1957) no. 1, 3-14; Nowa Huta," *Geography,* XLIII (1958), 54-56; "The Spread of Mining in the Coal Basin of Upper Silesia and Northern Moravia," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 48 (1958), no. 2, 149-163.

In a monograph which correlates Polish, German, and French documentation and research, Professor Pounds pursues a regional study of Upper Silesian industry from the 1750s to the middle of the decade just past. The development of Silesian resources and the participation of Silesia in the economic theater of northwestern and eastern Europe is blocked arbitrarily into the period from the epochal events at Jena and Tilsit to the First World War. The period saw Silesian coal mining placed on competitive levels with Ruhr production,[2] the rise and fall of lead and zinc mining and processing in Zabrze, Bytom, Katowice, etc., and the organic growth of iron-and-steel production from modernized Königshütte to our own century, when pivotal technological changes were introduced.

The dislocations brought about by the last two World Wars, and the changed geopolitical orientations since 1945, have had direct repercussions on the status of the Silesian compage. The pressing need for an administration correlating the industrial and mining functions of Upper Silesia toward sustained production was submerged after 1918 in a flurry of territorial claims and Partitions. The unrealistic assumption was for long entertained that the dismembered units of the Silesian complex might yet be made to function upon an integrated basis.

The contemporary phase of Silesian geography, the so-called "East European Revolution," and Poland's unified administration of the area receives a somewhat inadequate treatment. One would have welcomed, together with Professor Pounds' excellent description and evaluation of production in Silesia, an analysis of the labor-structure within the G.O.P., of aspects of transportation and movement of raw and finished materials, water resources, and the status of canalization linking the Odra, Vistula, and the Danube. The erection of a "social and economic framework within which the coal, iron, steel and zinc industries may flourish" is stated to be the intent of planning authorities. What that structure is, in substance, or what the main lines of implementation are, are not discussed. The so-called "social geography" (cities, populations, workers, agriculture, food production, etc.) is too sketchy, perhaps by intent. Finally, the Conclusion does not conclude in relation to the whole study, but describes the present landscape of slag and mine-waste hills, subsidence areas, "negative forms" due to extractive mining operations, which pose locational problems.

It is recognized that editorial tasks are never simple. Attention must be called, however, to a number of typographical errors in the text as well as illustrative material, discrepancies between Table of Contents and chapter headings, cartographic work marred by misspellings, ambiguous captions, legends, and symbols. These do not of course detract from the value of the study, which gives the student of Eastern European affairs an analytical account of the historical geography of Upper Silesia and its present economic orientations.

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[2] The Upper Silesian-Moravian coal field is comparable to the Ruhr, but differs from it in the lack of anthracite and canal transport and relatively lesser industrialization. (Pounds, "The Spread of Mining in the Coal Basin of Upper Silesia and Northern Moravia," *op. cit.*, p. 163.

University of Colorado **Pablo Guzmán-Rivas**

Chalupa, V., *The Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State.* New York, Leiden: H. E. Stenfert, 1959 (Publication of the Czechoslovak Foreign Inst. in Exile). Pp. 294. Guilders 15.00.

There is a natural division of this book into two parts: I, The Dynamics of Totalitarianism. and II, The Case of Czechoslovakia. The first part presents a master scheme of a Communist conspiracy for seizure of power in a democratic state. The Party strategy, directed from the Center in Moscow, prescribes that the Communists pose as crusading patriots among unsuspecting citizens of a democratic state and champion the formation of a national front in order to involve and pentrate mass organizations. This strategy was to work in any country; it was to exploit existing conditions in Eastern Europe after the expulsion of the Germans, since it was not too difficult to find support for demands such as the nationalization of property, creating suspicion and insecurity and conducting purges against real as well as imaginary enemies of the state. This seemingly never-ending process was coupled with building a totalitarian movement for Party control of power as well as monopolization of mass communications and such vital fields as education, information, internal security and foreign affairs. This process was to be accelerated on the one hand by intimidation and blackmail of opponents and on the other by showering material rewards on those who obligingly accepted the emerging new order.

Presumably what happened in Czechoslovakia, taken as a case study, can happen to any democratic country. Yet Czechoslovakia was subjected to this transformation only as a result of a reality created by the Big Three in World War Two, notably that "international politics placed Czechoslovakia in the Soviet sphere." In vain did the democratic elements in Czechoslovakia hope for a "shift in world balance of power that would outweigh the local Communist position of power." In vain did these devoted adherents of the democratic way of life look forward to the May 1948 election. Instead the Communists perpetrated a coup d'état in February 1948, which was indeed what they had been preparing for from the very first days of the postwar era. Czechoslovakia, as the pattern emerged, became a dictatorship, an "antithesis of a legal state." Moscow's "guidance" was so overwhelming that intimidation was extended even to Cabinet ministers and to the President himself. President Beneš was held virtually a prisoner and was prevented from addressing the people during the crisis of February 1948.

Conspiracy against the Republic of Czechoslovakia was directed by Moscow in a manner which ignored the home-grown Party leaders. Soviet agents, for instance, did not inform the Czechoslovak Party leaders that they had imprisoned Dr. Vlado Clementis, though the Czechoslovak Communist leaders were reported to have suspected for days that Clementis had defected to the West and to be searching frantically for him.

The critical reader may at times question the sources used as a basis for this volume; yet one can hardly find a more unemotional and convincing exposé of Communist conspiracy than is *The Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State.*

It presents effectively theories and realities of Communism at work full of tense drama and potentially far-reaching consequences for unsuspecting nations.
University of Pittsburgh V. E. Andic

Pospieszalski, Karol Marian, *Sprawa 58,000 "Volksdeutschów"* (The case of 58,000 "Volksdeutsche"). Poznań; Instytut Zachodni, 1959. Pp. 220.

Many will no doubt remember an infamous product of the Nazi propaganda mill entitled *Polish Atrocities against Germans in Poland.* Published shortly after the disastrous September Campaign, the book purported to prove, especially by the use of innumerable nauseating photographs, that the Poles had brutally murdered over five thousand Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) residing in Poland. The book was rejected by most individuals in the outside world, other than Nazi sympathizers, as a Goebbels' fabrication and was soon forgotten.

One is somewhat surprised, therefore, to find that the Western Institute in Poznań has published a volume, largely documentary in content, to refute the German charges and to reveal the nature of German espionage and diversionist activities in Poland. The explanation lies in the fact that during the war the figure of *Volksdeutsche* losses was increased to 58,000, and even in recent years some West German writers have continued to cite figures equally fantastic. Only one West German scholar, Fritz Hesse, calculates the number to be less than 5,000 and admits that the deaths were due to the diversionist activities of the Germans.

The best evidence of the greatly exaggerated character of the German statistics are German records. Discovered immediately after the war, they were the files of the so-called "Central Office of Graves" in Poznań. This office compiled a card index of all the *Volksdeutsche,* military and civilian, who were killed or missing in Poland. The index lists the names not of 58,000 *Volksdeutsche* but just over 5,000. Although this figure corresponds closely to the one cited originally in *Polish Atrocities against Germans in Poland,* Pospieszalski points out that the majority of the *Volksdeutesche* lost their lives as a result of German bombardment, machine gunning, and other military action. Not more than 2,000, Pospieszalski concludes, were victims of Polish reprisals against those Germans who were engaged in espionage and diversionary activities behind the Polish lines.

The volume under consideration is the seventh in a series entitled *Documenta Occupationis.* Poles who lived under the German occupation will never forget their frightful experience. The museum at Oświęcim (Auschwitz), numerous bronze plaques in every Polish city marking the spots where Poles were executed by Germans, and the printed word as in the *Documenta Occupationis* will continue to remind present and future generations of one of the darkest periods in Polish history.
Ohio State University Charles Morley

Höpker Wolfgang, *Die Ostee — ein rotes Binnenmeer?* (Beiheft 8, *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*). Frankfurt a. M.: Mittler & Sohn, 1958. Pp. 94. DM 6.30.

The Baltic Sea and the fundamental political and economic issues connected with the surrounding Baltic powers have been consistently neglected in English and American scholarship as well as in the diplomatic arena. Only recently can we note an increasing realization of the importance, both historically and in our own time, of the Baltic area; and it is a merit of Höpker that he contributes information for an assessment of the Baltic Question as it presents itself to us now.

It may be doubted that in our age of atomic weapons and long-range missiles the strategic aspects on which Höpker concentrates his attention are of more than secondary importance. Yet, his analysis of the role which the Baltic might play, either in a local or in a world conflict, may well be useful.

Höpker examines the strategic position of each of the surrounding countries individually; he reminds us of the dangers which, after World War II, ignorance and shortsightedness have, by upsetting the existing favorable and historically evolved balance in the Baltic area, brought upon the West in general and upon Central Europe and the Scandinavion countries in particular — a grave danger, indeed, inasmuch as the North of Europe has moved from a side issue into the center of strategic planning; and he examines the distribution of the naval strength of Soviet Russia and her satellites in relation to the NATO and uncommitted Sweden. He points out the economic importance of the Kiel Canal (through which far more ships sail than through the Panama and Suez Canals put together, even though the total tonnage does not equal that going through the Panama Canal), and he comments at length on the attempts of Soviet diplomacy to turn the Baltic, in practice, from a *mare liberum* into a *mare clausum,* which would guarantee Soviet predominance.

It has been said that the French and Indian War was won on the battlefields of Europe; it may well be assumed that the Baltic issues and the freedom of the many millions whose fate is linked with the local Baltic scene will likewise be decided elsewhere in the world; but it must also be considered that the Baltic issues constitute in themselves an active force in today's situation and that watchful observance, as prompted by Höpker's study, is much to be recommended.

University of Delaware WALTER KIRCHNER

SCHEIDER, THEODOR, ed., *The Expulsion of the German Population from the Territories East of the Oder-Neisse Line. A selection and translation from Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa Band I, 1 und I, 2.* Editorial Committee: A. Diestelkamp, R. Laun, P. Rassow, H. Rothfels. Transl. Vivian Stranders. Published by the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, Bonn. (n. d.)

This is an abridged English version of the two-volume German original. The introductory analysis has been translated in full but only a selection of the documents. For scholarly purposes, as the editors recommend, the German edition should be used.

The book was prepared and published on the initiative of the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims and copies of it were distributed by German consulates. This suggests that one of its objectives is to win friends and influence people. On the other hand, the quality of the editorial committee and the serious scholarly character of the introduction and notes lift it out of the familiar class of atrocity propaganda. The editors recognized the difficulty of collecting reliable facts and of subduing their natural emotions. They state that they insisted on and obtained complete freedom from the Federal Government in carrying out their task. There is no reason to doubt their good faith. In the introduction and in the notes there is frequent reference to the nature of the Nazi provocation (e.g., p. 95), and in the documents chosen for translation the tales of horror include examples of individual and group attempts to mitigate the hardships and sufferings of the victims.

In sifting and checking the documents the editors worked out methods of criticism for dealing with the problems of "mass documentation," methods that are described in the Foreword of the German edition but omitted from the English. They emphasize that "the 'best' documents selected for publication are not necessarily those most vivid in color and individual shading, and certainly not those indulging in generalities or most abundant in tales of horror."

The introduction and the documents cover more than is suggested by the title page. The former begins with an account of the migrations of population which took place in the Reich from 1939 to the end of the fighting, then follows with an account of effects of the flight before the Red Army and of the deportation of Germans to the Soviet Union. The German title is more indicative of the scope of the volume.

University of Minnesota LAWRENCE D. STEEFEL

GUINS, GEORGE C., *Communism on the Decline.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp. ix, 287. $7.50.

Its title notwithstanding, this book is concerned not with the prospects of Communism, but with the relationship of Soviet propaganda claims to Soviet realities. It contains eighteen chapters which sketch briefly Soviet theory on such diverse subjects as industry, agriculture, trade, social classes, art, and foreign policy, and then contrasts theory with practice. The analysis of the practice is based largely on evidence provided by Soviet sources, especially daily newspapers.

Methodologically, such an approach to the Soviet Union suffers from two inherent weaknesses. In the first place, the image which the Communist regime creates cannot be taken at face value any more than any other official image, for it reflects wishes, not realities. Claims such as those that Soviet Russia has established a classless society or that it is committed, by the very nature of its economic system, to a peaceful foreign policy, surely do not deserve serious scholarly attention, except perhaps from a student of social psychology and propaganda techniques. To take these claims as a starting point of one's investigation and then to disprove them (which can be easily done) seems not only futile, but misleading. In the second place, it is by no means certain that Soviet printed sources reflect accurately Soviet reality even when they say things uncomplimentary to the regime. Criticism and its twin, self-criticism, are in the Communist system built-in correctives, whose function it is artificially to take the place of public spirit and social control that, in free societies, are naturally exercised by the voter. One of its aims is to keep in line the enormous body of civil servants. The "exposure" of an inefficient saleswoman in Kursk, or of an arrogant Party secretary in Turkestan, is a means of informing every saleswoman and every local Party secretary in the country that the eyes of the Government are upon him. The charges themselves may or may not be true. But considering the function of criticism in the Communist system it is dangerous to take them at face value. It is doubly dangerous when one confronts the self-criticisms with the ideal image created by the regime's propagandists. By so doing, one merely confronts two Communist-created images, neither of which is directly related to life.

In his conclusion, the author points out how great is the danger which the Soviet Union presents to the Western world, and urges constant vigilance. It is a strange conclusion to a book which promises to show the decline of Communism.

Harvard University RICHARD PIPES

Canadian Slavonic Papers IV. Papers presented to W. J. Rose on his Seventy-sixth Birthday. Toronto: University of Toronto Press with University of British Columbia, 1959. Pp. 217.

Professor Rose's long and inspiring career in Slavic Studies finds in this stately volume of studies by friends, colleagues, and former pupils, a fitting tribute. The contributions quite appropriately range widely over the whole Slavic field, but lean toward Professor Rose's first love, Poland and her life and literature. The first item in the book is a bibliography of the writings of Mr. Rose – consisting of 320 items, books, articles, translations, pamphlets, prefaces, published over a period of 56 years. Two articles published in 1921 and 1922 were missed. It would be difficult to find anywhere a more impressive sum of work, scholarly, publicistic, literary and inspirational. Mr. Rose's early immersion in the Western Slavic scene as he went from Oxford to Prague before the first World War, and thence to Poland, where, living through the war on Polish soil, he came to love and respect the Polish people and dedicate himself to the Polish cause, has given him an advantage over all other Slavists of this last and the present generation. It is the intimate sympathy and even identification with Poland that has set him apart from all other workers in this field, and endeared him not only to Poles everywhere, but to the rest of us who also have come to admire and love the heart of Poland.

In the paper "Bunyan in Poland" Wiktor Weintraub describes an interesting instance of Poland's cultural connection with the English world. *The Pilgrim's Progress* was translated into Polish in 1778 from a French version of 1722. In a paper on "The Structure of Russian Surnames" James St. Clair-Sobell and Irina-Carlsen, strove, on a basis of a compilation of 5,000 Russian items to ascertain if there was any discernable principle of stress in surname derivatives. L. I. Strakhovsky returns to an earlier interest in his "The Silver Age of Russian Poetry: Symbolism and Amceism." A few of the very felicitous translations in verse are his own. In some of Mr. Strakhovsky's renditions I sense the mood, to say nothing of the meter of the Goliardic Anonymous. But that is good company to get caught in. H. Gordon Skilling subjects the February 1948 Prague coup to close examination based on the latest documentation from the Czech communists and memoirs published by former officials now in the emigration. He comes to the realistic conclusion that the non-Communist forces failed to act, trusting, quite unjustifiably, in parliamentary means – on the naïve assumption that the enemy would restrict himself to these gentle and established devices. J. G. Rudnyckyj studies "The Slavic Suffix – EP / A /", and concludes that it is more significant as a formant in the several Slavic languages than has hitherto been thought. Peter Brock, following up some of his earlier researches, writes on "Socialism and Nationalism in Poland, 1840-1846," showing that, contrary to Marx's assertion, the Polish left-wing nationalists who brought on the revolt in 1816 was not Communist. V. J. Kaye surveys the rise and growth of the Slovak migration to Canada, which began as an overflow from migration to the United States and now amounts to about 50,000, the largest number, over 23,000 of which are in Ontario. Veronica M. Du Feu traces English Sport Terms in Polish, a pursuit which she properly calls fascinating and exasperating in view of the perversions that have taken place in the meaning of loan words – a change usually true of other languages. Among the other papers in this collection is a study of "Joseph Conrad: A Centenary Review" by H. E. Sawyer, which considers Conrad as a cosmopolitan writer rather than a Pole, and Stanley Z. Pech's "A Marxist Interpretation of the Hussite Movement." A whole corps, it seems, of Czech scholars has been concerned with reworking the crucial history of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Hussite movement is being presented as a manifestation of social revolutionary forces. Out of this new approach there has come some very interesting work. Economic history has its contribution to make, and previously, in all truth, not enough has been done in this area. But it is already clear, and has been pointed out by Czech scholars, that this line of research soon reaches the limit of its relevance. Only at the cost of disregarding a tremendous mass of evidence can a Marxist presentation pretend to be the explanation of a movement such as Hussitism.

This is a *Sbornik* worthy of its presentee. Niech żyje sto lat.

University of Colorado S. Harrison Thomson

SHORTER NOTICES

Miskolczy, Julius, *Ungarn in der Habsburger-Monarchie.* (Wiener Historische Studien, Bd. 8). Vienna/Munich: Verlag Herold, 1959. Pp. 210. AS 128.

Habsburg-Hungarian relations from 1790 to the First World War is the subjecte treated here by Professor Miskolczy of the University of Vienna.

Hungary's struggle to maintain its national existence in the face of persistent Austrian interference forms the main theme of the book. Miskolczy draws a well-coordinated picture of the intellectual, social, economic, and political problems which prevented genuine Austro-Hungarian cooperation for any length of time. Such difficulties as the question of separate Hungarian regiments, officers, and language of command are presented not as isolated problems, but as constant obstacles to successful Austro-Hungarian relations. The story of Hungarian political nationalism, beginning with the rebellion of the nobility in 1790, is told with particular emphasis on the development of Hungarian constitutional thought. Stressing the economic causes of Hungarian dissatisfaction with Austrian rule, the author discusses tariff and currency policies in some detail.

With one notable exception, this book offers as sound a treatment of the subject as one could hope to find. Miskolczy is admittedly looking for areas in which the Habsburg-Magyar relationship went awry, but his final judgments are, by and large, well-balanced ones. He is quick to point out the better features of Austrian government (e.g., the Bach-Schwarzenberg regime merits some recognition for its reorganization of Hungarian schools) as well as the less desirable ones. He wholeheartedly condemns the Hungarian shortsightedness which manifested itself in thes selfishness of the Hungarian nobility and in the lack of Hungarian appreciation of Austrian problems.

His only questionable conclusions concern the *Ausgleich* of 1867. His opinion that the formation of the Dual Monarchy was an arrangement preferable to federalization is left unsupported. Despite the fundamental lack of sympathy and understanding which he sees between nationalistic Hungary and patriarchal-dynastic Austria, Miskolczy views the split of the two states as an unfortunate turn of events. At the end of his study, he claims that if the *Ausgleich* had not contained the weakening economic clauses and had been directed by stronger men, it could have been an effective institution of government.

Professor Miskolczy's work merits the attention of all scholars working in the Habsburg or East European fields. Much of his material has been drawn from Hungarian sources not readily available to the Western historian and from unpublished manuscripts.

University of Pennsylvania Paula Sutter Fichtner

Gugushvili, P. V., *Razvitie Promyshlennosti v Gruzii i Zakavkaze* Vol. I. *v XIX-XX VV,* Tbilisi: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk Gruzinskoj SSR, 1957. Pp. 343. 21 Rub.

The economic history of Georgia, originally published in Georgian and now translated into Russian, is presented in three chapters: first, there are 130 pages dealing with the history of handicraft in Georgia, starting with the earliest records from the sixth and seventh centuries A. D. The second chapter covers, in 85 pages, the development of home industry in the years 1801-1920. Finally, the third part describes the growth of manufacture since the first half of the nineteenth century up to the beginning of World War I. Each chapter is introduced by a quoted reflection upon Marx and Lenin's ideas. Accordingly, the author seeks to show how the development of manufacture has increased the dependency of producers upon businessmen-organizers. The early organization-community of craftsmen, the *amkar*, was similar to the peasant *obshchina* (p. 76). The inflow of foreign capital and its close cooperation with Czarist authorities later promoted the development of industry. The author discusses particular industrial branches, attaching some descriptive statistics about the volume of production.

For us this study provides further evidence that governmental initiative had been the most important factor in bringing about the industrialization of Czarist Russia, as pointed out, e.g., by Reinhard Bendix in his *Work and Authority in Industry*.

University of Kentucky JIRI KOLAJA

HELMREICH, ERNST CHRISTIAN, *Religious Education in German Schools, A Historical Approach*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, Pp. 365. $7.50

Professor Helmreich's book reveals an impressive command of his subject. Few experts, even in Germany, will equal his knowledge of religious education in that country. The eight pages of bibliography bear witness to the thoroughness of his efforts.

The book is actually a history of religious education in German schools. The first three chapters deal briefly with the background up to 1871. Though the development in the thousand years preceding 1871 actually set the stage for what followed, these early chapters are necessarily brief. The three periods since then, 1871-1918, 1918-1933, 1933-1945 are examined with great care and attention to detail. There is a moving chapter dealing with the darkest page of this story, the Jewish education in the Third Reich, the preparatory restrictions, 1933-35, the increased isolation, 1935-38 and the final liquidation, 1938-45. Without any effort at propaganda the facts, objectively presented, speak for themselves.

One major omission in this otherwise complete study is the failure to mention the influence of the voluntary parent organizations upon the development of educational policy, especially in the *Weimar Republik*. It is somewhat misleading to describe the pattern of religious education in Germany merely as the result of the desires of princes and parties. Groups like the *Evangelische Elternbund* (Dr. Hinderer) and the more fundamentalistic *Kirche und Haus* (Dr. Winkler) spoke for the ordinary citizens and influenced the development considerably.

It is perhaps of some interest to note that in Germany, in spite of all efforts from the *Left* and the *Right* to hamper religious education, the overwhelming majority of the people wanted and still want religious education for their children. In 1956/57 94% of the children in West Berlin were enrolled in religious classes. That these figures were much lower in the Soviet zone of Germany is apparently the direct result of oppressive governmental policies and not of any rejection of religious education on the part of parents or children.

Chicago Lutheran Theological Seminary, Maywood, Illinois GEORGE W. FORELL

STALŠANS, K. *Latviešu un lientuviešu austrumi apgabalu likteni* (Destiny of the Latvian and Lithuanian Eastern Provinces). Chicago: Škirmants, 1958. Pp. 456. $5.

It is well known that there are many more histories of political and administrative entities, e.g. states, provinces, etc., than there are of geographical regions or peoples bound together by the same or cognate language.

Stalšans' work belongs to the latter type. It cuts across state boundaries and attempts to show how the Old Prussians, Yatvingians, Galindians, Latvians and Lithuanians who linguistically belong to the so-called Baltic group, have fared under the rule of other nations, especially under Slavs and during the Second World War under Germans in the eastern provinces of present-day Latvia and Lithuania.

This rather new approach to a problem of Eastern European history shows that there is much similarity in the struggle for survival of nationalities in this region. It also shows that both Latvians and Lithuanians—the other Baltic nations having become extinct—have had a hard time preserving their language and with it their nationality, since every foreign intruder was eager to pass off in official statistics the native inhabitants of the region in question as his own, i.e. as Russians, Poles, White Russians or as the case may be. It is clear, therefore, that an interpretation of the censuses taken during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the various governments is the main concern of the author.

The data thus gained are supplemented by those to be found in various other sources (for the most part printed ones) and by the author's own experiences.

Quite often attention is drawn to place names (e.g. p. 318) or to personal names (e.g. p. 346) as being indicative of the region's or the name-bearer's nationality. It seems, though, that the author, not being a linguist, has not always been able to interpret them correctly or to recognize their value especially for those periods for which there are no official statistics available.

Although the book has some short-comings, e.g. the author in some cases gives no references at all or cites a whole book, where page-reference is required (see e.g. note 9, p. 36 or n. 15, p. 39), the attached maps do not always show the places referred to (e.g. p. 171), etc., it cannot be doubted that Stalšans' work will serve as a sound basis for further research on the questions raised in his book.

New Haven, Connecticut B. Jegers

Drożdżynski, Alexander and Jan Zaborowski, *Oberländer, A Study in German East Policies,* Poznan: Wydawnictwo Zachodnie, 1960. Pp. 325. Illus.

Dr. Theodor Oberländer was removed as head of the West German ministry of Refugee Affairs in the fall of 1959. He had been following a policy of extreme and open irridentism for some time. As a member of the Christian-Democratic Union, Chancellor Adenauer's party, he seemed to be speaking for the government when he declared that the removal of the Germans from east of the Oder-Neisse line cancelled out all German "crimes" of the Hitler period. As his speeches became more anti-Polish and sounded more Nazi, attention began to be directed to his past, and in Germany the opposition challenged Adenauer's repeated assertion that there were no Nazis in his government.

The present book, heavily documented with many facsimiles of records of Oberländer's past, refutes definitively any possible disavowal of his extreme Nazi record, with particular attention, scientific and journalistic, to *Ost Europa* and *Ostforschung.* Decorated for collaboration with the Sudeten movement, active in the Frank *Generalgovernment* in 1940, then back in Prague, in November of 1941 a high ranking officer in Poland, responsible for execution of scores of Polish professors and their families, then back to Prague as a professor of economics at the university, since 1945, active in politics and political "science" in Bavaria and the Federal Republic. The documents, from German archives in Berlin and the K. H. Frank files in Prague, seem to make it clear this is the case of a callous and blood-stained opportunist. It is a wonder he reached so high in the post-war German bureaucracy, or is it?

S. H. Thomson

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